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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to evaluate the implementation
experience of Nigeria's new capital city, Abuja. The study
involves a retrospective assessment of the problems associ-
ated with the ideas as originally conceived, problems
encountered in its construction, and problems that seem to
emerge in the new capital's future development. We examine
particular outcomes of the capital planning enterprise with
special attention to those where there is a difference
between the goals and the final result, and we look for
explanations.
We evaluate the new capital enterprise by assessing
critically the activities, operations, and performance of
the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), the agency
charged with executing the new capital policy. We contend
that simple exercise of rational organizational structure or
arrangement for project implementation as such, does not
necessarily guarantee the desired goals and objectives.
Successful outcomes, however rapidly they are desired, would
seem to come about essentially through appropriate responses
to demands posed by the project's social, political,
economic, financial, and institutional characteristics.
From the results of our analysis, the conclusions are
that in spite of considerable strides made in urban facil-
ities development, the FCDA largely failed to meet its
construction targets. The agency's processes of urban land
and housing allocation, and the beneficiary distribution of
these resources and facilities tended to be biased in favor
of the upper-middle and high-income segment of the urban
population.
The FCDA's performances were generally inhibited by
four major factors some of which were beyond the agency's
sphere of control. These were: (i) political intervention
and the problems it created for the agency in terms of its
ability to control its operations; (ii) inadequate funding;
(iii) problems arising from management skills and competence
or administrative efficiency as well as the integrity of the
personnel; (iv) fast pace of construction. Although each of
3the four problems listed above contributed to inhibiting the
performance of the FCDA, it would seem that the problem of
political intervention and control was pivotal in determin-
ing the degree of effectiveness.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr.' Ralph Gakenheimer
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Civil Engineering
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The construction of new towns, for whatever reasons or
purposes, involves long-term and complex processes. To
translate the plan for a new town into built space, there is
a need to marshall the necessary political, financial,
natural, technical and managerial resources, and to organize
a carefully orchestrated program of sequential, coordinated
phases. The complexity of this process and the time pressure
that often arises from the need for quick and fruitful
results require definition of the critical activities, the
time period necessary for accomplishment, and the appropriate
sequences and lead times. Og1her significantly important
problems that could be encountered in the process range from
the mechanics of administration, financing, and development,
to the problems of political conflicts and intriguing
normative issues. Should such towns be built? How? What
kinds of cities are desirable? How would the cost be borne?
what kind of organizational structure can best guide their
development? What should be their role and scope? How are
policy and political conflicts resolved? How feasible is
this goal of comprehensive planning of functions, growth, and
efficiency? These and still other difficult questions face
those who are bold enough to engage in new town planning and
development.(1)
In this thesis, we evaluate the implementation
experience of Nigeria's new capital city, Abuja, in an effort
to present the problems encountered during its construction,
their causes, and consequences on the overall project
construction. It is not a comprehensive history of new town
development in Nigeria. Instead, it can be described as a
case study of an important planning experience. It is a
retrospective evaluation of the problems associated with the
ideas as originally conceived, problems encountered in its
implementation experience, and problems that seem to emerge
in its future development.
In the thesis, we also examine particular outcomes of
the capital planning enterprise with particular attention to
those where there is a difference between the plan and the
final result, and we look for explanations. These
explanations come from pressures on implementation through
environmental forces, economic change, financing mechanisms,
and bureaucratic characteristics that were brought to bear on
the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), a public
agency empowered to execute the new capital project.
The problems of executing the new capital project are
therefore studied by evaluating critically the operations
and activities of this agency. It is argued that simple
exercise of a rational organizational structure and
(1) Lloyd Rodwin, The British New Towns Policy: Problems and
Implications. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1956.
arrangement for project implementation as such, does not
necessarily bring about the desired goals and objectives.
Appropriate and successful outcomes, however rapidly they are
desired, would seem to come about essentially by adequate
understanding and appropriate responses to the demands of the
project's social, political, economic, financial, and
institutional characteristics. Thus, a successful project
would require an adequate and appropriate response to
questions about the project in terms of: What problems are
the planner or the government trying to solve? Are the
problems properly defined? Is the project or program being
designed to solve the problems the appropriate one? What are
the distributional impacts (implications) on the various
groups in the society? Do all or most of the groups affected
share the project's goals? Who gains and who loses?
In conjunction with these, there are other questions
that would also need to be addressed: Is the time allotted
for the project's completion sufficient? Is there an
adequate organizational capacity (skill, autonomy, manpower,
management ability, etc.) to execute the project? How is the
project to be financed? Through public funds, private funds,
or both? Are the sources of funds reliable? All these
questions and perhaps many more would have to be addressed in
order for the desired outcomes of project implementation to
be realized.
The problems or "failures" of the new capital project
(Abuja Project) hinged on the inability of the project's
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proponents (planners, government, and bureaucrats) to
recognize and consider adequately, or respond to, most of
these questions. Thus, the new capital's failures or
problems can be traced through the pressures brought to bear
on the execution agency through political forces, economic
change, financial and organizational characteristics.
In spite of the FCDA's sweeping powers, its activities
and operations were critically affected by the political and
institutional conflict brought to bear on it by the nature of
the country's multifarious and often contentious ethnic
groups. The influence of ethnic conflicts is significant in
the new capital's siting and the appointment of senior FCDA
officers, as well as in the process of allocation of urban
land and housing resources.
The evidence of political influence is also demonstrated
by the short time span (eight years and later reduced to four
by the politicians) (1) demanded by both the military leaders
and the politicians for completing the project without
effectively linking this time span with the available
financial and organizational resources. The commencement of
construction even before the Master Plan was drafted is a
reflection of pressures brought to bear on construction as a
result of this short time frame.
(1) The new capital construction was initially scheduled for
completion in 1986 by the Murtala Muhammed administration.
This time frame was however changed by the civilian
government that was elected into office in 1979. This
government, led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari, moved the completion
date to 1982.
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The influence of political forces is further reflected
by the FCDA's ineffective role in steering the course of the
new capital's construction in terms of decisions involving
labour needs, infrastructure development, and land-use
policies. The Agency's operations were also inhibited by
ineffective linkage between the project's financial
requirements and available funding sources, which were, in
turn, nearly or entirely dependent on a weak federal revenue.
The Agency's financial position was further worsened by its
inability to exploit and manage effectively the project's
internal revenue sources. Evidence of mismanagement is seen
in the allocation and distribution of urban land resources,
and inability to collect rents, pay contractors, and give
approvals to applications for plots, contracts, etc., on
time, and corruption.
The FCDA's poor attainments in the provision of urban
housing, community facilities, utilities, and infrastructure,
and in the overall allocation and distribution of urban
resources, are an outcome of the interaction of these
political, financial, and organizational forces.
1.1 Purpose and Objectives of the Study
Using Nigeria's new capital city as a case study, the
purpose of this thesis is to study the problems of
implementation in developing countries. This study is,
however, not aimed at developing an implementation theory.
Rather, it is a study of an important planning experience.
It is believed that a case study of this one country's
experience provides a more concrete basis for an in-depth
analysis than a more general study would, to evaluate the
problems of new urban construction in developing countries.
The findings of one particular agency will also be
relevant in varying degrees to all other agencies. The FCDA
is the first of such agencies set up to carry out the
construction of a new urban development from scratch.
Therefore, the experiences of this young agency could provide
some valid generalizations and inferences upon which the
performance of its future public role vis-a-vis new agencies
could be predicated.
Finally, it has been rightly said that the reason that a
question is good for inquiry is because it has consequences;
and that a good research ought to have the potential for
changing somebody's or an institution's behavior.(l) It is
hoped that this case study will play some part in providing
knowledge not only about the substance of Nigeria's new
capital construction problems, but also provide information
to help solve them.
This evaluation of Nigeria's new capital project
involves an analysis of an evolving process--planning and
implementation. As such, the objectives of the study are:
(1) A. Fleisher, "Seminar Discussions," October 1974. Cited
in D.C. Okpala, The Potentials and Perils of Public Urban
Land Ownership and Management, PhD Thesis, MIT, 1977, p. 10.
1. To examine critically the factors that led to the
relocation of the capital. This objective is important in
order to understand the problems relocation was designed
to solve and the goals it was expected to achieve. Our
analysis of these factors will reveal that problems of
national development--colonially influenced urban
patterns, unbalanced settlement, ethnic tensions, and poor
conditions of urban life--provided acceptable, but not
sufficient, force for relocation to take place. The
radical changes that occurred during the past eighteen
years in the Nigerian political, economic, and social
environment provided the country with a need, the
financial assets, and an appropriate leader to initiate a
new capital project.
2. To evaluate critically the project's formulation or
planning process. This objective enables us to understand
how and why certain policy choices were made and not
others; for example, why the new city was sited where it
is, why and how particular infrastructure and housing
policies were pursued, and who made those choices and
their consequences on the overall project construction.
It also enables us to assess the FCDA's effectiveness in
controlling the planning decisions. Our discussion in the
thesis will reveal that, due to a near-excessive control
by the Federal Military Government, the FCDA, in spite of
its sweeping powers, was unable to exert much influence
over these choices or decisions.
3. To evaluate critically the project's funding mechanisms.
This involves the assessment of the project's funding
sources, in terms of their ability to provide adequate
resources for the project's construction. The extent to
which the FCDA managed effectively the project's internal
sources of revenue is also examined.
4. To evaluate critically the FCDA's organizational
structure, as well as its strengths and weaknesses on
overall project execution. Essentially, the capacity of
this agency to execute the project is assessed in light of
government interventions, financial problems, and
organizational instability, and corruption
5. To examine critically the FCDA's performance in urban
development in light of the construction targets and goals
set for the project. This is done by way of analyzing the
first phase of the new capital construction, (commonly
referred to in this thesis as Phase One,) which was
targeted for completion in order to facilitate movement to
the city in 1986.
The FCDA's performance is defined by the level of
the agency's attainments in urban development in terms of
construction and allocation of urban resources. While the
assessment of the financial, organizational, and
environmental elements, and the planning process, relies
mainly upon documented evidence and library materials and
interviews, the performance evaluation is carried out
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using two criteria adopted (but modified by this writer)
from the literature, on the methods for evaluating
organizational effectiveness on urban resource allocation.
(1)
Using the first of the two criteria--The Target
Achievement Criterion, we simply compare the FCDA's
attainments with particular targets the Agency has set for
itself for achieving the 1986 movement deadline. Using
this criterion, we itemize the construction targets for
housing and other urban facilities, amenities, and
utilities required to achieve movement to the city in
1986, and compare them with the level of the FCDA's
attainments.
With the second criterion--The Distributional
Effectiveness Criterion--we take the FCDA's attainments in
urban development and evaluate them in terms of their
distributional implications on accessibility among
socio-economic groups. Although the issue of equitable
distribution of resources among socio-economic groups is
not clearly spelled out as one of the objectives being
pursued by the FCDA, we are of the opinion that an
equitable distribution of the urban resources among
socio-economic groups is equally important for the
achievement of peace and tranquility which are vital for
national unity.
(1) A similar method is used in Anthony Downs: "Evaluating
the Allocations to Urban Development," in L. Rodwin (Ed.),
Planning Urban Growth and Regional Development: The
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Because of the difficulties of acquiring the
relevant data, and because of the "indivisibility" nature
of some urban facilities, and the fact that many of such
facilities are still under construction, it is not
feasible to evaluate in detail the distributional
implications of all the urban resources among
socio-economic groups. Hence, the application of the
Distributional Effectiveness Criterion is limited to the
assessment of urban land and housing resources.
Obviously, the restriction of our assessment to
these two resources, may not provide generalizations upon
which to draw conclusions about the FCDA's effectiveness
in the allocation and distribution of urban resources.
Furthermore, the FCDA is not necessarily concerned only
with the construction and allocation of facilities. The
agency is also involved in other procedural and
administrative functions, which this thesis could not
effectively cover. However, some aspects of these
administrative and procedural functions are covered during
the analysis of the financial and organizational
mechanisms and the planning activities.
6. This thesis concludes by offering thoughts and new
directions for improving the FCDA's effectiveness in
overall project implementation.
Experience of the Guayana Program in Venezuela, MIT Press,
1969.
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This study is based upon documentary research,
interviews, and field work. I spent three months at Abuja,
from August to November of 1984. While there, I collected
basic documents, interviewed FCDA officials and others, and
made many trips to the considerable number of urban
settlements (the development areas) of the federal territory
in an effort to verify the present status of these
development areas. The visit took me, also, to a number of
sites where construction was still in progress, and others
where work had not yet started although was scheduled to have
been started or completed before my visit.
In addition to interviewing FCDA officials in Nigeria, I
also had the opportunity to interview some members of the
planning team--the International Planning Associates--who
produced the Master Plan. With the interview of this team,
the working relationships that existed between them and the
Nigerian officials during the development of this Master Plan
were recorded.
A study of this nature is prone to certain difficulties
that can be transformed into weaknesses. First, very limited
financial resources restricted the length of my stay at Abuja
and perhaps the scope of this study as well. Nevertheless,
this limitation does not in any discernible way compromise
the quality and proficiency expected of this study. The
limited financial resources, in short, made me aware of how
efficiently and effectively I needed to use my time, what
resources to look for, and how to go about obtaining them.
Secondly, the Abuja project is an ongoing project, so,
while this thesis is being written, many developments are
taking place at the site. Also, because it is still ongoing,
already-compiled and neatly-assembled data are hard to come
by. Thus, the researcher was faced with having to dig
through raw data, and at times was forced to do his analysis
physically at the site to observe what was going on. As
challenging and exciting as on-site research may be, the
process can render one's analysis more descriptive than
perhaps desired.
Thirdly, Abuja is a highly sensitive project. Opponents
of the project have capitalized on some of the mistakes in
its execution to voice their protests. Many of the country's
economic problems have been blamed on the project. Because
of this, information, especially of the type that could make
the project "look bad," is highly classified and difficult to
obtain.
1.2 Background to Abuja: Arguments for the New Capital
Project
The creation of a new capital has always been
accompanied by much controversy. Even after so many years
and the realization of the plans, there is yet to be formed a
consensus on the absolute necessity for such new capitals as
Brasilia and others.
On February 4, 1976, the Federal Government of Nigeria
announced a plan for moving the federal capital from Lagos to
a new city to be built in the central part of the country.
Figure 1.1 shows the location of the new federal capital
territory within Nigeria. In this section, in order to
understand the goals of the new capital project, we outline
and discuss arguments for this decision. Understanding of
the goals and aspirations is important for analyzing their
implications on the construction process in terms of the
strategies or policies designed to achieve these goals. For
example, the need to build an 'ideal' capital city, which in
the eyes of most Nigerians signifies modernism, must have
affected the adoption of the high housing construction and
plot development standards, and may also have led to the
construction of facilities with 'sophisticated' technological
attributes. By the same token, the emphasis on building a
primarily administrative capital left the impression on the
decision makers that mainly government workers would inhabit
the city. Thus, most of the FCDA's efforts to provide
housing were geared toward this group of the population. The
large number of the city's residents which constituted
non-government workers, especially the poor among them, were
largely left on their own to provide housing for themselves.
Argument for Abuja
The proponents of Abuja based their arguments on many
factors. To some, Abuja symbolizes Nigeria's coming of age,
her initiation into mature nationhood, and a break from her
colonial past into a future of pioneering growth in the
Figure 1.1 Location of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) within Nigeria
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interior and in the realm of urban development. The capital
symbolizes the optimistic mood of developments and is to be
at the center of her multiferous and often contentious ethnic
conglomerates.
The goal and expectation of the new capital is perhaps
summed up by this memorandum of Dr. Okoro, a medical
practitioner, to the Panel on Location of the Federal
Capital:
...This new federal capital in its central location on
de facto and de jure FEDERAL (not State) TERRITORY will
constitute the heart of the nation in the heartland of
the country. It will be every Nigerian's Mecca,
inspiration, and pride. It will be a place where our
diverse peoples can be blended into one people. It
will be our symbol of unity. It will be our cultural,
scientific and political show-piece.(l)
To Abuja's detractors, the city is a monumental
urbanistic and social disaster, a venture into wasteful
consumption on a national scale in the midst of hunger,
poverty, slums, disease, corruption, and despair.
One way to understand why and how Abuja was constructed
is to examine the public pronouncements of its promoters.
While undoubtedly some of these arguments do not rise above
propaganda of a rather trivial kind, others at least imply a
more profound kind of social analysis.
(1) Dr. A.N. Okoro, Memorandum to the Panel on Location of
the Federal Capital, 1975, p. 5.
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The first motive was the conviction that the transfer of
the capital was a means toward achieving long-sought national
unity. This unity motive was given a strong push by the
country's 1979 Draft Constitution, which called for a new
federal capital to achieve a number of goals"
recognition of the diversity of the people, the
promotion of national integration, the formation of
national associations that cut across ethnic,
linguistic, or other sectorial barriers, and the
fostering of a feeling of belonging, and of Nigerian
Peoplehood.(1)
As Gandonu (1975) further wrote:
A new federal capital should aim at providing
opportunity for all Nigerians to meet each other on
equal footing without prejudice as to places of origin
of individuals in the federation. It should be
accessible to all ... and should be in every sense, a
national symbol of pride to the Nigerians and a uniting
factor in Nigeria's effort to leap from divisive
ethnocentricity to national consciousness.(2)
The relation among the more than 250 ethnic groups in
the country has been a strategic problem. One of a few of
the latest and tragic manifestations of this problem was the
civil war which was fought between 1967 and 1970. A new
capital city, planned on an ethnically central location, was
therefore seen as a panacea for this ethnic discord.
(1) Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 Draft Constitution
(2) Dr. A. Gandonu, "A Proper Federal Capital for Nigeria,"
text of a lecture at the Nigerian Centre, London, under the
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Another motive was the conviction that the transfer of
the capital was a means toward fulfilling Nigeria's
'continental destiny.' Thus, Gandonu wrote:
Whatever else Abuja may become or represent, it is
important to recall that Abuja was conceived by its
originators as one of the vital provisions towards
political, socio-economic, and infrastructural
restructuring of Nigeria in preparation for her new
aspirant role as a decolonized and viable nation state
in contemporary world politics.(l)
Large in area, Nigeria is nevertheless, in terms of
urban population concentrations, a coastal country, most of
her large urban centers being concentrated within a
few-hundred miles of the Atlantic coast. Some supporters of
Abuja advocated a northward location in order to counter this
tendency of which Abuja was to be the center,
from which development should spread rapidly from the
new federal capital in widening eddies to the farthest
corners of the country rather than sluggishly in a
circus movement around the lagoon.(2)
In accord with this idea, various important highways have
been proposed, or are under construction, to link Abuja with
auspices of the Nigerian High Commission, April 29, 1975, p.
11.
(1) Dr. A. Gandonu, "Nigeria's Abuja. The Building of a New
National Capital." Paper delivered at Harvard Africa
Seminar, Harvard University, Cambridge, May 12, 1983, p. 2.
(2) Dr. A.N. Okoro, Memorandum to Panel on Federal Capital,
1975.
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the major urban centers of the rest of the country. These
major highways include: (a) the North artery, which connects
the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) with Kaduna, Kano,
Sokoto, Katsina, and Minna; (b) the Southern artery, which
connects the FCT with Akure, Benin City, and Warri, as well
as with Owerri and Port Harcourt; (c) the East and Southeast
artery, which connects the FCT with Jos, Bauchi, Maiduguri,
and Yola, as well as with Makurdi, Enugu, Owerri, Port
Harcourt, and Calabar; and (d) the Western artery, which
connects the FCT with Ilorin, Abeokuta, Ibadan, and Lagos.(1)
But it was not merely the desire to achieve national
unity and to open up the interior that the proponents of
Abuja used to advance their proposal. There was also the
idea of fleeing from the negative characteristics of the old
capital, Lagos.
Lagos is a city crushed by a series of urban problems,
some seemingly insoluble. Locked between the creeks and
estuaries of the Atlantic Ocean, the city has seen its growth
choked and distorted by the very geographical circumstances
that gave it its magnificent pictorial charm. Instead of a
starlike or a radial growth typical of large cities, Lagos
has grown in space shaped like an amorphous strip
development, increasing the distances, and the amount of
money and effort spent on public works. Between 1973-75
alone, close to N2.6 billion (US $3.6 billion) was spent on
(1) See Regional Development Plan for the Federal Capital
Territory, Vol. 2 (Book 3): The Proposed Regional Plan and
Appendices, p. 1128.
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the construction of fly-overs, bridges, waterworks expansion,
popular housing, and other civil works, but congestion and
housing shortages still remain out of control.(1) Only in
the northern suburbs (the Agege-Lagos transit line) has any
kind of rapid transit system been put into operation, but the
service is crowded, slow, and inefficient. The plan in 1975
to expand transit services in the city by the Lagos State and
Federal Government was quickly overtaken by the proposal to
move the Federal capital. Public utilities (electricity,
water, sewage, telephones) are unable to keep pace with the
city's growth, and combined with the jammed undisciplined
traffic make the daily life of the citizens a constant
struggle. Proponents thus hope to seize the opportunity
offered by the new capital, to find answers to congestion,
energy, and their land-use problems. (2)
If underground railways, monorails, suspended
electrical cabin ways, multi-storied car parks,
helicopters and other futuristic traffic systems will
be required then, calculations for their development
can be made now.(3)
(1) Dr. A. Gandonu "Abuja: Planning the Nation's Capital," in
Development Planning in Nigeria: Planning Experience in a
Developing Economy, Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic
Research, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 1983.
(2) The suggestion to use Abuja to find solutions to traffic
congestion, land use, energy, and recreational problems, was
offered by Professor Madu during a Workshop held at Ibadan,
on "Policy Considerations" for building the new capital city.
Various other Nigerian experts who were present offered
further suggestions along Madu's view. For example,
architect Onafowoka suggested that an underground transport
system be developed in the the new city. See "Workshop on
the Construction of Abuja," Nigerian Institute of Social and
Economic Research (NISER), September 27-29, 1976.
(3) Dr. A.N. Okoro, Memorandum to the Panel on the Location
of the Federal Capital, December 1975, p. 5.
In addition to the traffic problem, squatter settlements
and run-down and overcrowded houses proliferate the city to
the point where they may house more than half the population.
Against this phenomenon some of the proponents suggest that:
FCDA should aim at developing an ideal city by
providing essential services to all its dwellers.
They should avoid building decent houses without access
roads as are found in our towns today.
Others suggest that:
There should be a need for housing regulation in terms
of number of people in a house, an establishment of
shopping centers [in the new capital].(l)
In the face of all these problems, there were many who felt
that whatever the possible solutions to the problems of
Lagos, it would be best to move the national government to a
made-to-order, modern, perhaps even utopian new capital.
Proponents of Abuja also argue that the capital's
location in Lagos distorted the government's view of the
nation. The old capital is very different from the interior.
Many feel that Lagos is far too remote from the everyday life
of the ordinary Nigerians, that its location makes for an
insularity of the decision makers who rarely venture out to
(1) Workshop on "Policy Considerations for the Construction
of Abuja," held under the auspices of the Nigerian Institute
of Social and Economic Research, University of Ibadan,
September 27-29, 1976.
see the rest of the country. Perhaps an Emir(l) sums up this
feeling most when he remarked during a welcoming ceremony for
a federal commissioner that the federal government has the
"traditional habit of seeing Nigeria as not extending beyond
Carter Bridge"(2) (which joins Lagos Island with the rest of
Nigeria).
But the desire to escape from the problems of Lagos had
another aspect. Lagos, which is the largest industrial and
commercial center of the country, is also one of the areas
most politically unsafe for non-Yoruba politicians,
especially during national elections. The premature
celebration of the opening of the new federal capital in
1982, by the Shagari administration before its completion was
seen by critics as a desperate effort to move the national
government just before the upcoming national elections of
1983. Moore (1982) has noted that the hastened effort to
move the capital even before its completion, was a desperate
effort by Shagari to insulate his party from the hostile
Yorubas.(3) The first general election in thirteen years of
military rule was held while the military was still in power,
thus security was not a problem. Now that the military had
gone, the only way to insure a violence-free election was to
move the electoral headquarters vis-a-vis Shagari's party to
(1) 'Emir' is a title given to the traditional leader (ruler)
of a Muslim city in northern Nigeria.
(2) Cited in West Africa, December 13, 1976, p. 1923.
(3) J. Moore, "Planning Abuja: The Politics of New Capital
Construction," B.S. Thesis, Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1982.
Abuja, which happened to be located in the Northern Region.
Equally convincing to some was the universally shared
belief in the inefficiency of the federal bureaucracy in
Lagos. The reputation of the civil servant among most
Nigerians is very low. "Nigerians show a high degree of
inefficiency in their attitude to work and we should try to
find a solution for this."(1) This was an opinion expressed
by Professor Udo at the Workshop organized by the Nigerian
Institute of Social and Economic Research to consider
suggestions from Nigerian experts for developing the new
capital. In other words, Abuja was not a place where
bureaucratic inefficiency characteristic of many Nigerians
should be tolerated. The problems of public administration
seemed to many to be insoluble. The civil service is
protected by a philosophy of 'acquired rights' by which a job
in the federal or state government is considered to be
virtually a piece of private property. A solution seriously
proposed by the Murtala Muhammed military administration to
ensure an efficient implementation of the new capital, was to
create a new bureaucracy, rather than use any of the existing
agencies. In other words, the move in space was seen as a
relatively painless means of effecting a revolution in
mentality and methods. It may be that the inefficiency of
the civil service stems from political clientelism and the
civil service's function as a dole for the middle class.
(1) FCDA Workshop on Policy Considerations, ibid., op. cit.,
Section III, p. 2.
Many believed, however, that the move to Abuja, by itself,
could produce a change in mentality. (As we will see in
Chapter 7, even the new bureaucracy--the FCDA--was not free
from the inefficiency problems which its creation was to
solve.)
It was even argued that the transfer of the capital
would be a weapon against unemployment problems facing the
country.
Even if the cost of building the capital is high, we
can afford it today. Much of what will be spent to
build the capital will be expended in the country and
so will generate secondary revenue and provide jobs
rather than be a total loss, as if the money were
hidden abroad.... While Lagos cannot be harmed
significantly by a relocation, the new public projects
that will accompany relocation would provide enormous
job opportunities that will go some way towards
alleviating our unemployment problems. also, the new
location would provide a new growth point from which
strong generative forces would radiate to surrounding
areas.(1)
Even against the background that in this modern world a
capital city located inland is no less vulnerable than one
near the coast, proponents of Abuja still argue that a
central location would provide an effective defense against
external attack. As Gandonu wrote,
A new federal capital should be accessible to all, attractive
in terms of climatic and physical surroundings, strategically
safe in relative terms from external and internal
(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal
Capital, December 1975, pp. 55-56.
aggression--therefore, easily defended--and from such a -
capital all corners of the nation can be defended or brought
under national control with minimum political,
administrative, or military efforts.(1)
Finally, there was the conviction among much of the middle
class that Nigeria is a country with a magnificent future.
The need to affirm this optimism, combined with a reluctance
to combat the structural obstacles to economic development,
helps to explain the symbolic significance of the
construction of Abuja for a large segment of the lower and
middle class.
Although it is not within the scope of this thesis to
analyze the merits and demerits of these public
pronouncements, goals, and aspirations, it is still important
to highlight some of the implicit assumptions of the
proponents of the new capital project, for it is the
inadequate consideration of these characteristics and their
weaknesses that led to failures or problems of the new
capital construction.
The great mistake of the new capital proponents is the
assumption that funds would not be a problem. There was
little or no conscious effort on the part of project
proponents to consider the long-term impact of the new
capital construction on the available funding sources. Even
the Committee appointed by the military leaders to study the
(1) Dr. A. Gandonu, A Proper Federal Capital for Nigeria,
ibid., op. cit., p. 11.
new capital proposal overlooked this factor. According to
this committee,
The argument that colossal sums of money would be
involved in building up a new capital is attractive but
unconvincing.... First, we must say that we are not
economists, but we can see no justification for the
pessimism displayed in the above quote [referring to
critics' charge against the movement of the capital on
cost grounds].... Even if the cost is high, we can
afford it today. (1)
The other major mistake of the proposal was the
assumption of adequate organizational capacity to execute the
new capital construction. The problem of lack of skilled
labor and bureaucratic inefficiencies in developing countries
has been the focus of the development literature, and
Nigeria is no exception to the problem. The proponents did,
to a certain degree, also touch upon this problems when it
was suggested by one of the new capital supporters that
inefficiencies characteristic of the Nigerian civil service
should be avoided or dealt with at Abuja. The creation of an
entirely new agency, the FCDA, was perhaps a response to this
problem. But any agency, irrespective of whether it is new
or old, could not be expected to function efficiently if it
still lacks the necessary prerequisites (skilled,
experienced, and committed personnel and management ability
and autonomy) to do so. In short, the FCDA exhibited a lack
(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal
Capital, 1975,p. 55.
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of some of these qualities, which, in turn, led to mismanage-
ment practices and misallocation of resources. Furthermore,
as with other public agencies, the influence of governmental
controls and interventions, the pressure to bow to political
forces, and other social problems surrounding its operating
environment, limited the FCDA's capacity to operate efficiently.
With the prescription for a modern or even a utopian
city, the proponents also implicitly assumed that every
Nigerian, irrespective of his or her ethnic background, income,
or class, would be equitably benefited. In other words,
movement in space was seen as coterminous with an egalitarian
development. But evidence from the analysis of the policies
and strategies adopted for project construction shows that
these aspirations represented ideals rather than reality.
The high standard adopted for housing construction and land
development was one of such strategies that aided the dis-
placement of the less privileged class from owning or leasing
plots in the new capital city. These themes and other
problems of the new capital construction will be fully
examined in detail in the body of this thesis.
In Chapter 1, various theoretical perspectives on
project implementation are reviewed. With the review, it is
possible to trace the problems of Nigeria's new capital's
construction, which is the subject of this thesis.
In Chapter 2, the nature and characteristics of Nigeria's
urban and political environment are presented as a setting
and background for understanding the factors that led to
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relocating the country's capital city. The historical
presentation in the chapter facilitates an understanding of
the complexities of the FCDA's operating (external) environment
and the effects they had on the activities of this agency.
We further examine the immediate forces that moved the
new capital question from a matter of political contention
to one of reality in Chapter 3. Essentially, the chapter
traces new capital relocation through the (recent) dramatic
developments in the country involving political changes, the
civil war, and a sudden economic boom, each of which provided
fresh impetus for relocation.
In Chapter 4, we examine the new capital's planning
process, with particular attention given to the feasibility
studies and site selection processes. This is done by
evaluating the activities of the new capital's location
committee appointed by the military leaders in 1976 to study
the question of a new capital city for the country. The
conclusions and some of the problems with this committee's
recommendations, as well as their input on the new capital
construction, are identified and analyzed.
In Chapter 5, an in-depth examination of the new capital
project's planning process is carried out. The working
relationships between the federal government, the planners
hired to develop the master plan, and the FCDA, are particularly
traced and analyzed. The extent of the FCDA's role in this
process, as well as the problems encountered in this relationship
and their impact on overall project construction are discussed.
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In Chapter 6, we assess the FCDA's financial position
with particular attention to its funding sources, the weaknesses
of the sources, and their. impacts on the new capital's
construction.
In Chapter 7, the FCDA's organizational structure is
examined in light of the sweeping powers given to the agency.
The agency's capacity to execute the new capital project is
assessed in light of these sweeping powers. We pay particular
attention to individual problems (governmental intervention,
inadequate manpower, corruption, organizational instability,
etc.) facing the agency in spite of these powers. The
sources and impacts of these problems are also identified
and analyzed.
In Chapter 8, we assess the performance of the FCDA in
urban development and construction. Specifically, the
agency is assessed in terms of its effectiveness in achiev-
ing the construction targets (goals) that the agency set for
itself for meeting the 1986 movement deadline. In addition,
we analyze the distributional aspects of the FCDA's urban
land and housing development. We also assess the impact of
the agency's land and housing activities on the different
income groups.
In Chapter 9, we conclude the thesis by recapitulating
the main points of the thesis, presenting our thoughts on
the subject of policy implementation and making suggestions
for a better and more effective approach to the new capital
project 's implementation.
Chapter 1
PERSPECTIVES ON PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION:
ASSUMPTIONS AND WEAKNESSES
1.1 Defining Implementation
Policy implementation as an area of study and analysis
is in many ways still struggling to achieve a common body of
theory. 1 This struggle lies in part on finding an appro-
priate or acceptable definition for the concept--implemen-
tation. Part of the definitional problem relates to the
question of at what part in a project's development should
the analysis or evaluation of policy implementation begin.
Should such analysis begin before or after a project is
adopted as a public policy, or at the point that project is
adopted as a policy? What constitutes a project's successes
or failures?
(1) See D. J. Palumbo and M. A. Harder (eds.), Implementing
Public Policy, Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Co.,
Lexington, MA, 1981, p. ix.
In "On the Hazards of Selecting Intervention Points:
Time Series Analysis of Mandated Policies," Michael C.
Musheno discusses the problems of determining the initial
implementation point for public policies. The difficulty as
Musheno sees it, stems from the current lack of an
implementation theory that tells us when implementation
actually has occurred. The time taken between policy
adoption and actual program implementation Musheno terms
"implementation lag."(1) One way to begin our review of the
literature on policy implementation is, therefore, to present
a general definition of the subject-using some perspectives
shared by different authors in the field.
Grindle (1980, p. 6) defines implementation as the task
of establishing a link that allows the goals of public
policies to be realized as outcomes of governmental activity.
It involves, therefore, the creation of a "policy delivery
system," in which specific means are designed and pursued in
the expectation of arriving at particular ends.(2) Public
policy implementation--the art of putting policy into effect,
as Barrett and Fudge (1981, p. 4) put it, requires,
therefore, broad statements of goals, objectives, and means
(1) M.C. Musheno, "On the Hazards of Selecting Intervention
Points: Time-Series Analysis of Mandated Policies," in
D. Palumbo and M.A. Harder (Eds.) , Implementing Public
Policy, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington MA,
1981.
(2) D. Van Meter and C. Van Horn, The policy Implementation
Process: A Comceptual Framework, Administration and Society,
6, No. 4, February 1975, p. 446, cited inMerilee Grindle (ed)
Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World,
Princeton, 1980, p. 6.
which must be translated into action programs that aim to
achieve the ends stated in the policy.(1)
It is apparent, then, from Grindle's definition, that a
variety of programs may be developed in response to the same
policy goals. Action programs themselves may be
disaggregated into more specific projects to be administered.
The intent of the action programs and individual projects is
thus, to cause a change in the policy environment, a change
that can be considered an outcome of the program.
The distinction made here between policy and program
implies that policy implementation is a function of program
implementation and is dependent upon its outcome. As a
consequence, the study of the process of policy
implementation almost necessarily involves investigation and
analysis of concrete projects or action programs that have
been designed as a means of achieving broader policy goals.
Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavksy (1974) make a distinction
between project outputs and outcomes in an effort to shed
some light on the problem of measuring implementation or even
of recognizing it. They analyze the distribution of the
outputs or products of school, street, and library
departments and discuss the impacts of these
distributions--their outcomes--on client groups. Outcomes,
as they use the term, should be the concern of project
implementation. Levy et al. (1974, p. 254) suggest that in
(1) M. Grindle, "Politics and Policy Implementation in the
Third World," p. 6.
order to alter outcomes, the stimuli to which bureaucrats
respond must be changed or
they should be socialized through professional
education and other means, to a new awareness of the
effect on citizens of their actions in distribution
outputs. Once we understand -outcomes, there is less
reason to leave them as unintended consequences.(1)
To some degree, Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky's
definition is just as narrow as that of Grindle. Their
emphasis is mainly on the distributional (output and
outcomes) aspects of policy implementation. The definition
does not tell us much about the policy delivery system, that
is, the mechanics by which the policy is transformed into
outcomes, and the circumstances surrounding the adoption of
the policy that may- also have affected the outputs and
outcomes.
Edwards (1980), on the other hand, provides a much
broader definition of policy implementation than either
Grindle or Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky. According to
Edwards:
Policy implementation is the stage of policy making
between the establishment of policy, such as the
passage of a legislative act, the issuing of an
executive order, the handing down of a judicial
decision, or the promulgation of a regulatory rule, and
the consequences of the policy for the people whom it
affects.(2)
(1) Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky (1974), p. 24.
(2) G.C. Edwards, "Implementing Public Policy," Washington
From Edwards' definition, it is, then, apparent that analysis
of project implementation would include an evaluation of
circumstances that led to the adoption of a policy (which
Grindle neglected in her definition), an assessment of the
policy delivery systems (suggested by Grindle), and the
analysis of policy outcomes (suggested by Levy et al.). His
represents closely the process we follow in analyzing the new
capital construction. Not only are we examining the outcome
(e.g., the distributional aspect of urban land resources) of
the new capital construction, we are also examining the
mechanics of the planning process by which the new capital
policy was transformed into outcomes, as well as the
historical factors leading to the relocation of the capital.
The definitions of policy implementation reviewed above
have generally not shown us the factors that are critical to
a project's successes or failures. Mazmanian and Sabatier
(1983, p. ii) suggest three approaches generally followed in
the literature to assess projects' successes. The first is
to gauge the effectiveness of policy implementation against
goals and objectives articulated in the policy. In another
approach, the outcomes of the implementation process are
judged by some external standard, despite the fact that such
standards may not be reflected in the goals of a program as
envisioned by policy makers. In this approach the analyst
brings to bear his or her own normative values of what public
DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980, p. 1, cited in
D.J Palumbo and M.A. Harder, Implementing Public Policy,
Lexington Books, D.C. Heath, Lexington MA, 1981, p. xi.
programs ought to be accomplishing. A good example is the
adoption of the Rawlsian criterion that the justification of
any public program must be that it enhances the position of
the least well-off persons in the society. The third
approach is to view the formulation and enactment documents
of a program not as a benchmark against which to assess the
effectiveness of the implementation effort, but as a starting
point of an unfolding process. From this perspective the
articulation, clarity , and accomplishment of specific goals
is less important than their symbolic import. The
effectiveness of implementation is judged by a number of
critaria pertinent to a particular site as the implementing
agency finds its own way of responding to the generalized
policy mandate of the program.
To a large degree, the three approaches identified above
are adopted in this study. We begin the study of the new
capital's implementation by examining the project in terms of
what the project set out to accomplish, the mechanisms for
accomplishing it, and the extent to which it is successful.
This includes examining the project's funding situation and
the organizational structure developed for executing the
project. At the same time we develop a general criteria
which we feel are important for assessing the distributional
implications of the FCDA's attainments even though part of
those criteria were not clearly spelled out by the new
capital policy.
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1.2 Theoretical Arguments
Our analysis of the theoretical underpinnings is divided
into two major perspectives. The first of the two major
perspectives is shared by the group we will refer to as the
'discrete theorists.' The other perspective is espoused by
the second group, which we would refer to as 'structural
theorists.'
The 'discrete theorists,' among them Sharkansky (1970),
Smith (1973), Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), and Lipsky
(1970) view organizations as discrete entities and posit that
organizations, with their goals, resources, incentives, and
standard operating procedures, are rational, and have the
capacity to execute projects, plans, or policies as written.
Implicitly, they assume that organizations operate in a
stable environment free from factors such as pressures from:
interest group politics, political instability (generally
common in developing countries), ethnic or racial tensions,
poverty, corruption, limited natural resources, etc., all of
which can impinge upon organizational effectiveness.
On the other hand, the 'structural theorists,' among
them Bardach (1977), Derthick (1972), Warwick (1978), Bryant
and White (1982), and Katz and Kahn (1978), argue that the
organization's external environment is what determines
organizational outcomes. Implicitly, they assume that
elements of the internal dynamics of organizations, such as
management ability, financial resources, standard operating
procedures, etc., are inconsequential to organizational
outcomes.
As the proceeding analysis will reveal, the views of
these two groups of analysts are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. Rather, each perspective can be said to begin
where the other has left off. Thus, the relative strength of
one can be said to be the relative weakness of the other.
In carrying out this admittedly subjective
classification of the theorists, it is obviously difficult to
assign many of the theoretical themes adequately into the two
classifications. While some of the views fall neatly into
one category or the other, others do not. In some cases, the
views tend to bridge across the two classifications.
Mazmanian and Sabatier's (1983) views are particularly
relevant in this regard. They develop three sets of factors
that affect the success of project implementation which
reflect the positions of either of the two groups of
theorists. These are:
(i) the inherent tractability of the program; (ii) the
extent to which policy formulations legally structure
the implementation process by establishing priorities
of goals, the assignment of activitie's and powers to
implementing agencies in order to ensure that goals
will be accomplished, and the provisions for supportive
constituencies to participate in policy administration;
and (iii) factors such as the activities of relevant
interest groups, the commitment and leadership of
implementation officials, and the socio-economic
connections within which implementation occurs.(l)
(1) D.A. Mazmanian and P.A. Sabatier, Implementation and
Public Policy, Scott Foresman, 1983, p. 6.
Our criterion for assigning a theorist to a particular
group depends on which direction the theorist's position
leans. For example, although Bardach (1977) also sees the
success of policies to depend upon the organization's
internal dynamic, his emphasis for ensuring success lies
largely on the organization's external environment, as such,
we classify him as structural theorist. The same principle
we use for Grindle (1980) and Barret and Fudge (1981).
There are three main theories of the Discrete Theorists.
The first of the three theories views implementation as a
scientific, rational, or linear process, requiring only
routine administration, the second as a bureaucratic process,
while the third posits that implementation can be explained
as the diffusion of knowledge or innovation (Yanow, 1982).
According to the rational or linear point of view,
implementation is not a problem. Rather, once a project is
initiated, and the organizational structure for implementing
it has been specified, the project is executed in a series of
relatively straightforward and technical steps. With the
focus on how decisions are made, or policies formulated,
implementation is assumed to follow. Thus, Sharkansky wrote:
...It is the administrator who generally implements
the precise statute that is enacted by the legislature
or who makes the actual delivery of public
services.(1)
(1) Public Administration (Chicago: Markham, 1970), p. 8;
quoted in Pressman and Wildavsky (1973),p. 172.
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And T.D. Smith:
Once a policy has been "made" by a government, the
policy will be implemented and the desired results of
the policy will be near those expected by the policy
makers.(1)
With the failures of the Great Society Programs
initiated by the Johnson Administration in the United States,
critics discovered the 'missing link' in the linear
project-outcome model. Hence, projects began to be seen as
the outcome of a process--policy making--which involves many
actors and action channels (Bardach, 1977), many decision
points (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973), the issue of power and
resources (Grindle, 1980), bargaining and negotiation (Rein
and Rabinovitz, 1978; and Barrett and Fudge, 1981). Hence,
outcome was discovered to be the result of a
process--implementation--involving similar elements.
Slippage between the expectations of the policy and its
outcome could now be explained in terms of one or more
implementation problem. Thus, as Yanow puts it:
The process of realizing policy outcomes can no longer
be relegated to the downstairs arena of administrative
housekeeping. (2)
(1) T.D. Smith (1973), pp. 197-198.
(2) The phrase is Hargrove's (1975). Cited in D.J. Yanow,
ibid., op. cit., p. 26.
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The second theme of the discrete theorists focuses on
the bureaucratic characteristic of the organization. To this
group of analysts, project's successes can be explained by
the hierarchical relationships in the organization. The
bureaucratic point of view focuses on the policy maker or the
agency's chief executive: she or he is the one who must exert
control over the system, who must manage or direct
subordinates and the organization. If the problem of project
implementation is the fault of the subordinates who may not
be implementing the project according to the intent of their
superiors, the solution must be to increase the powers of the
superiors, and/or to increase other constraints over their
subordinates' discretion, to maximize consensus regarding the
goals of the organization and commitment to them, and to
minimize the possibility of intermediate discrepancies
(Yanow, 1982).
Even though implementation analysis was shifted to
bureaucratic relationships, the earlier rational, linear
models continue to influence its conceptualization. One of
these assumptions is that the concept of bureaucratic
hierarchy describes reality rather than some Weberian ideal
type of organizational form of behavior (Yanow, 1982). The
other assumption is that projects will be executed according
to the superior's orders and intent.
The issues of accountability, coordination, and control,
when introduced as a means to improve implementation, may be
seen as the fight against unintended consequences. Pressman
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and Wildavsky (1973), while presenting primarily a
descriptive analysis focusing on the multiplicity of actors
and decision points and the complexity of joint action,
nevertheless prescribed solutions to aid implementation.
Policy design and implementation should be brought
closer together. Policy designers should consider more
direct means of accomplishing their desired ends.
Decision points should be minimized in order to shorten
delay. And policy makers should spend time ensuring
that initial agreements are followed up by the
implementing agency.(1)
Eugene Bardach (1977), although generally belonging to
the structural theorist group, also proposed a solution to
problems of control: the 'fixer,' the legislator interested
personally in the policy, who pilots it through the various
intermediary actors and organizational levels until it is
executed in accordance with the policy's intent.
In challenging the 'top-down' bureaucratic approach,
Lipsky (1979) analyzed ways in which welfare workers, policy
makers, teachers, and other social service deliverers,
behaved in response to inadequate resources, challenges to their
authority, and ambiguous role expectations during their
face-to-face interactions with agency clients in the United
States. As Prottas (1979) and Weatherly (1977)
substantiated, their behavior modifications were often not in
accordance with the intent of their superiors, producing
(1) J.L. Pressman and A. Wildavsky, ibid., op. cit.,
pp. 145-46.
impacts on clients very different from the intent expressed
in the written policy. Because discretion was structured
into their roles, increasing organizational control in order
to limit discretion would defeat the organizational purpose
of employing 'street-level' bureaucrats.
These studies are an important departure from the top
down, hierarchical assumptions of the earlier analyses.
Rather than recommend bureaucratic paths to greater
accountability and control, Lipsky moves toward the role of
professional education as a workable control mechanism.
Arguing also in support of greater discretion for the
'street-level' bureaucrats, Palumbo and Harder (1981) further
maintain that what is traditionally regarded as a slippage or
failure in policy implementation is not necessarily bad. The
slippage represents adjustments that are needed in order for
the administrators (street-level bureaucrats) to turn a
poorly conceived and badly designed policy into something
that is relatively successful. According to Palumbo and
Harder, "it is necessary for policies to be reinvented so
that they better fit local needs."(1) The assumption here
is that the administrators, when given enough discretion,
will implement policies as written. Other assumptions which
may not necessarily obtain in the real world from Palumbo and
Harder's claim include: (i) all policies are badly desiqned
(ii) administrators are always skillful and competent enough
(1) D.J. Palumbo and M.A. Harder, Implementing Public Policy,
1981, p. xi.
to recognize when policies are bad; (iii) no outside interest
exists that can cause the administrators to abuse their
discretion or that humans are always perfect and would not
abuse their discretion.
In spite of the weaknesses of the above assumptions,
however, having sufficient discretion can be useful,
especially when certain amounts of flexibility are required
for project implementation. In Chapter 7 of this study,
where we emphasize giving the FCDA enough autonomy, we argue
that because of the rigid guidelines and intervention from
the Nigerian government, a great amount of delay is incurred
by the agency. This has impacted the fast speed required for
project implementation vis-a-vis meeting the deadline for
project completion.
The third theme of the discrete group of theorists
running through the literature, especially in its early
years, is that implementation may be explained as the
diffusion of innovation, knowledge, or information (Yanow,
1982). Bunker (1972) proposes such a model, although he also
includes elements of political processes and administrative
management. Central to realizing the adoption of a new
policy is the application of persuasion to key leverage
points throughout the headquarters field implementing
context. Requisite interaction among these levels must be
supported by "facile exchange of information" (Bunker, 1972).
Schon's (1971) "center-periphery" model is an extension
of the communication, innovation-diffusions view. In his
view, the responsibility for policy definition and
dissemination resides in the center, as it does at the top
under the hierarchical model. In the various forms of
implementation he describes, the center assumes that
execution will follow exhortation automatically or it
incorporates one or more constraints to encourage and enforce
compliance.
The preceding models, while analyzing project
implementation, have focused essentially on organization as a
system for making decisions and accomplishing goals. For the
most part, they are theories, which are concerned mainly with
what goes on within the boundaries of the organization, with
their emphasis on goals, choices, and incentives. The models
examine the organization internally as a discrete body with
its own dynamics, purposes, and methods to work more
efficiently. They help us look at the internal dynamics of an
agency and understand why it functions as it does and with
what results for those who work in it. However, they have
not sufficiently looked at project implementation in terms of
organizational relationships with the outside world. The
issues of interest-group politics, political instability,
poverty, limited natural resources, and uncertainties, are a
few of the environmental factors that can often change the
course of project implementation, especially in the
developing countries.
The attempt to incorporate environmental characteristics
into the analysis of project implementation is the focus of
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the 'structuralists'--the second group of implementation
theorists. The focus of this group is on the extent to which
organizations interact with their external environment.
According to this group, organizations are limited by outside
factors and can learn and incorporate strength from their
environment (Bryant and White, 1982). In the case of a
ministry, for example, this approach explains how and why it
'learns or fails to learn' from its interactions with other
organizations and from the larger cultural environment.
One of the pioneering theories of this group of analysts
concerns conflict-consensus behavior and focuses on
negotiations and bargaining or interest group politics. The
central contention of this group of theorists is that
conflicts among individuals and organizational actors in the
implementation scheme interfere with project execution,
either by causing delays or by railroading the project
entirely. The prescriptions, therefore, are for means to
promote consensus.
Bardach's game theory (1977) is the most straightforward
example of this group. His is a model of individual actors
vying, through the strategies and tactics of games, to
control over the implementation of a policy. Implementation
games, Bardach wrote, are political games; fixing the
game--his prescription for seeing a policy through to its
implementation--is an activity for a coalition of players.
Coalition-building requires negotiations and bargaining; and
a coalition then becomes an interest group vying with other
interested parties, be they individuals or groups.
Barrett and Fudge (1981) also emphasize the bargaining
consensus approach. They write:
... much of the existing literature tends to take a
"managerial" perspective; the problems of
implementation are defined in terms of co-ordination,
control or obtaining "compliance" with policy. Such a
policy-centered or "top-down" view of the process
treats implementers as "agents" for policy-makers and
tends to play down issues such as power relations,
conflicting interests, and value systems between
individuals and agencies responsible for making policy
and those responsible for taking action and
response.(1)
Murphy's studies of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (1971, 1976) in the U.S. and Derthick's
New-Towns-In-Town (1972) are also representative of
bargaining and interest-group theories. Murphy describes
pressures and counterpressures of various groups and the
ensuing cycle of delay; Derthick, bargaining through
different levels of a federated government. Both represent a
subgroup of the conflict-consensus assumption: federated
governments, because of their varying competing levels of
interest, generate too many obstacles to getting things done.
(2) conversely, the likelihood of a successful implementation
would be greater in a centralized decisionmaking environment
(1) S. Barrett and C. Fudge (Eds.), Policy and Action, Essays
on the Implementation of Public Policy, Methuen and Co.,
Ltd., New York, 1981, p. 4.
(2) A similar analogy could be applied to multiple agencies
that share common responsibility for implementing a
particular project. Delays then arise because of
interorganizational conflicts about who does what and when.
than in an environment with a federated or "decentralized"
form of decisionmaking.
To some degree, some of the tenets of the
bargaining-consensus model were reflected at the various
stages of Nigeria's new capital development. In other
instances, the tenets were not reflected. The successful
launching of the new capital, for example, as argued in
Chapter 3, was largely attributed to the highly centralized
military form of government at the time. Many of the
decisions made by this government during the planning of the
new city could not be challenged largely because of the
isolated form of decisionmaking structure.
On the other hand, disagreements that arose among the
mabers of the location panel during the new capital's siting
was not solved through bargaining and coalition as suggested
by the bargaining consensus theorists. Instead, a veto power
implicitly provided by the military's presence was used to
decide where the new capital territory was to be situated
(Chapter 4).
Determining what parts of the external world are parts
of an organizations's environment is a major administrative
job. Donald Warwick (1978) suggests that any list should
include influences from both the remote and more immediate
environment. The remote environment "consists of those
physical, historical, socio-cultural, ecological, and
technological conditions with distant effects on
(1) D. Warwick (1978), p. 14.
planning."(1) To illustrate their impact, he describes an
education-reform project in Peru. The government tried to
install a bilingual education program to teach Spanish and
the local dialect in the early grades. The assumption was
that the dialect would give the children an easier entry to
school and enhance pride in their own heritage.
This noble scheme, which seems to have been developed
by the planners for the Indians, rather than with them,
failed miserably for socio-cultural reasons.
...Since social and economic power was associated with
the language of the elite, they actually approved of
teaching the children in Spanish from the first day of
school.... Only after they reached secure middle-class
status did socially mobile Quecha speakers show
interest in advertising their knowledge of the
language.(1)
The immediate environment includes three factors.
First, is the power setting, which means any groups or
organizations that have some degree of power over an agency.
Second is the issue context, which is concerned with how
vital the organization is to the society. Are others very
interested in its work, or does it have a low priority? And
third, there is the operating environment, or the immediate
circumstances, that influence the operation of an
organization. An example of this would be a sudden change of
political regime in a coup d'etat, which can bring about a
total overhaul of the implementing agency.
(1) Cited in Smith, Lethem, and Tuoolen. Designer of
Organizations, p. 8.
A second way of classifying environmental forces is
provided by Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn (1978). They want to
show how aspects of the environment are related to
organizational tasks. First, they define sectors of the
environment (see Table 1.1). Second, they examine four
different dimensions of influence that these sectors have on
organization: Do they increase its stability? Are they
congruent with other influences? Do they occur randomly or
are they organized? Finally, do they create scarcity?
Each of these conditions can be applied to conditions in
the developing countries. Looking first at the
'Stability-turbulence' dimension, it is probably accurate to
say that all of the sectors reflect turbulent conditions.
Cultural values are changing, political regimes are fragile,
labor is making increased demands, and the value of physical
resources is constantly changing in the international arena.
Nations and communities vary, however, as to whether the
environment generates uniformity or diversity, the second
dimension of influence. Some countries have a diverse
economic structure; other countries are tied to the export of
a single commodity. Some have a much more pluralistic
society; others have a single dominant culture or ethnic
identity. This second factor has profound implications for
organizations. Horowitz (1971) has shown that the extent to
which different ethnic groups can enter the bureaucracy is a
major determinant of conflict in a country. Some
organizations have purposefully tried to recruit members from
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Table 1-1
The Environment of Organizations
Environmental Sectors
or Types of Functional Stability- Uniformity- Clustered- Scarcity-
Relationships Turbulence Diversity Random Munificence
1. Societal values:
Cultural Legit-
imation
2. Political:
legal norms and
statutes
3. Economic:
markets and labor
4. Informational
and technological
5. Physical:
geography and
natural resources
Source: Katz, Daniel and Kahn, Robert L. Social Psychology of
Organizations, John Wiley and Sons, 1978 p. 125.
different ethnic groups; others have tried to insulate
themselves and recruit from a single ethnic community. (In
Chapter 7, we show the purposeful attempt by the federal
government to achieve ethnic balance in the hiring of senior
FCDA staff.)
The third dimension refers directly to the extent of
organization within the polity, whether they are clustered
or random. Almost by definition, developing countries have
fewer organizations, weaker institutions, fewer mass
communications, and less-extensive media resources, than do
developed countries. In some countries the environment is
virtually consumed by anarchy, whereas in others, the
environment is rigidly controlled by highly authoritarian
regimes.
The last dimension is 'scarcity-munificence.'
Developing countries vary widely in the wealth of their
natural resources. The physical geography also has a direct
effect on the way organizations function. Geography
influences communication networks and the possibilities of
logistical support for projects.
In analyzing development administration in third-world
countries, Bryant and White (1982) further emphasize the
impact of an agency's external relations on project
implementation. They point out that because scarcity, or
poverty, and corruption are so pervasive in the third world,
they have a special influence on organizational dynamics.(l)
(1) Ibid., p. 51.
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One of the major responses to widespread poverty, as
noted by Bryant and White, is to establish patron-client
relationships. A patron-client relationship is an exchange
that develops under many circumstances and takes on many
implications. Poor peasants attach themselves to slightly
wealthier peasants who can plead their cases to those more
strategically located. Thus, in return for services or
goods, the wealthier peasants will represent clients about
school fees, licenses, or credit.
Although often thought of as political behavior, because
of its relationship to access, this phenomenon is as much
administrative as it- is political. The organizational
hierarchy may help those who negotiate such an arrangement.
The lower-level administrator will undertake services for
another (moving applications faster or processing his claims
more expeditiously) in order to gain access to some services
in return (Bryant and White, 1982).
Evidence of patron-client relationships was reported by
Epstein in the construction of Brasilia. In describing the
phenomenon, Epstein (1973) noted that the construction of
Brasilia was a "spectacular opportunity for patronage, for
rewarding one's clientele, and for promoting the interests of
the members of one's political entourage."(1) A similar
observation can be traced through the construction of Abuja
where the patron-client phenomenon was facilitated by a
(1) David Epstein, Brasilia, Plan and Reality: A Study of
Planned and Spontaneous Urban Development, University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1973, pp. 48-51.
resurgence of intense party politics after thirteen years of
military rule in the country, as well as by the highly
centralized and often inaccessible organizational structure
developed for project implementation.
Although most would agree that corruption has a very
debilitating effect, there is less agreement on the reasons
why it is so prevalent in third-world countries.
Traditionally, corruption has been traced to such social
factors as the lack of a commitment to the nation-state or
the breakdown of traditional values (Bryant and White, 1982).
In a contrasting argument, Scott (1967) contends that
corruption is most usefully viewed as a means of political
influence, rather than as an expression of moral degradation.
The problem is that the nature of political
institutions in third world countries encourages
certain kinds of influence rather than others. Whereas
nations with more developed political institutions
encourage the exercise of such influence before laws
are made, in third world countries, where political
opportunities are limited, this exertion is more apt to
o.ccur at the enforcement or implementation stage.(1)
1.3 Summary, Applications, and Conclusion
The implementation literature has been presented
according to two views that are useful in focusing attention
on the different aspects of the problem. The discrete
theorists begin with a 'pre-implementation' theme whose
(1) James Scott, An Essay on the Political Functions of
Corruption, Asian Studies 5:505 (1967).
administration model is based on a rational approach,
characterized by the assumption that projects are routinely
executed and by the assumption of intent to implement. Both
assumptions focus our attention on the expected outcomes of
projects as the yardstick against which implementation can be
evaluated. After the 'missing link' is discovered, the
routineness of project execution is no longer assumed.
However, having understood the nature of the implementation
problem, the next two groups of discrete theorists agree that
the link needs analyzing and fixing.
The bureaucratic-hierarchy theorists support the
assumption that projects are to be executed by subordinates
on their superiors' orders. The street-level bureaucrat
theorists, in challenging the operations of that model, move
us away from the assumption that subordinates automatically
comply with agency policy. Nevertheless, they retain the
assumption that implementation ought to be made to comply
with policy intent. The emphasis on increased control, even
when it is to be exerted through professional loyalties, is
still on narrowing the gap between goals and outcome. That
normative purpose, to narrow the gap between project goal and
outcome, also inspires even the later work of bureaucrat
theorists, who argue that the gap need not be fixed. The
third group of. the discrete theorists, however, maintain that
successful implementation would largely depend upon the
ability of the center (presumably the decisionmakers) to
communicate effectively to the subordinates (periphery) the
project goals.
But the discrete theorists have focused largely on the
internal dynamics of the execution agency, as if the
institutional factors outside the boundaries of the
organization that can impinge on project implementation, as
well, did not matter. The position taken by the structural
theorists is that due to the impact of institutional forces,
project implementation can still be expected to fail.
While substantial elements of facts and realities are
contained in each of these two views, it is more likely that
the most desirable and acceptable position cannot lie wholly
and exclusively with only one of these two views. In either
case, some institutional factors that have serious potential
social consequences are not fully taken into consideration by
either set of theorists. While the discrete theorists can,
for example, show that based on certain assumptions (rational
behavior, and stable social, economic, political, and
cultural environment) an agency can implement projects as
designed, the immediate or remote environmental
characteristics of the agency are neither always stable nor
always favorable. For example, many projects' failures have
been linked to the fragility of political institutions and
uncertainties, especially in developing countries (Hirschman,
1967; Grindle, 1980; Bryant and White, 1982). In a similar
situation, Nigeria's new capital project has been seriously
affected by the country's political instability. Four
political regimes, including civilian and military regimes,
emerged since the construction of Abuja began in 1979. Each
of the four regimes exercised considerable influence on the
activities and structure of the Federal Capital Development
Authority (FCDA), the agency responsible for executing the
new capital project.
Related to the problem of political fragility is the
fact that many of the governments in less developed countries
(LDCs) are less reflective of democratic systems. In such
situations, decision making is often centralized at the
national level, and power concentrated on a few people,
thereby making it relatively easier for one or a few interest
groups to control or influence nolicy decisions at the
center. The ability of Nigeria's Murtala Muhammed's regime,
for example, to initiate successfully the relocation of the
capital, has been attributed in part, to the project's strong
support from the Kaduna Mafia--a relatively small but strong
ethnic pressure group from northern Nigeria linked to the
installation and control of Muhammed's (military) government.
(1)
Furthermore, the 'rational' requirement of the discrete
models assumes a completely informed set of decision-makers
or executives whose decision process is based on maximizing
the attainment of a set of goals and objectives defined
through an identifiable public interest that guides the
implementation process. But what has become increasingly
clear in both developed and less-developed countries, as we
(1) Herbert Ekwe-ekwe, The Nigerian Plight: Shagari to
Buhari. Third World Quarterly 2, July 1935.
have noted above in the case of Abuja, is that there are many
groups that have an interest in public issues, and through
legislation, court interpretation, or even through their
positions in the society, can have access to and shape the
decision-making process. The political pressures brought to
bear on the new capital's construction in Nigeria, are
perhaps one aspect of pressure exerted on the execution
agency in terms of how it hired its personnel and who
benefited from the distribution of urban land resources.
The rational approach has been criticized also for its
requirements for comprehensive knowledge and the selection of
the optimal strategies for achieving goals. To most
observers, these requirements are rarely satisfied. In
reality, the decision maker chooses alternatives that satisfy
some minimum level of acceptability or which induce the least
harm or disturbance while conveying some benefit. The search
process in decision-making is thus best described as
satisfying.
We cannot, within practical computational limits
generate all the admissible alternatives and compare
their relative merits. Nor can we recognize the best
alternative, even if we are fortunate enough to
generate it early, until we have seen all of them. We
satisfy by looking for alternatives in such a way that
we can generally find an acceptable one after only
moderate search.(1)
(1) Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior. Macmillan, New
York, 1947, p. 24.
Even in the satisfying model, however, the underlying basis
for decision-making is rational choice, although rationality
is limited by the resources and ability of the decision-maker
to acquire and process information.
The weakness of the rational approach is perhaps
reflected by the process followed by the Nigerian New
Capital's Location Committee (appointed by the military
leaders) to select a suitable location for the new capital
city. Short of a broad public debate, General Murtala
Muhammed, Nigeria's Head of State at the time, appointed a
committee in August 1975 to analyze the options open to the
government for relocating the capital city. The Committee
was given five mandates. (1)
(i) to examine the dual role of Lagos as a federal and
state capital and advise on the desirability or
otherwise of Lagos retaining that role;
(ii) to recommend which of the two governments (Federal or
State) should move to a new location (note that Lagos,
by this time, had served as both Federal Capital of
Nigeria and State Capital of Lagos State), in the event
of the Committee finding that Lagos is unsuitable for
such a role;
(iii) to recommend a suitable alternative location, having
regard to the need for easy accessibility to and from
every part of the federation, in the event of the
(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal
Capital of Nigeria, December 1975, p. 9.
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Committee finding that the Federal Capital should move
out of Lagos;
(iv) to examine all other relevant factors which will assist
the Federal Military Government in arriving at the
right decision;
(v) to submit its recommendations to the Federal Military
Government no later than December 31, 1975.
The above guidelines reflect quite closely the
characteristics of rational decision making: The existence
of a clearly defined chief executive--the head of the
military government, a "rigorous and exhaustive" search by
the Location Committee for the best alternative, and the
final decision dependent upon the goals and objectives
established in the Committee's mandates.
Without fully considering other alternative sites for
locating the capital, this Committee chose a site that was
central and that the Committee felt would satisfy the demand
for an "ethnically-neutral" capital city. As Jonathan Moore
observed about this process:
The Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital
was supposedly established to pursue an open
examination of the desirability of relocation. In
actuality, the Committee developed practical
rationales, based on developmental need for.what was a
predetermined politically motivated decision.(1)
(1) Jonathan Moore, Abuja: The Politics of New Capital
Construction, 1982, p. 5.
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He goes further to point out that:
The planning process of Abuja was not based on a
systematic or analytical procedure. Instead, it was a
reflection of political goals of the Military
Government in the context of social and economic
constraints.(1)
The weaknesses of the structuralists view, on the other
hand, hinge on its shaky assumptions as well. The model
posits that with a stable environmental condition project
implementation can be expected to proceed successfully. In
other words, stable organizational environment is coterminous
with effective project execution. Issues of organizational
capacity (skill, management ability, and personnel
commitment) and financial resources are assumed to be
inconsequential to the project's successes. But historical
evidence has shown that problems of lack of skilled labor and
inadequate capital resources have hampered project
implementation, especially in the developing countries.(2)
In Chapter 6 we will show that construction and relocation
(1) Ibid.
(2) Albert Hirschman cites an example of, how the Nigerian
Government wanted to achieve a national balance after
independence through a reorganization of the railway system
which was previously run exclusively by one ethnic group.
The reorganization interfered with the efficiency of the rail
system and began to lose traffic to the trucks because the
reorganization required that all segments (ethnic groups) of
the population be represented in its administration. That
led to the recruitment of both the "qualified and less
qualified" personnel (to achieve integration) which, in turn,
led to the mismanagement, and hence inefficiency of the
railways. See Albert Hirschman, Development Projects
Observed, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1967.
delays were caused mainly by lack of adequate financial
resources and the inability of the FCDA to manage effectively
other internal sources of revenue.
In conclusion, it is the position of this study that the
views of both the structural and discrete theorists are
important for analyzing and understanding the problems of the
new capital construction. On the one hand, the failures or
problems of the new capital's construction have hinged on
management inefficiency, and lack of financial resources,
both of which are critical elements to an organization's
dynamics. On the other hand, the impact of political
interventions, instability/uncertainties, corruption, and
ethnic conflicts which were also critical factors in the
FCDA's operating environment, were additional factors that
led to inefficient management and misallocation of resources.
Thus, there are situations where aspects of the two
theoretical views apply to Abuja. There are other situations
in which they do not apply. Although these varying
situations will be evident in the subsequent chapters, we
keep our final thoughts on the theoretical applications until
the last chapter (9) of this thesis.
CHAPTER 2
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM:
FACTORS INFLUENCING RELOCATION
In introducing this study, we presented the hypothesis that the
extent of the FCDA's effectiveness in developing the new
capital depended not only on its organizational capacity
and financial resources, but also on the characteristics
of its operating environment. We pointed out that this
operating environment included some of the pressures from
the political system, ethnic tensions, and urbanizational
problems. We also considered the arguments for the relo-
cation of the federal capital, which essentially hinged on some
of these factors in the FCDA's operating environment and
also on the need to create a befitting capital for
the country.
This chapter presents a background description of the
characteristics of this environment. It is a description
of the country's urban settlement pattern, ethnic composition
and relations, and her political structure. Such background
is useful in understanding factors that influenced relocation
of the capital and the rationale for this decision.
The initial discussion concerns the developmental forces
acting upon the country's unique urban conditions and settle-
ment pattern. The second section of the chapter examines the
dramatic social and political developments in the country in
terms of her ethnic structure and relationships, the sources
of tensions, and their impact upon national decision-making.
Finally, the proposal for a new capital is traced as a
solution to the problems of the country's unbalanced settlement
pattern, ethnic rivalries, and political instability. A
knowledge of this complex history is important for uner-
standing the magnitude of the problems relocation was
designed to solve, as well as the difficulties of the
FCDA's operating environment.
2.1 The Urban Settlement Pattern: Impact of Colonial Development
(1900-1960)
The early stages of cities and towns in Nigeria, their
form, function, and distribution have been well documented.1
An account of the characteristics and patterns of towns that
emerged due to the thrust of the British has also been
documented. But it suffices to analyze the development of
these towns and cities in the context of Nigeria's decision
to build a new capital city. Such an analysis is important since
the decision to move the capital was partly based on the
intention of correcting a maldistribution arising from the
colonially-influenced urban system.
With an estimated (1978) population of 80 million, 2
Nigeria occupies an area of approximately 900,000 square
kilometers (sq. km). With only 18 percent of her population
(1)See Akin, L. Mabogunje: Urbanization in Nigeria, London
Press Ltd., London, 1968.
(2)F.A. Olaloku: Structure of the Nigerian Economy, St.
Martins Press, New York, 1979, p.4
urban, Nigeria is to a large extent still rural. Compared
with some less developed countries(LDC's) such as Argentina
which has 80 percent of her population living in urban areas,
Mexico (63%), Brazil (59%), and Senegal (28%), Nigeria's
level of urbanization is still fairly low.
The early forms of urbanization in parts of what later
became Nigeria predated the colonial era. On the basis of
population of 20,000 or more, as many as 23 towns and cities
were known to exist before the arrival of the "imperialists
depredators." These settlements were known to serve various
needs and purposes including defense, administration, and
trading centers. However, as trade and politics changed in
their emphasis, many new towns were created, some fell, stag-
nated, or declined. For example, trade with Western Sudan
and North Africa initially boosted many towns in the North
including Kano, Zaria, and Katsina. However, the Atlantic
Coast-oriented trade which later developed, first in slaves
and later in manufacturing, brought about the stagnation and
decline of some of the Sahara-oriented towns in the North,
while at the same time promoting others such as Lagos and
Abeokuta in the South.
The initial thrust of colonialism on the country was
from Lagos, the country's first contact point with formal sea-
(l)J.O.C. Omyemelukwe: "Urbanization in a Development Con-
text: Patterns, Probelms, and Prospects in Nigerai," in
Urbanization and Nigerian Economic Development, University
of Ibadan, Nigeria, 1977.
borne political, economic, and cultural relations.
This thrust, among other things, set in motion far-reaching
changes in the territory's political, economic, and spatial
organization through its system of cities and towns. The
"British bombardment" of Lagos marked the beginning of
the end of pre-European urbanization in Nigeria."For thereafter
the British policy of political control and economic exploi-
tation began to find expression in the subjugations of other
urban centers in the name of Pax Britannica, and the dis-
organization of the existing system of urban hierarchy
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especially through the coast-to-interior rail route system.
Because the rail routes established by the colonial
government were designed to link up places with
agricultural export crop5. and mining potentials, and not
necessarily laid in the best interest of the existing system
of towns, many of the towns were by-passed. While such by-
passed towns like Sokoto, Yerwa (Maiduguri), Oyo, and Ijebu-
Ode experienced rapid decline, new towns like Kaduna, Port
Harcourt, Aba, Enugu, and Jos sprang into existence on the
rail-route system later complemented with feeder motor roads.
The pre-colonial towns, notably Ibadan, Kano, Zaria, Ilorin
and Abeokuta given more growth impetus by their vantage
location on the rail-route systems, grew relatively fast to
3
lead the way in the articulation of regional trade.
(1)J.O.C. Onyemelukwe: Ibid., p. 23.
(2)A.L. Mabogunje: Op. cit. , p. 101.
(3)J.O.C. Onyemelukwe: Op. cit., p. 23.
This drastic reshuffling of the country's urban hierarchy
as it seemed, is illustrated by the increase in population
of Kano from 30,000 in the 1850's to 127,000 in 1952, and
the decline of Sokoto from 120,000 in the 1850's to only
52,000 in 1952. On the other hand, other new towns such as
Kaduna, Enugu, Port Harcourt, etc. which were not even on
the map of Nigeria's pre-1900 urban systems attained the
population of 45,000, 63,000, 72,000 respectively by 1952
(See Tables 2.1 and 2.2).
One important consequence of this era of urbanization was
the two dimensional patterns of migration into the growing
urban centers. One dimension was rural-urban, often involving
occupational mobility from primary activity (agriculture,
forestry, or fishing) to the secondary or service sectors.
The other dimension was urban-urban not necessarily involving
occupational mobility between economic sectors. With the
improvement in modern transportation and monetized internal
trade, the rising urban centers took on wider central place
functions and thereby provided more incentive to migrants.
Table 2.3 shows the number of urban centers of 20,000 or
more inhabitants and their rate of increase between 1952 and
1963.
The nature of the emerging urban pattern is better
understood in light of the motives behind British settlement
(1)J.O.C. Onyemelukwe: Op. cit., p. 23.
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Table 2.1
Population of Pre-Colonial Towns of 20,000 or More People
Estimated Prior to 1880
Town
Sokoto
Ibadan
Abeokuta
Ilorin
Zaria
Iwo
Oyo
Ijebu-Ode
Kano
Ijaiye
Ogbomosho
Tabra
Population (000)
120
100
100
70
40-50
50
40
35
30-40
30
30
20
Town
Ede
Argonon
Addo
Deogoa
Oke-Odan
Baebarjie
Dikwa
Isehin
Koso
Epe
Wawa
Lagos
Population (000)
30-40
30
20
30
20
20-25
25
20
20
20
20
20
Source: A.L."Mabogunje, Urbanization in Nigeria,"London 1968,
in J.O.C. Onyemelukwe (ed.), Urbanization in a Development
Context: Patterns, Problems and Prospects in Nigeria.
Proceedings of the 1977 Annual Conference of the Nigerian
Economic Society, p. 23.
Table 2. 2
Growth Rate of Selected Towns of 20,000 and Over from 1952/3-1963
Population Population
Town 1952/3 1963 Growth Rate
(000) (000) (%)
Lagos
Ibadan
Ogbomosho
Kano
Oshogbo
Ilorin
Abeokuta
P. Harcourt
Zaria
Ilesha
Onitsha
Iwo
Kaduan
Ado-Ekiti
Maiduguri
Aba
Owo
Ikirun
Calabar
Shaki
Jos
Ondo
Akure
Ijebu-Ode
Kumo
Oka
Ikare
Warri
Sokoto
Shagamu
Nnewi
267
459
140
127
123
41
84
72
54
34
77
100
45
25
57
58
31
26
47
23
39
36
39
24
29
28
25
20
52
30
28
665
627
320
295
210
202
187
180
166
166
163
159
150
158
140
131
80
80
76
76
90
74
71
69
65
62
61
55
90
51
44
9.5
3.1
8.6
8.7
5.5
17.6
8.3
9.5
11.8
17.1
7.7
4.7
12.8
20.2
9.4
8.4
9.9
11.8
4.9
12.6
8.7
7.4
6.1
11.1
8.4
8.2
9.3
0.6
5.7
5.4
4.6
Source: Onyemelukwe, J.O.C. Urbanization In A Development
Context: Patterns, Problems and Prospects in Nigeria, 1977,
p. 27.
79
Table 2.3
Urbanization in Nigeria 1890-1963
Changing Urban Frequency Changing Share of Urban Pop.
Urban Centers
of 20,000 % of Total Urban % of National
Date or more Increase Pop. (000) Total
1890 25 --- 939
1953 56 124 3,214 10.6
1963 184 228.5 10,745 19.3*
Source: Onyemelukwe J.O.C., "Urbanization in Development
Context Patterns, Problems, and Prospects in
Nigeria." In Proceedings of the Annual Conference
of the Nigerian Economic Society, 1977, p. 25.
* It must be mentioned that Onyemelukwe's figure for the
percentage share of urban population in 1963 (19.3%)
seems to contradict a World Bank's estimate of
Nigeria's 1975 percentage share of urban population
(18.2%). Or else, the urban population will be
declining, which does not seem realistic. The dis-
parity between the estimates may have arisen due to
lack of census figures for Nigeria since 1963; the two
estimates may have been made on the basis of different
indicators.
Relying on Onyemelukwe's estimates implies that
there has been an unprecedented rate of urbanization
since 1952. In fact, Table 2.2 seems to support this
speculation because most of the cities doubled their
populations between 1952 and 1963.
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in Nigeria. The guiding principle that motivated colonial
policy can be traced to factors external to the Nigerian
economy. Important among these external determinants of
policy were British industrial input requirements and their
quest for future markets. The demand created by European
industrialization for tropical agricultural raw materials in
the pre-20th century, and to a lesser extent, the need for
potential markets for their manufactured goods were among
the critical factors leading to the European acquisition of
the Nigerian territory. The achievement of these dual ob-
jectives (raw materials and markets) could not be envisaged -
without two related prerequisites: a political and admini-
strative system to control foreign trade and the development
of an exchange economy based on money. These constituted
the nucleus from which colonial policy radiated. Economic
development was primarily thought of in terms of policies
associated with foreign trade. Local resource utilization was
of little concern for such policies except to activate agri-
culture for the export sector. Agriculture accounted for as
much as 90 percent of the national income in 1910, and less
than 60 percent when Nigeria gained independence. Expansion
of export volume was accompanied by expansion of the export
structure. The exports of oil palm products, which clearly
(1)E.J. Usoro: "Colonial Economic Development Strategy in
Nigeria 1919-1939: An Appraisal," Nigerian Journal of
Economic and Social Studies 19(1), March 1977.
dominated at the turn of the century and were produced chief-
ly in southern Nigeria, were joined by cocoa also produced in
the south, ground nuts from the north, and to a lesser extent
by hides, skins, and cotton, all produced in the north. A
distinct regional specialization became noticeable in the
production areas for agricultural export goods: ground nuts
and cotton in the north; cocoa, palm kernels and palm oils
in the south.
The British "dependency-oriented" economy was facilitated
mostly by three independent yet internal activities: public
sector capital expenditures on transportation, selective
expenditures on experimental technological innovation
in agriculture and the adaptation to the new economic opportunities
by communities adequately endowed with needed resources.1
The construction of the railways starting in Lagos between
1901 and 1930 provided an opportunity for realizing the desired
market-oriented goals. None of the existing modes of transpor-
tation was as important as the railways in accelerating the
expansion of market opportunities. Through the hauling by rail
of cotton, groundnuts, hides, and skins from the North,
cocoa and palm products from the South, exchange relations,
mostly in monetary terms, were stimulated.
The activities and interaction in transport investment,
administrative organization, trade and production promoted
(1)E.J. Usoro: Ibid., p. 124.
thegrowth of social overhead facilities, commerce , and
urbanization. Thus, this type of colonial economic in-
volvement and their preferred economic system laid the
foundation for the subsequent growth and the type of urban
pattern that emerged.
Social overhead facilities were located strategi-
cally at such seaports as Lagos, Calabar, Sapele, and
Port Harcourt, along the rail line, and on major roads
linked to the rail line, to facilitate the flow of the
increased volume of exports and import trade. Lagos was
designated the only 'first class' town in 1917 by the
British, and it became the main focus of attention in so-
cial overhead investment. Lagos harbor was expanded to
handle the incoming volume of export and import traffic.
The growth in port traffic not only induced a cor-
responding growth in employment opportunities, but also
widened the scope for commercial activities. Expansion
in employment through commerce and administration was not
confined to Lagos, however, but spread throughout the
country. Eighteen commercial and administrative towns,
12 in the south and 6 in the north, were located at stra-
tegic rail lines and at ports, and were by 1919 important
enough to be classified as 'second class' towns. The
towns were Abeokuta, Calabar, Enugu, Ibadan, Forcados, Itu,
Onitsha, Opobo, Port Harcourt, Sapele, and Warri in the
(1)A.L. Mabogunje, op. cit., P. 68.
south; Ilorin, Kaduna, Kano, Lokoja, Minna, and Zaria in the
north. The British administration's criteria for the recog-
nition and classification of towns were not population- or
size-based, but their importance as contact centers between
Nigerian and foreign merchants in the promotion of the export/
import trade.1  Fifty other towns, 38 in the south and 12 in
the north, were recognized as government stations with small,
but mixed, native population.
The classification and subsequent recognition of these
towns into first-class or second-class townships had three very
important consequences. First, it provided an opportunity for
these towns to be provided with urban amenities--schools,
water supply, health services, improved roads, housing etc.
The presence of such facilities in turn attracted a number of
modern businesses to such towns and with them employment
opportunities. As Mabogunje (1968, p. 68) noted about the impact of
these facilities: "Both the glamours of urban utilities and the
new employment opportunities would exert a strong pull, drawing
population to the urban centers." Second, the recognition of
these towns implied that those not recognized were given less
attention in terms of urban amenities, because the level of
infrastructure provided to a town depended upon the class or
category to which the town belonged. As a result, most of the
towns not located by the rail line, which were in turn not
(l)A.L. Mabogunje, op. cit., p. 68.
among the classified towns, actually declined. Third, the
designation of towns led not only to a restructuring of the
national space economy in terms of the location of facilities
and amenities, but also has led to skewed distribution of
urban centers towards the southern region of the country. A
total of 51 out of 69 new towns created were located in the
south.
The uneven distribution of urban centers was generally
seen as accentuating the maldistribution of socio-economic
welfare among the five regions (Northern, Eastern, Midwestern,
and Western Regions and the Federal Territory of Lagos) that
existed prior to 19642 (Figure 2.1). A casual assessment
of these regions in terms of income distribution, and their
levels of infrastructural endowment (Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6),
show that the Federal Territory of Lagos (from now referred
to as Lagos throughout this chapter) consistently commanded
the largest per capita income, the highest level of infra-
structure, and manufacturing industries. (Approximately 44
percent of the total manufacturing employment in the country
is concentrated in Lagos.) From Table 2.4, it can be seen
that the Western and Midwestern Regions, and Lagos (all
(1) A.L. Mabogunje, ibid., p. 68.
(2) Before Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the country
was divided into four politico-administrative regions--East,
West, North, and the Federal Territory of Lagos. In 1963, the
Midwest was carved out from the Western Region to bring the
number of regions to five. In 1967, the formerly five admini-
strative regions were eliminated. A twelve-state structure
was adopted. The number of states was increased from twelve
to nineteen in 1976.
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Table 2.4
Gross Domestic Product (at Factor Cost) by Region, 1965
1963 Population Share of GDP Per Capita
Percentage Percentage
of Nigeria's of total Index
Region 000's Population f'm GDP b N19=100
Northern 29,809 53.5 526.7 45.5 19.0 100
Eastern 12,395 22.3 256.6 20.7 20.0 105
Western 10,266 18.4 255.6 20.7 25.0 132
Mid-Western 2,536 4.6 79.4 6.4 31.0 163
Federal
Territory of
Lagos 665 1.2 82.0 6.7 123.0 647
Total 55,671 100.0 1236.3 100.0 22.0 116
Source: Teriba, 0. and Philips A. 0. "Income Distribution
and National Integration." The Nigerian Journal
of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1,
March 1971, pp. 82-85.
Table 2.5
Level of Infrastructure Endowment: Area, Population, and Roads by Region
Area 1963 Population Road Mileage
Percent-
age of Percentage Persons Percentage
Square total of Nigeria's per square of total
Region Miles area (000's) population mile Total Nigeria
Northern 281,782 79.0 29,809 53.5 106 21,437 38.8
Eastern 29,484 8.3 12,395 22.3 420 18,184 32.9
Western 30,454 8.5 10,266 18.4 326 9,608 17.4
Mid-Western 14,922 4.2 2,536 4.6 170 5,820 10.5
Federal 27 ..(a) 665 1.2 1,045 207 0.4
Territory of
Lagos
Nigeria 356,699 100.0 55,671 100.0 156 55,256 100.0
Source: Teriba, 0., and Philips, A. 0. "Income Distribution and National Integration."
The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1971,
pp. 82-85.
Table 2.6
Level of Infrastructural Endowment: Hospitals and Schools by Region
Hospital Beds in all Primary School Secondary School
Medical Establishments Pupils per Pupils per 1,000
per 1,000 population 1,000 Population Population
(1966) (1966) (1966)
Index Index Index
Region No. 0.25=100 No. 17=100 No. 0.6=100
Northern 0.25 100 17 100 0.6 100
Eastern 0.92 368 100 588 5.5 917
Western 0.44 176 72 424 8.0 1,333
Mid-Western 0.53 212 153 900 11.2 1,867
Federal 4.0 1,600 214 1,259 21.2 3,533
Territory of
Lagos
Nigeria 0.49 196 54 318 3.8 633
Source: Teriba, 0., and Philips, A. 0. "Income Distribution and National Integration."
The Niaerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1971.
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located in the southern part of the country) accounted for a
proportionately greater share of gross domestic product (GDP).
Consequently, per capita income was highest in these three
areas and generally above the national average. It was low-
est in the North. The gap in per capita income in 1965 ranged
between ;19 in the North to f123 in the Federal Territory of
Lagos.
The existence of developmental and social welfare gaps
between the various regions is in itself a reflection of
differences in regional resource endowments as well as of
social and infrastructural services, some of which are shown
in Table 2.5. Both the population density and the road
mileage figures shown in the table are good indicators of
the extent to which various regions have been opened up, which,
in turnis a possible indicator of the volume of trade and
economic transactions. The North has a comparatively low
population density, while at the same time accounting for only
39 percent of the total road mileage in the country in spite of its
overwhelming land size. Its road mileage per 10 square miles
of land area was half of the national average and one-eight,
one-fourth, and one-fifth of those of the Eastern, Western
and Mid-Western regions respectively.
The gaps in the potential stock of human resources
roughly indicated by differences in primary and secondary
school population are shown in Table 2.6. In 1966, the
Midwest had nine times the number of primary school pupils
per 1,000 pupulation as compared with the North, while the
Western and Eastern regions, respectively, had almost six and
four times that of the North. This difference was more
marked in secondary education, with the number of secondary
school pupils per 1,000 population in the North being far
below the national average.
The differences in socio-economic welfare and the gap
in the level of infrastructure between the North and Southern
regions of the country explain in part the relatively strong
support for locating the new capital city in the Northern
region. Figure 2.1 shows the position of the new Federal
Capital Territory (FCT), which is bounded by the Plateau,
Kwara, Niger, and Kaduna states, all in the former Northern
region.
Opponents of the new capital project have, however,
argued that, maybe, with slight adjustments in national
policies and priorities, and with a sustained rural develop-
ment effort, industrial dispersal, and further 'juggling' of
political boundaries, the disparity in socio-economic wel-
fare between the North and the rest of the country could,
in the long run, be wiped out. These suggestions seem,
however, to have been responded to, although unconsciously,
by the federal government. Recently, the federal government
has sited one of the largest oil refineries at Kadnua, in the
north, and also built the nation's largest steel complex at
Ajaokuta. The government has also intensified its rural de-
velopment effort, although with no preferential attention to
the northern region.
In an effort to ease the impact of the maldistribution
problem as well as to bring the decision-making apparatus as
close as possible to the local level, the federal government,
abjugating the five (colonial) regional structure, created a
twelve-state regional (politico-administrative) structure in
1967 (Figure 2.1). Six of the 12 states (Benue-Plateau, Kano
Kwara, North-Central, North-Eastern, North-Western) were
carved out of the former Northern region, and the other six
(East-Central, Rivers, South-Eastern, Mid-Western, Western,
and Lagos) from the former Southern regions including Western,
Midwestern, and Lagos. The number of states was extended
to 19 in 1976 (see Figure 2.1).1
Although it may be too early to assess fully its impact,
the new state structure seems to have exacerbated the regional
disparity problem. The creation of the states in 1967 seemed
to make very little difference in the economic unevenness in
the country at that period. Indication of state disparities
(after the-creation of states) is reflected by the figures
of per capita recurrent expenditures shown in Table 2.7. The
Lagos state has the highest per capita government expenditures
(1 )The creation of states was not consciouIyarriedoli
in order to correct maldistribution of urban centers. However,
it was expected that in addition to decentralizing decision
making it would help to offset some of the negative externali-
ties associated with the concentration of cities by stimulat-
ing the development of new growth points in the newly created
states.
Table 2.7
Area Population and Public Expenditure Levels of the Twelve States of Nigeria
Area
Percentage of
Square total area
Miles (percent)State
1963 Population
000's
Percentage
of Nigeria's
Population
(percent)
Percentage Per Capita
of total Recurrent Govern-
Planned ment Expenditure
Public (1968-69 Estimates
Investment
1970-74 Index
(percent) 0.9=100
Benue-Plateau 39,204
Kano 16,630
Kwara 28,672
North-Central 27,108
North-Eastern 105,025
North-Western 65,143
East-Central 8,746
Rivers 7,008
South-Eastern 13,730
Mid-Western 14,922
Western 29,100
Lagos 1,381
Nigeria 356,699
10.9
4.7
8.0
7.6
29.4
18.3
2.5
2.0
3.8
4.2
8.2
0.4
100.00**
N/A: not available
h 1.0 = 49 2.0 = U.S. $2.80
* Federal government percentage of planned public investment expenditure is 52.5.
** Figures do not add up to 100 percent because of rounding.
Source: Teriba, 0., and Philips, A. 0. "Income Distribution and National Integration."
The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1971,
pp. 82-85.
4,009
5,775
2,399
4,098
7,793
5,733
6,223
1,544
4,626
2,536
9,488
1 ,444
55,670
7.2
10.4
4.3
7.3
14.0
10.3
11.2
2.8
8.3
4.5
17.0
2.6
100.0**
2.7
5.3
2.3
3.8
3.6
3.0
5.1
3.4
3.0
3.9
8.7
2.7
47 .5*
1.4
0.9
2.2
1.4
0.9
3.8
N/A
N/A
1.4
3.8
2.1
7.1
156
100
244
156
100
422
156
422
233
789
0.0
while the North-Eastern and Kano have the least.
In manufacturing employment, the overall regional dis-
tribution is still uneven, and'as can be seen from Table 2.8,
the greatest industrial concentration is in Lagos and the
former Western region. Given that the North is larger than
the rest of the country on both area and population, the
disparity in industrial distribution may be greater -than the
table indicates.
The unique position of Lagos accounts largely for the
concentration of industries in the Lagos State. Both the
Federal government and the former Western Regional government
concentrated the bulk of their development efforts in Lagos.
The higher income per capita, the higher population density,
and the higher level of infrastructural development encouraged
industrial agglomeration. About 48 percent of labor employed
in medium-scale and large-scale manufacturing in Nigeria is
in Lagos, while 1.1 percent is in the North-Eastern states.'
Because of lack of data, it is not possible to assess
with a great deal of certainty the impact the expansion
(to nineteen) of states may have had on the distribu-
tion of socio-economic welfare among the new states. How-
ever, if the geographical distribution of the population,
industries, and primary and secondary enrollments shown in
Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 are any indication to go by, it
(1 )A. Adejugbe, "Manufacturing," in F.A. Olaloky (Ect.),
Structuring of the Nigerian Economy, St. Martins Press, New
York, 1979, p. 30.
Table 2.8
Manufacturing Employment, Population Distribution
and Location Quotients, by State: 1966, 1973
Percent of *Percent of Location
Manufacturing Total Population Quotient
States Employment (1966) of Nigeria (1966) (LQ)a
Lagos 31.4 2.6 17.51
Benue-Plateau 1.1 7.2 0.30
Kano 9.2 10.4 0.71
Kwara 2.8 4.3 0.70
North-Central 7.9 7.3 1.47
North-Eastern 2.6 14.0 0.08
North-Western 0.4 10.3 0.14
East-Central 13.0 11.2 0.47
Mid-Western 11.3 4.5 1.37
Rivers 8.1 2.8 0.52
South-Eastern 3.2 8.3 0.70
Western 9.2 17.0 0.48
Number Employed in Manufacturing
LQ= in a State
Number Employed in Manufacturing
in Nigeria
-State Population
- Population of
Nigeria
* Teriba, 0. and Philips, A. 0. "Income Distribution and
National Integration." Nigerian Journal of Economic
and Social Research, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1971, p. 82.
Source: Adebayo Adejugbe "Manufacturing," in F. A.
Olalokun (ed.) Structure of the Nigerian Economy,
1979, p. 43.
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Figure 2.2 Population Density Distribution
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can be said that there is still a relatively significant gap
in socio-economic infrastructure endowment between the northern
and the southern regions of the country.
In conclusion, it can be noted that there is a rela-
tively 'skewed' distribution of some of the socio-economic
infrastructure towards the southern part of Nigeria. Many
of the large cities, as well as industries, are concentrated
mainly within this region of the country (Fig. 2.3). However,
the question remains as to whether the 'skewed' distribution
was sufficient to warrant the relocation of the capital to
the northern region. Depending on what side of the argument
the interested parties to the problem are, the answer is yes
or no. The new capital supporters (as noted previously)
believe that the new capital project could be used to open up
the relatively undeveloped and sparsely populated parts of
the northern region in order to counter the polarizing in-
fluence of the Lagos region, which, in turn, is critical to
the overall integration of the country, and attainment of
national unity. On the other hand, as we have earlier pointed
out, opponents believe that building a new capital city was
a wrong policy to pursue for three main reasons. First,
they believe that the project is too costly. Secondly,
the government has not sufficiently tried other policy instru-
ments (such as an intensified rural development, industrial
dispersal, etc.) which may be less expensive than the new
capital project. Thirdly, the movement of the capital might
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negatively affect the development of Lagos and other neigh-
boring cities thereby reducing any potential benefits that
could have been derived from relocation. It is beyond the
scope of this thesis to discuss the merits and demerits of
both sides of the argument. Within the scope of descrip-
tion of the situation presented, it is not sufficient to con-
clude either way. However, the new capital project was also
expected to solve another national problem. In the following
discussion the aspect of that problem (involving the
contentious relationship among the country's ethnic groups)
expected to be solved by the project is presented.
2.2 Ethno-Political Structure: Pattern and Sources of
Tension
There is wide agreement that one of the most difficult
problems facing the country was the relations among the
country's ethnic groups. Thus, when we consider the
vital importance of the new capital city as a unifying
factor for the country, an examination and adequate under-
standing of the ethno-political structure becomes very
critical.
(1 )See V. Olorunsoln, "Patternsof Interaction Between Bureau-
cratic and Political Leaders: A Case Study," J. Developing
Areas 3:52-53 (1968). See also: F.A. Schwatz, Jr., "Ni-
geria's Constitution and Economic Development,"in Managing
Economic Development in Africa, W1.. Hausman (ed.), p. 185.
J. O'Connell and B. Dudley have made similar observations in
their publications: J. O'Connell, "Political Parties in
Nigeria," The Politics and Administration of Nigerian
Government, L.F. Blitz (Ed.), London: Sweet and Maxwell
(1965), p. 86; and B. Dudley, Nigerian Government and
Politics, 1982, p. 36.
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Before the penetration of the boundary of what later
became known as Nigeria by the British, the settlement pattern
was marked by a distribution of many ethnic groups. There are
three major groups located in particular geographic regions
of the country: the Hausa representing the Muslim Sudanic
cultures (based on the early northern city states), the Ibo
linked to the independent communities of numerous forest and
coastal cultures, and the Yoruba representing the forest
kingdoms of the Southwest. Splitting these groups are numerous
smaller ethnic groups in the Middle Belt, along the Niger and
Benue River valleys and in the Midwest sector (See Figure 2.5).
For much of the 19th century, what could be called
a history of these ethnic groups was marked by a record of
bitter internecine warfare between these different groups.
Hence, the settlement of the smaller ethnic groups within the
river valleys, and high plains was seen as an escape from
constant warfare and the influences of the more dominant groups.
The British colonial rule accentuated tribal division. In
order to be able to govern effectively the newly colonized
territory, which became known as Nigeria, the colonial administration
had to maintain these scattered conglomerates of ethnic groups
into a pattern of an organized, politico-administrative framework.
(1)
Ajato Gandonu. "250 Niqerian Ethnic Groups: Realtiies and
Assumptions," World Antnropology Series, 1973-78, pp. 243-79,
NIGERIAN ETHNIC GROUPS SURVEY 1972
Source: Gandonu, Ajato, 250 Nigerian Ethnic Groups: Realities and Assumptions.
World Anthropological Series (1973-78) . Reprints: pp. 243-279.
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Thus, the country became divided into three regions along
the three major ethnic lines--the North corresponding to the
Hausa-Fulani group, the West consisting mainly of the Yorubas,
and the East consisting mainly of the Ibos. With the imposition
of colonial rule and the incorporation of the various groups
into the new politico-administrative framework that became
Nigeria, a new sense of identity began to form amongst the
linked groups. Competition for differential rewards within
the new administrative framework further encouraged the move
towards greater cohesion, " a cohesion which increasingly
took on the characteristics of a closed system as the regions
sought to protect their respective power bases.""
With the approach of independence, it became important
for Nigerians to be actively involved in the management of
their own affairs. The year 1946 marked the beginning of this
new initiative. This year marked the introduction of the '
"Richards Constitution," so named after the man who was the
Governor of Nigeria at the time, Sir Arthur Richards. It also
marked the beginning of regionalism, which was to accentuate
2-
ethnic conflicts. What is perhaps much more important is
that it was the year when the administration of Northern
Nigeria was brought into the general framework of the government
of Nigeria. What today is known as Nigeria, is the product
of the amalgamation in 1914 of the territories known as the
(1) B. Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian Government and
Politics, Indiana University Press, 1982, p. 37.
(2),B. Dudley, ibid., p. 43.
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Northern and Southern provinces of Nigeria by Sir Frederick
(later Lord) Lugard. Though the two territories were supposed
to have been amalgamated into one political unit, for all
practical purposes they were administered as separate entities,
more so after 1916 when Lugard left Nigeria.
Basically, the 1946 Richards Constitution provided for the
establishment of regional assemblies in the three regions
into which Nigeria had been divided in 1938, but in the North
and West, besides the assemblies, there was to be a house of chiefs.
The assemblies were composed of (a) representatives of the
colonial administration, who formed the majority; and (b)
nominated persons chosen from the various "native authorities"
(local government units). The assemblies could discuss legis-
lative proposals put before them by the administration, but
could not pass these into law. For the latter purpose, a
central legislature was created. This, like the regional
assemblies was composed of designated officals and members
nominated from the regions, but the North had fewer "representa-
tives" than either the East.or the ,West. The arguments in support
of the new arrangement were that it would (a) enable each
region to develop at the pace best suited to it; (b) provide a
training ground for future political leaders; and (c) help to
create a sense of belonging to a common nation.1
But such a sense of belonging was not going to be realized in
(1) Ibid., p. 44.
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a situation where each region was allowed to develop almost
independently, instead of in harmony with each other.
Though the 1946 arrangement was supposed to last for
nine years, by 1949 dissatisfaction with the Richards Constitution
was so widespread that changes became inevitable. The dissatis-
faction led to regional conferences being held, after which
a general conference of delegates from the various regions was
summoned which finally produced what came to be known (again
after the Governor) as the "MacPherson Constitution." This
came into effect in 1951, and its significance lies in six
things: (a) it gave to the regional assemblies the right,
for the first time, to make laws for the region; (b) it provided,
for the first time, for the election, admittedly indirectly,
of the members of the regional assemblies; (c) it provided
for the establishment of executive councils, composed of
Ministers, in the various legislatures; (d) at the level of
the central legislature it provided for an equality of represen-
tation among the three regions; (e) by providing for indirect
elections, the MacPherson Constitution facilitated the process
of political party formation; and (f) the regional conference
leading to the MacPherson arrangement provided for the first
time an opportunity for Nigerians not only to be involved in
the discussion of the constitutional arrangement for their
country, but also an opportunity to deliberate on the future of
its national capital.
(1) B. Dudley, ibid., p. 46.
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Like the formation of the regions,the emergent political
parties were largely ethnically constituted. The first of such
parties to emerge was the National Council of Nigeria and the
Cameroons (NCNC), which was formed in 1944, but only came into
prominence between 1946 and 1947.1 At first, the NCNC
could largely have been described as a truly national party
transcending all ethnic groups. In other words, it was meant
to be an open party since its main focus of operation was
the removal of the colonial administration. The NCNC was led
by Herbert Macaulay, a veteran nationalist leader, and on his
death in 1947, he was succeeded by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, an
American-trained journalist and a newspaper proprietor.
The NCNC has been described as a "mass party" in that unlike
"elite parties" its membership was open to everyone. The party
derived its finances from the contributions of its members.
In actual fact, however, all Nigerian parties have tended to
rely either directly or indirectly on the government of the
region they controlled to provide the bulk of their finances.
In the case of NCNC the main source of its funds was "loans"
from the African Continental Bank (ACB), a bank whose principal
shareholder was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Zik Enterprises Ltd.,
(a company again largely owned by Azikiwe), but whose assets were
later to be taken over by the East regional government when the
ACB was almost on the point of liquidation.2 From 1951 until
the military coup of January 1966, the NCNC controlled the
government of the Eastern region, and for much of thd same
(1) Ibid., p. 46.
(2) Ibid., p. 47.
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period formed the main opposition to the Western House
of Assembly.
Unlike the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) and the
Action Group (AG), the other two main parties of the first
republic (1960-1965), the NCNC drew much of its electoral
support from its association with various interest groups.
In the East itselfit relied largely on the Ibo State Union,
a federation of diverse clan unions of Ibo-speaking peoples,
for mobilizing the electorate. 1  In the North its support
derived from the alliance it formed with the Northern Elements
Progressive Union (NEPU) and with the Bornu Youth Movement (BYM).
But the wide support NCNC enjoyed from all the regions did
not last very long. As other parties which provided a more
ethnic appeal to the various regions emerged, former supporters
of NCNC naturally drifted to such parties. The first such
party was the Action Group (AG) party, which was formed in
1948 and was itself an offshoot of the Yoruba cultural asso-
cation, Egbe Omo Oduduwa (lit. association of the children of
Oduduwa, the mythical ancestor of the Yoruba speaking peoples),
started in London around 1945 by Chief Obafemi Awolowo who
was then a law student.2 Awolowo provided the rationale for
the Egbe in his book "Path to Nigerian Freedom" (London; Faber
and Faber, 1947). The argument wasstraightforward:
(1)' Ibid.,I p. 48.
(2) Interpreted from: Chief 0. Awolowo, Path to Nigerian
Nationalism, Faber and Faber, London, 1947. Cited in B.
Dudley, ibid., p. 50.
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It was that in a heterogeneous society such
as Nigeria's, political stability could be
achieved only if ethnic conglomerates were
grouped together to form a single self-ad-
ministering poltical entity and only by such
means can the cultural heritage of the
different ethnic groups be protected and 1
safeguarded and poltiical advance assured.
But while such a move could assure the AG the prospect of
control of the Yoruba-speaking areas, it was not likely
to attract support from other ethnic groups.
The AG, however, has been described as a "caucus party",
deriving its active support from the business class of
merchants, transporters and contractors, and the educated
class. It relied largely on the Yoruba-speaking peoples for
mobilizing the electorate.
The third party, and one of the most influential parties to
be formed was the Nigerian Peoples Congress (NPC), which was
formed in 1951. Somewhat like the AG, NPC was an offshoot
of a cultural association, the Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa (JMA)
(lit.: the association of peoples of the North). The party
was the only party with restricted membership, this being open
only to "people of Northern Nigerian descent" as the party's
constitution was later to specify; and as its motto
proudly took: "One North; One People, Irrespective of Religion,
Rank, or Tribe."
The NPC's leader, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduana
of Sokoto, was Premier of the North until his death in the
military coup of 1966; in this, the NPC was unlike the AG
(1) B. Dudley, op. cit, p. 50.
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whose leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, left the premiership
of the West regional government to become Leader of the
Opposition in the federal legislature after the 1959 elections--
and the NCNC, whose leader, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, left the
Premiership of the East regional government to become first
leader of the Senate, the federal second chamber in 1960, then
Governor-General in 1962, and a year later the first President
of the Republic of Nigeria. The fact that Alhaji Sir Ahmadu
Bello remained the Premier of the North gave his deputy,
Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the opportunity to become
the first and only Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria,
a position the latter held until his death in the military
coup of 1966. From 1954 to 1966 the NPC remained the dominant
coalition partner (with NCNC) in the federal government.
But the preference of the leader of theparty to remain Premier
of the North showed where the NPC's priorities lay with
respect to the Nigerian political process and also where the
ultimate power in the federation resided: "that power resided
in the North."'
There were, besides the three main parties, numerous
other smaller parties. But they were highly localized parties,
based essentially on specific interests and whose main
significance was that they provided avenues for one or the
other of the three dominant parties, through alliances by means
of which they could extend their electoral reach into ethnic
groups outside their principal sphere of influence.
(1) Ibid., pp. 50-51.
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The important thing to note from the foregoing description
is that as parties emerged and gained control over the
machinery of government, they increasingly became avenues
through which ethnic consciousness and solidarity were
largely espoused and maintained. This was not surprising,
as these parties drew most of their power and financial
support from their ethnic constituencies.
2.2.1 Regionalism and Problems of National Development
The MacPherson constitution marked the start of a full-
scale swing towards regionalism. Between 1954 and 1959 the
region became the principal arena of politics, "the field
where the action was." Though the 1951 constitution had
conferred on the regions the power to make their own laws,
there still remained some constraints on that power. The
difficulties ,which the constraints created led to demands
for increased autonomy for the regions, a demand that was
met with the introduction of a new constitution, the Lyttel-
ton Constitution, in 1954. Included among the key points of
this constitution were:
(a) Nigeria was to be a federation made up
of federal government and three regional govern-
ments, each with specified powers such that no
one government could legislate on matters not
allocated to it. (b) The federal legislature,
to be composed of an equal number of members from
each of the three regions, was to be directly
elected, and whichever party won a majority of
the seats in the federal legislature would form
the federal government. (c) Each region was to
have its own civil service which would be
headed by the regional executive to which the
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bureaucracy would be responsible. (e) Each
region was to have the power to determine yhen
it would become internally self-governing.
The increasing regionalization of functions and
activities arising from the constitutions so to say, could
not have occurred without a serious dent on overall balanced
development. For example, the "regionalization" of the
bureaucracy, and all the structural changes that went
with it, meant that the civil servant no longer had the
choice of what region he/she could serve in, or for the prospec-
tive civil servant, a choice in where to seek employment.
The regionalization of the public service meant that the
civil servant could now work, or seek employment only in his/
her "region of origin," which also meant his/her ethnic
origin. Easterners, the bulk of whom were Ibos, working in
the West had perforce to move to the East or face a loss of
employment, and what applied to the West applied equally to
the other origins. The probess did not stop with the main
civil service; it extended to the corporations, the para-
statals, and to a large extent, to the private sector.
Furthermore, as an employee, these workers found that the
level of their tax varied with the region in which they resided:
they paid the most income tax if they resided in the East and
and the least if their residence were in the North.
(1)-Ibid, p. 52.
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Parents with children of school-going age found that if
they resided in the West, they did not have to pay fees
for their schoolchildren in primary schools, but they had
to do so if their place of abode was in the East or in the
North.
In light of this ethnically and regionally oriented
political structure, development of an effective or effi-
cient planning for an overall national development could
not be guaranteed. As Aboyade (1968) noted in reference
to the ethno-political scheme of things:
For purposes of planned development, there was
not so much a government as a collection of
regions at the center. [The Federal Govern-
ment] was caught in the continuous struggle
for regional economic advantage, especially
as the resource picture became less promising
as the years rolled by. This struggle for
regional economic advantage, known in Nigerian
journalistic parlance as "sharing the national
cake," provides the key to understanding the
economic planning strategy and plan implementa-
tion. The energies of the people were consumed
by the politics of regional rivalry--the politi-
cal game at the center received more than
usual prominence among all regions. 1
A practical example of Aboyade's view can be shown by the
problems experienced during the execution of the country's
first National Development Plan (1962-1968). The
(1) o. Aboyade, Rlations Between Central and Local Insti-
tutions in the DeveIoping Countries, cited In E. Dean,
Plan Impiementation in N'igeria 1962-1966. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1972, p. 52.
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National Development Plan is a policy document
prepared every five years by the central government.
The aim of the National Development Plan is to take stock
of previous performances of the national economy and the
resources available to it, and with these set priorities
in terms of the sectors where investments would go for the
following five years. The 1962-1968 Plan is often referred
to as the first of such plans, although a similar plan was
started in 1946 by the British administration, but was never
implemented.
Two central agencies--the National Economic Council
(NEC) and the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) were responsible
for coordinating the first plan. Each of the three regions
was required to submit its own sub-plan, according to the
national guidelines, which the two central agencies would
coordinate into a national plan.
But the regional orientation of Nigerian politics
conflicted with the attempt to implement the plan, and in
particular with the attempt to implement the priorities set
1
forth under the inspiration of the Federal planners.
Regional rivalries, and the difficulty of influencing the
regions to implement the plan's policies and priorities,
influenced the formulation of the plan itself. Each region
attempted to secure the largest possible expenditure target
(1) E. Dean, Plan Implementation in Nigeria: 1962-1966.
Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 53.
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for its own plan, and, by implication, the largest federal
financial support for its plan. Thus, Clark (1965, p. 261)
wrote:
The regional planning groups went about the
planning exercise independently; each drew up
its own program and employed its own method
of review and evaluation. Only under strong
pressure was a uniform sectoral format em-
ployed for the presentation of the regional
plans in the national document.2
Clark further noted that rivalry among the governments often
hindered the interchange of ideas, information, or personnel.
Regional plans embodied an attempt to diversify exports on
a regional basis. Some examples are the plan of the East
to foster cocoa production, which was a specialty of the
West, and the West's plan to encourage rubber and cotton,
which were specialties of the Mid-West and North, respective-
3
ly. Dean (1972, p. 54) has also emphasized: "the region-
alization of the planning process simply provided no format
for comparing benefit/cost ratios of potential projects
within the sector." For example, there was no office in
which the merits of an irrigation project in the North
could be compared with the merits of'farm settlements in
4
the West.
(1) Ibid., p. 54.
(2) P. Clark, "Economic Planning for a Country in Transition:
Nigeria," in Edwin Dean (Ed.), ibid., p. 54.
(3) Federal Republic of Nigeria: National Development Plan:
1962-1966, pp. 220, 229, 273, and 286.
(4) E. Dean (1972), op. cit., p. 54.
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The NEC and the JPC did not effectively coordinate
regional and federal planning. This was partly because
the decisions of these two agencies were not binding on
the various governments, but also because in the middle
nineteen-sixties, antagonistic regional leaders apparently
were unable to agree on any other forum for the negotiation
of major political compromises, so that NEC and JPC meetings
were devoted to important political problems rather than
planning.
Some specific instances of potential conflict between
plan implementation and regionalism may be briefly examined.
They involve the location of a proposed steel mill and
national secondary schools. The proposed steel mill was
the second largest project in the 1962-1966 plan, with an
expected cost of h 30 million, and it was probably the only
major project that was held up because of regional rivalries.
The NEC debated this project from 1959 until the fall of
the civilian government in 1966, yet no firm decision was
taken, partly because of the desire of each region to have
the mill, and partly because of serious technical difficulties.
At one point; it appeared that the East and the North would
each have separate integrated mills, while it was promised
that consideration would be given to the establishment of a
third mill in the West.2
(1) E. Dean, ibid., p. 55.
( 2) Ibid., p. 55.
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In the case of national secondary schools, their siting
was intended to foster political integration. Three ministers
who were selected to decide their location came from Sokoto
in the North, Warri in the Midwest, and Afikpo in the East:
the three schools were allocated to Sokoto, Warri, and
Afikpo. 1
Further events tend to support the view that relations
among the regions were a strategic problem including the
events relating to the campaign to create the Midwestern
Region, a fourth region carved out of the Western region
in 1963, and events relating to the dissatisfaction in the
North and among the minority tribes, that is, the tribes
other than the three largest. But the most dramatic reflec-
tion of the ethnic problems was provided by the events
following the military coup of January 1966. This coup was
initially regarded as a nationalist effort on the part of
a nationalist army to end the instability of the old regime.
But within a few months it was interpreted in ethnic terms.
The second coup of July 1966 was followed by the massacre of
the Eastern.ers (Ibos) in the North, and finally, by the secession
of Easterners in May 1967 resulting in the Civil War which
lasted from 1967 until January 1970.
In conclusion, the regional and ethnic orientation of
the political structure has led to the political struggle
becoming a struggle among ethnic groups. Given this structure,
the critical problem of each political regime, whether civilian
('l) Ibid., p. 56.
116
or military, is to distribute power among the ethnic groups,
especially among the three dominant ones--Hausa-Fulani,
Ibos, and Yorubas.
The efforts to decentralize administration close to
these groups have been the focus of the subsequent military
governments. Starting with the first military takeover of
1966, General Aguiyi Ironsi sought to replace the old re-
gional structure with the earlier British-instituted pro-
vincial system. But his plans did not materialize as Ironsi
himself was deposed in another military coup d'etat six
months after he seized power. His successor, Lt. Colonel
(and later, General) Yakubu Gowon from the Middle Belt in
the Northern region, also made the unity of the country the
center of his policy. The successful waging of the civil
war, which prevented the secession of the Eastern region,
and the creation of twelve states in 1967 in order to involve
the minority groups to a greater extent, are a few examples
of this effort.
In drafting the national constitution, which ushered
in the civilian regime in 1979, the issue of national unity
was again the central concern.
... national integration shall be actively
encouraged, whilst discrimination on the
grounds of place of origin, sex, or religion,
status, ethnic or linguistic association or
ties shall be prohibited. (1979 Draft Con-
stitution; Section 15(2).
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Part of how such a policy can be pursued is illustrated by
the following:
The composition of the Government of the
Federal or any of its agencies and the con-
duct of its affairs shall be carried out
in such a manner as to reflect the federal
character of Nigeria--there shall be no pre-
dominance of persons from a few states, or
from a few ethnic or other sectional groups
in that government or any of its agencies.
(1979 Draft Constitution; Section 14(13).)
The effectiveness of this constitutional provision for
dealing with the ethnic situation was,perhaps, first put to
test during the 1979 general election. The constitution
stipulated that in order for any political party to win the
electorate and thus control the national assembly, the party
must win at least 25 percent of all votes cast in not less
than two-thirds of the 19 states.
Six political parties contested the election. They
included the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP), the United
Party of Nigeria (UNP), the National Party of Nigeria (NPN),
the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), and the Nigerian Peoples
Party (NPP). The GNPP, PRP, and NPN are respectively led
by Alhaji Ibrahim Waziri, Alhaji Aminu Kano, and Alhaji
Shehu Shagari, former political 'bosses' from the former
Northern region. In turn, the UPN was led by Chief Obafemi
Awolowo, the former political boss of the banned Action
Group (AG) of the Western Region. At the same time, Dr.
Nnamdi Azikiwe, also the former leader of the banned NCNC
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party largely controlled by the East, became the new leader
and presidential contender for the NPP party.
After the NPN, Shagari's party, had won the election,
Awolowo, the leader and presidential contender for the UPN,
would not concede victory to Alhaji Shehu Shagari (NPN's
leader) even after the court had decided in favor of the NPN.
But what was most remarkable was the voting pattern of that
election (see Table 2.9). The UPN, which was an off-shoot
of the former Action Group party in the former Western Re-
gion, carried only the states in the former Western Region.
The GNPP, PRP, and NPN, all of which are Northern parties,
also won most of their votes from the states in the former
Northern Region. In a similar fashion, the NPP, an off-
shoot of the former NCNC, got two of its three states from
the former Eastern Region.
Another test of the constitutional provisions for eth-
nic balance is provided by the new capital construction. In
Chapter 7 it is shown that, in spite of the requirement for
balancing personnel appointments in governmental agencies,
the pinnacle of political control at the FCDA was still
largely dominated by one of the most powerful of all the
ethnic groups--the Hausa-Fulani. It will also be evident
that some of the instruments for implementing this goal of
national unity were'largely ineffective.
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Table 2.9
Party Control of States
(1979 Presidential Election)
GNPP UPN NPN - PRP NPP
Bornu (N) Bendel (W) Bauchi (N) Kano (N) Anambra (E)
Gongola (N) Lagos (W) Benue (N) Imo (E)
Ogun (W) Kaduna (N) Plateau (N)
Ondo (W) Kwara (N)
Oyo (W) Cross River (E)
Niger (N)
Rivers (E)
Sokoto (N)
N,W,E.... indicate the states that were carved out of the
former Northern, Western, and Eastern regions
respectively.
Source: Derived from: Dudley, Billy. An Introduction to
Nigerian Government and Politics. Indiana University
Press, 1982, p. 205.
120
In the discussion that follows, the history of the new
capital relocation is traced in the context of this contentious
ethnic environment. The discussion will again reveal
that, as in other matters of national concern, the question
of a new capital was mainly seen by the regions, later the
states, and national leaders from the angle in which their
ethnic groups would be benefited--and not necessarily in
the interest of the whole country.
2.3 The History of Relocation: 1914-1975
The location of the capital of Nigeria is a question
that has arisen periodically since 1914 when the Southern
and Northern Nigerian Protectorates were amalgamated by
the British to form the present geographic boundaries of
Nigeria. The first proponent of moving the capital out of
Lagos was the country's first colonial governor, Sir
Frederick Lugard. The city of Lagos appalled Lugard. In
1914 he stated:
To the lagoons and swamps must be added the
often laden skies reflected in the grey
waters, the hot and heavy atmosphere during
much of the year, and the vast maze of long
established slums which, at a density of
30,000 to the square mile, in the hands of
determined owners with the rights of British
subjects, have been the despair of a long
succession of town-planners and sanitary
officers.1
(1) Cited in T.N. Tamuno, "The Capital City in Modern Nigeria."
Nigerian Institute-of Social and Rcanomic Research, Vol.
14(1), March 1972, p. 96.
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With the amalgamation of a "new Nigeria," in 1914 Lugard
turned to the city of Kaduna as a logical location for
a new capital. Here, he could "plan a capital on a virgin
site with an eye to vistas, and express, on the grand
scale, that soldiers love." Lugard's plans were never
translated into action. The colonial office rejected his
initial proposals. War broke out and the need for economic
austerity damned the plan.
The questions about the status of Lagos and its role
as capital were raised again during the 1950 constitutional
conference. The delegates to this conference made up of
representatives from the Western, Eastern, and Northern
provinces and Lagos and colony, interested themselves in the
position of the national capital city based on Lagos Island.
Other aspects of the same question dealt with administrative
and legislative arrangements for the adjoining "rural
districts" of Ikeja, Badagry and Epe. Conflicts occurred
over the position of Lagos. The Nigerian delegates who
attended the joint Lagos and Colony conferences and those
of the West regional conference in late 1949 decided that
Lagos Island and the "rural districts" of the Colony be
included in the Western Region for legislative and adminis-
trative purposes. But a majority of the delegates to the
General Conference at Ibadan in January 1950 agreed that the
"rural districts" should be merged with the Western Region
provided that the municipality of Lagos, as Nigeria's
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capital territory, was kept outside the Western region.
That decision was opposed by the representatives from the
Western Region, Lagos, and the Colony and by the British
Secretary of State, James Griffiths. Griffiths recognized
that the municipality and the Colony districts had for a
long time been administered together.
While Griffiths welcomes that Lagos be merged with the
Western Region for legislative and administrative purposes,
he wanted to safeguard the position of the capital city.
Accordingly, port facilities and expenses on Lagos as a
capital city were to remain a central responsibility, and
the Central Council of Ministers were to approve the annual
estimates of the Lagos Town Council (LTC).1
With the emergence of the country's political parties--
the NCNC, AG, and NPC, the position of Lagos became a subject
of even greater contention. The emergence of these parties
had coincided with what can generally be described as
intensified "divisive ethnic politics," as each -party leader
supported national issues only to the extent that they
benefited their ethno-regional constituencies. A brief
description of what transpired between these parties on the
position of the capital will help illuminate the point.
(1) T.N. Tamuno, ibid., p. 97.
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Before the 1953 Constitutional Conference in London,
the leader of the NCNC party, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe had failed
to win an election to the Western House of Assembly as a
Lagos member of the House of Representatives. The AG
charged that because of this failure, the NCNC, 'smarting'
under Azikiwe's defeat, tried unsuccessfully in March and
August 1952 to pass motions in the House of Representatives
demanding the separation of Lagos from the Western Region.
In another but similar move, the NPC which then controlled
the Northern regional government, had demanded the separa-
tion of Lagos from the West because of a disagreement with
the AG over the terms of the impending independence from
Britain. 1 Thus, when these three parties and other
delegates met in July and August of 1953 to discuss further
the position of Lagos, at another consitutional conference,
an agreement could not be reached. Again, the British
Secretary of State, Oliver Lyttelton, was invited to decide
the issue for them. This time, Lyttelton (later Lord
Chados) reversed an earlier position of the British Govern-
ment and favored making Lagos the commercial and political
capital of Nigeria. Thereafter, the former Lagos municipality
(1).T.N. Tamuno had pointed out that AG ministers had re-
signed over a disagreement with NPC over a debate in the
House of Representatives for self-government in 1956. Over
this debate, the AG ministers in the Central Council of Mini-
sters made public statements which "embarrassed" their former
NPC colleagues. The NPC, which then controlled the Northern
Regional government, negotiated with an Eight-Point Pro-
grammes advocating a confederal arrangement for Nigeria, an
arrangement which included the demand for the separation of
Lagos from the Western Region.
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was separated from the Western Region to become known as
the federal territory.
There were two basic arguments which were more relevant
to the controversial position of Lagos (Tamuno, 1972, p.
96). The first dealt with the contention of NPC leaders
that the status of Lagos raised an economic, not a political,
problem. The other argument, again, was that Nigeria, under
a new federal constitution, should adopt the practice of
making the federal capital city independent of any con-
stituent unit of the federation, and merging Lagos with the
Western Region would violate this principle. The economic
argument had three other aspects, including the contention
that administrative and legislative arrangements for the
federal capital territory were connected with the other
controversial issue of revenue allocation. Since 1947,
the unsatisfactory principle of derivation had played a
major part in revenue allocation in Nigeria. The excision
of Lagos from the Western Region would therefore seriously
affect the quota for that region. Another aspect dealt
with the argument that Lagos, historically, had been de-
veloped with public funds and that such benefits should
not be handed over to any region. Thirdly, there was the
proposal that Lagos should mean more than the island, should
extend to vital Apapa port, which Northern Nigeria then
1
needed for easy access to the coast.
(1) Lyttleton's decision to excise Lagos according to Tamuno,
was taken in order to (1) allay NPC's fears concerning North-
ern Nigeria's access to the sea, and (2) persuade NPC to drop
its demand for a confederal state of Nigeria.
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Lyttleton's decision was vehemently opposed by AG, as
was evident in a memorandum it published on their return
from London. The memorandum reads: "...To the people of
the Western Region, however, Lagos is precisely what the
head is to the body of an individual." In other words,
if membership of the Nigerian community would mean the
cutting off of that head, they would prefer to keep out
of Nigeria, and remain an independent member of the British
Commonwealth of Nations. Put differently, the surest way
of driving the Western Region into demanding secession and
assenting it in due course of time is to sever Laqos from
it. 1
At this point the AG elected as an alternative to the
decision, supporting a new federal capital located at a
more central position. As its memorandum continues, "...
Lagos is not a suitable place for the capital of Federal
Nigeria." Strategically, Lagos was vulnerable; nor was it
geographically central. Lagos, as the powerhouse of Ni-
gerian nationalism and radicalism, could not be made safe
for the NPC leaders who disliked the hooliganism of young
Lagosians. A safer place, the AG argued, should be found
elsewhere, preferably "near Kafanchan which is almost central
geographically and strategically comparatively safe, for
the purposes of building a new and neutral capital." 2
(1) Action Group. "Lagos Belongs to the West," Ibid., 1953,
p. 10.
(2) Action Group, Ibid., pp. 15-16.
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This support for building a new capital elsewhere by the
West should be noted, for when the issue to move the
capital from Lagos came up finally in 1976, the Western
State was one of the three states that strongly opposed the
movement. The factors influencing this later position will
be dealt with in detail in Chapter 4.
At another constitutional review of 1957, the future
role of Lagos once again became a subject of confrontation.
Various parties put forward different suggestions for the
proper future role of Lagos. It was finally decided that
in the general interest of Nigeria, the existing status of
the city would remain unchanged.
Although the constitutional conferences held during the
late 1940's and 1950's did not elect to relocate the capital
city, they paved the way to Nigerian independence under a
federal constitution in October 1960. With independence,
the new capital development became strictly a Nigerian
issue, and the question was no longer subject to the views
or interests of British government officials. The question
of relocating the capital was considered by the 1962 United
Nations study on "Metropolitan Lagos." In the study, it was stated
that the federal government's role as an employer had in-
creased substantially by 1962 and that this might justify
the removal of the federal capital from Lagos. It also
outlined the fact that a transfer of the capital would
take six to ten years, that the attractions of Lagos would
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still draw people, and that regardless of the location of
the capital, major infrastructure improvements were needed
in Lagos. After considering the cost of a new capital,
the authors of the study decided against the removal of the
federal capital because "the benefits which might be de-
rived from such a step are not commensurate with the capi-
tal expenditure involved."
In 1965 the management of the Lagos Executive Develop-
ment Board (LEDB) proposed to the Federal Government that
the federal secretariat should be moved to Otta, an area
23 miles north of Lagos. The ministry charged with land
control in Lagos ruled in opposition to such a relocation.
Two years later the following statement was delivered to
the Sagoe Commission of Enquiry looking into the affairs of
the defunct LEDB:
A paper entitled Roles of Master Plans for Metro-
politan Lagos 1965-75 is now being submitted to
the tribunal by a Senior Planning Officer. I
[Fadahunsi] am in agreement with most of what
is included in the paper but would like to state
that very serious consideration should be given
at this stage to the relocation of the federal
government offices on the mainland.2
By this time broad changes were occurring in Nigerian
politics that were central to the development of a new
(1) United Nations, Report on Metropolitan Lagos, Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Affairs, 1963.
(2) Cited in J. Moore, "Planning Abuja: The Politics of
New Capital Construction," B.S. Thesis, Princeton University,
1982, p. 23.
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capital. The civilian government that had held power from
1960-1966 was toppled in January 1966 by a coup, leading
to a military government led by General Ironsi. In July
of that year a countercoup occurred, and General Gowon be-
came head of the Federal Military Government. On May 30,
1967 the Eastern Region seceeded from the rest of the
country and declared itself the sovereign republic of
Biafra. Just six days later the federal army initiated an
attack on the new Republic of Biafra, the opening phase of
a civil war that would last until January 1970. This
bloody conflict would serve to change the entire perspec-
tive on the new capital issue.
2.4 Summary
In this chanter we examined some of the charac-
teristics of the problems that relocation of the capital
was expected to solve. We noted that these problems
hinged on: the uneven urban distributional pattern,
arC a long-term ethnic and political disunity. We then
traced the history of relocation in light of these two
major circumstances. The history of relocation prior to
1960 reveals that the issue did not have sufficient
political support to be translated into action. The major
factors prohibiting the relocation of the capital city
were ethnic and regional political effects. Social, po-
litical, and economic changes took place after 1967 which
converted the general need for an improved capital into
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a determined political decision backed by economic vitality
aimed at securing a new level of social and national
stability. The discussions of the nature and character-
istics of the socio-economic and political changes and how
they affected the relocation question are the subject of
Chapter 3.
CHAPTER 3
FORCES OF RELOCATION: IMMEDIATE FACTORS
The discussion in this chapter focuses exclusively on
the immediate circumstances that brought a fresh and added
pressure to move finally the capital city. The immediate
factors hinge on: first, the position of Lagos in terms of
problems of political control and its urban growth dynamics
and physical planning needs. The second set of factors
hinges on the radical developments that occurred on the
country's economic and political scene without which many
analysts believed relocation would not have been possible.
These two factors, although not necessarily new problems,
contributed to bringing fresh attention and urgency to the
new capital's supporters when the issue of relocation was
brought up once more.
3.1 The Position of Lagos: Problems of Political Control
and Urban Growth Dynamics
Apart from the regional problems arising from the
national urban development pattern discussed in the last
chapter, there were other factors at the micro-level that
gave further impetus to the relocation of the capital. These
factors relate to the problem associated with the physical,
demographic, and ethnic characteristics of the former capital
city, Lagos. Proponents of the new capital have argued that
Lagos could no longer function effectively as a national
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capital because of these problems. An examination of these
characteristics will help to illuminate the magnitude and
nature of the problems and their impact on the relocation
question.
3.1.1 An Overview of Lagos
The city of Lagos is located at the southwest corner of
the country on the Atlantic coast (Figure 1.1). As noted in
Chapter 2, the city was mainly oriented towards Europe and
North America, "serving essentially as a transmission center
for the dispatch of primary raw materials and slaves."(1)
Among the towns considered to become the capital of the
newly created Southern Nigeria in 1906, Lagos was chosen
because of its eminent position as a trading town with easy
communication with Europe and with the interior parts of the
country through the railways, which had been commenced from
Lagos before the end of the nineteenth century.(2) The other
factor favoring the choice of Lagos as the capital was the
existence of some rudimentary infrastructure, such as water
and electricity supply. Even at that time, the possibility
of removing the center of administration from Lagos to
elsewhere was considered by the Britith.
At the time of amalgamation in 1914 of the Northern and
Southern Provinces of Nigeria, Lagos was, for the same
(1) A.T. Salau, "A New Capital for Nigeria: Planning,
Problems, and Prospects," Africa Today 24(4), 1977, p. 11.
(2) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal
Capital of Nigeria, December 1975, p. 10.
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reasons given above, preferred over such towns as Calabar,
Port Harcourt, and Kaduna. Consequently, Lagos continued to
be better developed than other towns and cities within the
country. In 1915 Lagos was provided with pipe-borne water.
In 1917 it was declared a first-class township, and had
elected representatives on its municipal council in 1920.
Eight years later, in 1928, a development board, the Lagos
Executive Development Board, was set up with the general duty
of planning the city and reclaiming some of the nearby
swamps. As noted in Chapter 2, the position of Lagos had
become one of the most controversial issues among political
parties existing within the country when the British
government decided that Lagos should remain the federal
capital and that the municipal area of Lagos should become
federal Territory and should come directly under the
administration of the federal government. Thus, the Lagos
municipal area was excised from the existing Western Region
and declared the Federal territory under the administration
of the Federal Government. This position became crystallized
under the 1960 Independence Constitution which declared that
"Nigeria shall consist of three Regions and the Federal
Territory."
With the creation of states on May 27, 1967, the
Federation of Nigeria was divided into twelve states, one of
which is Lagos State which includes the area previously
referred to as the Federal Territory. Thus, the
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administration of what had previously been Federal Territory
came directly under a State Government, namely the Lagos
State Government. But Lagos continued to serve as the
capital of Nigeria. In addition, it was to serve as the
capital of the newly created Lagos State Government.
The location of Lagos at the southwest corner of the
country presented problems of political control and
administration. This problem coincides with what Hamden
(1964) termed the major problems of coastal location of
capital cities in Africa: "the difficulty of political
control, the weakened grip of the capital on the distant
provinces, and its failure to strike a balance between the
component regions of the state."(1)
The problem of insularity of decision makers may be seen
to be exacerbated by inadequate communication networks
(telephone, transportation, etc.) joining the capital and the
rest of the country, especially given that the distances from
Lagos to many of the state capitals are long. For example,
four of the nine state capitals in the North are located at
distances of more than 2,000 kilometers from Lagos. Thus,
siting the capital at a more equidistant location from all
the states not only would cut the distances, but also was
expected to exert its influence to these states much more
effectively.
(1) G. Hamden, "Capitals of New Africa," Economic Geography
40(3), 1964, p. 239.
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3.1.2 Lagos: Urban Growth Pressure
The increased attention brought upon Lagos by its dual
status as both the federal capital and a state capital, as
well as its disproportionate share of the national
infrastructure, continued to fuel its growth. Lagos is the
most populated city in the country. With a 1978 population
of nearly four million, and an average growth rate of 9.5
percent between 1963 and 1968 (Table 3.1), it is considered
to be one of the fastest growing cities in Nigeria.
But the importance of the city's development lies in its
triple role as the main administrative, commercial, and
industrial center of the country. Since the administrative
reform of 1967 resulted in the creation of states, the
importance of the function of the city has been magnified by
its double role as both the federal and state capitals.
Its importance as the chief commercial center is
manifested in its control of the largest seaports and
airports, the central bank as well as the largest number of
foreign and indigenous banks in the country. The Lagos Port
handles about 80 percent of the imports, and about 70 percent
of the exports of the country. As noted in Chapter 2, Lagos
accounts for approximately 44 percent of the total
manufacturing employment in the country. The high per capita
income, high level of infrastructure, and its large
population density make it particularly attractive for
industries to locate in Lagos.
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Table 3.1
POPULATION GROWTH OF LAGOS, 1866-1963
Intercensal increase or decrease
Total
Population
Number Percent
Area Covered by Census'
(in square miles)
25,083
28,518
37,452
32,508
41,847
73,788
99,690
126,108
230,256
267,407
449,500
665,246
1866
1871
1881
1891 d
1901
1911
1921
1931
1950e
1952 f
1962
19639
*1967
*1975
*1978
3,435
8,934
-4,944
9,339
31, 919
25,924
26, 318
104,148
37, 151
182,093
215,746
833,954
1,500,800
1,000,000
-13
1.55
1.55
1.55
c
18.00
20.17
25.59
27.20
27.20
27.20
27.20
48.00
60.00
62.00
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* Estimates, projections and field surveys (no census) reported in:
(1) Amos, A. (1974). Land Use and Industrialization in Lagos, Vol. 3.
(2) Abstracts from Lagos Master Plan Project Unit-Qualitative Land Use
Survey, 1976
a The first decennial census of Lagos was taken in 1871; the firs-
enumeration for registration of births and deaths was taken in 1866.
b Before 1901, the census area included only that part of Lagos Island
West of Macgregor Canal, i.e., all of Lagos Island except Ikoyi.
In 1901 Ebute Metta was included. The total area covered by the
1901 census can be estimated at 3.85 square miles, the area of the
island (1.55 sq. mi.) plus Ebute Metta west of Denton Street (2.30 sq.mi.)
Year of
Censusa
1,499,200
3,000,000
4,000,000
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Table 3.1 continued
In 1911 the boundaries of the town were defined according
to the Sanitary District of Lagos, which nearly coincided
with the town boundaries fixed in 1917. This township
boundary was used for the 1921 census, but was expanded in
1927, bringing the 1931 census area to slightly more than
25 square miles.
By 1950 minor boundary changes had again been made; since
then the area has remained at a total of 27.20 square miles.
b
c Not available (see note ).
d The 1891 census showed a decrease because it counted only
those persons "ordinarily resident" in the houses visited,
whereas the 1881 census had enumerated "all persons" in Lagos.
Moreover, the 1881 enumerators were paid on a per entry basis,
whereas in 1891 they were paid on a daily or job basis and
hence might have been less assiduous in registering names.
e No census was taken in the 1940's because of the war, but
one was needed in 1950 in order to compile voters' lists
for Lagos Town Council election. The 1950 census covered
Lagos only.
f Because Lagos was included in the Western Region count in
the 1952 census, occasional discrepancies appear in the
reported figures. Some sources put the city's population
at 272,000 instead of 267,407, but the Federal Office of
Statistics in Lagos has confirmed the lower figure.
g Because the 1962 national census was widely disputed, a new
census was taken a year later. The 1963 census is believed
to be more accurate, especially for Lagos.
SOURCES: (l) P.A. Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria
(London: Oxford University Press, 1926), vol. 4; Population
Census of Lagos, 1931 (Lagos: Federal Office of Statistics,
1931); Population Census of Lagos, 1950 (Lagos: Federal
Office of Statistics, 1950); Population Census of the Western
Region of Nigeria, 1952 (Lagos: Government Statistician,1953-54);
Population Census of Lagos, 1963 (Lagos: Federal Office of
Statistics, 1963).
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Apart from the economic and administrative function, the
city is also the social and cultural center of Nigeria. This
is so, partly because of its 'lead factor' over the rest of
the country as a result of its being the capital of the
federation, and partly because of the concentration of
political and economic activities there. For example, Lagos
now houses a multimillion Naira cultural center and sports
stadium, both of which are designed to provide a lead to the
rest of Nigeria.(l)
The concentration of activities detrimentally affects
both the functioning of Lagos proper and the balance of
Nigeria's urban development. Because of its attractiveness
in job opportunities, amenities, etc., Lagos creates many
'pull factors' which draw people to it particularly from
rural areas. Consequently, the city witnesses a dramatic
increase in population, such that, by 1972, migrant
population accounted for 75 percent of its total population
increase.(2)
The consequence of the rapid population increase is
reflected in slums, overcrowding, squatter settlements,
traffic congestion, acute shortage of housing, and breakdown
of power and sanitary services. For example, despite its low
level of car ownership (22 per 1,000 population by 1974),
Lagos is considered one of the most congested cities in the
(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal
Capital, ibid., op. cit., p. 31.
(2) S.K. Mechta, "Some Demographic and Economic Correlates of
Primate Cities: A Case for Re-evaluation," Demography 1(1),
1964, p. 136.
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world.(1) With an average of 3.8 persons per room, it ranks
as the most crowded city in Nigeria (Table 3.2). It is
estimated that there is a shortage of over 40,000 housing
units in Lagos, which means that approximately 300,000 people
have no regular habitation.(2) The magnitude of its urban
problem is perhaps best summed up by a comment from a
prominent newspaper:
The problems of Lagos as a national and state capital,
chief sea and airport, and main industrial and
commercial center were becoming too complex and
intractable. Particularly the end of the civil war and
the oil boom of the early seventies had unleashed on
the city such an unprecedented influx of people and had
raised the tempo of economic activity to such level
that it made the city seem overburdened. Perennial
traffic jams, intolerable congestion, chaotic sanitary
situation, inadequate social amenities, an alarming
crime rate, had become its trademark defying all
solutions.(3)
A weekly magazine, West Africa, contains further
information on some problems in Lagos:
...Those who officially have a roof over their heads
often have little more ... and pay outrageously for
what they have.... Public transport is inadequate and
costly. Some workers spend up to four or five hours a
day travelling to and from their work and spend as much
as 25 percent of their incomes for the privileges.(4)
(1) The New Nigeria, January 11, 1982, p. 11.
(2) See West Africa, December 13, 1976, p. 1923.
(3) The New Nigeria, Ibid., op. cit., p. 11.
(4) West Africa, ibid., op. cit., p. 1923.
Table 3.2
Housing Conditions in Selected Nigerian Towns
Percentage Average Percentage Percentage Percentage
of households number of of houses of houses of houses
occupying persons with pipe- with flush with
Town one room per room borne water toilet electricity
Lagos 72.5 3.8 71.7 43.5 93.2
Port Harcourt 51.5 2.4 75.0 18.6 81.4
Benin 48.0 2.2 24.9 4.0 59.3
Warri 59.9 2.6 62.4 10.9 89.7
Kaduna 63.9 2.1 40.3 14.1 53.3
Kano 69.1 2.4 26.1 1.8 69.1
Ilorin 23.9 1.6 30.7 10.3 28.4
Ibadan 47.3 2.1 33.4 25.2 56.1
Onitsha - 3.6 72.7 4.5 -
Un-Source: Adejuwon, Adeniran. Assessment of Low Cost Housing Program in Nigeria.
published MSC Thesis. Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, 1979, p. 8.
140
Because of the urban problems touched upon above, the
most common argument has been that Lagos has lost its
effectiveness as a capital and has become an embarrassment to
the country. In its report, the Panel set up by the
federal government to study the feasibility of retaining
Lagos or creating a new capital, flatly asserted that:
Lagos remains one of the dirtiest capitals in the
world, as most parts of the city suffer from perennial
stench ... apart from the fact that these conditions
are a disgrace to a country like Nigeria, they do not
in any way enhance efficient administration of the
country.(1)
In addition to the demographic problems, administrative
problems have also emerged between the federal and Lagos
state governments as a result of the city's dual status as
both the seat of Lagos state and the federal government.
These conflicts have arisen in areas of fisheries
development, housing, municipal affairs, land tenure, etc.
For example, although the responsibility for fis.heries was
specifically allocated to the Lagos state government by
Government notice No. 992 of 1967, the power given to the
federal government under Fisheries Decree No 30 of 1971 has
been used to deprive the Lagos state government of the
responsibility for the licensing of trawlers landing in
Lagos. This has led to some controversy and loss of income
to the Lagos state government.
(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal
Capital, ibid., op. cit., p. 35.
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The difficulty of the Lagos state government in getting
the federal government establishments to comply with housing
and town planning regulations of the Lagos state government
has contributed to what the Panel on the Location of the
Federal Capital termed "the planning confusion in
Metropolitan Lagos."(1) In other instances, the federal
government has interfered with the Lagos State government
regarding the affairs of the Lagos City Transport Service,
which it insists must be run as a social service.
Specifically, the federal government has overruled or
curtailed proposed fare increases without giving sufficient
grants to cover the necessary rise in operational costs.
This has put the Lagos City Transport Service in great
financial strain.
Land tenure control is yet another major area of
conflict. Although land is an exclusive responsibility of
the Lagos state government (as it is of all other states
within their areas of jurisdiction), the dire need of the
federal government for land for its services and the scarcity
of land has sometimes led to appropriation of land vested in
the Lagos state, especially within Lagos without adequate
consultation.(2)
(1) Ibid., p. 32.
(2) Ibid., p. 32.
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3.1.3 Physical Planning Needs
One of the major contributing factors to the urban
growth problems in Lagos is a lack of adequate land space for
expansion. The city occupies approximately 62 square miles
in area and has an average density of 65,000 persons per
square mile. In some parts of the city, however, such as
Shomolu, the density is over 100,000 persons per square mile
(Table 3.1).
The high density results in overload of public
facilities such as water, electricity, and
telecommunications, schools, etc. The large increase in
population puts extra pressure on the existing administrative
and management machineries. The large densities also
contribute to general environmental degradations. It is
within this small span of land (62 square miles) that most of
the federal and Lagos state government establishments,
embassies, and most of the commercial and industrial
activities are located. Approximately one million persons
are employed by the federal government and its agencies in
Lagos.(1) It is estimated that 77.6 square miles of land is
required to adequately accommodate these persons in addition
to the present office space occupied by federal government
agencies.(2)
Because of the lack of land space in a city that is
fully urbanized, it is often difficult to plan effectively
(1) Ibid., p. 33.
(2) Ibid., p. 33.
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for infrastructural expansion. Even where vertical expansion
is contemplated, technological know-how is not enough
advanced as to facilitate such efforts.
In addition to land space constraints, the topography of
Lagos is almost flat, thus making drainage difficult. As the
Panel on the Location of the Federal Capital noted:
It will be a matter of some considerable difficulty and
expense to have a modern system of drainage throughout
the city.... For several months of the year,
especially during the period of heavy rainfall, it
becomes impossible for pedestrians to walk along some
major streets without removing their shoes and pulling
up their trousers and skirts as water in the streets
will be knee-deep.(1)
In the context of these problems, perhaps a valid
question to ask is, to what extent has the government
attempted to deal with them? In other words, has there been
at any time a conscious and deliberate effort on the part of
the federal government to formulate a long-term and
comprehensive plan to deal with these problems? Perhaps, a
good way to respond to the above question is to take a look
at the history of planning in Lagos.
As already stated, Lagos was just another town in an
isolated British colony. But the constitutional changes that
in 1914 brought about the amalgamation of the Southern and
Northern protectorates, giving birth to Nigeria, conferred on
the city the status of a Federal capital. It is doubtful
(1) Ibid., p. 35
144
that the colonial rulers considered the long-run implications
of making a very small island with physical handicaps the
capital of a very large country. For a long time no serious
attempts were made to confront many important planning issues
facing this capital of a growing country.
It was not until the end of the bubonic plague which
ravaged the city in 1929, that any attempt, for example, was
made to think of real development aimed at improvement of the
environment of Lagos. The incidence of the plague led to the
creation of the Lagos Executive Development Board (LEDB), a
planning agency which orchestrated the first slum clearance
in Isale-Eko, the residential quarters of earlier Lagosian
settlers. The slum clearance also resulted in the
development of the first housing estate, the Yaba Housing
Estate, in which the displaced dwellers of Isale Eko were
resettled.
Between 1945 and 1955, at the end of World War II,
various development plans were drawn up to aid the
resettlement of war veterans who were migrating in large
numbers to the city. But the programs developed within these
plans were only partially implemented. Thus, until October
1960, when Nigeria gained her independence from Britain,
Lagos had only benefited from "ad hoc planning." No
long-range comprehensive plans were developed. In 1963, a
team of experts from the United Nations (UN) was brought in
to analyze the problems facing Lagos. Among the problems
identified twenty-two years ago by this team, were (a)
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competition for land, (b) housing shortage, (c) growth of
slums, and (d) traffic and parking problems.(1) But a number
of recommendations made to combat these problems including
the need for a metropolitan government whose jurisdiction
would cover the administration of the entire federal
territory, were never implemented.
A major obstacle to the solutions of some of the
problems was a lack of an institutional framework within
which these solutions could be effected. The absence of a
viable institutional unit could be shown by the fact that,
for example, any agency involved in the problem of sewage
disposal in Lagos had to approach at least four agencies,
none of which was in a position to make a permanent and
binding decision.(2)
3.1.4 Lagos Ethnic Composition
One of the main criticisms against retaining Lagos as
the federal capital is that the city did not reflect the
nation's ethnic diversity. The Yorubas make up 72 percent of
all the ethnic groups in Lagos (Table 3.3). To supporters of
Abuja, that situation is inconsistent with a long sought-for
national unity. Thus, the Panel on the Location of the
Federal Capital wrote:
(1) C. Abrams, S. Kobe, 0. Koenisberger, M. Shapiro, and
M. Wheeler, Metropolitan Lagos, New York, United Nations,
1964, p. 56.
(2) S.O. Fadahunsi, "Lagos and its Dual Role as a Capital."
Daily Times, Lagos, September 11, 1975, p. 7. Cited in T.S.
Ademola, "A New Capital for Nigeria: Problems and
Prospects." Africa Today 24(4), October-December 1977.
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Table 3.3
Ethnic Group of Nigerians in the City of Lagos (1963)
Percent of
Total Total Population
Ethnic Group Population (Nigerians)
1. Yoruba 465,406 72.20
2. Ibo 99,638 15.46
3. Edo 20,450 3.17
4. Hausa 13,225 2.05
5. Efik 12,606 1.96
6. Ijaw 11,754 1.82
7. Urhobo 7,171 1.11
8. Ibibia 5,819 0.90
9. Itsekiri 2.703 0.42
10. Isoko 1,785 0.28
11. Ekoi 658 0.10
12. Nupe 556 0.09
13. Tiv 555 0.09
14. Idoma 485 0.08
15. Fulani 434 0.07
16. Igala 220 0.04
17. Annang 204 0.03
18. Igbirra 193 0.03
19. Poli 100 0.02
20. Yalla 67 0.001
21. Ogoni 65 0.001
22. Others 515 0.08
Total 664,609
Source: National Census of Population, Federal Office of Statistics,
Lagos, 1963.
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In our view the circumstances of Nigeria demand that
the capital be not situated within a city of the type
of Lagos with a strong conne-ction with one of the
major ethnic groups.... The present Lagos State is
predominantly a Yoruba state. The vast majority of the
people speak the same language and have the same or
similar cultures and traditions.... It is true in the
legal sense that the indegenes of Lagos are, like
other Nigerians, citizens of Nigeria, but any capital
of Nigeria should be a place where every citizen of
Nigeria can lay claim to every available right and
privilege on equal footing with any other citizen....
If we were to recommend that Lagos should continue as
the capital for the federal government this will not in
our view augur well for the unity of the country. (1)
The dominance of the Yorubas in Lagos is further
reflected by this group's share of landed assets in the city.
Table 3.4 shows the distribution of ethnic origins of
landlords in Lagos residential areas. The table indicates
that 12 of the 25 residential districts have exclusively
Yoruba landlords. These districts include Idumagbo,
Ebute-Ero, Idunshagbe, Isalegangan-Aroloya and
Idunmota-Alakaro. Other districts are Offin-Itolo,
Olowogbowo, Ereko-Agarawa, Lafiaji, Ebute Metta East and
West, and Yaba East. Even in other districts, non-Yoruba
landlords represent a negligible proportion.
The insignificant number of non-Yorubas owning property
may be due to the nature of Nigeria's land tenure system. In
Southern Nigeria, in which Lagos is located, land is owned by
(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the federal
capital, ibid., op. cit., p. 35.
Table 3.4
Ethnic Origins of Landlords in Lagos Residential Areas, 1960
Other Total Other Non-
Residential area Lagosian Egba Ijebu Yoruba Yoruba Ibo Nigerian Nigerian
Idumagbo 75 -- 15 10 100 -- -- --
Ebute-Ero 63 25 -- 12 100 -- -- --
Idunshagbe 73 18 9 -- 100 -- -- --
Oke Awo 18 11 35 18 82 -- -- 18(D)
Isalegangan-Aroloya 46 29 17 8 100 -- -- --
Idunmota-Alakaro 60 10 10 20 100 -- -- --
Offin-Itolo 40 20 10 30 100 -- -- --
Olowogbowo 56 11 11 22 100 -- -- --
Ereko-Agarawa 29 57 -- 14 100 -- -- --
Okepopo 42 16 16 24 98 -- -- 2(T)
Epetedo 86 7 -- -- 93 -- 4(B) 3(G)
Faji 47 16 5 16 84 -- 5(I) ll(D)
Brazilian Quarter 56 33 -- -- 89 -- -- ll(T)
Lafiaji -- 66 -- 31 100 -- -- ll(T)
Okesuna 11 25 39 12 88 -- -- 12(G)
Araromi -- 18 55 27 100 -- -- --
Obalende 9 6 13 23 52 13 3(H) 33(TG)
Ebute Metta East -- 35 18 47 100 -- -- --
Yaba -- 48 25 25 98 2 -- --
Ebute Metta West -- 37 36 27 100 -- -- --
Ojuelegba -- 21 42 17 80 8 4(E) 8(T)
Yaba East 16 34 34 16 100 -- -- --
Musnin 11 36 17 28 92 4 4 --
Shomolu -- 18 35 39 92 8 -- --
Surulere -- 31 23 19 93 23 4(E) --
Key: B - Bini D - Dahomian E - Efik G - Ghanian H - Hausa I - Itsekiri T - Togolese
Source: Mabogunjie, A. L.
London University,
tical Change: The
Berkeley, 1974, p.
"Lagos," A Study in Urban Geography (Ph.D. dissertation,
1961), p. 144. Cited in Baker, P.: Urbanization and Poli-
Politics of Lagos. 1917-1967. University of California Press,
86.
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the family unit or the community, which, in turn, forbids the
sale of such lands to nonmembers of the family or community
who are often regarded as 'strangers.' (1) In other parts of
the country, land is often held for sacred reasons, and the
disposal of such land is often believed to constitute a
sacrilegious act. This situation may have made it difficult
for the non-Yorubas to gain access to land. What this means,
is that, even moving the capital to a non-Yoruba territory
may not necessarily eliminate accessibility problems unless
there were governmental intervention to ensure
transferability of land.
Whatever the cause of lack of access to land resources
may be, the Abuja supporters believe that the mere fact that
Lagos does not reflect the ethnic diversity of the country
makes the city incapable of contributing to the integration
of the country. It may be that proponents of relocation (who
happen to be mainly non-Yorubas) are spiteful or envious
because the capital was not located in their ethnic
territory. After all, there is no piece of land in Nigeria
(except, perhaps a few government lands) that was not owned
by either an individual, group, or community by 1978 when all
the land in the country became public lands. The analysis of
the new capital's planning process (in Chapter 4) will, in
fact, reveal that most of the new capital's supporters when
asked where to locate the capital, named their own states or
(1) D.I. Okpala, "The Potentials and Perils of Public Land
Ownership and Management: The Case of the Lagos Executive
Development Brand." PhD Thesis, MIT, 1977, p. 33.
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at the most, their 'backyards' as the best place to build the
new capital city.
3.1.5 Conclusion
The problems just reviewed are not necessarily peculiar
to Lagos. Other Nigerian cities as well are experiencing
tremendous urban growth pressure. There are evidences of
overcrowding, traffic congestion, slums, and inadequate
public facilities and utilities. Table 3.2 shows that while
Lagos may be regarded as the most crowded city in the country
in terms of the number of persons living in one room, other
cities, such as Onitsha with 3.6 persons per room, Warri (2.6
persons per room), and Kano (2.4 persons per room), are
following Lagos very closely.
In terms of ethnic distribution, there is hardly any
town in Nigeria that is ethnically balanced or neutral. Most
of the cities are usually dominated by persons from the
city's ethnic territory. In Onitsha, for example, more than
two-thirds of its city's population are Ibos. the same is
true for Kaduna, Kano, and Sokoto, where the Hausa-Fulani
groups are the most dominant, and in Calabar where the Efiks
and Ibibios are' the dominant groups.
What this situation implies, is that no matter where the
new capital is built, the problems that the decision-makers
want to avoid may likely reappear. As critics of relocation
have argued:
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The movement of one or both of the capitals out of
Lagos has therefore become a desideratum, some people
argued. Whilst this argument is valid, it has to be
accepted that the new capital wherever it is located
would in due course be faced with this problem.(1)
Others went further to argue that:
... the federal capital should be retained in Lagos.
We must make all efforts to solve the problems of Lagos
... because you do not solve a problem by running away
from it.(2)
In the following section, the second set of factors that
finally gave an impetus to relocation is reviewed. As we
noted earlier, these factors relate to the radical
developments on the country's politics and economic scene.
They are: the civil war of 1967-1970, the sudden change of
government from a democratically elected system to a
prolonged military rule, which, in turn, brought on increased
centralization of decision making, and the sudden but
short-lived economic boom due to oil revenues.(3)
3.2 Forces of Relocation: Radical Developments from
1967-1975
(1) Western State Government Memorandum to the Panel on the
Location of the federal capital, 1975, p. 1.
(2) The view was that of the Rivers State Government reported
in Report of the Committee on the Location of the federal
capital, op. cit., p. 33.
(3) See J. Moore (1982), op. cit., p. 23-29.
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Three major events occurred in the period from 1967-1975
that brought new meaning and support to the forces of
relocation established in the preceding half-century. First,
from 1967-1970 a brutal civil war fought along ethnic lines
split the country. Second, in 1973 the economy received an
unexpected and dramatic boost with the rapid increase of oil
revenues. Finally, in 1975 there was the development of a
military government with the power and conviction to locate a
new federal capital outside Lagos. The events of 1914-1967
showed sufficient cause for relocation. The events of the
turbulent years between 1967-1975 provided the conditions
necessary for capital construction to move from a need to a
reality.(1)
3.2.1 The Civil War: 1967-1970
As pointed out earlier, in 1966 Lieutenant Colonel
Yakuba Gowon, a Christian from the Middle Belt, toppled
General Ironsi in another military coup to become the head of
the Federal Military Government (FMG). Gowon faced a country
divided into ethnic groups on the verge of war. Violent
dissension existed among the Northern, Western, and Eastern
Regions. In September and October the Northerners launched
an attack against Easterners (the Ibos) living in the north
in an effort to crush Ibo's economic power. Fatalities were
estimated at between 10,000 and 30,000. The army was divided
into eastern and northern regiments, leaving no base for
(1) Ibid., p. 25.
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national unity. In light of continued dissension, the
leaders of the north, with the support of smaller ethnic
groups,. proposed , the formation of a multi-state country and
offered to give up regional unity for the strength of the
federation.. This offer was accepted by the Yoruba in the
West but was not well received among the Ibos. On May 26th,
the Eastern Region, not willing to accept the north's offer,
voted to secede. But before that, Gowon had announced a
state of emergency and at the same time divided the regions
of Nigeria into twelve states. This was an effort to break
down the sharp ethnic cleavages, and at the same time to
deprive the Ibo heartland of its control over the eastern oil
fields and prohibit their access to the sea. On May 30th,
1967, the Ibo leader, Lieutenant Colonel C.O. Ojukwu,
announced the formation of the independent republic of
Biafra.
In the next thirty months, the bloody civil war raged
and an estimated one million Easterners died from either
malnutrition or the violent conflict. The federal troops
overcame the secessionists in January 1970, ending the civil
war. The Gowon administration adopted a post-war campaign to
integrate the Ibo and reconstruct a strong and unified
Nigeria. This bitter civil war became a central force behind
the decision to relocate the capital as the war changed
dramatically the context of the new capital issue from one of
practical necessity to one of political survival for the
existing military government. No longer did relocation mean
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simply the establishment of a more central capital. Now it
meant a capital located in an ethnically-neutral ground from
which it was feasible to administer the country.(1)
The dynamic change in the distribution problem was
accompanied by a change in the philosophical attitude adopted
by the Gowon administration and its successors that urged the
country to take whatever measures were necessary to avoid
another civil war. The conflict brought attention and
political significance to any decision that enabled the
formation of a harmonious, unified Nigeria.
I. J.Ebong, a former permanent secretary, recalled that
the concept of a new capital had vast support in the early
'70's.(2) In 1972 Ebong paid an official visit to the new
capital city of Brasilia. On his return from this trip he
delivered a report to Gowon that outlined the nature of
Brasilia and suggested that such a project was advisable for
Nigeria. According to Ebong, Gowon "bought the idea" as he
was intrigued by the concept of a new capital city on a
virgin site outside the dominance of a single ethnic
group.(3)
As early as 1965, even before Ebong's visit to Brasilia,
some scholars such as Dr. Ajato Amos had begun to advocate
for a new capital as a solution to the ethnic problems, but
the political climate at the time precluded any meaningful
(1) J. Moore, 1982, op. cit., p. 26.
(2) Ibid., p. 27.
(3) Ibid., p. 28.
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discussion of the issue.(l)
At the end of the war the majority of political power
was vested in the Federal Military Government (FMG). None of
the three major ethnic groups had significant control of the
government. The geographic division of the Northern Region
into six states and the East and West into three states,
respectively, contributed to the breaking up of the former
base of power. With the decline in influence of the major
northern, southern, and eastern ethnic groups, a new force
developed in Nigerian politics. A major share of the
Dolitical power and an important voice in the executive were
given to the smaller ethnic groups, particularly the Ijaw and
Ibibio from the east, the Tiv, the Nupe, and other Middle
Belt peoples.(2) The new groups had felt geographically
isolated from the present capital of Lagos. Thus, they must
have seen a new capital as a means of linking themselves
geographically to their new power. The large representation
of these groups in the armed forces and in areas with
significant oil production must have given added influence to
their political views.
However, these new political forces alone were not
sufficient to propel Nigeria to construct a new capital. The
(1) See A. Gandonu, A Proper federal capital for Nigeria,
Text of a Lecture at the Nigeria Centre, London, under the
Auspices of the Nigerian High Commission, April 29, 1975.
(2) One of the positive consequences of the creation of
states is that it helped to give administrative from to the
minority areas--the non-Yoruba, non-Hausa, and non-Ibo ethnic
groups which included Ijaws, Ibibio, Effik, Tiv, Nupe, and
others.
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decision to relocate was not made until 1975. This delay can
be explained in part by economic conditions in Nigeria. In
1970 the country was in shambles. By 1975 changes in global
oil prices brought to Nigeria the revenue and the optimistic
ideology necessary to support a new capital.
3.2.2 Economic Boom and the Oil Money
The Nigerian economy is heavily dependent on the export
of oil. The dramatic rise in oil prices in 1973-74 resulted
in a surge of revenue from the government-run oil industry.
The net effect was that "Government oil revenues shot up from
160 million in September 1973 to a peak of 770 million in May
1978."(1)
According to an economic theory developed by the
economist Sayre Schatz, there is a lag between the time the
magnitude of increased revenue is realized and the time when
the government increases its expenditures. "As a result,
substantial surpluses accrue in the government budget and the
balance of payments."(2) The figures generated by Schatz on
government surplus are phenomenal; these are: a surplus of
58.6 million naira (N) in 1972-73, N285.5 million in 1973-74,
and "an historically huge surplus of N1850.9 million in
1974-75" (Table 3.5). Once the government realized it had
accumulated large surpluses it acted quickly in support of
relocation.
(1) Federal Republic of Nigeria: Second National Development
Plan 1970-1975, Third National Development Plan 1975-1980.
(2) S. Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism, University of California
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Table 3.5
Nigerian Federal Government Revenues and Expenditures
1972/73-1980
(N millions)
Total Allocations
Federally Total to State - Federal
Fiscal Collected Federal and Local Surplus or
Year Revenues Expendituresa Governmentsb (Deficit)c
1972/73 1,389.9 1,009.0 322.3 58.6
1973/74 2,171.4 1,562.1 328.8 285.5
1974/75 5,171.1 2,492.5 833.7 1,850.9
1975/76 5,861.5 6,289.3 963.1 (1,390.9)
1976/77 7,076.6 7,071.7 1,414.9 (1,460.0)
1977/78 8,359.0 8,560.5 1,491.8 (1,693.3)
1 97 8/7 9d 6,800.0 8,000.0 1,750.0 (2,950.0)
197 9/80e 8,800.0 9,500.0 2,500.0 (3,200.0)
1980 11,859.0 10,011.0 2,819.0 ( 971.0)
a: Total Federal Expenditures do not include statutory
allocations to state and local governments, which are
shown in column 4, but do include non-statutory appro-
priations for state and local governments.
b: These are statutory allocations and do not include non-
statutory appropriations, nor are federal loans to
state and local governments included.
c: Equals Total Federally Collected Revenues minus Total
Federal Expenditures and Allocations to State and Local
Governments. Deficits are shown in parentheses.
d: 1978/79 figures are estimates made in March, 1979, for
the preceding fiscal year. The 1979 Budget Speech provided
figures for columns 2 and 4. The figure for column 3 comes
from The 1979 Budget Speech (for recurrent expenditures)
and Rupley (for capital expenditures).
e: 1979/80 figures are budgeted figures presented in The 1979
Budget Speech for the forthcoming fiscal year.
f: The 1980 fiscal year is only 9 months, April 1 to December
31, 1980. The figures are estimates presented in The 1980
Budget Speech.
g: Figures for the last three years must be considered highly
unreliable.
Sources: Lawrence A. Rupley, "Why Nigerian Spending Has
Grown," West Africa, June 4, 1979, pp. 977-980;
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Economic Indicators,
January 1975; The 1979 Budget Speech; The 1980.
Budget Speech. Cited in Moore, Jonathan (1982),
p. 30.
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In addition to the short-term excess 'in government
revenue, the oil-boom fluctuation led to the new
philosophical attitude that Nigeria was a wealthy country.
The surplus revenue created an artificial barrier to proper
economic consideration of the national effect o.f costly
projects. The new revenue figures were used to defend the
government against opposition forces that argued that the
country could not afford a development project the magnitude
of a new capital city.
A secondary effect of the oil boom was that leading
government officials were recipients of rising federal
expenditures. Those in power also gained increased personal
prosperity through ties with oil industry contractors and
held the opinion that the entire country was wealthy.(1)
Their perspective on Lagos as the capital city was radically
altered. These leaders now could not conceive of a rich and
powerful country with a "dirty and ill-planned city" as its
capital. This economic and philosophical change coincided
with the rise to power of a new Nigerian leader who was
capable of initiating a new capital project.
3.2.3 Impact of New Political (Military) Leaders
In his essay titled "Corrective Government," Dent argues
that there is an incompatibility between the goals of reform
and the political nature of a permanent government. He cites
Press, Berkeley, 1977. Cited in J. Moore, ibid., op. cit.,
pp. 28-29.
(1) J. Moore, ibid., p. 31.
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the example of an elected civilian government that uses a
non-representative figure to support his philosophy on an
issue likely to spark contention.
The secret of this kind of action [reform in a
democratic system] is that the unpopular authority is
outside the system and, having no permanent position to
maintain, does not have to worry about making friends
and avoiding enemies. But once let him have a
permanent position in the system to maintain, he will
normally become far less ruthless in corrective action.
(1)
This principle is even more apparent in a military regime.
The unique qualities of military government with a limited
mandate result in a great ability to implement projects
requiring centralized decisions. (The more decentralized
implementation, the harder it is in a military regime.)
However, a military government that has an unlimited mandate
and is concerned with self-preservation, acts in a far more
circumspect manner and loses those very qualities of military
promptness and precision that are its real justification in
military corrective government.
The Gowon regime that ruled Nigeria from 1966-75 is seen
by many analysts as representational of a military government
concerned more with preservation than reformation. Under the
Gowon government there was neither the return to stability,
nor a transfer out of military rule. The government has been
(1) M. Dent, "Corrective Government," p. 10. Cited in J.
Moore, ibid., p. 31.
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compared to a colonial power that was preparing a country for
independence, yet was not willing to disassociate itself. As
a result, few policy changes or decisions were made. The
question of relocating the capital was actually considered on
a number of occasions, but the issue never left Gowon's desk.
No committee was ever formed to evaluate relocation. Gowon's
inaction can be explained in part by his close association
with the Western Region. The West had joined Gowon in waging
the civil war against the secessionist Biafra. For him to
move the capital would have been tantamount to 'cutting off
the fingers that fed him' since Lagos (as noted in Chapter 2)
"was to the West what the head was to the body."
Gowon was clearly not operating a government with a
limited mandate. His promise of a return to civilian rule in
1976 was not kept, and instead the exact date for the
transfer of power was postponed indefinitely. On July 29,
1975, nine years to the day after Gowon had come to power by
means of a coup, he himself fell to a coup.
Twelve hours after the fall of the Gowon regime,
Brigadier General Murtala Muhammed became the head of state.
According to the criteria established by Dent, the Muhammed
regime was a perfect instrument for change. Above all else,
the new leader was an able man of action. In contrast to his
predecessor, Muhammed gave his government a clear and
limited mandate (three years). The combination of a firm
decision to give up power in a period of three years with an
equally firm decision to act with vigor to make the necessary
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reforms during the three-year period has been the strength of
the military government, both before and after the death of
Muhammed.
Muhainmed acted quickly and decisively on two issues of
fundamental importance to the political structure of Nigeria.
The first was the creation of additional states. Gowon's
division of Nigeria, as discussed above., was made in 1967 on
the eve of the Biafran secession. The divisions were made in
a haste with the belief that they would later be refined by
boundary adjustments and the creation of new states. It was
the action-oriented Muhammed who in 1975 appointed a five man
advisory committee to gather evidence from the states and to
make recommendations to the Supreme Military Council (SMC),
which summarily decided to increase the number of states to
nineteen.
The second issue was the location of the federal
capital. Muhammed appointed a committee on the location of
the federal capital and as a result, sixty years after it was
first considered, the concept of a new federal capital for
Nigeria reached the planning stage necessary to initiate
construction.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter we have examined some of the factors
that gave rise, finally, to moving the capital city. These
factors included, among others, the pressures from rapid
urban growth exerted on the old capital city, Lagos. The
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pressures were reflected in inadequate land space for
expansion, traffic congestion, poor housing conditions,
problems of political and administrative conflict between the
city's administration and that of the Federal Government, and
a lack of ethnic balance in the city. We pointed out,
however, that the problems listed above are not necessarily
peculiar to Lagos. Instead, they are problems which are
generally characteristic of many of the country's urban
centers. As such, moving the capital on the basis of these
problems alone, would not necessarily eliminate the problems
from the new capital city.
In conjunction with the problems noted above, it was
also pointed out that the impetus to move the capital was
additionally provided by: the Nigerian civil war which
brought an added emphasis on the need for a national unity;
the increase in government revenue due to the 'oil boom'
which provided the necessary capital to embark upon
construction; and the emergence of a determined and
purposeful military leadership which formed a committee to
evaluate the prospects of a new capital city in the country.
In the following chapter, the activities of this
committee, as well as the general planning process of the new
capital city, are evaluated. Also, the outcome of the
orocess and its consequences on the overall project
construction are identified and analyzed.
CHAPTER 4
PLANNING THE NEW CAPITAL CITY: FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
In this chapter, we analyze the characteristics of the
first stage of the new capital's planning exercise . This
analysis enables us to understand how some of the goals noted
earlier in the thesis were incorporated into this planninq exercise,
the kinds of policy choices or strategies that were adopted
for realizing project goals, how these choices were made, and
their assumptions and their impact on overall project
construction.
The planning model adopted for Abuja involved
essentially two major activities--a feasibility study and a
master plan . The feasibility study can , in turn , be
broken into two main activities: the first involves the
appointment of a committee that studied the question of a new
capital; the second involves the site selection process, also
carried out by this same committee.
The masterplanning aspect resulted in a Masterplan--a
policy document that would guide the development of the city.
This aspect of planning was contracted out to a consortium of
American planning firms--The International Planning
Associates (IPA). This second phase of the planning
activities is analyzed in Chapter 5.
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the feasibility
studies. Essentially, the feasibility studies are examined
by: (i) assessing the activities of this government-appointed
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committee in terms of the strategies they used for evaluating
the question of a new capital city, as.well as the
conclusions reached by this committee; and (ii) analyzing
the criteria adopted for choosing the site for the new
capital territory as well as the problems emanating from the
poor locational decision of this committee.
The analysis in this chapter will reveal that the panel,
in supposedly studying the question (feasibility) of a new
capital city, essentially developed practical rationales for
what was a predisposed politically motivated decision. This
would contradict some of the assumptions of the rational
process model we examined earlier, in Chapter 1. In that
chapter, we argued that decision makers whose decision
process is based on maximizing the a-ttainment of a set of
goals and objectives defined through an identifiable public
interest, do not exist in reality. We further noted that the
rational model's requirements for a comprehensive knowledge
and the selection of the optimal strategies or best
alternatives for achieving goals are rarely satisfied in
reality. Instead, the decision makers often choose
alternatives that satisfy some minimum level of acceptability
that induces the least harm or disturbance while conveying
some benefit.
The Muhammed regime was determined to move the capital
city. After all, the environment was ripe. The 'oil money'
was available (see Table 3.5 for revenue surpluses). The
country had just emerged from a bitter civil war, after which
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it had begun to yearn for political unity. The government
was an authoritarian regime. At the same time, the regime
had a limited mandate (three years), This meant that if
relocation were to take place, it must be done very quickly.
Thus, the Location Committee was given only four months to
study the feasibility and at the same time select a site for
the new capital. This short time span, in conjunction with
the inexperience of this panel in large-scale urban
development, explains in part the committee's
ineffectiveness. No alternative sites for relocation were
considered. No feasibility studies or analyses of
costs/benefits were executed.
An analysis of the site-selection process further
reveals that the criteria for choosing a 'proper location'
for the new capital territory shifted to the criteria
(centrality, health and climate, land availability, water
supply, etc.) that would bring about a 'functional city,'
rather than the conditions that would mainly bring about
national unity, which was one of the central goals of
relocation. This shift in criteria is reflected in Table
4.2, which shows that 'ethnic accord' was given the lowest
score among the 13 requirements posited for choosing the site
for the new capital territory.
The economic impact of Abuja's construction on Lagos,
site of the existing federal capital, was not considered in
the planning process. The Report on the Location of the
Federal Capital published by the panel noted that the
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relocation of the government will have only positive effects
on Lagos. The negative impact that could accompany or weaken
existing businesses was not considered in the feasibility
studies.
The interaction among the members of the Location
Committee is worth noting, for it brought again into focus
one of the critical elements (ethnic rivalries) that had
historically hindered the development of an acceptable
capital to the country. The members of this committee, due
to loyalties to their ethnic groups, could not agree on the
proper location for the capital territory. The disagreement
among them, which was spawned mainly by ethnic sentiments,
resulted in a choice of a less suitable site, which later
created construction difficulties, such as land use and
resettlement problems. This particular situation reflects in
part the adverse impact of Nigeria's ethnic relations on the
new capital project, as pointed out in Chapter 1.
4.1 Feasibility Studies: Committee on the Location of Abuja
From our discussion in Chapter 2 of the contentious
social and political relations among the Nigerian states
vis-a-vis the ethnic groups, it seemed that relocation of the
capital could only be possible through a strongly committed
and purposeful government. The Murtala Muhammed regime
provided such an opportunity. As noted earlier, Muhammed had
on July 29, 1975, just overthrown his predecessor and had
promised to hand over power to a democratically elected
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civilian government in 1979. With a limited mandate,
relocation plans would have to be started immediately, lest
it might be overtaken by the country's ever-changing
political circumstances. (Recall that in the past there had
been coups and countercoups d'etat.) Muhammed acted very
quickly. On August 9, 1975 he appointed an eight-person
Location Committee to study the feasibility of a new capital
for the country (only seven of the members participated in
the study). As pointed out in Chapter 1, the Committee was
given four mandates: (1) to examine the effectiveness of
Lagos in playing a double role as the capital of both the
nation and Lagos state; (2) if Lagos were ineffective in
playing the role, to recommend which of the governments
(Federal or Lagos state) should move its headquarters; (3) if
it is the federal government, to recommend a suitable
location; and (4) to examine other relevant factors that
would assist the government in its decision. The Committee
was given four months to present its findings to the military
government.
In this section, we critically evaluate the
effectiveness of the strategies used by the Location
Committee for studying the feasibilities of a new capital
city for Nigeria. Essentially, four main strategies were
adopted by the committee.
(1) The Committee sent out for opinions (memoranda) from the
Nigerian public on the subject. This was essential in
order to test the acceptability of the new capital
project among the general public.
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(2) The Committee contacted the State governments to solicit
their opinions about relocating the capital.
(3) The Committee took a tour of some African and overseas
countries which have in the past relocated their
capitals. This would enable the Committee, supposedly,
to learn from these countries' mistakes, and to minimize
or eliminate such mistakes from Abuja.
(4) The Committee toured the Nigerian State Capitals and
interviewed a number of selected personalities and
organizations in order to solicit their opinions on the
subject.
4.1.1 The Location Committee: Request for Memoranda from
the General Public
The request by the Location Committee for opinions on
the subject was made through the Nigerian newspapers. The
advertisement specifically called for written representations
from individuals, groups of persons, associations, etc. to
submit materials on the four mandates issued to the
Committee. All representations were to be submitted in
fifteen copies to the Secretary, Panel on Location of the
Federal Capital, no later than the 30th of September, 1975.
The response to this advertisement was expectedly low.
About 258 persons representing less than 0.0003 percent of
the population responded to the advertisement. Nevertheless,
the proponents of Abuja still celebrated this turnout which
they claimed indicated mass support for the new capital
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project.(1)
The low response could have resulted from any of the
following: (a) the quality of the Nigerian mail delivery
system is very poor. In some instances, it takes more than
six weeks for letters to travel from one corner of the
country to the other, (b) the time allotted to the
advertisement (30 days) seems too short in light of such mail
delivery problems, and (c), more than half the population
cannot read or write. Therefore, the persons likely to have
responded quickly, would have been the literates. But this
group of people is too small to represent a generally
meaningful consensus.
4.1.2 The Location Committee: Contact with State
Governments
The second strategy used by the committee to solicit the
public's view about a new capital was to contact certain
persons and bodies. The selection of these persons and
bodies was arbitrary. However, an examination of their
profile reveals that they consisted mainly of government
functionaries and representatives of the twelve state
governments.
A large number of individuals and groups contacted did
not submit memoranda. It is not clear why this was the case.
(1) In the Report of the Committee on the Location of the
Federal Capital, there was no indication of the percentage of
those who opposed the new capital project. Most views in the
Report emphasized reasons for the necessity for the move.
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Some of the reasons for failure to submit memoranda may hinge
on the reasons stated in Section 4.1.1--poor communication,
short time frame, and inability to read or write. It is also
possible that those who failed to submit, did not do so out
of sheer apathy,- or simply because they might be opposed to
the project. Because the Committee was soliciting opinions
from a position in which they were seen as proponents of the
project, these individuals might be unwilling to submit views
that would openly oppose the military government.(1)
Table 4.1 represents the respon3es from the twelve state
governments regarding their views about moving the capital.
Five general conclusions can be derived from this table.
First, all states in the former Northern Region
supported moving the capital. The sites selected by these
states for locating the new capital coincided with the areas
in the Northern Region. The present position of these states
thus, matches the position held by the Northern Region in the
1950's regarding the status of a federal capital (see
discussion in Section 3.3).
Second, the Western State Government, an offshoot of the
former Western Region, did not support relocation. Recall
also that in the 1950's, severance of Lagos as a federal
capital was strongly opposed by the Western Region. However,
at that time the West had noted that it would contribute to
(1) There is often a general trend in the country for people
not to speak up against military regimes. And since the
proposal for a new capital came from the military
establishment, it is highly unlikely that individuals would
oppose such a proposal openly, even if they wanted to do so.
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Table 4.1
Position of the 12 State Governments with Respect
to the Location of the Capital
Support Suggested
State Movement Site Remarks
Lagos Not Clear ------ Lagos State Government
was less open about its
position. But from its
analysis of the problem
it seemed inclined to
oppose movement. To her,
if movement should occur,
it should have been
within a "short range"
from Lagos.
North Yes Abuja Before it was incorpor-
Western ated into the new federal
territory, Abuja was
originally a town in the
North Western State
Kano Yes Minna Minna town is located in
Kano State
North Yes Kaduna ------
Eastern
North Yes Kafanchan
Central Kontagora
and Minna
Benue Yes- Area adjoin-
Plateau ing Benue
Plateau North
Central and
North Western
Kwara Yes Lokoja
Western No The Western State
recommended expanding
Lagos to include adjoin-
ing areas
Bendel Yes Some officials of this
State government recommended
Benin City which is the
capital of the Bendel
State.
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Table 4.1 Continued
Support Suggested
State Movement Site Remarks
East Yes Kwara, Benue
Central Plateau, North
Central
South Yes Auchi-Ida
Eastern Nsukka Axis
Rivers No
State
Source: Compiled from Report of the Committee on the
Location of the Federal Capital of Nigeria,
December 1975.
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constructing a new capital elsewhere. The Western
Government's support for building a new capital then was
probably because it felt that the government was not ready
financially and politically to build a new capital. Now that
the environment is conducive, the state has opposed such
construction on cost grounds. Proponents believe that the
Western State's opposition to a new capital stems from its
substantial investments in Lagos (see discussion in Section
2.1). A United Nations survey of households and businesses
in Lagos (1976) noted that nearly 67 percent of businesses
indicated willingness to move to or locate their branches at
Abuja.(l) To the Western State Government, this could mean a
substantial loss of income.
Third, all the minority states (that is, states
comprised mostly of the minority tribes) except the Rivers
State supported moving the capital. Their support may be in
keeping with the general belief that allocation of resources
has often catered to the interest of the 'super-tribes.'
Thus, they might have seen relocation as an opportunity to
voice their opposition to the general scheme of things, as
well as the opportunity to participate in a major
decision-making. After all, their participation offered the
opportunity to even site their own states as the best
location for the new capital.
(1) See Economic Commission for Africa: Report on Survey of
Industrial, Commercial and other Non-public Service
Establishments in Metropolitan Lagos, United Nations, New
York, December 1980.
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Fourth, the states that supported movement indicated
ethnic accord (national unity) as their main concern. But
their concern for a national unity did not match with the
sites they suggested for the location of the new capital.
Most of them, for example, the North Western, North Eastern,
Kano, North Central, Benue Plateau, Kwara, and the Bendel
States, chose sites within their own states, or at best, in
neighboring states. The choice of their own state seems
natural and may indicate that they place greater priority on
their state's welfare than on the entire nation. As we shall
also see in the subsequent sections, ethnic accord although
widely recognized by the states as the major problem that the
new capital's location should address, occupied very low
priority in the criteria for final selection of the site.
Fifth, those states opposing movement (Western and
Rivers) did so for cost reasons. As we maintained earlier,
cost considerations were given hardly any attention in
planning the new city. But most of the major
failures--inability to meet deadlines, lack of adequate
housing, reorganizations, etc., have been affected in part by
shortage of financial resources.
In all, it can be generalized that responses from the
state governments were favorable to relocation. However, it
must be remembered that the state governments were then
administered by military governors appointed by the Central
Military government whose disposition was to relocate the
capital. Under this situation it was highly unlikely that a
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significantly different response could have been expected
from the respondents. As discussed later in this chapter,
the sites chosen by the twelve states were not evaluated by
the Location Committee. The committee, having been appointed
by the national military government that generally wanted a
central location, must have felt inclined to be more
responsive to the national government's position than to that
of the states. Hence, the new capital territory was
positioned in a geographic center of the country
(Figure 1.1). A detailed discussion of how the committee
agreed on this site is presented in Section 4.3.
4.1.3 The Location Committee: Tour of African and Overseas
Countries and Cities
The other strategy used by the Location Committee to
study the new capital's feasibility was to tour some African
and overseas countries that had recently built new capitals
or relocated their capitals in the past. The tour would
familiarize the committee with some of the problems
encountered by these foreign governments during the
construction of their capitals. Learning of these problems
would, supposedly, help the Committee to minimize or avoid
similar mistakes at Abuja. One measure of the Committee's
success is, therefore, to examine the extent to which it
incorporated its learning into the construction of Abuja.
Among the cities visited were Nairobi and Mombasa
(Kenya), Lusaka (Zambia), Gaborone (Botswana), and
Dar-es-Salaam and Dodoma (Tanzania). Others include
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Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Karachi (Pakistan), New Delhi
(India),, Sydney and Canberra (Australia), and Rio de Janeiro
and Brasilia (Brazil). The Committee's tour of these cities
took 29 days (from August 31 to September 9, 1975 for the
African countries, and from September 18 to October 18, 1975
for the remainder). There is hardly any question that the
time allotted to the tour would be inadequate to define and
comprehend all the problems of these cities that required
study. Nevertheless, the Committee was able to gather useful
information in terms of the problems confronted during and
after the construction of these cities. The Committee, in
its report, noted that the cities had confronted at least one
of the following problems.
Urban Problems Confronted by the Cities Visited by the
Location Committee
1. Migration. Almost all the new cities had experienced
near-excessive migration. In Gaborone (Botswana), for
example, a ten-year projection figure of the population
for the city was achieved in less than five years. The
population, only 8,000 in 1971, had by 1975 jumped to
25,000. A similar problem is being experienced by older
cities such as Nairobi (Kenya), Lusaka (Zambia), and New
Delhi (India). In New Delhi the pressure was so great
that the government decided to develop smaller cities a
few miles around the capital and establish industries in
the areas so as to relieve the pressure from New Delhi.
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In Nairobi (Kenya), the population now grows by 7-1/2
percent every year. This has resulted in congestion in
the schools, hospitals, and housing estates.(l) The city
council and the government are trying to encourage the
people to return to their lands, but with little success.
Therefore, the government now encourages the erection of
more industries in rural areas outside Nairobi, so that
people can secure employment there and still live not too
far from the city.
2. Growth of squatter settlements.
Squatter settlements are features peculiar to most of the
capital cities visited by the committee. The settlement
has grown as a result of a lack of adequate provision for
low-income housing. In the case of Brasilia, for example,
the planners had made the most glaring oversight of making
no provision for temporary housing. The Costa Plan was
unable to integrate the migrant workers drawn to Brasilia
harmoniously into the urban form. Improvised situations
were necessary for the thousands of workers on the site
who had no place to live. Outside the pilot-plan area, a
temporary settlement called Ciadade Livre was established.
Within this town, land was made available free with the
understanding that once Brasilia was completed, the town
would be demolished (Epstein, 1973). However, the town-
became a commercial center and a base for the informal
(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal
Capital of Nigeria, December 1975, p. 14.
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activity so prevalent in developing countries. Much to
the dismay of planners, the town has become a satellite
. community. As Ciadade Livre became filled, numerous other
satellite towns were formed. These communities are not
self-sufficient and serve mainly as a base for the people
who must work in Brasilia, but cannot find affordable
housing there. Epstein (1973) has made an interesting
correlation between the central problems of Brasilia and
more general national conflicts. He sees a similarity
between the social structure of Brazil and "the contrast
between the planned area of apartment houses and the
squatter settlements and satellite towns, almost a
caricature of the social structure of Brazil as a whole."
2. Failure to locate housing areas of low-income group
nearer the center of the town. This particular problem
makes it difficult forthe low-income group to have easy
access to government offices and employment opportunities
within the city center. Alternatively, they will have to
pay substantial transport costs to get to the center.
Most of the cities visited by the Location Committee
experienced this problem.
3. A general lack of adequate accommodation. This aspect of
the problem makes workers and thousands of officials live
in outlying towns. In Islamabad (Pakistan) for example,
thousands of government officials and others who work in
the city still live in Rawalpindi. This has contributed
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to spontaneous (squatter) and unplanned developments in
and around the city.
4. Ghost city phenomenon. The term 'ghost city' relates to a
situation whereby workers deserted the city at the end of
the workday or workweek. Brasilia is a typical example of
a new capital city that suffered from this phenomenon.
5. Lack of funds. Lack of funds was the major constraint on
the quick implementation of the Capital Development
Project for Islamabad.(l)
One way to evaluate the effectiveness of the committee's
tour of the foreign cities, as discussed earlier, is to
assess the extent to which its experiences with regard to
the problems of these cities have been avoided in the
construction of Abuja. From personal observations, most of
the problems just outlined have begun to emerge at Abuja.
The emergence of these problems would suggest that the
Location Committee's tour made little or no significant
impact on the new capital's planning process in terms of
alleviating the problems. Some of the problems being
experience already include the following:
(a) As in some of the capitals visited by the Location
Committee, there was an upsurge in population during the
early stages of Abuja's construction. The upsurge has led to
the spilling over of population to the adjoining towns such
(1) Ibid., p. 13.
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as Suleja,Nyanya, Garki, Kari, and Gwagwalada. For example,
Suleja, which had only 10,000 residents in 1977, swelled to
nearly half a million population in 1983.(1) Except for a
few workers' camps, originally designed to accommodate
construction workers but later converted for housing of top
officials of the FCDA and private contractors, and the
residential housing built exclusively for the FCDA employees
and other government workers, the rest of the workers live
outside the city from where they are hauled on trailer trucks
to and from work. Although the increase in population
tapered off in 1934 as a result of the slack in construction,
the trend may continue as soon as construction picks up or
when the official movement to the new city begins.
(b) Most of the low-income housing is developed outside
the city and at distances far from the city, which is the
main center of employment. For example, junior civil
servants (Grade levels 01 to 06) are assigned housing at such
places as Gwagwalada, Karshi, Kuje, and Bwari, which are,
respectively, 52 km, 31 km, 72 km, and 43 km from the city.
In short, there is a general lack of adequate accommodation
even for government employees. However, the situation may
improve as soon as most of the buildings scheduled for
completion in 1986 are built.
(1) Ajato Gandonu. Implementing Abuja: 1975-1983. A
Commissioned Paper for the United Nations University, Tokyo,
and NISER Workshop on New Capital Cities in Developing
Countries, held at Abuja, 5-9 March, 1985, p. 9.
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(c) Already, squatter (spontaneous) developments have
begun to appear in the new capital city, especially around
the villages originally earmarked for relocation. The
population of these areas has grown rapidly, so that it is
becoming increasingly difficult for the FCDA to evacuate them.
Appendix I shows some of those settlements bordering the
central area of the city.
(d) Lack of funds to pay for both the completed
projects and the new ones has drastically slowed the pace of
construction. Many of the contractors have not received
payments on work completed as far back as two years. The
situation has forced the government to reschedule some of
FCDA's debts.
(e) Until the construction is completed and official
movement to the city begins, it is hard to say with certainty
whether Abuja, like its contemporary, Brasilia, will become a
ghost city. From this writer's experience, the streets of
Abuja are essentially empty both day and night except for a
few cars racing down the newly built expressways and arterial
streets. The emptiness could be attributed to any one or
more of the following: (a) The city is not yet fully
operational. (b) There are very few recreational spots to
keep people on the streets. (c) The city is automobile
oriented. Moving from one zone to the next requires (in the
absence of public transportation) private transport, which
very few can afford. (d) Mainly government workers live in
the city. Because these workers are by law not allowed to
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engage in other income-earning activities, and because there
are few or no spaces allotted for inform-al activities, it is
unlikely that the kind of atmosphere necessary to support
maximum interaction among residents can be sustained.
What is important to note in this part of our analysis
of the committee's study strategy is that, its experiences
with respect to the problems of other capital cities seemed
to provide little or no aid in avoiding similar problems at
Abuja.
4.1.4 The Location Committee: Interview with Selected
Personalities and Organizations
The fourth and final strategy used by the Location
Committee to study the feasibility of. the new capital project
was to tour the Nigerian state capitals, and to interview
selected personalities and organizations. Again, the
committee restricted its meetings to top-level government
officials and well-placed individuals in the states. The
committee did not consult with other segments of the society,
such as the association of market women, petty traders, labor
organizations, etc. Talking to these groups would have meant
not only that their inputs would be solicited, but would have
shown that as many groups as possible participated in the new
capital's planning process. It is likely that their
participation would have given greater support to the
project, as well as bring attention to the special needs of
these groups in the new capital. Participation of the market
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women and petty traders, for example, might have brought to
the attention of planners the need to provide adequate
traditional open-market stalls, which are lacking in the new
city.
4.2 The Committee's Findings and Recommendations
In this section we analyze the findings or conclusions
and recommendations reached by the panel on the mandates
provided by the military leaders at the beginning of its
study, and incorporate some of our thoughts on the general
effectiveness of this committee. Recall that the first
mandate was to examine the dual role of Lagos as a federal
and state capital and to advise on how effective Lagos is in
playing that role. Second, in the event that the city is not
effective, to recommend which of the two governments should
move out of Lagos.
In addressing the first part of the
mandate--effectiveness of Lagos as a dual capital--the
committee concluded that the city was unsuitable as a dual
capital. This conclusion was based on the constraints
imposed by the present urban setting of Lagos, some of which
we have discussed in Chapter 3. These include:
(i) Conflicts between the federal and Lagos state
governments regarding the control and management of
certain functions in the city.
(ii) Inadequacy of land space;
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(iii) inadequacy of security: the committee notes that
because Lagos is located on the coast, it is vulnerable
to external aggression;
(iv) Inadequacy of infrastructure, such as transport
facilities, buildings, and other related facilities:
the situation is worsened by inadequate land space.
(v) Inadequacy of topography: Lagos is considered flat,
which makes it difficult to drain and to implement
sewerage systems.
(vi) Population growth pressures arising from the
concentration of activities and industries, which, in
turn, make the city attractive for migrants.
(vii) Inadequacy of physical resources--water supply,
electricity supply, telephone services, etc.
It is worthwhile to note that the ethnic constraint was
not among the factors picked up by the committee. However,
this factor was important in deciding which of the two
governments, federal or state, should move out of Lagos. The
committee recommended that the federal government should move
out of Lagos. This decision was based on three main factors:
inadequacy of land space for the two governments; ethnicity
pattern of Lagos which reflects mainly one ethnic group, the
Yorubas; and security.
The choice of these three factors would imply that the
location of the new capital must involve a site that would
provide for an adequate land space, an ethnically-balanced
urban environment, and security against external aggression.
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But as we argue in Section 4.3, not only was
the site selection done without giving priorities to
these elements, the site for the location of the new federal capital
territory could not be chosen because of ethnic rivalries
among the members of the Location Committee. The
'sub-optimal' location has resulted in many construction
problems involving land-use and resettlement difficulties.
From the review of the first two parts of the mandates
given to the Location Committee, the military leaders have
assumed a priori that the only solution to the administrative
conflict between the Lagos state and the federal government,
as well as the urban pressures posed by the situation in
Lagos and the demand for physical resources, lies in moving
one of the two governments and not necessarily in a better
management. From such a perspective, the Location Committee
had thought of their function as mainly determining an
alternative location for the capital. The committee was
therefore required to develop practical rationales to support
this motive. These practical rationales were formed through
feasibility studies that centered first on advocating for
memoranda from the general public, touring national capitals
of countries that have relocated their capital cities
recently or that have built one in the past, and meeting
mainly with government functionaries.
Another indication of the determination to move the
capital at any cost is related to the committee's belligerent
use of words when responding to criticism or divergent
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opinions on a number of issues about the proposed movement.
One of such comments relates to the committee's response to a
criticism from the Western State, to the effect that moving
the capital might cost the federal government as much as N100
billion, which the economy could not afford. The Location
Committee's response was:
There is no doubt that the arguments along the line of
the quote above [referring to the Western State
argument] would impress a large number of the
population, but whilst such arguments have our
sympathy, we do not consider them strong enough to turn
the balance against our conclusions and
recommendations.(1)
Other such pronouncements read:
We have no doubts in our minds that it is most
undesirable that Lagos should continue to retain its
dual role as a capital for the Federation of Nigeria
and also as a state capital.... Our conclusion is
based upon our overall view of Lagos as a city. After
stating our conclusion above, it is only necessary to
state that a large majority of people who presented
reasoned memoranda to us, probably between 85 and 90
percent, urged it upon us to arrive at this conclusion.
(2)
The last statement would indicate that the so-called reasoned
memoranda submitted by the general public were only used to
support a predetermined decision--hence the phrase" after
stating our conclusion above, it is only necessary to
state...."
(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal
Capital, Ibid., op. cit., p. 56.
(2) Ibid., p. 36.
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A further indication of a predetermined effort to move
the capital is related to a lack of interest in a detailed
analysis of the financial cost of the capital before the
committee's decision. Furthermore, the committee made no
effort to assess the negative impacts of relocation on Lagos,
nor on the overall economy. Most of the committee's report
centered on the positive attributes of building a new capital
city--having a 'befitting' capital, employment creation from
construction, etc.
In addition to not analyzing the financial aspect of
relocation, the committee would not study the detailed (root)
causes of problems associated with the capital city. Why is
the city growing very rapidly? What are the best
alternatives for curbing this growth? Why is it not possible
for other ethnic groups to be assimilated in Lagos? It is
only after a full consideration of these kinds of questions
and many more, that the committee might have been able to make the
most rational judgement as to whether the best solution was
to move the federal capital or to embark upon other less
costly policies. For example, in Chapters 2 and 3, we noted
that Lagos controls nearly 44 percent of the total national
manufacturing employment in the country. The city is
attractive to migrants and industries because of the
concentration of jobs and other amenities. Maybe the
solution to easing some of the growth pressures is to embark
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on a drastic industrial dispersal. This effort will not only
ease pressures on Lagos, but may contribute to improving
other regions from which most of the migrants come. This
proposal does not suggest that industrial dispersal is the
most optimal solution. However, it is argued that a consider-
ation of such alternative is one way of arriving at an
optimum solution to the Lagos problem. Sometimes a
combination of a number of alternatives--for example,
industrial dispersal, sustained rural development schemes,
including provision of amenities and other facilities, may be
required. These facilities may, in turn, make it possible
for industries and other employment generators to locate in
these areas.
On the other hand, the federal government can embark
upon decentralizing some of its functions. There is no
reason for every person who needs a passport, for example, to
go to Lagos to obtain it. It should be possible to issue
passports in the state capitals and other major urban
centers. Nor, must individuals always travel to Lagos in
order to obtain their foreign exchange for fee payment,
import licenses, and other related services?
In terms of the ethnic question, we have also noted in
Chapter 3 that the problem should be seen as a lack of access
to resources, rather than just sheer domination of one ethnic
group (in terms of numbers) by another. We pointed out that
in Lagos, for example, the Yorubas control most of the land
resources, and that non-transference of lands to non-Yorubas
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may stem from the characteristics of the traditional land
tenure system which prohibits (in many parts of the country
as well) transfer of such lands to 'strangers.' If that were
the situation, then maybe the solution to the problem lies in
reallocation of resources through efficient land tenure
systems. The 1978 Federal Land Use Decree, which
automatically vests all urban land on the respective state
governments, may be one way of averting this problem.
However, in order for this kind of strategy to be effective, it
must be strictly enforced.
4.3 Site Selection Process, Ethnic Conflicts, and
Consequences
Having critically reviewed the strategies used by the
Location Committee to reach its decisions, this section
analyzes the methods used by the Location Committee for
choosing the appropriate site for the new capital territory.
In the discussion, particular emphasis is given to the
conflicts that developed among the members of the Location
Committee, how the conflict was played out, its impact on the
site selection process, and the consequences on the overall
project construction.
A total of thirteen criteria were developed by the
Location Committee for choosing the best location for the new
capital territory (Table 4.2) The site chosen, shown in
Fig. 1.1, which is equidistant from almost all the state
capitals, covers 3,600 square miles (8,000 square
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Table 4.2
Criteria for Site Selection
Weight attached
Positions Criterion by percent
1 Centrality 22
2 Health and Climate 12
3 Land Availability and Use 10
4 Water Supply 10
5 Multi-Access Possibilities 7
6 Security 6
7 Existence of Building Materials Locally 6
8 Low Population Density 6
9 Power Resources 5
10 Drainage 5
11 Soil 4
12 Physical Planning Convenience 4
13 Ethnic Accord 3
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria: Report of the
Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital
of Nigeria, December 1975, p. 47.
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kilometers). It is bounded by Niger, Kaduna, Plateau, and
Kwara states. As shown, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT)
is central to Nigeria. The criteria for choosing this site
include, in order of priority and weighting points, the
following: centrality (22 points), health and climate (12),
land availability and use (10), water supply (10),
multi-access possibilities (7), security (6), existence of
local building materials (6), low population density (6),
power resources (5), drainage (5), soil (4), physical
planning convenience (4), and ethnic accord (3).
As pointed out earlier, two of the three main
elements--inadequacy of land, ethnicity problems, and
security--which had guided the committee's decision to
relocate the capital, were among the lowest priorities . In fact,
as Table 4.2 indicates, ethnic accord scored the least
points. It is not certain why the three elements were given
lower priorities. One of the reasons may be, as in the case
of ethnic accord, the realization that there is no site in
the country that is ethnically-neutral.
The other reason for low priority points for the
security criterion may be that, since the committee was
predisposed to locate the new territory in a central area, it
must have felt that it was unnecessary to raise this
element's (security) score points, because a
geographically-central position was assumed to provide
automatically for the security of the nation.
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The need for adequate land space was, however, given a
relatively high priority scoring (10 points), behind health
and climate (12 points) and centrality (22 points). It is
important to note that centrality scored the highest (22
points). This score would practically eliminate all other
sites that are not geographically central to the country.
The reason for the very high score of centrality may be due
to the third part of the Committee's mandate, which required
that: "In the event of the Committee finding that the Federal
Capital should move out of Lagos, to recommend suitable
alternative locations, having regard for the need for easy
accessibility to and from every part of the Federation."
Thus, the Location Committee must have interpreted this to
mean a central position. Also, choosing a central position
would again mean that the Location Committee was not being
responsive to the general wishes of the states, because many
of them, as pointed out above, did not recommend a central
location.
It is significant to note also that no alternative sites
were considered by the committee. The lack of consideration
of alternative sites meant that there was no way of comparing
the performance of this selected site with other sites. it
is possible that comparable or even better sites existed
elsewhere. Thus the committee wrote:
After full and careful consideration of all relevant
questions, we have arrived at the decision that it will
be to the best interest of the country that we
recommend an area of land to be designated as the
National Capital Territory. Having done this, we do
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not see any further necessity for suggesting
alternative locations. Applying the criteria
catalogued above [referring to our Table 4.2], we have
come to the unanimous decision as to a particular area,
the question of alternative location does not arise.(1)
But a rational site analysis (feasibilities studies)
should have considered alternative sites, especially those
that were suggested in the memoranda submitted by the various
groups, individuals, and state governments. Many of such
sites were: Achi-Okene-Osara, Agena-Buga, Ife-Agege area,
area between Kafanchan and Makurdi, Kafanchan-Zungeru, and
Kagoro-Kafanchan. Others included the area south and west of
Kachia, the area around Lokaja, Ife, between Agege and
Abeokuta, Ibadan, Ogbomosho, Jos, Zaria, Calabar, Benin City,
etc.
It was probably not feasible to analyze all these
locations, given the limited resources (time, funds, etc.)
that were available to the committee. However, a few of
these locations could have been isolated and studied in order
to choose the best location suited to the overall goal of the
new capital city.
Three major factors prevented an effective examination
of alternative sites. The first factor relates to the
limited time allowed for the feasibility studies. The
military government wanted the committee to select, "with
precision," a proper location for the new federal capital.
(1) Ibid., op. cit., p. 48.
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For such to be possible, many sites would have to be
considered. But the committee was given only four months to
complete its work. Out of the four months, the tour of
African and overseas capital cities took nearly one month.
The remainder was devoted to the tour of -state capitals and
the analysis of memoranda from the general public.
The limited time for site analysis was further worsened
by the inexperience of the committee members in large-scale
urban development. The members consisted of a businessman, a
judge, a professor of gynecology, an army chaplain, a legal
practitioner, a secondary school principal, and a geographer,
all with very little or no experience in urban planning.
They saw their function as a political one. This perspective
explains in part the disagreement that erupted among them
that would finally determine where the new capital territory
was to be situated.
The next factor that prevented effective site analysis
relates to the internal rivalries just mentioned above. This.
factor is very critical, in that it led finally to the choice
of a site that has been considered to be "very poor." (1) As
pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the conflict
among the members of the Location Committee was largely
ethnically-motivated. Some members of the committee wanted
the new capital to be positioned within or very near to their
ethnic territory or state of origin.
(1) See Ajato Gandonu. Implementing Abuja: 1975-1983,
ibid., op. cit., p. 5-15.
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The sources of the committee's disagreements can be
better understood by examining the backgrounds of the members
in terms of their positions with regard to moving the federal
capital before their appointment to the committee. The
analysis will reveal that some of the members were already
concerned, before their appointment to the panel, about
relocating the capital to a different region or ethnic
territory. Thus, as Gandonu wrote:
Never did Muhammed interfere with the panel of these
seven eminent and individually quite obstinate
characters who initially held divergent views on both
the fate of Lagos and the location of a new national
capital. Thus, Aguda, Fiebai, Gandonu, Isma, Martins,
Ogan, and Solarin had to battle it out among themselves
and submit a reasonable recommendation to the Supreme
Military Council of that time.(l)
Perhaps the best point to start the analysis of the
backgrounds of the Committee members is with its chairman.
The chairman of the panel, Dr. Justice T. Akinola Aguda, was
in 1975 the Chief Judge of the Western State. Prior to his
appointment to the panel, he was not in support of moving the
capital from Lagos. The pressure not to support relocation
increased during the Committee's tour of the Western State to
solicit that state's views (opinion) about moving the
capital. Recall that the Western State was one of only two
states to oppose relocation (see Table 4.1.). According to
one member of the panel, Aguda was under so much pressure
(1) Gandonu (1984), op. cit., p. 2
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from his home state that he "promised to ensure that the new
capital location was no further removed than a few kilometers
from the Western State border."(1)
The second member of the committee, Dr. Tai Solarin, was
a school principal, also from the Western State. Before his
appointment to the Panel, Solarin did not support relocation.
This lack of support is attributed to his close association
with Chief Awolowo (the often-acclaimed leader of the
Yorubas), who since the 1950s had strongly opposed the moving
of the federal capital. He had advocated locating the
capital as close as possible to the Yoruba territory.
The next member of the location panel was Dr. Ajato
Gandonu, a geographer, who had been a strong advocate of a
new capital city. He was often considered to be one of the
most nationalistic among the group. As early as 1965, while
still studying in England, Gandonu had begun to advocate for
a federal capital that would reflect the ethnic diversity of
the country. In 1974, he presented a proposal to General
Gowon, then the Head of State, for moving the capital to the
(1) The pressure from Aguda's home state was confirmed during
this writer's interview with one of the members of the Panel
in September 1984. Being Chief Judge of the Western State
which strongly opposes relocation, and at the same time
Chairman of the Location Committee appointed by the Military
government which wanted a new capital city, seemed to
represent a conflict of interest. On the one hand, Aguda
could not oppose the Military's conviction that a new capital
should be built and at the same time be the Chairman and on
the other hand, he could not disappoint his home state by
supporting relocation. Thus, Aguda resolved the dilemma by
ensuring that the new capital city was located as far south
as possible so that the Westerners would not feel that they
lost totally in the whole process.
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northern region, very close to where Abuja, the new capital,
is presently located. According to Gandonu, Gowon "bought
the idea." Gowon's approval was however killed when he
presented a proposal to his new cabinet, which consisted then
mostly of Yorubas. Nevertheless, Gandonu, still determined
to 'sell' his idea, published the proposal in the Daily Times
(see Daily Times, July 9, 1975). Shortly afterwards, on 29
July 1975, General Gowon was toppled in a military coup
d'etat, after which General Murtala Muhammed became head of a
new military government. It was thereafter that Dr. Gandonu
was invited to serve on the Location Panel appointed by
Muhammed.
Thus from Gandonu's previous position he was very much
in support of locating the capital in an ethnically-neutral
territory. However, his strong conviction of the need for a
neutral capital tended to obstruct his view from those that
seemed counter to his, even when such views might have been
useful for a proper planning of the new capital. In fact, as
his quotation, above, would indicate, he generally saw these
other opposing members as a threat to his idea and not
necessarily as members who may hold important, though
divergent, views from his own. An example of Gandonu's
intolerance was his insistence that the location of the
capital should move as far north as possible to incorporate
Suleja, the largest and nearest city to the north of the
federal territory. His opponents disagreed because of the
city's existing infrastructure and large population
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threshold. The opponents argued that incorporating Suleja
would lead to increased resettlement costs and would spur
migration to the city, thereby making planning more
difficult. As noted in Section 4.1, the excision of Suleja
from the rest of the territory would not, however, stop
migration to the city. The city's population by 1981 reached
nearly half a million.
Another member of the committee, Colonel Monsignor Pedro
Martins, an army chaplain, was from Lagos State. Like that
of his home state, Martins' position with regards to whether
the city should be relocated was unclear. However, given
that he was part of the military establishment, he might have
been inclined to relocating the capital.
The fifth member of the panel, Alhaji Muhammed Musa
Isma, a wealthy businessman, was from Kano State. Isma
supported relocating the federal capital from Lagos. He also
wanted the capital to be located in the north.
Chief Owen Fiebai, a legal practitioner, was a close
associate of General Theophilus Danjuma, the Chief of Staff,
Army Headquarters at the time. Fiebai was from the Rivers
State, which had opposed moving the capital. His support for
the movement was therefore seen as contrary to the position
of his home state. It is likely that his close association
with the army might have influenced his position. He wanted
the new capital sited in a central location.
Professor O.K. Ogan, a professor of medicine, who was
the seventh member of the panel, was from the Eastern State.
He also supported a central location of the capital.
199
This brief profile of the committee members indicates
that the criteria developed for choosing the site had very
little relevance to the site selected, as the majority of
the members went into the Committee with a predetermined
position of where (if at all) the new capital should be
located. The analysis suggests that some of the members
preferred a central location, others wanted the site moved
further north to include Suleja, and the remaining members
favored a location as far south as possible to include Yoruba
territory. In a democratic process, the boundary dispute
could have been resolved through bargaining, negotiation, or
voting among the disagreeing members. That did not, however,
happen. Justice Aguda was chairman of the panel. Being
appointed to that position by the military leaders, he had
the veto power. Because it was his conviction (as well as
that of a few others) that the new capital territory should
be located further south, he acted accordingly to implement
his position. Thus the new capital territory was extended
southward (excising Suleja in the north) to include much
undevelopable land in Kwara and Plateau States.
The exercise of choosing the site for the new capital was
therefore not seen as a process of constructive analysis
whereby the best site in terms of overall national interest and
construction quality should be selected. As Gandonu noted
about the problems of the site:
The shape and delineation of the Federal Capital
Territory (FCT) posed, and will continue to pose,
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serious physical planning and political problems in the
implementation efforts for this project. In
particular, the artificial."V" feature carved into the
northern part of the FCT and meant for excising Suleja
from an otherwise ideal contiguous territory, plus the
marginal transgression into Kwara and Plateau States,
thereby excluding the recommended area farther south
than considered ideal, were to create planning and
resettlement problems of long-term consequences.(1)
Gandonu further wrote:
The position of the Federal Territory has narrowed the
options for locating the capital city where it might
have maximized the advantages set out in the acclaimed
criteria for locating the capital (as set out in Table
4.2). With the constraint caused by the "V" excision,
the planners have had to sacrifice more ideal
locational options for the capital city. The incursion
into Kwara and Plateau States brought in less desirable
parts such as the lands south of Kwali and increased
resettlement problems.
In the following discussion, we examine the nature of
these problems posed by the committee's poor locational
decision. The analysis will also help to shed light on the
consequences of the problems on the overall project
construction.
The problems posed by the new FCT site can be grouped
into two major categories. They include: (i) physical
planning problems that are related to soil, water, and land
use and (ii) resettlement problems.
(1) Ajato Gandonu. Implementing Abuja: 1975-1983, ibid., p.
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4.3.1 Physical Planning Problems
The choice of the 3,600 square miles of the FCT included
a site for locating the Federal Capital City (FCC). The
physical planning problem seemed to be most serious in
choosing this site. Ideally, every part of the FCT should
provide a suitable site on which to locate the FCC. But
because of soil difficulties, only the northeastern
quadrangle of the territory was found suitable for locating
urban development (see the position of the FCC in Fig. 4.1).
The process for identifying candidate locations and finally
selecting the capital city itself was based on a detailed
description and evaluation of the natural and man-made
environment of the Federal Territory undertaken by the IPA as
an initial step in the master planning process. The site
selection of the capital city site was based on an evaluation
and ranking of each of the candidate locations according to
three major criteria: urban suitability, visual amenity, and
man-made constraints.(1)
Urban Suitability
Urban suitability was defined by a combination of
environmental factors, including soils and characteristics,
vegetation quality, geologic characteristics, probable
conservation zones, quality of climate, and suitability of
terrain. Because no environmental factor is particularly
(1) The Master Plan for Abuja, the New Federal Capital of
Nigeria, February 1979, pp. 30-54.
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Figure 4.1 Federal Capital Territory, Showing the Capital City
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meaningful by itself, to determine sites for urban
suitability, interpretation and correlation were required to
transform them into useful measures for site evaluation. Key
positive and negative criteria were therefore employed by the
IPA. A set of most important positive qualities for the
capital city site include:
- the most comfortable and healthful climate available;
- sufficient size to accommodate future growth;
- configuration to allow maximum choice in urban form;
- minimum topographic restrictions including the possibility
of an efficient transportation system and organization of
land uses;
- building soils and geologic conditions not requiring
unusual or heroic engineering measures for construction;
- unique or exploitable natural features for urban design
purposes.(1)
By the same token there are certain negative site
qualities that can present hazards to development or make the
cost of construction so high as to make them undesirable for
urban development. Such negative criteria include:
- flood plain terraces;
- slopes over 15 percent;
- soils having many laterites, variable draining, medium
draining density, or propensity to erosion;
- riverine and rain forest, swamps;
(1) Ibid., p. 32.
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- geologic faults, joints, or shear zone.(l)
Using the positive and negative criteria, the IPA
investigated three sites in the territory (Fig. 4.2).
Site 1 (Northeastern quadrangle) was chosen as offering
the best potential for maximizing the positive criteria and
the best potential for minimizing the negative criteria.
This writer has no way of obtaining the actual scores of
these three sites. However, what is important is that in
spite of the Northeast quadrangle having the best potential
for urban development, the site still posed difficult
problems during construction.
During the Master Planning process it was found
inevitable to designate 33 percent of the entire city site
for open spaces because of mainly terrain difficulties.(2)
Most of the open space area was found to be unable to sustain
residential development. In a similar situation, the
population of 230,000 inhabitants projected for the first
phase of the project could not be realized because a detailed
planning process had identified more undevelopable land in
Phase One area. As a result, Phase One's target population
was cut by approximately 22 percent to 190,000. It was later
discovered that this population would still not be
accommodated because some residential plots in Garki and
(1) Ibid., p. 32
(2) Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago. "Implementing a Master Plan: The
Abuja Experience," paper presented at the workshop on The
Planning of New Capital Cities in Developing Countries, held
at Abuja, Nigeria under the auspices of the United Nations
University, Tokyo, Japan, NISER Ibadan, and the FCDA. March
5-9, 1984.
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Figure 4.2 Federal Capital City: Candidate Sites
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Asokoro districts were found undevelopable during the
physical setting out on the ground.(l) This latest discovery
led to a further reduction of the Phase One population to
150,000. Such plots had to be merged to form larger plots or
converted to non-residential uses, such as open spaces.
The evaluation of the three candidate sites based on
the two remaining criteria--visual amenity, and man-made
constraints, also favored the choice of the north-east
quadrangle (Site 1) of the capital territory.(2) However,
even with this site being favored on the basis of the two
criteria, two additional problems were encountered at the
site during construction.
The first problem relates to the inability of the FCDA
to control or coordinate developments outside the new capital
territory. The Niger state government, for example, has
taken undue advantage of its proximity to the territory to
construct an International Hotel near the territory without
reference to the FCDA.(3) There is a potential for conflict
with this government whereby planning control to preserve
such national monuments as the Zuma Rock is being torn down
(1) Ibid., p. 10.
(2) Visual amenity pertains to unique natural features or
general attractiveness of the environment. Man-made
constraints relate to regulatory procedures, airport approach
and departure zones, highway corridors, probable size of
urbanized areas, and water, power, and waste disposal
requirements of the new capital. For a detailed description
of the characteristics of the visual amenity and man-made
constraints see Master Plan for Abuja (1979), ibid., op.
cit., p. 37-45.
(3) Ajato Gandonu. Implementing Abuja: 1975-1983. Ibid.,
op. cit., p. 13.
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by the Niger state government in order to make way for the
international hotel.
The second problem relates to the potential for an acute
scarcity of water in the territory. Available data suggest
that the probability of large supplies from groundwater
sources in the territory is low.(l) Surface water in the
territory itself is also not particularly promising. While
there are several large rivers in the territory, namely the
Gurara, Usuman, and Afara-Bokwoi, their flows are highly
variable, according to season, with few opportunities for
appropriate dam sites for water-impoundment purposes in the
territory. Rather, small watersheds, high evaporative loss,
and entrophication and disease vector problems also minimize
potential reliance on surface water.(2) Because of this lack
of reliable water-supply sources within the territory, it was
necessary to develop water supply schemes outside for both
interim and ultimate water supply to the city. The schemes
include a proposal for three dams or reservoirs to be
construct-ed on the River Usuma and a pipeline to be laid from
the Shiroro Hydroelectricity Dam being undertaken by the
National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) on the River Kaduna
to the Lower Usuma Dam. This was to draw water from the
Kaduna river to supplement the Lower Usuma Dam Reservoir.
The Shiroro piping scheme was found to be uneconomical
because of the long distance involved in moving the water
(1)Tle Master Plan for Abuja. Ibid., op. cit., p. 37.
(2) Ibid., p. 38.
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(via pipeline) to the territory and potential maintenance
problems in the future. The NEPA too objected to the
proposal, for the scheme would affect the generating capacity
of the Shiroro Hydro-electricity scheme. In the case of the
network of three reservoirs to be constructed on the River
Usuma, just work on the Lower Usuma Dam was embarked upon.
This dam was completed in 1984. The project has a capacity
to cater to just the 230,000 inhabitants projected for Phase
One of the city. For the ultimate water supply to the 3.1
million inhabitants of the FCC, another joint scheme was
being planned for harnessing the River Gurara for
hydroelectricity and water supply.
The two Upper Usuma Dams, scheduled in the Master Plan
to supplement the Lower Usuma Dam, which were to have
preceded it, were abandoned after it was discovered in 1979
that there were many more villages and towns than originally
anticipated that needed to be relocated, and, compensated.
Thus by August 1984 when this writer visited the new FCC,
work on these two dams had not begun.
When it became obvious that the Lower Usuma Dam would
not be ready before the commencement of the rescheduled
movement of the city in 1982 by the defunct civilian
administration, it became necessary to embark on an
alternative interim water supply scheme. This was what gave
birth to yet another dam, the Jabbi dam. The project was
commissioned towards the end of 1981. The location of the
dam, however, falls within the Phase II development of the
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city scheduled to start after 1986, and the larger part of
the catchment area for the dam also falls within the city
land. There is also the fact that the catchment areas will
eventually be developed into residential areas. The dam
reservoir also cuts across the alignment of one of the major
expressways (Northern Parkway) in the city. The design for
this road had in fact been completed by the FCDA. A special
bridge would therefore have to be built over the dam when the
Northern Parkway is to be constructed in Phase Two. There
would also be some problems with the laying of the water main
carrying water from the Jabbi Treatment Plant to the
reservoir at the Asokoro area, which presently feeds Garki
and Wuse Districts of Phase I. This water pipe cuts across
other land uses, such as residential plots in Wuse, Maitama,
parts of Asokoro, the State House (Presidential Complex), and
the National Assembly. Before such buildings are erected, it
may be necessary to realign the pipes.
The point being emphasized here is that the poor
locational choice of the Territory has exacerbated the
problems of building the capital in terms of construction
costs, administration, and delays. Lack of reliable water
sources, as we have shown, meant transporting water long
distances into the territory. At the same time, it has
necessitated building a series of dams, which in turn have
required the alteration of the land use pattern. All these
mean that funds that could have been devoted to other things
will have to be spent on water supply (see Table 4.3).
Table 4.3
Lower Usuma and Jabbi Dam Projects
sums (in Treatment Length of Completion
Scheme millions N) capacity Dam date Remarks
Lower Usuma N 145 million 24 million 1350 meters June 1981 To cater to
gallons/day 230,000 popula-
tion target for
FCC, Phase I
expected by 1986
Jabbi Dam N 14.99 million 1.86 million 1100 meters Oct. 1981 Presently
gallons/day serving Garki,'
Wuse, and
contractors in
the Life Camps
Source: Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago. "Implementing a Master Plan; the Abuja Experience."
Paper presented at the Workshop on The Planning of New Capital Cities in Develop-
ing Countries, held at Abuja, Nigeria, under the auspices of the United Nations
University, Tokyo, Japan, NISER, Ibadan, and the FCDA, March 5-9, 1984.
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4.3.2 Resettlement Problems
As noted above (Section 4.3), the main contention for
excising Suleja from the rest of the territory (as argued by
some members of the Location Committee) was to minimize
resettlement costs that would be involved if this city were
to be incorporated within the territory. Hence, it was felt
by the committee that by moving the territory further south,
it would be possible not only to avoid Suleja but also to
avoid many other towns and villages, thereby minimizing the
total potential displacement costs.
On completing this study, the committee members had
estimated that approximately 50,000 inhabitants would be
affected (displaced) by the new capital project. But as it
turned out during implementation, when a detailed study of
the territory was conducted, the number of inhabitants that
would actually be affected or displaced by construction stood
at 150,000.(l) This latest revelation had several
consequences.
First, the government had to alter its resettlement
policy in order to accommodate the increased number of
displaced persons. Before the discovery that many more
villages than originally planned for would be displaced, the
government's policy was to resettle the earlier estimate of
50,000 inhabitants in the areas (states) of their choice
(1) Memorandum on the Progress Report of Resettlement
Schemes, Federal Capital Development Authority, August 20,
1984.
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outside the new capital territory so that construction would
proceed on a virgin land. But on discovering the new figure
the government changed its policy to resettle all affected
persons within the new capital territory. This policy change
now meant that the responsibility for resettling most of the
inhabitants would fall on the FCDA, thereby impinging on the
agency's generally weak administrative capacity.
Another major implication of the increased number of
displaced persons was that more funds were needed for
resettlement. The total allocation, in fact, increased from
barely N6.5 million to N117 million (Table 4.4).
The third implication of the resettlement problem is
that because of the change in policy to resettle everyone who
chose to stay within the FCT and others in their states of
origin, confusion has arisen because of the FCDA's inability
to coordinate effectively the resettlement exercise. Some
states have taken undue advantage of the situation to request
more money than their original allocation when, in fact ,0
the number of persons needing rehabilitation -in these states
should be decreasing. As a result, there has been a sharp
increase (rather than decrease) in total funds allocated to
the states for resettlement purposes (Table 4.4).
Finally, the change in policy to resettle all the former
inhabitants within the territory has contributed in part to
the slumification of the villages in the territory, because
immigrants have seized the opportunity to invade such areas.
This has created serious planning problems for the FCDA in
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Table 4.4
Total Allocation Due to the States
for Resettlement Purposes
Budget
Allocation for Budget
Resettlement of Allocation for
Original Estimate Newb Estimate
of 50,000 of 150,000 Percentage
inhabitants inhabitants Increase
States (N million) (N million) (%)
Niger State 4.00 54.72 1268
Plateau State 1.50 19.82 1221
Kwara State 1.00 0.83 - 17
Federal 0.00 41.50 ---
Capital
Territory
Total 6.50 116.87 1698
Estimate provided by the
Estimate derived after a
site by the FCDA (1979)
Location Committee (1975)
more detailed study at the
Source: Compiled from: Memorandum on the Progress Report
on Resettlement Schemes, FCDA, August, 1984.
a:
b:
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terms of being able to provide sufficient infrastructure for
these people.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we examined two important stages of the
new capital's development involving: (1) the activities of
the Panel appointed by the Military government to examine the
feasibility of a new capital city for the country, and (2)
the site selection activity also carried out by this Panel.
We noted that the outcome of the two activities was largely
influenced by the military leaders who were bent on building
the new capital city. Also significant was the fact that the
committee's performance was inhibited by the very problem
(ethnic cleavages) which relocation was designed to
eliminate. Hence, the choice of an appropriate location
precluded a rational analysis of alternative and adequate
sites for locating the new capital. This has resulted in
part to water supply problems and land use probelms, all of
which have added to overall cost of building the capital.
CHAPTER 5
THE MASTERPLANNING ENTERPRISE
In this chapter, the second phase of the new capital's
planning enterprise, involving the masterplanning process, is
examined. Three major actors were essentially involved in this
aspect of the planning enterprise. They are the Nigerian
military leaders, the International Planning Associates (IPA)
which developed the Master Plan, and the Federal Capital
Development Authority (FCDA). This stage marks the bepginning
of the FCDA's involvement in overall project development. The
job of the Location Committee had ended before the beginning
of the phase, although two of its members were later appointed
to the Board of Directors of the FCDA. The FCDA served mainly
as a medium through which the IPA interacted with the military
government.
The interaction among the three actors is examined in
order to understand the kinds of policy decisions made, and
their overall impact on project construction. Our analysis
will reveal that contrary to accepted rational planning
principles, the military government once more, dictated the
"tempo" of planning, while the IPA developed mainly technical
solutions to match their demands.
The planning and construction of a new city is a long-
term process. Yet, the construction of a capital city designed
to accommodate an initial population of nearly a quarter of a
million people was to be completed in less than eight years, a
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timeframe demanded by the military leaders. A result of this
fast pace was that the IPA had to develop a "fast track"
strategy (whereby actual construction would begin at the site
before the completion of the Master Plan) to meet this
government demand. The entire masterplanning exercise was
completed in less than two years. Another result of the fast
pace was the failure of IPA to take into account many of the
fundamental issues also omitted during the feasibilitv
studies. The planners did not examine the dramatic effect the
new capital's construction would have on the existing
financial resources and organizational capacity. Durinc his
meeting with the IPA, Dr. Sayre Schatz, an expert on Nigerian
economic development, expressed the opinion that the new
capital project was too large and too costly for the presert
Nigerian economy. It was not in IPA's interest to consider
this opinion themselves, or to pass the comment on to the
Nigerian government which was already bent on building a
capital city.(1) (Recall that the feasibility studie= had
already been completed, the decision to.build a new capital
made, and the site for locating the new city identified
therefore, it was highly unlikely that any pressure would have
*deterred the military government from build:ing the new city.)
In no section of the Master Plan is there a discussion of the
financing aspect of the plan.
The domination of the planning process by the military
(1) J. Moore. Planning Abuja : The Politics of New Capital
Contruction. B.A Thesis Princeton University, 1982, p. 95.
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government is further reflected in the selection of
appropriate infrastructure and housing strategies. The
i ncl i nati on to b ui I d a "bef i tti ng" capital has cont r i bcuted i n
part to the selection of infrastructure with relatively high-
standard technological attributes. This inclination is evident
in the construction of sewerage and transportation systems.
Furthermore, the intention to build an administrative capital
left the impression that mainly government empliyees Would
inhabit the city. Thus, housing strategies have been develope-?d
mainly with this group of residents in mind. The result has
been that a very large segment of non-government workers,
including the poor, has been left to find their own hcusing in
the open market.
Finally,. the government's decision to have the new
capital designed by expatriates, and the nature of their
selection process, was another indication of political
constraint on the new capital 's constructi on. The sel ecti on oc
an expatriate firm can be attr:ibuted, in part, t(o the need t
further insulate the plan from internal political pressure.
The organizational structure of the FCDA and IPA and the
planner-client relationship established between these two
groups demonstrates the evolution of such political
priorities.
5.1 Choice of Expatriate Firm, the Nature of IPA /
Nigerian Relationship
In late 1976 the FCDA held an international compet it: i cn
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among a select group of expatriate firms to award the contract
for the comprehensive planning of the new federal capital. At
that time Nigeria was operating under a military/civilian
dyarchy. The military and civilian leaders concurred in the
selection of non-Nigerian planners. Two major factors were
responsible for the choice of expatriate planners. First, the
military government involved in the initial stages of the
planning process had limited experience in large-scale urban
development. This government, as explained in Chapter 3, was
oriented to action. Military leaders stated that to achieve a
maximum level of efficiency the project should be turned over
to experts who could complete the planning process as qAiCi.y
as possible. (1) Because Abuja was being planned to imitate
western capitals, the military government must have felt that
expatriate (western) planners would be in a better position to
produce its design.
A second motive behind the military's selection of an
expatriate planning team was related to the need to insulate
the plan as much as possible fr om the dynamic f+orces of the
opposition. As we noted in Chapter 4., the panel on the
location of the capital did not make an adequate evaluation of
the new capital question. A large majority of organizations
and private groups were not consulted by the committee. The
committee was largely used to find practical rationales for
what was largely a predetermined political decision. Many
people, including professional bodies in Nigeria held
(1) Ibid, p. 47.
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opposition views on the form and role of the new city.(I:) In
the memoranda of the FCDA/NISER workshop, numerous a rc4Gments
were g:i ven in support of using .Ni geri an p1l anners to build:J the
new capital. Moore (1982) has noted however,, that the use of
Nigerian experts would have permitted each step of the
planning process to be subject to internal political
pressures. By isolating the planning process within the
decision making structure of a foreign firm, internal
questioning could be avoided. The more deliberation and
consultation involved in a project, the longer it takes to
make and implement planning decisions. (2) In the Nigerian
context, with numerous competing ethnic groups, contesting
political organizations, and conflicting opinions on the new
capital's proper role, the use of indigeneous experts was
likely to subject it to immense political opposition.
The military's justification for the use of expatriate
planners is expounded by Mr. Ebong, a civil servant and the 4:irst
executive secretary of the FCDA. (3) As quoted in Moore's thesi
"Ebong argued that the decision to hold a limitied competition
was based on purely analytical criteria." In Ebong's words, "the
project of planning the new capital was not within :ind:genous
capabilities" and the Nigerians did not have the necessary
(1) See Excerpts from the FCDA Workshop on "Policy Considera-
tions" For the Construction of Abuja, held under the
Auspices of the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic
Research, University of Ibadem. 27-29th September 1976.
(2) J. Moore, Ibid, opp. cit., p. 48.
(3) Ibid, p. 48-49
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"techn:ical expertise". (1) Ebong did not mention that other
Nigerians felt strongly that the new capital "should be a
Nigerian city built by Niger:ians. " But Ebong viewed the
FCDA /NISER workshop as an opportunity -for diverse groups to
express their opinions without fully integrating them into the
planning process. In the final analysis Ebong believed that,
surpassing all political questions, the city had to frunction,
and he felt the only way to achieve this was by asking the
leading international planners to submit proposals.(2)
The selection of planners was a policy dec:ision in which
both the military leaders and the civilians (i nvoiving mostly
Nigerian professionals) argue about the use of an expatriate
firm. In this situation it is not difficult to ascertain whose
views would be more influential. According to Bienen (1981 ),
while Nigeria operates with civilians in executive positions,
neither the military nor the c:ivilian participants were in any
doubt as to the source of authority in the system. It is the-
military. Had Ebong chosen not to hire an expatriate f :irim
and awarded the contract to indigenous professionals, the
military government would have been in a position to reverse
this decision. In this case, since there existed
military/civilian harmony, Ebong and the FCDA were given the
freedom to select, within a limited scope, the planning firm
for the new capital project.
(1) Ibid, p. 48.
(2) Ibid, p, 48.
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The international competi ti on of planning f irms led to
the selection of an Armeric:an conSortium, International
Pl anni ng A saoci ates (IPA). The IP'A team vj a joi c:i nt venture of
Archisystems Inc.; Wallace, McHarg, Roberts and Todid; and
Planning Research Corporation. The rationalization of the
military government's selection of an ex patriate fi rm to plan
the city is clarified and elaborated in the working
relationship and organizational structure of the IP 1--FCDA
partnerhsip.
The political priorities of the military governmert -were
discernible in three stages of the Masterplanning process
preparation, formulation and finalization. (1) In the
preparation stage, important assumptions and decisions were
made prior to the awarding of the planning contract to IPA. By
examining the planner-client relationship established during
the formulation period of the master plan Moore (1782), noted
that -the planning team was orgahized according to political
constr-aints and personal ideol ogqy, not planning theory,
final stage of development is a politically desi~gned process
of consultation, contrived to minimize protest against the
project and to insure the implementation of the master plan."
(2)
The response by the IPA planner-s to the political
(1) The three stages of the masterplanning process are adopted
(but modified by this writer) from : Moore (19'2), Ibid,
opp. cit., p. 50.
(2) J. Moore, Ibid, opp. cit., p. 50.
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constraints imposed by the presence of the Nigerian military
government seems to satisfy one of the tenets of the structural
theorists who argue (as we noted in Chapter I) that the success
of any plan implementation activity depends on an organization's
(in this case the IPA team) relationship with the outside actors
(the military government). As it is going to be evident in the
following discussion, the IPA planners, inspite of their
expertise, were largely controlled by the dictates of Nigeriarn
military leaders. Hardly anywhere in the process did this team question or
argue with the Nigerian leaders about some of the:ir dec i si ons or
demandseven when such decisions would affeact adversely the
process of project implementation.
Prep ar at ion
The American consortium awarded the contract for planning
the new capital of Nigeria, was given four firm guidelines prior
to the initiation of their work. These were : "1. The new capital
city must be located within the 8,000 sq. km. area of central
Nigeria designated the Federal Capital Territory.
2. The new capital city is to be ready for initial occupation by
1986. 3. The new capital city is to be an administrative city
with a minimal amount of industry. 4. The new capital city
shoulcd be able to accomodate a population of up to 3 mi 1l ion."
(1)
According to rational planning methods, such guidelinEs
should be established only after a long series of analytical
(1) Ibid, p. 50.
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studies and should be accompan:led by a number of eptable
alternatives. As noted in section 4.-.3., Guideline 1, the
location decision, was crudely arrived at, with nadequate or
proper site analysi s . A1 ternative s i te s for the Federal
Capital Territory were never considered. No analysis was ever
made by IPA whether the site (the entire territory) selected
was appropriate as it was not within the scope o-F the
contractual arrangement. According to Dr. A. Gandonu,ne of
the members o-f the Location Committee who opposes the present
location of the Federal Territory, "a more effectivre locatio;:'n
would be -further to the north and east", yet because the site
was specified, IPA had to work within this parameter. Clearly,
the location of the capital was isolated from the planning
process, and whether site selection was made by the Committee
on the Location of the Capital, or imposed by political
constraints, the qualities of the selected site were never
carefully and adequately evaluated.
A similar process was refflected in the selection of the
siz2e
, the -form, and the schedule for development o-f the new
capital. The population figure given to IPA was a maximum of' 3
million residents in the new capital. It is not certain how
this figure was arrived at. It was not considered durina
-feasibility studies by the Location Committee.
The third guideline given to the IPA team designated the
administrative nature of -the city and outlined the basic
economic structure. This decision is fundamental to the
operational effectiveness of the new capital. However, without
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even a limited study of the city's economics, it was decided
that l arge-scal e industry would not be permi tted i n Abuj a. The
dec i si on on the ci ty s economic form has i imp Iicat ions forI-
determi ni ng whi chi 1 evel s of Ni geri an soc i ety wOuld i nhabit the
city as well as its general land-use pattern.
The fourth guideline was the timetable for- completing
the Master plan (2 years) and the city (8 years). The failure
to develop a realistic schedule is attributable to the fact
that the Nigerian military government was operating under a
1 i mited mandate. All planning decisions were made with the
knowledge that within three years there would be a return to
civilian rule. It was imperat:i ve that a signi -f:i cant portion of
the city be planned before the advent of civilian elections-,
and multi-party competition.
These four guidelines are fundamental to the design process
established for the new capital. They demonstrate the case in
which -functional decisions were subordinate to the political
priorities of the military government.
Formul ati on
The formulation of the master plan was exclusively the
work of the IPA and the FCDA. Only after examining the
organizational structure of the FCDA and the IPA is it
possible to discuss the interaction of these groups and the
effect of this symbiiotic relationship on the develcopment of
the master plan.
The FCDA, from its inception through the completion o-F
the master plan, was chaired by Mr. Mobolaji Ajose--Adeogun.
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Adeogun and the seven members of the authority were appointed
by the Supreme Military Council. The five major
responsibilities of the FCDA accord:ing to its constitutional
decree were (1)
1) The choice of site for the location of the capital
city within the Capital Territory;
2) The preparation of a master plan for the capital city
and of land use with respect to town and country
planning within the rest of the Capital Territcry;
3) The provision of municipal services within the Capital
Terr:itory;
4) The establishment of infrastructur-al services in
accordance with the master plan referred abov"e;
5) The coordination of the activities of all ministries,
departments and agencies of the Government of the
Federation within the Capital Territory.
The organizational structure of the FCDA: is shown
schematically in Figure 7-1 of Chapter 7. At the top of the
decision-making framework is the Board of Directors. The
Chairman (Adeogun), an ex-Mobil executive, had no background
in urban planning. Next in commrnand was the executive
Secretary..- As previously mentioned, the first man to hold this
position was I. J. Ebong. Characterized as a bright and
ef+icient administrator, Ebong had been one of the many
powerful civil servants in Nigeria, serving as a permanent
Secretary in the Ministry of Economic Development prior to his
appointment with the FCDA. The nature of the decision-mai.kina
hierarchy is represented by the working relationship
established between Adeogun and Ebong. There was a great deal
(1) Federal Capital Territory Decree, No 6, 1976.
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of conflict between the two; Ebong was in favor of competitive
procureTient, whi-le it is reported that Adeogun general ly
awarded contracts to "friends." (1) The tension is traced back
to the decision supported by Ebong to hold a competition for
the job of planning the capital. Adeogun would have preferred
to decide on the planning firm. Ultimately, Ebong was asked to
step down from his position while Adeogun remained in power.
The lower level of the FCDA's organizational structure is
divided into five -departments : Administration. Finance and
Economic Planning, Physical Planning and Architecture,
Development and Engineering Services, and the Department of
Estate. Department-level operations were run according to two
principles outlined by Ebong's successor, Alhaji A-'bu-bakar Koko.
In a long memo Koko states that in the current Nigerian situation
"many town planning initiatives can be translated into action
with speed, without having to go through a very long chain of
public inquiry or consultation."(2)
The first operating principle of the FCDA- was to proceed with-
Out delay with the planning and construction of the new capital.
The second principle enunciated by Koko is that the FCDA must
act to ensure "that every section of the Nigerian society
becomes involved with the new city." It is against this
background that it is considered necessary to evolve an
organizational structure and to develop management practi ces
that are flexible enough to meet the current and future needs
on the project." (Moore, 1982, p. 56)
These two principles characterize the nature of the FCDA. The
(1) J. Moore, Ibid, opp. cit., p. 54.
(2) Cited in J. Moore, Ibid, p. 56.
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FCDA was often described as an agency far removed from the
actual planning process wh:ich "only served as a propaganda
device for the Nigerian voice" channeling Nigerian
participation through a superficial level . "(1) Thi s
operational position of the FCDA has been confirmed by members
of the FCDA and the IPA. The IPA planners have argued at
length that the FCDA's lower-level departments did not play an
active part in planning, an opinion supported by the FCDA
planning staff during this writer's :interview with some of the
FCDA's officials. Plans or other tasks that could have been
equally well carried out by the FCDA staff were assigned to
the Western planners.
Again, the inadequate involvement of the FCDA's staff
may have also stemmed -from their lack of experience already
stressed above or simply from the political need to allow an
inconsequential level of Nigerian participation in the
planning process.
The decision making structure of the FCDA, combined with
the inexperience of Nigerians working for the A-uthority,
insured that the high-speed production schedule of the IPA
would not be challenged by excessive indigenous input. The
ineffect:iveness of the FCDA is matched by mi sconceptions and
weaknesses of the IPA inherent in a situation in which the IFA
was made to remain as dependent as possible on the
specifications of the military government.
(1) Ibid, p. 56
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There were other weaknesses apparent in the operatiozna.l
structure of the American consortium. The-- IPA planners were
primarily concerned with ful-filling their contractuial
arrangement with the Niger-ian governirent. This is not to impTly
that the planning team had little or no regard for developing
an efficient urban development plan (Master Plan). The point
is that given the position in which the IPA had to depend on
the federal government for most of its guidelines and
specif:ications, the IPA had very little leverage with wh:i ch to
perform their function effectively.
The IPA did most of its design work abrocad and not in
Nigeria. The long distance that separated the planners from
the site has thus helped in the accomplishment of the
government's goal of isolating the plan's development from the
forces of Nigerian politics (Moore, 1982, p. 58).
An examination of the interaction that took place
between the FCDA and the IPA reveals that such interacti on
occurred mainly at the highest levels of the deci si on-maki ng
structure,. Top-ranking members of the FCDA and power-ful
military personnel were actively involved in the formulation
of plans for the new capital. The interaction that took p
at this level alone could not but have serious ramifications
for the new capital's execution process. First, the government and its
agencies must be responsible to the public, must be answer-able
to the public, and must account for :its actions to thee publ ic.
It is therefore essential that not only the government and
the FCDA, but also the lower and middle level staff,,
and the general public must know and
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accept what the FCDA's responsibilities are. Second, if
substantial agreement on a feasible and desirable course of
action is to be achieved each of the variousL levels of
officials of the FCDA,t the government and the general public
must see something desirable in the contemplated action, hence,
the need for the participation of all levels in the planning
process. The two categories -- responsibility and
responsiveness --- embody the strategy for achieving a
constructive input from the general public. This enhances the
likelihood of success in carrying out the agency's
responsibilities and responding to the public's expectations
and can be thought of as achieving effectiveness objective.. In
Chapter 7, it is noted that lack of full involvement or
partic:ipation of all levels of FCDA's staff leads tb a number
of problems including lack of personnel commitment., loss of
potential on-the-job experience, and corruption, which
impinge upon the success of the project.
An American planner recounted an incident. when IPA
delivered a presentation outlining the estimated cosits of the
project to a number of military officials at Dodan Barracks :rin
Lagos. The military men were generally oblivious to the
figures. (1) Cost, to the majority of the military Ieader s and
even to the Location Committee., was not a factor worthy of
major concern. The economic boom brought on by the rise in oil
revenues had brought with it a mistaken perception that
Nigeria was a wealthy country.
(1) Ibid, p. 57.
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A lack of concern for the cost probilem is perhaps bette-r
re-flected in the exc hangqe between the opponents of the n w
capital who had arg..ied that the new capital s cons trLct ion
would cost some N 100 billion, and the Location Committee.
Opponents argued that even if the N 100 billion was spread
over a generation, the mere size of it would have the
following implications
a. it would involve the expenditure of a huge amount of-
money during the constrAction period, worsening the
inflationary spiral, first in the construction Sector
and ultimately in the entire economy;
b) :it would increase greatly the cost of bui ldin n materi als.
c) it would create a great obstacle to the successful
complet:ion of Third National Development Plan;
the nation's attention would be diverted from other more
important matters, such as the provision of basic: need
and the greatest happiness of the greatest numiber, to a
project that by its very nature has very f-ew s£pread
effects on the local economy itself;
d) it would further increase Nigeria's propensity to import
because a large proportion of the material, e::xpertise.
and other facilities that would be reqlulired:1 iin the new
capital would have to be imported and paid for in hard
curren-cy.(1)
(1) Report of the Committee on the Locat:ion of the Federal
Capita.1, December 1975, p. 56.
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They have further argued that in spite of the oil boom.
the country has still not been able to provide certain
s-ervices -- free education, health care service-S; it ha not
been able to clear its slums and provide a healthy
environment to all citizens. The urban centers are in a
deplorable condition, and communication facilities, potable
water, and electricity are yet -to get to the majority of the
towns and villages.(1)
In response to these charges, the Location Committee
maintained (as we noted in Chapter 4) that the opponents'
argument represents onl y a sign of pessi mi sm. The commi t t eE
maintained that such an argument would not alter its
conclusions and recommendations for moving the capital.
On numerous occasions during the formulation of the
Master Plan, IPA staff met with representatives oF the FCDA
and presented alternative proposals for the construction of
the capital. At these meetings it became apparent that
accompanying the requireiients of3 having the capital built
quickly, there was a broad feeling that the c:ity should be a
proud reflection of Nigeria's wealth and power.(2) (Recall
the argument similar to this feeling, presented in Chapter 1,
from the Abuja supporters.) Moore (1982) points out that the
FCDA's tour of some Western capitals had reinforced the policy
that only a city of similar qualities to those visited would
(1) Ibid, p. 57.
(2) J. Moore, Ibid, opp. cit., p. 6k.
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be acceptable to Nigeria. In the following section, the
examples of how this input affected the citv's design are
presented. (1) The exampies involve the p1ans for wast-water-
treatment, transportation development, housing strat egie Fs and
the general land use organization.
5.2 Selection of Appropriate Strategies : The Case o-f
Housing, Sewerage, Land Use and Transport Systems
IPA, in developing a sanitary sewerage system -for the new
capital, made a number of recommendations. The most important of
these is that
the system should be a gravity collection system., with no
lift stations, force mains or other powered devices. This
type of system presents a number of advantages :it :is
low in construction cost; in addition, the long lead time
(up to three years) required for the purchase and
installation of large pumps is eliminated together with
their high cost. The operational and maintenance costs
are much lower than for pumped systems; the probability
of a "c:atastrophic" type of system failure is extremelyv
low; energy requirements are nil. (2)
In light of these objectives, and with the consideration that
IPA had to work in the absence of detailed informati on
regarding soil, depths to bedrock, topography, demand
distribution, etc, four alternative systems were identified.
The systems vary in the complexity of their technology -frcom an
anaerobi c-ox i dati on system, and an anaerobi c-aer ated pond
(1) A ful1 discussion of the overall impact c3f the Nicerian
government's inclination towards the construction of the
"western-type" capital city is presented in Moore (1962),
Ibid, Chapter III, p. 46-78.
(2) The Master Plan, Ibid, opp. cit., p. 200.
233
system to a "standard" activated-sludge, secondary treatment
system and/or advanced waste-water treatment systei (AWT) , the
latter bei ng the most sophi sti cated in ter of- tecInoCl ogY
but also the inost costly.
The concept of anaerobic ponds was strongly supported by
IPA planners. These ponds are constructed relatively deep (+ 8
feet), and
solid materials settle -to the bottom of the pond to
decompose. The depth of water and turbidity prevent
penetration of sunlight and thus growth of algae and
aquatic plants, maintaining the pond's anaerobic
condition... because water conditions ef fectively prevent
plant growth, maintenance of anaerobic ponds and their
surroundings is relatively easy. Access to the ponds is
restricted to prevent stirring of the water.(1)
Oxidation ponds are shallow constructions , which permit
the sunlight to penetrate the surface. "Algae growth is thus
supported, generating oxygen to support oxidation of sewage
water."(2) The aerated pond is very similar to the oxidation
pond except for the fact that oxygen is introduced
mechanically.
The waste-water system selected by IPA for the capital
city was the anaerobic pond system (anaerobic ponds followed
by oxidation). This system, which is suited to the
climatological setting o-f the FCT, is capable of meeting
treatment requirements with a minimal commi tment to mechanicial
equi pment.
IPA also demonstrates that the cost o-f the selected
(1) Ibid, p. 201.
(2) Ibid, p. 201.
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system is far less than that of a more standard, mechanically
operated sewage . stem. Esti mates of th(3 rel. ative op rating
costsi of the standard secondary type system indicat, e tht
they are five- to fifteen-fold greater in cost than an
anaerobic pond system. Further reasons that these costly
systems were not suggested relate to the relative sludge
generation rates and the energy requirements of sewage
treatment. The sludge generation of the standard secondary and
AWT system is 30- to 100--fold greater, respectiveilvy (Tab lie
5.1). As a -final note on the alternatives, the s:ize and skill
levels of the operating and maintenance staf-f, and the need
for repair facilities and replacement parts inventories will
increase for the mechanical systems on the same relative scale
as does the sludge generation.
In direct contradiction to the policy guidelines of the
IPA, the FCDA selected the standard secondary treatment-
system. The FCDA acted with the belief that Nigeria as an
advanced country shoul d have the most advanced system oTf
waste-water treatement comparable to other Western capi tails
(Moore, 1982). Included in the final master plan is a table
summarizing IPA's observations and conclusions on the relative
aspects of the different systems. The table has a blank space
where f i gures for rel ati ve costs- shoul d be li sted. L.eav i ng
this blank space was probably a deliberate decision to avoid
debate over the costly nature of the selected svstem.
Regardless, it is clear that the unrealistic goals of the FCDA
and the top decision makers adversely affected the planning of
Table 5.1
Alternative Waste Water Treatment Technologies
for 1.6 Million Interim Design Population
Electrical
Land Area Site* Relative* Energy
Requirement develop- Total* Sludge Requirement
Alternative Technology. (hectares) ment Capital Operating* Generation (kw)
Pond System (anaerobic 1900 10 1 1 1 100
ponds followed by
Oxidation Ponds)
Aerated Pond System 375 2 1.2 2 5 2200
(anaerobic ponds
followed by Oxidation
Ditch System)
Standard Secondary 150 1 2 5 30 3300
Treatment System
(Activated Sludge
System)
Advanced Wastewater 300 2 5 15 100 3800
Treatment System
(for Urban Water
re-uses Only)
1: Includes area allowances for irregular terrain and buffer zones.
* Units are used only for comparing the relative standing of each treatment system with
the other. For example, because land area requirements is an important factor in
estimating the relative total capital cost of each system, site.development (excava-
tion plus underground piping) costs are estimated to be ten-fold greater for the
anaerobic pond-oxidation pond systems than for the standard secondary system.
Source: The Master Plan for Abuja: The New Federal Capital of Nigeria, (FCDA), February
15, 1979, p. 201.
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the new capital city. As of November 1984, the contract -for
this sel ected treatment pl ant has n.ot been awArded due in part
to the exorbitant cost requi red. The c:ontem p at i on nloW .
whether to revert to one of the cheaper alternatives
recommended in the Master Plan. As a result, no treatment
plant is in place in the capital city. The FCDA has resorted
to providing temporary septic tanks and soakways to the
completed houses both in (3arki and Wuse Districts as well as
at Karu New town and Gwagwalada in order- to make such houses
inhabitable. The soakways and septic tanks are presenting
environmental probl ems because of stench and odours leaking
from the tanks. Furthermore, the use of temporary tanks is
adding to the cost of providing the treatment facility.
The attitude of the FCDA staff had a similar effect on
transportation planning. The "compressed radial form" designed
by IPA staff for Abuja conforms to a transportation system --
based on efficiency and simplicity. The evolution of the
compressed-radial form for the City, in combination with the
socio-economic realities of the anticipated population in the
new city, lead to a configuration of four major transport
spines, extending the length of each corridor of the city. The
planners estimated the cost of different transportation
systems for Abuja. The major considerations were bus or rail
systems. Based on cost-benefit analyses (Figure 5-1) and the
level of technological development in Nigeria (i.e., their
ability to operate a sophisticated transportation network),
IPA suggested a bus system. IPA staff noted that in the early
phases of the Federal Capital Development, the transit spine
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FIGURE 5-1
COMPARATIVE BUS AND RAIL COSTS
More Likely Breakeven
Point In Nigerian
Rail Costs
.001
Rail-Bus Breakeven
With US, European-
Rail Costs
5000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000
Passengers Per Hour, Single Direction
Source: The Master Plan for Abuja, the New Federal Capital
of Nigeria, Federal Capital Development Authority
(FCDA)-, February, 1979, p. 139.
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will operate as a busway, and at later stages, might
incorporate a higher capacity transit mode. The more likely
alternatives ar-e rapid transit and light--rail -transit.
Members of the planning team said this was a ploy and the IF'A
staff actually thought that a rail system would be a
failure.(1) Unfortunately, the FCDA was not to be stopped by
cost-benefit analyses. After the IPA ended its contract with
FCDA, a French corporation was hired to plan an underground
rail system for the city. This extremely expensive (Abuja is
located on bedrock) and inefficient system was deemed
necessary probably because the major cities that they strive
to emulate (Paris, London and Washington, for example) all
have underground transportation networks.
A detailed examination of development of a housing
program for Abuja further demonstrates the nature of Nigerian-
American interaction. IPA submitted their original proposals
for housing on May 20, 1978. The draft plan first examines the
cost and affordability of housing for the new capital. The
cost of housing is the sum of the individual cost of land,
infrastructure, and construction management. Because the land
is owned by the Federal Government, it is not a large cost.
Investment in infrastructure is estimated to be 20-45 ercent
of the total housing development costs. The single largest
factor is building, management, and maintenance costs,
approximately 50-60 percent of development investment.
(1) J. Moore, Ibid, opp. cit., p 64.
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The cost f+ housing is dependent on the method of
construction. The draft plan ets ouit a number of ways to keep
these costs at a minimum. These are : 1) redu-cing the AfotCunt
of imported materials used; 2) modifying the building
subsystem mix by changing building materials or omitting
portions of building construction that are less important; and
3) relying on more self-help housing. These cost factors are
then used in combination with Nigerian income levels to
develop a housing program that is harmonious w:i th the
anticipated income of Abuja's residents.
The draft outlines four basic income groups that are
expected to inhabit the new capital. These are :(1)
1) a high income group with minimum annual incomes of
approximately N 5,600 and comprising an estimated
2.2 percent of all households in the new capital;
2) a middle income group comprising approximately It)
percent of households and having incomes o+ N 1,60C
to N 5,600; -
3) a low-income group having incomes between N 770 and
N 1,200 and representing 58 percent of all households;
and
4) a transient group havi.ng unstable incomes of at least
N 60) and comprising about 30 percent of all ho:useholdis.
'The Nigerian government has establ:i shed standards for
(1) Draft Master Plan in Abuia, The Federal Capital of
Nigeria. Report submitted by IPA to AA. Koko (FCDA),
May 20, 1978, p. 126.
240
the rents that income groups should pay for hoLuing in AbL.Ja.
The government 's positiOn iSS that c i ti ens hoLul d not have to
pay more than 20 percent of their income in ri-ents-. For low
income earners, rents are desioned to be even lower, between
10 percent and 15 percent of income. There is a large
contradiction between this goal and a-ffordable housirg. Cost
analysis reveals that if 20 percent of the income of a new
capital resident earning money in the 50 percent range is
capitalized over a 25-year period at economic repayment terms,
it yields between N 3,000 and N 4,000. The dra-ft plan points
out that this is -far short o- the cost o-f building a standard
house (estimated cost N 10,000). This demonstrates the large
gap between the amount o-f disposable income available -for
housing and the cost o-f housing. The draft suggests that the
FCDA operate cognizant o-f this cost/a-f-fordability problem and
develop innovative housing to overcome such a problem.
IPA proposed -four types o-f housing for Abuja (Table 5-
2). Historical overview has demonstrated that the largest
housing problems in new capitals occur in relation to the
lowest income group. The living space allocated for this group
is minimal yet the cost is still too high. The IPA report
states that "to bring costs within a-f-fordability, substantial
amounts of sel-f-help are required."
IPA proposed six housing program options (Table 5-3)
that were di-Fferentiated according to the amount o-f subsidies
they provided. Program A, the most expensive, necessitated N
513.5 million in subsidies to make housin affordable to ever-v
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Table 5.2
Principal Types of Dwelling Units
Plot Area per Built Space per
Housing Type Sub-Type Household Household
I. Detached/ A. Large 1,000 mZ 120-160mz
Semi-
Detached
II. Service
Land
III. Flats
IV. Multi-
Family
B. Medium
C. Small
A. Large
B. Medium
A. Large
B. Medium
C. Small
A. 2-3 Family
B. 4 Family
*C. Transitional
100-80 0m2
75-100m2
1,000m 2
400m 2
80 m2
60-80m 2
35-60m 2
12-150m2 a
180m 2 a
240m 2 a
70-100m2
30-60m2
10Om 2
10Om 2
85-10Om 2
45-7 0m 2
40-75m2
60-80m2
60-80m2
Represents Total Plot Area
Represents temporary housing for migrant workers
upgraded or eliminated in the future.
= Square meters
Source:
to be
of NigeriaFCDA, February 1979, p. 177.
a:
m2
The Master Plan for Abuia, theANew Federal Capital
The Ma ter Plan or Abuia. the New Federal anital
Table 5.3
Housing Program Options
Detached/
Semi-
DetachedOption
A. High Standard, Single-
Family, Detached
B. Detached, Reduced
Standards
C. Higher Density, No
Subsidy
L,M,S
L,M,S
S
D. Reduced Density & Infra- L,M,S
structure, Low Subsidy
E. Mixed, Low Subsidy L,M,S
F. Mixed, Moderate Subsidy L,M,S
Serviced
Land
L,M
L
L,M
L,M
L,M
L,M
Multi-
Flats Family
L,M,S
M,S
M,S
M,s
M,S,T
M,S,T
M,S,T
M,S,T
Total
Capi tgl
Cost
(V million)
3,125 
.
Subsidy
Includedb
( millin)
1,514
2,119
1,502
1,751
1,813
1,932
564
61
127
186
L = Large; M = Medium; S = Small; T = Transitional (refer to Table 5.2)
b: Costs and subsidy are total present value of costs and payments incurred over 20-40 years.
Source: The Master Plan for Abuja, the New Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, February
1979, p. 180.
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income group, and approximately N 3,124.8 million in initial
capital costs. The option recommended by 11PA was Program F.
'This provided 95.000C:' single family detached housing units fr
all income gror..ips, 11,200 serviced plot, 5,15C0 flat; and
117 ,700 low income multi-family dwellings. Migrants were
allocated an additional 19,000 transient housing units.(1)
The IPA cost approximations are likely underestimated.
They do not include the historically proven need for price
contingencies of at least 25 percent added to the total costs
of these options to account for variations in estimating
costs. To make matters even more uncer-tain, inflationary costl.
lack of construction materials locally, and the weakness of
implementation strategy in developing countries will
undoubtedly lead to even greater total costs.
The housing designed by IPA planners for the new capital
came under substantial criticism when reviewed by the FCDA. .The
most common objections centered on the issue of using self-help
housing as a means for reducing housing cost for the low-incoine
group. Critics offered examples of the unsuccessful use of this
housing strategy and argued that low-income workers would not
have the energy, after a hard day's work, to make contributions
to their housing. Instead,, the FCDA preferred to plan for low-
income housing provided by public and private efforts.
Stephen Loc:kwood, one of the IPA's project manacers.,
responded to this criticism in a memo to the Chairman of the
FCDA. In his memo Lockwood states that the new capital residents.
(1) Ibid, p. 130.
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even those employed by the government, will not have high
ncomes. Studies .Ising the 1978 ci vil s:ervice :sala ir tructure
tended to bear this out (1), as show.'rn -in Table 5--4.
A few days after Lockwood' s memo was sent to the
chairman of the FCDA, Lockwood also sent a memo to the IPA
workers. This clarified some of the problems covered in his
memo to the FCDA. He stated that it was clear that the FCDA.,
if not IPA, has a naive knowledge of what the city will look
like if it provides home ownership to the ma>x i mum nL rIcome
spread possible. "It cannot look like a European city in
Africa, not with 70 percent of the households earning less than N
3,000 per year."(2) In addition, Lockwood states that the
FCDA cont:inues to act unaware of the problems in building
housing.
8,000 ur
politica
domi nati
economi c
A
building
land-use
of land
land (49
The chairman of the FCDA indicated that
its of housing constr
l demands for complet
rig wishes for housing
characteristics of N
further reflection of
a city of Western qu
organizational plan.
uses in the capital c
percent) is set asid
he wanted
ucted in only 15 months. Thus,
ing the project quickly were
harmonious with the socio-
igeria.
the government's pol i cy of
ality is provided by the general
Table 5-5 shows the distribution
ity. The largest proportion of
e for residential purposes. The
open space/recreation sector is allocated percent of the
(1) Cited
(2) Ibid,
in
p.
J. Moore, Ibid, opp. cit., p. 75.
75.
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Table 5.4*
Civil Servant Income Available for Housing
Income and Grade Level
Finance 01-04 05-07 08-10 11-13 14-16
Annual Income
(0)
25% of Income
for Housing*
(N)
3% Financing
for 15 Years
(N)
N768-
1,452
192-
363
2,880-
5,445
1,476-
3,252
369-
813
5,535-
12,195
3,264-
6,43 2
816-
2,608
12,240-
24,120
6,444-
8,724
1,611-
2,181
24,165-
32,715
8,868-
12,420
2,217-
3,105
33,255-
46,575
Cost of Current Housing Being Constructed
(Satellite Town)
Category A
Category B
Category C
2 bedroom
3 bedroom
4 bedroom
*The civil service salary structure has changed following
the 1981 minimum wage act. Effective September 1981, the
starting salary level (minimum wage) is N11,500/yr. Even if
the new salary structure is used to recompute the money
available for housing, it is unlikely that the results
obtained would change significantly given that the cost of
housing has also increased dramatically over the years.
Source: "Key Issues in FCDA Housing Policy Development,"
memorandum from Stephen Lockwood (IPA) to A. A.
Koko (FCDA) , November 24, 1978, p. 10, cited in
Moore (1982, Ibid., p. 74.
Cost
Cost
Cost
N14,625
N21,300
N28,500
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Table 5.5
Distribution of Land Use in the Capital City
Percent of
Land Use Activity Area in hectares Total Area
Governmental Activity 500 2
Services 891 3
Residential 12,486 49
Light Industry 920 4
Transport-Infrastructure 1,840 7
Commercial 561 2
Open Space and Recreation 8,300 33
Total 25,498 100%
Source: The Master Plan for Abuja. the New Federal Capital
of Nigeria, FCDA, February 1979, p. 76.
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available land. The rest of the other activities are to share
the remaining 18 percc-nt of the total I and. Wi thin the
rem a ni ng Cgroup o- act ivities, tr an sport -:i nl frast rut'U Ir 1 3
all ocated 7 percent, light industry 4 percent., service 3
percent, governmental activity 2 percent, and commercial
activity 2 percent.
The lack of emphasis on commercial and industrial
activities is a further- reflection of the government's policy
of constructing strictly an administrative capital that would
accommodate mainly civil servants. Exclusion of large
industries and other commercial activities would minimize
activities, considered to be obnoxious by the government, and
will, in turn, make it easier to maintain a cleaner and more
attractive environment than the old capital city, Lagos. The
maintenance o-f an attractive environment is to be further
sustained by the requirement for a low-density residential
development. The average residential dens ity allowed in the
Phase One area of the city is 26 dwellings per hectare. in
some parts of the city the density is as low as 10 houses per
hectare.
Final ization : The Role o-f Consultants
Early in the project's history two independent groups., a
three-member International Review Panel (IRP) and a 27-member
Technical Assessment Panel (TAP), were formed to serve as
consultants and advisors to the FCDA-IPA^ planning team.. The
IRF was composed o-f international experts in new capital
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planning. The TAP members were Nigerian professio:nals
i ncluding urban plzanners, geographer, eng-sineers, rchitect,
doctors; and political scientists. The members iwre appoin rt ed
by-./ the Supreme Military Council. The panels are listed in the
FCDA organizational structure as "Special Advisors." It was
not until after the master plan had been completed that these
two panels were asked to submit evaluations of the project.
Thus, it would seem that the TAP and IRP were used only to
verify that the Nigerians had purchased a valid plan for a new
capital .
5.3 Implementation Aporoach, Fast-Track Strateqv, and Imoacts
of Timincg
Part of the masterplanning process was the requirement
for a formal guideline detailing the sequences for
implementing the elements in the master plan. The development
of this guideline was again, largely influenced by the
government 's demand that required completion o-f the city in
eight years. In order to meet the demand, a "fast-track
strategy" was developed by the IPA.
Fast-tracking refers to an approach to planning, design,
and construction that segments the process so as to permit
some components of the master pl an to enter into the
construction stage while others were still in the pl anninq and
design stage. This contradicts the conventional approach
whereby the master plan must be completed and followed by
detailed site development planning prior to engineering design
and construction, or where all infrastructure must be complete
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prior to building construction.
To faci Iitate the i mpl ementati on of thi s stratey., IF
segmented al1 the ac:t i vi t i es into si- broad a r-as. Each
activity was to be completed within a scheduled time frame to
enable the commencement and completion of the next stage of
activity. Table 5-6 shows schematically the sequences o-F these
activities. They include :(1) base technical studies,
planning/architecture/eng:Lneering, logistics/staffing,
regional infrastructure development, inance/management
activity, and the Phase One Capital City construction. A
careful look at the table shows that work on majority of the
activities was expected to begin in 1978, one year be-fore the
master plan was completed. The table also shows that most of
the activities scheduled for completion as early as 1982 have
not been completed as of this writer's visit at the site
between August and November 1984.
5.3.1 Implications of Timing Policy
Advantages
-There are perhaps two major advantages to the relatively
short time period devoted -for t-he project's completion. The
ffirst is that it can provide for a consider able amount of
savings in labor and material costs. In developing countries
where building materials costs increase very rapidly,
(1) The Master Plan for Abuja. Ibid, opp. cit., p. 261.
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Table 5.6
Required FCDA Activities in the Fast-Track Strategy
Expected Time Present
Activities of Completion Situationa
Base Technical Studies 1978-1980 Not yet completed
(2 years) for Satellite Towns
and New Towns
Planning/Architecture/ 1978-1982 Only completed for
Engineering (4 years) some parts of Garki
and Wuse Districts,
Phase One and the
Presidential complex
and Maitama district
Logistics/Staffing 1978-1981 Completed although(3 years) quite a lot of
reshuffling of staff
going on because of
political changes
Regional Infrastructure 1978-1981
involves essentially: (3 years)
-regional highway access
-- topographical mapping
-- regional water system
-- interim water system
-- regional power trans-
mission
-- construction of airport
Regional highway
access and the airport
are completed. But
the required power
transmission and
water are incomplete.
For example, Nyanya,
which is one of the
few priority satellite
towns, has no pipe-
borne water.
Finance/Management Continuous
till 1986
Phase One Capital City All activities
Construction in elements
above are
fast-tracked
to meet 1986
occupancy
a: Remarks based on the author 's visit to the site in November
1984.
Source: Compiled from: The Master Plan for Abuja. the
Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, February 15,
1979, p. 262.
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shortening the construction time may save these ever-rapidly
i ncreasinFo mate~r:ials costs. Hiowever. suc h savijngs must b-e
weighed agai tah potenLial adverse consequeces of the
policy (See ex a m pL es from di scussi Ons bel ow)
The other major advantage of the relatively short time
span is that it can save or minimi:te a project's future
uncertainties. We have noted that this policy has enabled
the construction -of Abujia to commence imnediately, thereby
saving the project from potential adversxr-iies who would h ave
wanted to stop the project.
Disadvantages
The disadvantages of the timimg policy, however, hincie
on the weaknesses of its assumptions. Implicitly the policy
assumes -first, the availability o-f already-compiled
(sufficient) data to facilitate some basic qroundwork to
begin. The weakness of this particul ar assumption is a td
to by the serious data probl ems encountered during the
development of the master plan (Recall the absence of
hydrological information -For the new capital territory site).
Similar problems were encountered (during the detailed site
planning and actual laying out on the ground. There were no
large-scale topographical maps to assess the amount Of
developable land. A detailed survev on the ground revealed
later that more villages would have to be relocated than
originally accounted for. A national census has not been
conducted in Nigeria since 1963 ! Second, the short peri od
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all oted f or construct i on assurmes avail abi li ty of suf fi c ient
funds to acfcommodate additional projects that 'jou Id have to be
br ought " orwar d b:cauCse o+ the I i mi ted t i me sp an f or thei r
i mpl emetati on. The tenacity o-f this assumption i explored in
detail in Chapter 6; nevertheless, it is important to
highlight here some of the consequences of this assumption.
In order to maintain the limited time schedule, manv
projects that could have been scheduled for future
construction have to be brought forward. This, in turn,
requires that more funds be channel ed into the implementation
activities during the construction period. The channeli ng of
more funds than would have been necessary means that other
competing demands on the available funds are neglected.
The next assumption of the policy is the availability o-f
adequate organizational capacity, to coordinate, manage., and
administer the potential construction boom that would ar ise-
from implementation. Bringing forward more projects than would
be necessary., means that an elaborate and e-ff i ci ent
organizational structure would have to be set up to manage the
activities. In a situation where skilled and experienced
personnel are few, managing the activities was a major
problem. In Chapter 7 it is shown that, in fact, an elaborate
organizational structure was developed to facilitate ef-ficient
impliementati on, which hardly ever materialized. There were
coordination problems and misappropriation of funds.
The -fourth assumption o-f the timting policy which is also
tenacious, is the availability o-f building materials locally
to sustain intense construction activities. The fact is that
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many of the building materials, c-?>: c:ept for doors, paint, and,
to a small extent, exter ior wl I cI addi nc- are, not
mauatue n ag uantLitLies in Nigeria. As- -g such,~ impovrt
was required for a signi-ficant portion of tihe bLuil ding
construction demand. Importation of cement, one of the majOr
components of building materials in the country, for examole,
accounted for 34 percent of total domestic supply of cement in
1977. (1) Also, in 1975 plans were only announced for a steel
compI ex< at Aj ao kuta with an annual capaci ty of 1.5 m 1 ii on
tons o-f steel, using domestic i ron and coal , and two direct
reduction plants. One of the two reduction plants was. on.y
commissioned in 1981. Even then, the plant relies on :inported
materials. The three rolling mills also went into service juSt
in 1983. It is estimated that the demand -for virtually all
materials would rise drastically over the period 1980-1986,
because of the construction boom. (2) This means that
increased importation would be necessary in order to meet the
driemand imposed by the relatively short construction period.
Many of the buildings that were not completed have been
abandoned by contractors, in part, because of lack o1 building
materials. (.)
Another seriOuS consequenc:e of the timing polic y relates
(1) The Economist. "The Poli tical Economy of N:iqeria."
1984, p. 19.
(2) The Master P1lan for A buja. Ibid, opp. cit., p. 263.
(3) This observation was cconfirmed by some members of the
staff of the FCDA dur:ing an interview with them.
(August to November 1984).
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to the i ncreased mi gratory trend that ac:ompani erd the
construct i cn boom . We have noted (Section 4..1) the e:fect of
thi phenomenon on the vi 1 lages within a_-nd aro3iurnd the n ej
capi tal territory. The other effect of the boom phenomenon was
the structural unemployment that resulted as soon as
construction slacked. A massive lay-off had resulted because
many of the contractors (who could not be paid by the
government) could not pay their- workers. The result was; for
some of these laid-off workers to seek alternative trade --
petty trading. Evidence of this activity is seen within and
around the city where in-formal activi ties have been on the
rise. (Appendix II)
5. 4 Summary and Conc us:i on
In -the chapter, we examined the second (and final) phase
of the new capital's planning enterprise. We paid particular
attention to the characteristics and outcome o-f the working
relationship among the three major actors in the planning
process. The three actors included the Nigerian military
leaders, the Federal Capital Development Authority given the
responsibility for executing the capital project, and the
International Planning Associates hired to develop the master
plan. A review of the planning acti vi ty showed that the
Nigerian military leaders played the most dominant rolc-, among
the three major actors. The FCDA2's role as we pointed Out, was
mainly a secondary one, and so was the IPAs role. The IPA
planners provided mainly technicai solutions to essentially
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political demands from the Nigerian Government. We also noted
that to the extent that the Planners were able to incorporate
these pol i ti cal constriints to produce an efficient plan (the
master pl an) the p1 anners had sat i si -i ed one of the tenets 0
the structural theorists' argument. This group as we noted in
Chapter 1, maintains that the success of any plan
implementation activity depends largely on an organization's
(for example, the IPA) ability to learn and incorporate the
-factors in its external environment, in this ciaSe, the
Nigerian actors. Thus, the outcome of the planning activity,
which in this case, was the master plan, can be said to be
successf ulI. However , we noted al so that there were some
"slippages" (problems or failures) in the planning process, a
situation created mainly by the Nigerian political
environment. This environment as we pointed out, necessitated
that not only that the capital be moved, but also that
it be completed very quickly. Consequently, the overall
success of the project has been impacted because the time
frame demanded by the politicians did not match with the
available financial, administrative, and managerial resources.
The FCDA's position in the overall project planning was
similar to that of the IPA planners, this agency was in a
relatively weak position to control the planning activity
because it had to resF:ond to the dictates of the mili tary
government as well. In this situation, it can also be said
that its activity was largely controlled by factors outside
the domain of its influence. This is not to suggest that
without this external influence, the agency would have all the
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necessary management and professional expertise to develop the
master plan. After all, it was due to a lack oF such
expertise, in part, that an expatr-iate firm was hired in the
first p:lac . However , given the nature of the working
relationships described in the chapter, it was obvious that
the FCDA would not have played a dominant role even if it had
all the resources. The main point to note in the preceeding
analysis is that the political control of planning activity,
while it may have contributed to a successful completion of
the master plan (by isolating it from potential oppositions),
was also instrumental for triggering off and creating
obstacles to the project's successful implementation.
CHAPTER 6
FINANCING THE PLAN
One of the implicit assumptions in the development of
the new capital is that there would be sufficient funds to
execute the project to allow for a timely movement to the
new city in 1986. The result of this assumption has been to
neglect adequate analysis of the new capital's financial
requirements.
In this chapter, the weakness of this assumption of
adequate financial resources is demonstrated by analyzing
the project's (FCDA's) financial structure. Our analysis
will reveal that the FCDA's financial position is generally
weak. The weak position is indicated by the relatively
higher level of capital expenditure than revenues, a high
proportion of debt owed to contractors, and the low propor-
tion of funding released to the agency in comparison with
the total amount allocated to the project annually.
The project's weak financial situation can be attri-
buted principally to four major factors: (i) the relatively
fast pace of construction necessitated by the need to meet a
new deadline (1982) set by the civilian government that came
to power in 1979; this latest demand set in place, a spiral
of reorganization problems which caused funding delays; (ii)
the weak federal government revenue sources and the FCDA's
inability to generate internally other substantial revenue;
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and (iii) a result of general management incompetence, high
overheads, bureaucratic red tape or levity of the FCDA's
administration. This is most apparent in the agency's
laxity in collecting rents, paying contractors, coordinating
projects, and granting approvals.
The impact of the weak financial situation is felt in
four major areas: (i) It affected the ability of the FCDA
to pay contractors; (ii) it has resulted in a major reorgan-
ization and reduction of the FCDA's staff; (iii) it has
resulted in the FCDA's inability to meet construction
targets; (iv) it has resulted in part, to the postponement
of the movement of the national seat of government until
1990.
6.1. FCDA: The Project's Financial Structure
The capital expenditure and revenue income pattern
shown in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 are one indication of the
project's financial standing. Whereas the 1979 to 1983
figures represent actual capital expenses and revenue
incomes, the figures for the period 1984 to 1990 are
projections for the period. Except for the years 1980 and
1984, the capital expenditures have consistently exceeded
revenue incomes. The higher revenue income over capital
expenditure for 1980 may have marked the beginning of
construction, which started in 1979. Similarly, the high
proportion of capital expenditures, vis-a-vis revenues for
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Table 6.1
Capital Expenditure and Revenue Income of the FCDA
(N millions)
Revenue income as a
Year Capital Revenue Percentage of
Expendituresa Incomeb Capital Expenditure
(percent)
1979 N/A 113.48 N/A
1980 92.50 187.33 203
1981 839.03 438.55 52
1982 1640.12 526.60 32
1983 N/A 313.18 N/A
1 9 84 c 108.55 162.90 150
1985c 810.38 155.32 19
1986c 927.49 159.38 17
1987c 930.00 162.39 17
1988c 738.99 160.16 22
1989c 742.74 156.32 21
1990c 894.94 154.11 17
Total W: 7,724.74 2,689.72 35
*Represents annual federal government allocationsN/A = Not available
a: represents capital expenditure on the entire Abuja
project
b: represents revenue income for the entire project except
revenue from internal sources and municipal appropria-
tions
c: projections
Sources: The 1979-1980 capital expenditure is from Aptroved
Estimates for 1982, Dept. of Finance, FCDA; 1984
to 1985 capital expenditure projections are from
the Report of the Interministerial Committee on
the Review of the Abuia Project, August, 1984.
The 1979 to 1983 revenue incomes are from: Alhaji
Sabo Ago, Implementing a Master Plan: The Abuia
Exprien, FCDA, March 1984. The revenue income
projections for 1984-1990 are from The Report of
the Interministerial Committee on the Review of
the Abuia Project, FCDA, August 1984, p. 21.
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Figure 6. 1
Capital Expenditures and Revenues.-
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the period 1981 to 1983 coincides with the period of intense
activities following the civilian government's commitment to
move to the new capital city in October, 1982.1 Because the
1984 figure is a projection, it may be premature to assume
that the total projected revenue for that year would
actually be realized. On the average, however, FCDA's
revenue income has represented 35 percent of the total
capital expenditure, an indication that FCDA would have
difficulties meeting its short-term obligations.
The projections (1984-1990) in Table 6.1 were recom-
mended by an Interministerial Committee set up by the Buhari
government, which has just toppled the civilian government
in another military coup in December of 1983, after it was
apparent that a total movement to the capital would not be
possible by 1986.2 On that belief, Buhari's military
government decided after a careful study of the new capital
project in 1984, to extend the date of movement to 1990 and
to reschedule the entire financing structure. Movement was
to occur in phases rather than a one-time movement as
originally conceived by the preceding regimes. Thus, the
(1) Shagari's proposal to move the capital in 1982, four
years earlier than scheduled, was followed with increased
government funding between 1981 and 1982. This has,
consequently, accounted for the relatively high revenue
income to the FCDA in that period.
(2) Since 1979 to date (1985) there has been four successive
governments--the Murtala Muhammed/Obasanjo's regime which
handed power over to the civilians in October 1979; the
Shagari's (civilian) government which lasted from October
1979 to December 1983; the Buhari's regime which lasted from
December 1983 to July 1985; and Babangida who just seized
power in August 1985.
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projections represent the new military government's effort
to rationalize the new capital's funding process. Even so,
the projection shows that at no period except in 1984, would
FCDA's revenue incomes exceed or equal its capital expendi-
tures.
The figures in the table do not, however, include
revenues from internally-generated sources, such as rents,
fees, charges, etc. But given the low proportion of such
revenue from the internally-generated sources, as shown
later in Table 6.8, and given that the amount realizable
from these sources in turn, depends very much on this
government's funding, the ability of the FCDA to collect
such revenue, the intensity of activities, and the public's
willingness to pay rents, it is unlikely that the amount
from the internal sources would contribute significantly (at
least in the short run) to the total revenue available to
the FCDA.
Another indication of the FCDA's weak financial
structure is provided by Table 6.2. The table contains the
budget allocation for the Abuja project and the level of
funds actually released to the FCDA. The table shows that
barely half of the annual budgets allocated for the project
was being released to the FCDA, which is another imposition
of serious financial constraint on the operations of this
agency. Of a total of N305 million budgeted for the project
in 1980, only 61 percent of this amount was actually
disbursed to the FCDA.
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Table 6.2
Capital Budget (Revenues) Allocated and the Actual Amount
(Receipts) Released to Abuja Project 1976-1983 (N millions)
Amount
Released as
Amount Amount a Percent of
Budgeted Released Amount Budgeted
Year (N million) (4 million) (%)
1976 N/A* 2.8 N/A
1977 N/A 72.58 N/A
1978 N/A 98.18 N/A
1979 N/A 113.48 N/A
1980 30 5 .33 a 187.33 61
1981 7 23 .7 4b 438.55 61
1982 93 2 .42b 526.60 56
1983 87 8.26 b 313.18 36
Total 1752.7 Average 54%
for
1980-1983
N/A: Not available
a: Amount includes (N 118.00 m) allocated to the FCT from
the 1980 Federal Government Budget quoted in Abu
Ibrahim, Director of Administration: "Abuja Expendi-
ture," FCDA, 1983. The remaining N 187.33 million
represents direct funds to FCDA.
b: The figures include amount budgeted as statutory
allocation to Abuja as a state and FCT's share as a
Ministry. The direct subvention to FCC as a'local
government in 1983 is not included.
Sources: 1. The Fourth National Development Plan 1980-85,
Ministry of National Planning, Lagos, 1980.
2. Abu Ibrahim (Director of Administration,
FCDA): Report on Abuia Expenditure, FCDA,
1983.
3. Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago (Director of Planning
and Survey, FCDA): Implementing a Master
Plan: The Abuia Experience, FCDA, March,
1984.
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A similar situation occurred in 1981. In 1982 and
1983, the proportion of funds disbursed actually declined to
56 and 36 percent of the budgets, respectively. On the
average, the proportion of funds disbursed to the FCDA is
less than 55 percent. If the agency yearly collects only
about half of its annual funding as shown, it implies that
the FCDA may not be able to meet its construction targets
especially, if such targets were tied to the expectation of
a full collection of its annual allocations. In short, this
has been one of the dilemmas facing FCDA, because, it
prepares its annual expenditure plan based on the expecta-
tion that it would be making a full collection of its annual
receipts from the federal government in the same year.
Consequently, the delays in making a full collection,
results in part to non-payment of contractors, and prevents
the agency from starting construction of new projects.
A further reflection of the FCDA's weak financial
situation is indicated by the proportion of debt N 1392
million) owed to contractors (which results in part from the
slowness in releasing funds to the Agency), compared with
the total contract commitments (W 1967 million) as of June
1984 (Table 6.3). Table 6.3 shows that none of the Depart-
ments of the FCDA have been able to pay half of its out-
standing contract obligations. As of 1984, the Departments
of Engineering and Estate Services had paid off less that 30
percent of their outstanding debts. The Department of
Finance and Economic Development had paid off less that 50
Table 6.3
Summary of FCDA's Commitments as of June 1984
(in N millions)
(2) as (4) as
Departments Contract Amount percent Amount percent
Sum paid of (1) outstanding of (1)
1 2 3 4 5
(N million) (N million) (%) (N million) (%)
a) Engineering 820.91 173.74 21.0% 647.17 70.0%
and Estate
Services
b) Finance and 37.14 18.01 48.5% 19.13 51.5%
Economic
Development
c) Planning & 139.64 14.37 10.0% 124.27 90.0%
Surveys/
Rese ttl ement
d) Administration/ 86.98 35.64 41.0% 51.34 59.0%
FCT projects
e) Building 882.55 333.88 38.0% 548.63 62.0%
Total 1967.22 575.64 29.0% 1391.58 71.0%
Average Average
Source: Compiled from: Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of L
A1buia Project, FCDA, August 1984, p. 29.
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percent, Planning and Surveys 10 percent, Administration 41
percent, and Building 38 percent. In total, the departments
have not paid off nearly 71 percent of their total obliga-
tions.
Finally, the high proportion of uncompleted projects
compared with the total number required to ensure movement
to the new city in 1986, as shown later, also indicates that
the FCDA may be in deeper financial trouble than the
preceding tables have indicated. A detailed analysis of the
FCDA's attainments in Chapter 8 will help illuminate the
problem.
6.2 Factors Affecting FCDA's Financial Position
The generally weak revenue income situation of the FCDA
is explained principally by three basic factors:
(i) the fast pace of construction necessitated by the
demand that the project be completed in a rela-
tively short time (8 years). The pressure arising
from this time, although previously imposed during
the master planning process, was worsened by the
civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari.
Shagari demanded that instead of moving the
national government to Abuja in 1986, as ori-
ginally planned, that it be moved in 1982. This
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new demand set in motion serious reorganization
problems that affected the FCDA's financial
position.
(ii) the project's near-total dependence on weak
federal government revenue sources, that relied
largely on the oil revenue, and the inability of
the FCDA to generate internally other substantial
revenue.
(iii) the lack of general management competence, high
overheads, bureaucratic red tape or levity of the
FCDA's administration. This was most apparent in
the Agency's laxity in collecting rents, coor-
dinating projects, and the inability to grant
approvals on time.
6.2.1 Conflicting Objectives and the New Capital's
Funding
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the master plan for Abuja
was born of military leaders that had just gained control of
the government. Nigerian politics changed rapidly during
the time that the plan was being developed in an isolated
environment. On February 13, 1976, General Muhammed was
assassinated in a coup attempt. The death of Muhammed did
not affect the relocation plans, as his successor, General
Obasanjo continued to proceed along the same path. As noted
in Chapter 3, the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime had given a
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mandate for a return to civilian rule. The process of
replacing the military government with a civilian government
developed steadily throughout the planning period. In
September 1976, the Constitutional Drafting Committee
submitted its final report to the Federal Military Govern-
ment. On August 31, 1977, elections were held for positions
in a Constituent Assembly. A constitution was presented to
the head of state on August 29, 1978, and it was promulgated
on September 21. A little less than a year later, a
Presidential election was held and in October 1979, the
military government withdrew, allowing for the election and
inauguration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari as the President of the
Second Republic.
The inauguration of a new civilian government in 1979
coincided with what could be described as the beginning of
the new capital's actual construction process, because the
completed Master Plan was submitted to the government only
in February of that year. (But recall that some construc-
tion had already begun by 1978). President Shagari,
although a wholehearted supporter of the new capital, was
the head of a civilian regime. The new president had to
conform his desire for relocation within the framework of a
new political process. The insulated environment of the
military period had been replaced by the contentious
environment of party politics. Ethnic groups clinging to
party loyalties accentuated the political division of the
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country.1
The nature of political integration in the country was
abruptly transformed by this sudden advent of democracy. At
each level of decision making, the new capital project had
faced the conflicting and sometimes hostile objectons of
the country's numerous parties. Some of the top politi-
cians, for example, the leader of the Unity Party of Nigeria
(UPN) had threatened to stop the new capital project if
elected to office.2 Shagari's primary goal in this situa-
tion was survival. In order to lead the country he had to
maintain his elected position. To this end, the new capital
project was to be altered to a great extent, to reflect his
priorities. That change in priorities is reflected by
Shagari's decision to move the capital officially to Abuja
in 1982 instead of the 1986 deadline.
Critics had charged that because of Shagari's weak and
constantly changing coalition, and the impending reelection
in 1983, the president sensing a possible shift in the
country's balance of power to the North (away from the
Yoruba South), realized that conducting the election from
Lagos would be extremely dangerous. 3 (The 1979 elections
were run by the military; thereforer security was never
(1) Recall that in Chapters 2 and 3 it has been demonstrated
that the formation of political parties was largely carried
out along ethnic lines; the situation did not change during
the second Republic as demonstrated by the 1979 presidential
election results (See Table 2.9).
(2) Ajato Gandonu (1984), "Implementing Abuja: 1975-1983;"
Ibid., op. cit., p. 10.
(3) Jonathan Moore (1984), Planning Abuia: The Politics of
New Capital Construction; Ibid., op. cit., p. 102.
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threatened). For this reason Shagari announced the move to
Abuja earlier (in 1982) than scheduled.
As Moore (1982) noted about the political developments
and the sudden change of the deadline:
Locating a new capital by 1986 would have been
difficult; accomplishing this by 1982 is incon-
ceivable. Yet the political importance of holding
elections vis-a-vis survival took precedence over
the problems inherent in moving the capital to a
virgin site in such an extremely short period of
time. 1
The changing time frame exemplifies how a plan produced
by the military under complete control was altered by the
political realities of Nigerian development. The optimal
political structure for the new capital's construction had
been replaced, yet the project survived.
To meet the 1982 deadline, the new civilian administra-
tion orchestrated an elaborate organizational structure that
had on its payroll 2,500 persons, thus altering the original
structure of FCDA established by the military. In addition
to expanding the FCDA, two additional new agencies--the
Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory (MFCT) and the
Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) were created
to quicken the pace of implementation. Expansion of the
FCDA to incorporate many more departments was done to
encourage the division of labor, which was to facilitate
efficient and faster project execution. Also, an involve-
ment of two additional agencies was to relieve FCDA of
(1) Jonathan Moore, ibid., p. 104.
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certain territorial functions so that FCDA would concentrate
on executing projects within the Federal Capital City (FCC)
and thus, facilitate the anticipated movement in 1982.
Table 6.4 shows the amounts released to Abuja as a
consequence of this new organizational structure. The
injection of funds over and above the figures stipulated in
the Fourth National Development Plan reflects this political
mood of the civilian administration for quick movement to
the new capital.
From Table 6.4 it can be shown that over 56 percent of
the total funds released to the entire project between 1976
and 1985 came within the two-year period of 1980 to 1982.
A more serious impact of this new organizational
structure is probably the cost of maintaining it. For
example, nearly 40 percent of the funds released to the FCDA
in 1982 was devoted to paying salaries and overhead costs. 1
In addition to financing the elaborate organizational
structure, the introduction of many departments had created
coordination and management problems, as many decision
points, involving bureaucratic red tapes have developed.
(See Section 6.3.)
Another major impact of this new organizational set-up
(1) The 40 percent is derived by dividing N 99.18 million
(representing expenditures on salaries and overhead costs
derived from the 1982 FCDA's Approved Estimates) by the
proportion of funds actually released to the agency in that
year. The actual amount released to the agency is derived
by multiplying N 485.41 million, the total budget allocatin
in 1982, by 54 percent which is the (average) percent gener-
ally released to the FCDA each year (Table 6.2).
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Table 6.4
Funds Released for Abuja Projects from 1976-1985
(N million)
Year Fourth National Amount
Development Plan1  Released 2
Allocation
1976 2.80a 2.80 a
1977 N/A 72.55
1978 N/A 98.18
1979 N/A 113.48
1980 11 8 .0 0b 187.33
1981 364.03 438.55
1982 485.61 526.60
1983 485.61 313.18
1984 533.93 16 2 .90c
1985 558.19 1 55 .3 2c
a: This amount was set aside in the Third National
Development Plan in 1975, at a time when the Master
Plan for Abuja was still being drafted.
N/A: The budgeted allocations are not available, and this
may be because the Master Plan for Abuja was not yet
completed by the time the Third National Development
Plan was being prepared.
b: The amount represents FCT's share of the 1980 Federal
budget: quoted in Abu Ibrahim, Director of Administra-
tion: "Report on Abuja Expenditure, FCDA, 1982.
c: Represents projected allocations after the military
take-over of December 1983.
Sources: 1. Fourth National Develooment Plan 1980-
1985.
2. Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago (Director of
Planning and Surveys). Implementing a
Master Plan: The Abuia Experience.
ECDA March 5, 1984.
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is reflected in the FCDA's weak funding relationship with
the two new agencies--MFCT and FCTA. During the military
regime (that is, before 1979) , funding was forwarded
directly to the FCDA as a parastatal by way of direct
subvention from the federal government. (Figure 6.2.) But
with the creation of the MFCT, this direct relationship with
the federal government was changed, as shown in Figures 6.2
and 6.3. With this new arrangement, two constraints
were additionally imposed on the FCDA. First, FCDA,
although allowed to prepare its budget based on needs, must
now submit budgets for approval through the MFCT, thus
creating an additional channel through which budgets must
pass before approval. This often resulted in serious delays
in getting funds to the FCDA. Second , while the FCDA had
to operate within the financial and budgeting constraints of
the federal government, the FCTA obtained its financial
resources as a statutory allocation from the Federation
Account. 1 Thus, the Federal Capital Territory Administra-
tion was relatively surer of funds than the FCDA. This
arrangement had implications for the implementation of the
Abuja project. While the development of the whole territory
proceeded without inhibition, that of the city was severely
constrained by shortage or delay of funds. As both the FCDA
and FCTA were engaged in the provision of houses and other
(1) The Federal Capital Territory is also entitled to
statutory allocations. From this account, the FCTA can
receive its funds directly from the MFCT rather than from
the federal government accounts.
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Figure 6.2. Schematic Representation of the Funding Structure
For Abuja during the Civilian Administration (1980-83)
Federal Government
MFCT
(Statutory Allocation
as a state from
Federation Account)
F AFCA (Funded by MFCT)
(Direct budgetary allocation
from FGN based on needs
articulated by FCDA but
submitted through MFCT)
Source: Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review
of the Abuja Project, Federal Capital Development
Authority (FCDA), August, 1980, p. 25.
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Figure 6.3. Interim Modification of the Funding Structure in late 1983
Federal Government
Nine Local Governments
(Share of Local Govern-
ment statutory allocat
Sources of funds: --
(i)Budgetary allocation to cover
recurrent expenditures as a
Federal Government Ministry
' ' (ii)Statutory allocation for
MFCT reasons of being treated as
state for reasons of revenue
allocation.
FIDA
(Direct budgetary allocation
ion) to finance capital and re-
current expenditure as a
parastatal of the Federal
Government)
Source: Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review
of the Abuja Project, Federal Capital Development
Authority (FCDA), August, 1984, p. 26.
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infrastructure, the former within the city, and the latter
within the Territory, it meant that the funds for the
physical implementation of the "Abuja Project" were shared
between the Federal Capital City (FCC) and the entire
Territory. But because the FCTA, within the new organiza-
tional structure, is able to obtain its funds much more
quickly than the FCDA, the agency has been able to provide
substantial infrast.cture to the FCT. On the other
hand, the FCDA which is constrained by the new funding
structure, has been unable to provide significant
infrastructure and services to the FCC. Consequently, there
is a substantial gap between the amount of infrastructure
built in the FCT and the FCC even though the later should
receive greater priority than the former because it was
targeted for completion in 1986. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show
respectively the quality of houses completed or under
construction within the FCC in comparison with the rest of
the Territory (the Federal Capital Territory). A comparison
of the two tables indicates that while a total of 9,931
housing units have been contracted out for construction in
the FCT, only 7,851 units have been awarded in the FCC. Out
of all the units awarded for construction, 7,002 units (or
71 percent) of those in the FCT have been completed, while
only 3,524 (or 45 percent) of those units in the FCC have
been completed.
Obviously, a rapid development of housing in the FCT
can be helpful in supplementing housing at the FCC, but when
Table 6.5
Housing Construction in FCC Phase I, Abuja
Serial Total No. of Houses Total No. Total No. Under
No. District (Contract Awarded) Completed Construction
Percent
Completion
1. Garki
2. Asokoro
3. Wuse
4. Maitama
Total
3,793
, 149
3,869
40
7,851
2,647
nil
877
nil
3,524
1,146
149
2,992
40
4 ,3 27
70%
0%
23%
0%
Almost all
of them have
completed
services
Senior Exec-
utive Houses
Without
services
Minister's
House
15%
Remarks
Source: Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the Abuia Project,
FCDA, August 1984, p. 15.
Table 6.6
Housing Construction in the FCT
LOCATION TOTAL # OF TOTAL # TOTAL # REMARKS
HOUSES AWARDED COMPLETED UNDER
ON CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION
1. Gwagwalada 898 406 492
2. Karu New Town 775 466 309
3. Nyanya Worker's Camp 7,232 5,950 1,282
4. Karshi Dev. Area 170 31 139
5. Bwari Dev. Area 165 64 101
6. Kuje Dev. Area 200 31 169
7. Kwali Dev. Area 175 55 120
8. Yaba Dev. Area 89 21 68
9. Abaji Dev. Area 137 55 82
10. Rubochi Dev. Area 90 23 57
TOTAL 9,931 7,002 2,929
Source: Report of the Interministerial Committee
FCDA, August 1984, p. 16.
on the Review of the Abuga Project,
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it is realized that such houses are being developed at great
distances from the FCC (See Table 6.7), coupled with the
problems of inadequate transportation between such areas and
the FCC, their utility in supplementing the FCC becomes
doubtful. ~This writer (1984) observed that while there was
a shortage of housing at the FCC, many of the housing units
developed in the FCT (for example, at Gwagwalada) remain
unoccupied, in part because of their great distance from the
FCC. 1
The need for further rationalization of the admini-
strative structure for the implementation of the "Abuja
Project" made the government scrap the FCTA in 1984.2 Its
responsibilities are now shared between the MFCT and the
nine Local Government Areas (including Abuja Municipal
Government). In reality, however, the distribution of
available resources between the territory on the one hand
and the city on the other remains the same. With the new
structure, FCDA is still required to submit its budgets
through MFCT,- which forwards it to the federal government
for approval. In addition, the amount of funds received by
FCDA still depends on the proportion of the total revenue
retained by the federal government. In other words, (as in
the former structure, Figure 6.2), the available FCDA funds
(1) Shortage of housing at FCC has led to housing many of
the FCDA workers at Nyanya and Life Camps which were
originally designated for housing the contractors and their
employees.
(2) Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Reviews
of the Abuia Project, FCDA, August, 1984, p. 26.
280
Table 6.7
Distances of the FCDA 's Housing Estates
f rom the Capital City
Location of Housina Estate Distance
Karshi
Bwari
Gwagwalada
Kuje
Rubochi
Abaji
Yaba
Kwali
from Abuia
31 km
43 km
52 km
72 km
131 km
117 km
112 km
68 km
Source: Compiled from the Report of the Interministerial
Committee on the Review of the Abuia Project.
FCDA, August 1984, p. 17.
Distance
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will depend on other competing demands on this federally-
retained revenue, as well as the extent to which such
revenue is realizable. In the following section, the
implication of this dependence on the federal revenue is
further explored.
6.2.2 Problems of Project's Dependency on Public Funding
As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, one of
the factors contributing to the new capital's financial
weaknesses is the project's near-total dependence on a weak
federal government revenue and the inability of the FCDA to
generate internally other substantial revenue. The objec-
tive of this section is to examine and assess the nature and
impacts of this phenomenon.
Being a quasi-governmental agency, FCDA is being
principally financed from public funds consisting essential-
ly, of direct federal government subvention. As Table 6.8
indicates, the federal government's subvention provided
approximately 97 percent of FCDA's revenue in 1980, and 99
percent of the revenue in 1981, and again 97 percent in
1982. Although the figures for internally generated
revenues for the periods 1976 to 1979 are not available, it
is unlikely that the pattern of revenue sources shown in the
table could have been significantly different, given that
those years marked the period of little activity in terms of
implementation. Table 6.8 also shows that internally-
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Tabl'e 6.8
FCDA's Revenue Sources 1980-1982 (N million)
Internally Generated Revenue
from the Departments of: 1980 1 9 81 a 1982b
Finance and Economic Development 2,299 1,766 2,818
Administration 70 120 96
Engineering Services 8 16 17
Planning and Surveys 925 4,001 6,355
Subtotal................... 3,302 5,903 9,286
Subvention from the Fed'l Gov't* 94,400 609,000 271,000
GrossTotal................ 97,702 614,903 280,286
% Internally Generated Revenue 3% 1% 3%
% Fedreal Government Subvention 97% 99% 97%
* In addition to the subvention, FCDA would benefit from
the Federal appropriation to the FCC as a municipal
government in 1983.
a: Approved Estimates for 1981
b: Estimates for 1982
Source: Compiled from: Approved Estimates for the Year
L9.2, Department of Finance, FCDA, 1983.
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generated revenue for the periods 1980, 1981, and 1982
represented only 3 percent, 1 percent, and 3 percent
respectively, of the FCDA's total revenue. Loans (external
and domestic) are not yet being utilized, although negotia-
tion has begun of a possible N281.2 million loan offer from
Britain,, N260.56 million from the United States, and N41
million from France. 1 But it is too early to build such
offers into the estimate of funds available for implementing
the new capital project. FCDA, however, has no power to
negotiate commercial loans. Such loans were required to be
guaranteed by the federal government, which is often not
disposed to give the FCDA a wide discretion or free rein to
negotiate for loans, perhaps in order to retain and ensure
strict government financial control, or possibly because the
government had not judged the Agency as being capable of
handling such loans efficiently. The sources of internally-
generated revenue include interest on bank deposits,
interest on loans for housing, vehicles, etc., dividends
from investments, rents from housing quarters, restaurants,
shopping center, club house etc., sales of publications,
maps, unserviceable assets, fees and charges for land
application, registration, certificates of occupancy, etc.
The proportional contribution of these sources to FCDA's
revenue is shown in Table 6.9. In 1980, internal revenue
sources generated approximately N2.4 million. Out of this
amount, interest on bank deposits alone contributed approxi-
(1) ILid., p. 38.
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Table 6.9
FCDA's Internally-Generated Revenue Sources (W)
Source 1980 1981 1982
1. Interest on Bank Deposits 2,200,000
(92%)
2. Interest on Loans (Housing,
vehicles, etc.)
3. Dividends from Investments
4. Rents from: (Quarters,
restaurants, ground,
shopping center, club
house, etc.)
700
(.03%)
73,700
(3%)
1,000,000
(23%)
5,800
(.1%)
600,000
(14%)
250 ,000
(6%)
1,392,932
(20.7%)
8,000
(.1%)
1,207,068
(17.9%)
450,000
(6.7%)
5. Loans
6. Sales of: (Publications,
maps, unserviceable
assets, petrol, etc.)
7. Fees and Charges:
(Tender fees, Guest studio
charges, land application
fees, service charges,
certificate of occupancy,
search fees, workshop,
etc.)
31,000
(1%)
84,200
(4%)
45,000
(1%)
2,501,500
(56.8%)
91,000
(1.4%)
3,565,900
(53%)
2,389,600
(100%)
4,402,300 6,714,900
(100%) (100%)
Total
Source: Compiled from: Approved Estimates for the Year
L982, Department of Finance, FCDA, 1982.
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mately N2.2 or 92 percent. Fees and charges followed only
by~N84,200 or 4 percent. Amounts generated from other
sources (rents, dividends, sales, etc.) were very insignifi-
cant. In 1981 the situation in terms of the proportion of
funds generated from the internal sources changed consider-
ably. The amount generated from interest on bank deposits
declined significantly to N1 million (or 23 percent) of the
total sources, while fees and charges picked up to more than
N2.5 million, (or 56.8 percent) of the total contribution
from all sources. Rents (although doubled) and sales still
remained low at approximately 6 percent and 1 percent,
respectively, of the total sources. Dividends from invest-
ments, which was a new source of revenue in 1981, generated
14 percent of the total funds.
In 1982, a pattern similar to that of 1981 was repeated
except that rents picked up very slightly to 6.7 percent,
fees/charges and interest on bank deposits declined slightly
(although increased in absolute terms) to 53 percent and
20.7 percent, respectively. Dividends from investments also
increased to 17.9 percent.
In general, interest on bank deposits, fees/charges,
and dividends represented the main three sources of in-
ternally-generated revenue from 1980 to 1982. Given that
interest on bank deposits and dividends are likely to depend
on annual allocation from the federal government, these two
sources may be highly unreliable as an internal source of
revenue, because there is a great inconsistency in the
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amount and frequency of such funds from the federal govern-
ment. Thus, the two sources (interest on bank deposits and
dividends) may not be reliable in predicting accruable
revenues from internal sources.
The high proportion of fees and charges occurred in
1981 and 1982. These two periods (as may be recalled)
marked the period of intense activity when movement to the
new capital was anticipated. Depending on the level of
activity, it is likely to remain the major source of
internally-generated revenue at the new capital.
As already stated, the rent contribution to the
internal sources of revenue was very small: 3 percent in
1980, 6 percent in 1981, and 6.7 percent in 1982. The low
proportion of total rents collected is due largely to:
(a) a lack of a sufficient number of completed rent-
yielding projects. For example, only 3,254 units out of
25,000 units of housing required for movement to the FCC in
1986 have been completed. (See Table 5.3.) Furthermore, a
high proportion of completed housing units within the FCT,
which could provide a source of rents, lay unoccupied.
(b) a concentration of construction of long-term and non-
rent yielding assets (except where the assets are already
being used by individuals) e.g., water resources, sewers,
electricity, schools, roads, etc.
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(c) laxity on the part of the agency in collecting such
rents, as well as a corresponding unenthusiastic and lax
attitude of the general populace to debts owed to the
government or its agencies. People do not feel much
pressure paying debts to the government, and the indebted-
ness to the agency by the public at any given time could be
substantial. For example, out of approximately twenty
residents (including non-FCDA workers) this writer talked to
during his study visits to Abuja, none had paid any rents to
FCDA at all.
Complementing this laxity is a lack of adequate records
as to who assigns the completed quarters, who lives in them
and the number allocated. Depending on the position of
officials in FCDA and in FCT's organizational hierarchy,
officers could randomly assign living quarters to prospec-
tive tenants. For example, the military attache to the MFCT
could, without proper consultation, overturn allocations
made by the Department of Administration, which is offi-
cially charged with allocating housing units. This writer
witnessed an incident when a military colonel went to evict
residents in one of the residential areas of the new city,
even though the residents were legally assigned to these
residential flats. In another incident, a professor this
writer was lodging with, had to vacate his flat and move to
a new location. Six persons showed up with duly-signed
papers from six different officers claiming that they had
been allocated the same flat. In yet another confusing
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situation, the professor noted above had just obtained an
extension of stay permitting him to remain in his flat for
another week to enable him to get adequately ready before
moving to his new location. The next day after he received
this permission, the military ordered him to vacate the
flat. The professor went back to the Department of Admini-
stration to report the incident, but was told that the
department had nothing to do with the military's orders. He
must obey the orders.
Granted that this kind of confusion in terms of who
does what, when, and how was likely to emerge in a rela-
tively young agency of the FCDA's type, such confusion may
not augur well with an efficient administration, which is
required to implement housing control and rent policies.
Potential rent evaders will take advantage of the situation,
and not pay rents, or those who assign the units will be
inclined to misappropriate such rents.
Because rents are likely to provide a much more stable
source of revenue (internally) than, say, interest on bank
loans or dividends from investments (which rely heavily on
government funding), their significance among the internal
sources of revenue to FCDA will depend to a large degree on
the extent to which they can be collected.
The ability of the Abuja project to continue to receive
funding would depend upon the reliability of the federal
revenue sources, the number of other competing demands on
such sources, and the federal government's priorities.
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Thus, any fluctuation or decline in federal revenue income
could be expected to adversely affect the project's funding.
In short, this has been the fate of Abuja's funding, which
has depended largely on the unreliable oil revenue sources.
Since the 1970's, the federal revenue source has
depended heavily on oil revenue (See Table 6.10). From 1973
on, oil has remained practically Nigeria's chief merchandise
export and the major source of the government's current
revenue. According to the Fourth National Development Plan,
the oil subsector accounted for 89 percent of the value
added of the mining and quarrying sector, which contributed
nearly one-quarter of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
during the period 1975 to 1980 of the Third Plan. 1 As a
matter of fact, the production of crude petroleum rose
steadily between 1975 and 1979 except for a slight drop in
1978. The drop in output was attributed largely to the fall
in demand in the world market. More specifically:
(i) production increased from 651 million barrels in
1975 (approximately 1.8 million barrels a day
(m.b.d.)) to 757 million barrels in 1976 (2.1
m.b.d.) and 765 million barrels in 1977 (again
approximately 2.1 m.b.d.);
(ii) in 1978 production dropped to 692 million barrels
(1.9 m.b.d.). In 1979, however, it rose to a
(1) Fourth National Development Plan (1981 to 1985).
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Table 6.10
Profile of an Oil Economy
Oil as a percent of:
Gross
Domestic
Product
18
18
Government
Current
Revenue
Merchandise
Export
79
78
74
68
84c
a = figures for financial year beginning in year indicated
b = average 1970-1 to 1972-3
c = calendar year
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria: Ministry of Finance, Lagos
Year
1970
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
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record level of 841 million barrels (2.3 m.b.d.) .1
The Fourth Plan projections of the GDP for the period
1980 to 1985 were based on the assumption- that petroleum
production would remain constant at about 2 m.b.d., while
the price would be around $38 per barrel in constant 1980
prices. 2 Thus, any decline in the oil revenue could be
expected to have serious consequences for both the growth of
the GDP and the government's ability to finance various
programs and projects. In fact, oil production dropped in
August of 1981 to 0.7 m.b.d., while the price (at current
prices) was $34 per barrel. 3 In December 1981 production
had risen again to 1.8 m.b.d. at a price of $34 per barrel
and has presently (March 1986) remained approximately at 1.5 m.b.d at
N15 per barrel. The "roller coaster" of oil prices and
production has correspondingly affected the levels of
federally collected revenue (Table 6.11) as well as the
level of funding for the Abuja project. 4 The decline in oil
revenue has forced the government to reschedule some of
FCDA's short-term debts and reduce the average annual
(1) Regional Development Plan For the Federal Capital
Territory, Vol. 2 Book 3, Final Report submitted to the
FCDA by Doxiadis Associates (Nigeria) Ltd., January 1983.(2) Fourth National Development Plan, 1981-1985.
(3) Regional Development Plan for the Federal Capital
Territory, Ibid., p. 1346.
(4) The future revenue incomes and capital expenditures
presented in Table 6.1 were estimated by the Intermini-
sterial Committee on the Review of Abuja Projects, and are
based on the levels of future oil productions and revenues.
See Report of the Interministerial Committee in the Review
of the Abuia Proiect, FCDA, August 1984.
292
Table 6.11
Federally Collected Revenue (1979/80-1983)
(N million)
Year Sources
Petroleum as a
Petroleum Other* Total Percent of Total
(V million) (%)
1979-80 10,100.4 2,171.8 12,272.2 82
1980 9-,486.8 2.108.4 11,595.2 82
4/1-12/31
1981a 11,562.3 3,183.4 14,745.7 78
1982b 5,143.9 3.780.3 8,924.2 58
1983b 5,111.9 3.443.2 8,555.1 60
*: Includes Customs and Exise Tax, company
a: Estimates
b: Revised Estimates
tax, etc.
Source: Report on the Nigerian Economy and Statistical
Review, Ministry of National Planning, Lagos,
1983, pp. 11-12.
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commitment on the new capital project. 1  (See Table 6.12).
The high level of funding maintained between 1981-1983
in Table 6.12, despite the decline in oil revenue during
this period, as shown in Table 6.11, may be due to: first,
the lag between the time the decline in revenue actually
occurs and the time it takes the federal government to
adjust to such decline; secondly, the continued high level
of funding was due to the determined effort (commitment) of
the government to move the capital by 1982. The table,
however, shows a sharp decline in funding after 1983. The
projected capital expenditure on Abuja from 1984 to 1990 was
based on the anticipated level of oil production and prices,
which the government expected to remain fairly constant at
1.3 m.b.d. and $30 per barrel respectively, and the contri-
bution of other sources of revenue. 2 This implies that the
current reduction in oil revenue could further jeopardize
the chances of a steady funding for the new capital project.
In concluding the analysis of the impact of the
project's dependency on the federal government sources, a
relevant question to raise and address is: suppose that the
oil revenue projections were realized, and suppose that all
the annual allocations for the project were actually
disbursed to the FCDA, would the agency still have been able
to meet its construction targets? It is difficult to
speculate the right answer to this question, however, in
(1) Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review
of the Abuja Project, Ibid., p. 37.
(2) Ibid., p. 33.
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Table 6.12
Summary of Public Sector (Federal Government) Financing;
Abuja Project 1976 to 1990 (N million)
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984a
1985a
1986a
1987a
1988a
1989a
1990a
Total Funding
2.8
72.58
98.18
113.48
187.33
438.55
526.60
313.18
162.90
155.32
159.38
162.39
160.16
156.32
154.11
a: projected figures
Sources: (1) Aihaji Usman Sabo Ago: Implementation A
Master Plan: The Abuja Experience, FCDA,
March 1984, p. 41-42.
(2) Report of the Interministerial Committee on
the Review of the Abuia Project, FCDA, August
1984, p. 28.
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light of the other factors involving political problems
identified and discussed earlier in the chapter, it is
unlikely that realizing the oil revenue projections and
giving the agency its full annual allocations would have
made much difference. In the following discussion, we argue
that FCDA's financial position was also weakened by manage-
ment inefficiency.
6.2.3 The Problem of Management Inefficiency
The other factor in the relatively weak financial
position of the FCDA can be attributed to a general manage-
ment incompetence, high overheads, bureaucratic red tape or
levity of its administration, also characteristics of many
public agencies. This is most apparent in the FCDA's laxity
in enforcing and collecting rents (as we have already noted)
and in the inability to manage all its contracts.
The inability to manage the contracts can be explained
in part by the weaknesses of the official government
guidelines for administering the projects. A brief descrip-
tion of the nature of this guideline will help illuminate
its weaknesses.
Prior to 1979, when the civilian administration was
voted into office, the military government had established a
committee to oversee, manage and administer all the con-
tracts awarded by the FCDA. This committee--the Executive
Management Committee (EMC)--consisted of all the directors
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of the various departments in the FCDA's administration. In
1980, this structure for administering the contracts was
expanded by the civilian administration which had just been
voted in in October of 1979. A three-tier organizational
structure was set up. The first, which is still the EMC,
consisted of all the department heads (directors) of the
FCDA, as well as the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of
the Federal Capital Territory (MFCT). (Recall that at this
point the MFCT had been created as an umbrella agency
housing the FCDA and the FCTA) . This time, the EMC was
authorized to review and approve all the contracts that were
less than N 0.5 million.
The next higher level for contract review was the FCDA
Board of Directors. The members of this board were appoin-
ted by the President. The permanent secretary to the MFCT
was also required to participate at this level. The FCDA
Board of Directors was authorized to review contracts worth
between N .5 to N 1 million.
The third level of contract review panel, which is the
highest level in the hierarchy, is the Presidential Mini-
sterial Council (PMC). The members of this panel included
all the various ministers from the federal ministeries.
Note that the appointment of ministers was the exclusive
responsibility of the President with the approval of the
national assembly. Thus, the President was practically in
control of the two highest levels (the FCDA's Board of
Directors and the PMC) of the contract review structure.
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The PMC was responsible for reviewing and approving all
contracts worth more than N 1 million.
The contract review structure just described has the
following implication on the financial position of the new
capital project: (i) While the FCDA was authorized to
execute the projects, the agency was not actively participa-
ting in the review of projects and selection of contractors
except those not exceeding N .5 million. Given that the
FCDA's professional expertise was not being fully utilized,
the review of projects and selection of contractors became
largely based on the discretion of the president and his
appointees. Because these appointees were politicians,
largely inexperienced in urban planning and project financ-
ing, the selection of contractors became, for the most part,
based on political criteria rather than on the contractor's
ability to do the work and his costing proposals. The
large-scale abandonment of projects halfway has been
attributed in part to the general incompetence of such
contractors.1 In other situations, such contractors have
sold their contract leases to entirely different contractors
who often executed the project without being detected.
Professional incompetence is reflected in some of the
completed structures in Phase One, where some of the housing
units have cracked walls, and floors, and falling fixtures.
(ii) The new (expanded) review structure has contributed to
(1) The abandonment of projects have also been attributed to
non-payment of contractors and lack of building materials to
complete the projects.
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execution delays. Because of many decision points and power
plays,a longer time is now required to review certain
projects than before. The non-execution of the Upper Usman
Dam project has been attributed in part to this factor.
(iii) Because the FCDA's participation in the contract
review was limited, it led to laxity or lack of interest on
the part of the agency to effectively supervise the acti-
vities of the contractors. Similarly, the payment of such
contractors was delayed except where the contractors would
offer favors in return for such payments. (iv) Finally, the
involvement of the three tiers requires additional mainten-
ance and overhead costs in terms of emoluments and other
fringe benefits. As Gandonu (1984) has noted about the cost
of maintaining public officials in the Abuja projects:
It is not often realized by cost analysts on this
and other Nigerian projects that while personal
emoluments or salaries could constitute less than
10 percent of the actual costs on staffing, the
enormous invisible costs peculiarly taken for
granted in Nigeria, go into the provision of
accommodation, health care, free travel/transpor-
tation, and assorted fringe benefits. 1
In addition to the institutional structure set up to
ensure an efficient management of Abuja contracts, the
government's guideline also requires that a 10 percent
mobilization fee be paid out to indigenous contractors as
soon as they are awarded contracts. This would encourage
(1) Ajato Gandonu, "Abuja: Planning the Nation's Capital,"
(in Development Planning in Nigeria: Planning Experience in
Developing Economy, (to be published) by NISER, University
of Ibadan, Nigeria, 1984.
299
the participation of indigenous contractors, by providing
them with initial capital to start off their projects
immediately and minimize delay in overall project execution.
On paper, this policy seemed well and good, but in practice,
many of the contractors actually abandoned their projects or
at best resold their contract lease (again) to different
contractors.
In order to secure the mobilization fee, many such
contractors presented false credentials to the officials,
who in turn, were unable to detect such falsification.
The ability of the contractors to secure contracts
fraudulently and also resell them without detection, can be
attributed to the weaknesses in FCDA's management, to the
incompetence of its personnel, to the corruptibility of its
officials, and to the general public's attitude that
fradulence was the only way through which they would
possibly benefit from the entire project. Many of the
housing projects did not get off the ground or have been
abandoned half-way, also, because of this particular
problem.
In Chapter 7 the analysis of the FCDA's capacity to
manage and administer the new capital project is investi-
gated further. We will reveal further aspects of management
inefficiencies, their sources, and their impact on overall
project construction.
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6.3 Summary: Consequences of'the Financial Weaknesses
We have provided a profile of the financial structure
of the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) in an
effort to identify and analyze some of the financial
problems of this agency. The circumstances that necessi-
tated the financial problems were also outlined and discuss-
ed.
It was noted that the FCDA's financial position is
relatively weak. The relatively weak position is attributed
principally to the fast pace of construction, which brought
reorganization problems that affected the FCDA's funding
position, its near-excessive dependence on a weak federal
government revenue, and the inability of the agency to
exploit other internal sources of revenue, and a resulting
general management inefficiency.
There are four consequences of the financial problems.
First, it has affected the FCDA's ability to pay its
contractors. We noted that the FCDA, as of 1984, had not
paid nearly 71 percent of its total debt to the contractors.
When these contractors are paid, they are often paid after
long delays.
The non-payment of contractors has affected the pace of
the new capital construction. The contractors, especially
the indigenous ones, rely heavily on such payments, to pay
their workers, pay for equipment and materials, and finance
additional (future) contracts. Furthermore, the long delays
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in paying the contractors have often resulted in giving or
demanding favors by officials, especially by those who were
inclined to seek such favors. (In Chapter 7, the causes and
consequences of this particular problem are explored in
detail since it is also manifest in other activities of the
agency.)
Second, the financial problems have resulted in part in
the reorganization of the overall project implementation
structure. Although such reorganization had some political
overtones, it is believed that the project's weak financial
position has contributed to the situation.
Third, the consequence of the FCDA's financial weak-
nesses is heavily felt in its inability to meet its con-
struction targets for the 1986 deadline. Most of the
housing infrastructure and amenities have not been built.
For example, there is at present no sewage treatment system;
the city center has not been built; only 15 percent of the
housing units required to accommodate the expected 150,000
population has been completed. There are an insufficient
number of office spaces. The hospital complex, primary
school, and other amenities are still under construction.
The full details of these features and problems are the
subject of our discussion in Chapter 8.
Fourth, because the necessary facilities required to
sustain the seat of government, public servants, and other
functionaries are inadequate, the Buhari Administration has
opted to organize movement to the new city in phases, in
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contrast to the originally planned one-phase movement.
Starting in late 1986, the first phase of movement will
start with about six federal ministeries and departments.
In 1988, an additional nine ministeries and departments are
expected to move. The final phase of movement (Phase III)
will occur in 1990.1
The ability to meet these deadlines will obviously
depend upon the level of facilities and infrastructure
provided, which depends on the project's general funding
characteristics, the reliability of the federal revenue, and
the general political mood of the country.
(1) Report of the Interministerial Review Committee on the
Review of the Abuja Project, Ibid., op. cit., p. 57-59.
CHAPTER 7
FCDA: ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY AND PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
One of the two major (implicit) assumptions of the new
capital's planning process is the availability of adequate
organizational capacity to implement the new capital project.
The other assumption relates to the belief that there would be
adequate financial resources to execute the project. In the last
chapter we examined the FCDA in terms of its financial structure
and noted that its financial position was weak. This chapter is
an extension of Chapter 6, in that it provides a deeper
background for understanding additional organizational problems
that inhibited or obstructed effective project implementation.
The origin, objectives, functions, and processes of the FCDA will
be examined, as well as the effectiveness of its legal powers
with respect to ensuring a successful implementation. The
evidence on the practical effectiveness of the enabling legal
authority is that, in spite of its sweeping powers, the agency's
capacity to carry out its functions and operations was inhibited
by four general problems not uncommon in many public agencie s.
They were:
(i) a general lack of management and administrative autonomy;
(ii) a lack of organizational stability, reflected in high
turnover of the FCDA staff due to rapid change of
governments and priorities;
(iii) a lack of sufficient and skilled labor and committed
staff, a problem generally affected by the 'federal
character' policy; and
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(iv) a lack of sufficient financial capacity--already examined
in Chapter 6.
The agency could not control effectively, its activities
because of constant interference from the federal government. In
addition, the FCDA could not effectively play its coordinative
role because of counter provisions in the Federal Capital
Territory Decree, which made it easy for the federal government
to intervene almost at will. An example was the sudden creation
of a complementary agency to the FCDA, the Federal Capital
Territory Administration, which practically took over the
administration and provision of infrastructural facilities to the
entire territory. While the creation of this agency was designed
to relieve the FCDA of some of its functions, in order to quicken
project implementation, the creation of this agency, together
with the MFCT, often resulted to organizational conflicts in
terms of who was in charge of what, how, and where. As a result,
it was difficult to give the Federal Capital City (FCC) the kind
of attention it deserved because greater emphasis was laid on
providing infrastructure to the territorial districts than to the
FCC. Other frequent intrusions by the government have also
hampered effective implementation. The freedom to intervene at
will, and unexpectedly to change adopted or existing policies,
did not facilitate fast implementation either.
The rapid, and often unexpected, structural changes
experienced by the FCDA in its eight years of existence, have
also inhibited operational efficiency as well as the opportunity
for an accumulation of on-the-job experience needed by the
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agency's relatively inexperienced staff. This would, in turn,
exacerbate the problem of inadequate labor. The inadequacy is
borne out by the fact that many of the agency's activities
including site analysis, building design, layout plans, mapping,
demographic studies, etc., were being contracted to outside
consultants and contractors.
The project's organizational structure and process left many
loopholes for both financial and political corruption. Examples
related to the project's highly centralized decision-making and
power structure, which created accessibility problems, especially
for the less privileged; ethnic bias, which has influenced top
level appointments in the agency; and bureaucratic red tape, that
has often led to frustration and delays, thereby creating the
avenues for graft, especially for those inclined to become
corrupt. The characteristics and magnitude of the impact of
these problems will become fully evident as we examine in detail
the FCDA's organizational structure in terms of the goals,
objectives, and administrative control mechanisms.
7.1 Federal Capital Development Authority: Origin, Goals, and
Objectives
The Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) was born
out of a military decree--The Federal Capital Territory (FCT)
Decree, No. 6 of 1976. Specifically in that decree, the FCDA
was given several powers (some of which we have noted in Chapter
5), including:(1)
(1) Federal Capital Territory Decree No. 6. Supplement to
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(i) the choice of site for the location of the capital city
within the capital territory;
(ii) the preparation of a Master Plan for the capital city and
of land use with respect to town and country planning
within the rest of the capital territory;
(iii) the provision of municipal services within the capital
territory;
(iv) the establishment of infrastructural services in accordance
with the Master Plan referred to above; and
(v) the coordination of the activities of all ministries,
departments, and agencies of the government of the
Federation within the capital territory.
In addition to these responsibilities, the FCDA was empowered to
"do anything which in its opinion is calculated to facilitate the
carrying on of its activities including, without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing, power":(l)
(i) to sue and be sued in its corporate name;
(ii) to construct and maintain such roads, railways, sidings,
tramways, bridges, reservoirs, water courses, buildings,
plant and machinery, and such other works "as may be
Gecessary for, or conducive to, the discharge of its
functions under the decree";
(iii) to purchase or otherwise acquire or take over any asset,
business, property, privilege, contract, right, obligation,
Official Gazette Extraordinary No. 7, Vol. 63. February 5, 1986,
Part A.
(1) Ibid., p. 9
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and liability of any person or body (whether corporate or
incorporate) in furtherance of its activities;
(iv) to enter into contracts or partnerships with any person or
body, that in the opinion of the authority, will facilitate
the discharge of its functions;
(v) to train managerial and technical staff for the purpose of
carrying out its functions
(vi) to exercise such other powers as are necessary or expedient
for giving full effect to the provisions of the decree.
However, "except with the general or special approval of the Head
of the Federal Military Government," the FCDA does not have the
power to borrow money or to dispose of any property.(1)
To enable the authority to carry out the responsibilities
(functions) specified in the decree, an eight-member Board of
Directors, headed by a chairman, was appointed by the Supreme
Military Council. In addition, an executive secretary (the chief
executive officer of the Authority) "charged with the day to day
running of the Authority" was also appointed by the Supreme
Military Council (SMC). All other officers were appointed by the
FCDA after consulting with the Federal Commissioner for
Establishments.
The overriding powers of the FCDA over practically
everything and everybody (except the Federal Military Government)
would seem to make execution of the new capital projects, or, at
least, the rationalization of the implementation process, easier.
(1) Ibid., p. 11
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This is more so considering the provisions in Section 7 of the
Decree that gave blanket powers to the FC-DA to take full control
of all developments within the Capital Territory. But all too
often, the confirmation of legal powers are far different from
the probabilities of the realization of the intents and
objectives of these powers. The legal powers of the FCDA over
the Abuja project were not an exception to this. Despite these
sweeping powers, the Authority did not seem to find it easy to
carry out its operations without a frequent and often excessive
interference from the federal government (see the discussion in
Section 7.2).
Furthermore, it is not certain that the federal military
government intended these powers to be used because some of the
powers appeared contradictory. Effect.ive implementation was
therefore impractical in light of these powers. The provision
that FCDA "should do everything which in its opinion is
calculated to facilitate the carrying on of its activities," for
example, conflicts with another provision that requires that the
FCDA not enter into any loan negotiations, or increase certain
rents and fees, or conduct sales of any kind, without the
approval of the federal military government, even under severe
financial crisis; the provision that FCDA can "enter into
contracts or partnerships with any person or body which in the
opinion of the Authority will facilitate the discharge of its
functions" is contradicted by another provision that stops the
agency from approving and awarding certain categories of
contracts, as discussed in Chapter 6.
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Furthermore, the provision for FCDA "to coordinate all the
activities of all the ministries, departments, and agencies of
the Government of the Federation within the Capital Territory" is
contradicted by the limited management ability of FCDA, as well
as its limited power over some of the agencies that were created
after the civilians took over in 1979. For example, as noted in
Chapter 6, the creation in 1979 of the Ministry of the Federal
Capital Territory (MFCT) automatically made FCDA subordinate to
that ministry. Furthermore, because this ministry and other
agencies such as the Federal Capital Territory Administration
(FCTA) had their specific and enabling powers to carry out
certain developments within the federal territory, FCDA had very
limited power to stop them even if these agencies were 'going
overboard' with their activities. A specific example of this
dilemma is the situation in which housing estates and
infrastructural facilities were being developed extensively in
the federal territory (by the FCTA) without full consultation
with the FCDA. The result has been that, while attention in
terms of providing such facilities and housing has been focused
on the FCT, the Federal Capital City (FCC) to which movement was
to occur in 1986, was being neglected. In this regard the FCDA
has not been effective in coordinating the territorial activities
with those of the FCC, because the agency could not do anything
to stop or control such developments.
There are other problems inhibiting the activities of the
FCDA. The problems hinge on the weaknesses of the assumptions
inherent in the agency's powers and authorities. In creating the
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agency and expanding the authority and scope of functions of the
FCDA and endowing it with the powers, the military government
presumably acted as if:
(i) the Agency would be free from the bureaucratic red tape and
inefficiency characteristics of many public agencies. This
particular assumption (as noted in Chapter 1) had a strong
influence in using a new agency, rather than an existing
one, to implement the new capital project.
(ii) the agency would be granted adequate autonomy to carry out
its functions. The weaknesses of this assumption are
evident in almost every aspect of the agency's operations:
financing, land matters, housing policies, etc.
(iii) the agency would have adequate and sufficient labor in
terms of skill, management ability, and commitment to
execute the project.
(iv) the agency would be organizationally stable so as to enable
it to acquire the necessary and sufficient experience. The
stability factor is important for a relatively young agency
like the FCDA in order to acquire on-the-job experience
that would augment its capacity for urban development
purposes.
The weaknesses and failures of the FCDA as a public agency
hinged on the shaky foundations of some of these assumptions, as
will be evident from the following discussion and analysis.
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7.2 FCDA Management: Autonomy versus Political Control
The magnitude of the weaknesses of the assumption that the
FCDA would be granted sufficient autonomy to exercise all its
powers can be understood by examining the pattern of the agency's
authority structure. An examination of the authority structure
is provided at three levels: first, the structure of the FCDA
from 1976 to September 1979, which was created by the
Muhammed/Obasanjo regime; second, the structure adopted by the
Civilian Administration from October 1979 to December 1983 when
this government was toppled; third, the structure adopted by the
Buhari Administration which succeeded the civilian
government--January 1984 to August 1985.
Figure 7.1 shows a general structure represented by the
first level of this analysis--the pattern provided by the
Muhammed/Obasanjo regime--created out of the FCT Decree, No. 6,
of 1976. The figure shows essentially that, hierarchically, the
Supreme Military Council (SMC), which was then the central
decision-making body of the Federal Military Government,
represented the highest level of authority even though it was not
formally designed to be part of the FCDA's organizational
structure. The second in order of authority is the Board of
Directors, followed by the Executive Secretary/Permanent
Secretary and the various departmental heads or directors.
Policy issues followed this line of authority relation in which
the final decisions are generally made at the topmost level of
the hierarchy involving the SMC.
Figure 7.1
FEDERAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE (1976-79)
SUPREME MI ITARY COUNCIL
FEDERAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Chairman and Board
Executive S cretary
Director
Administration
Dirictor
Fin/Econ. Planning
& Social Research
,pecial Advisers
Consultant Specialists
Dirictor
Planning &
Architecture
Director
Development &
Engin. Service
Director
Officer
Dept. of Estate
SOURCE: Federal Capital Development Authority, "Organizational Structure and Management Style
of the Federal Capital Development Authority" (unpublished, Lagos, August 6, 1978)
C.-
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In October 1979, a new organizational arrangement for the
entire project was formed by Alhaji Shehu Shagari. This new
arrangement, which corresponds to our second level of analysis,
is shown in Figure 7.2. The organizational structure would
represent a decentralization, so to speak, of execution
activities. Here, a new organization--the Federal Capital
Territory Administration (FCTA)--was created. The Ministry of
Federal Capital Territory was also created to serve as an
umbrella agency for the FCDA and FCTA.
Some new departments were created and existing ones
expanded. The new departments include, the Departments of
District Administration, Legal, Medical Services, and Works.
In the new arrangement, a permanent Secretary replaces the
Executive Secretary. A new set of members was appointed to the
FCDA's Board of Directors. Rather than being responsible to the
highest level of authority as in the case of the military model,
the FCDA's Board of Directors now reports to the Minister of the
Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory. The Minister, in
turn, reports to the President.
For the first time, the Legislature was brought into the
process of project implementation. Its role in the process was
limited to major policy decisions such as when to move to the new
city and how much funding would be allocated to the project.
By decentralizing and expanding the execution functions, the
Shagari's administration expected that the new arrangement would
quicken the pace of project implementation in order to facilitate
movement to the new city by 1982 (the new timetable set by
Figure 7.2 Basic Organizational Structure for the Abuja Project under Civilian Admini-
stration, October 1979-September 1983.
F N
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Shagari). But more importantly, the new arrangement enabled the
President to exert a direct control over the entire project.
This was achieved by introducing an amendment to the Federal
Capital Decree, which made it possible for the project's
organizational-status to be changed to that of a Ministry rather
than a parastatal as it originally operated before the civilian
government. A switch to a ministerial arrangement gave the
President the power (as in other ministries) -to appoint the
minister for the Federal Capital Territory. In addition, he also
had the power to appoint all the members of the FCDA's Board of
Directors.
The power to appoint the Minister, the members of the FCDA's
Board, and to some degree influence the appointment of the
Permanent Secretary, implies that the President virtually runs
the new capital project. Although the new civilian model seems
to decentralize the activities for project implementation, it
weakened the FCDA's control in the sense that the FCDA could no
longer take certain decisions without the approval of the MFCT.
We have noted in Chapter 6 the impact of this situation, in the
case of application for funds that must now go through the MFCT
(an additional decision point), which then passes the application
to the Federal Government for approval.(l) Furthermore, with the
creation of the MFCT and FCTA, the FCDA was now in a tighter
corner because the FCDA has to compete with these additional
(1) Although the FCDA must pass its application or requests
through the MFCT, the agency still retains the power to prepare
its budget based on needs. However, passing the application
through the MFCT creates additional bureaucratic red tape.
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implementing units for the limited financial resources. In
addition, the situation created organizational conflict between
the FCDA and these units, especially with the FCTA, over whose
activities the FCDA had very little leverage to control.
The military model of 1976 to 1979 shows a relatively high
degree of centralization of authority at the top (the SMC) of the
organizational hierarchy. Although the structure seems to
eliminate many decision points, thereby facilitating quicker
decision making vis-a-vis project implementation, it has the
potential of alienating other (middle and lower) levels of the
FCDA. We have noted in Chapter 5 the incidence of this problem,
in which a large majority of the FCDA personnel was largely
neglected during the Master-planning process.
By the same token, the modification of the organizational
structure by the civilian administration has not provided
adequate autonomy to the agency. Even though, for example, the
new arrangement would seem to have decentralized organizational
activities, the control of the agency was still vested on the
President. Evidences of this governmental (both SMC and civilian
government) control are manifested in areas of personnel
appointments, contract review and approval, land matters, and
land use control. Before we discuss the characteristics and
impacts of some of the control, let us first examine the third
level of organizational arrangement for project implementation.
As pointed out earlier, this third arrangement was adopted from
January 1984, following the overthrow in December 1983 of the
civilian government. This arrangement is still in operation at
the time of this writing.
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The organizational model presently under operation is shown
in Fig. 7.3. This model, which is similar to the civilian model,
was adopted by the Buhari administration. The main difference
between Buhari's model and that of his predecessor is that the
FCTA has been eliminated in Buhari's model. In addition, some
departments have been either merged or eliminated. A new set of
members have been appointed to the FCDA's Board of Directors.
7.2.1 Impact of Governmental Control: The Case of Personnel
Appointment
In spite of the provision in the FCT Decree that empowers
the FCDA to appoint all personnel except the Board of Directors,
Permanent Secretary, and Executive Secretary, the three
administrations (including the two military and civilian regimes)
have had a relatively strong influence on the appointment of
other top-ranking officers of the agency. The impetus for this
influence arises from two factors. The first factor arises from
the provision in the 1976 FCT Decree, which requires the FCDA to
appoint its officers, but at the same time is countered by
another provision in the same decree that requires the approval
of the Federal Commissioner of Establishments. Thus, there are
two bodies actually making decisions on personnel
appointments--one which is the FCDA located at Abuja, and the
other is the Federal Ministry of Establishments located in Lagos
nearly 800 kilometers from Abuja. Note that the Federal
Commissioner of Minister is appointed by either the military
government, if the military is in power, or the President, if
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civilians are in office. This means that either the SMC or the
President has considerable control over who may be appointed at
other levels of the FCDA's organizational structure.
The other source of governmental intervention is the 1979
Constitution, which introduced a new policy for recruiting public
officials into government agencies. The provision in the
Constitution has emerged from the need to minimize nepotism (or
to eliminate it entirely) and to foster ethnic balance in the
public service. To recapitulate what was noted in Chapter 2
about this constitutional provision: "a national integration must
be actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on the grounds of
place of origin, sex, or religion, status, or ethnic or
linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited."(1) The
directive principle of how such a policy can be pursued, in the
case of public appointments, requires that: "the composition of
the government of the federation or any of its agencies and the
conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as
to reflect the federal character of Nigeria.... There shall be
no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic
or other sectional groups in that government or any of its
agencies."(2)
To understand the implications of this federal policy (or
the "federal character principle"(3) as it is generally referred
(1) The 1979 Draft Constitution: Section 15(2).
(2) Ibid., Section 14.
(3) The federal character principle was to some degree, also,
adopted by Mohammed's regime in making certain key appointments
in the public service, but with its incorporation into the
Constitution, it became fully accepted as a matter of rational
policy during and after the civilian administration.
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to in the country) on the FCDA, it is important to recall that
many of the key appointments, including those of the minister,
the board of directors, and to some degree, the executive
secretary, and the directors of the various departments of the
agency were ntade or influenced by one man, the President, or the
supreme military council. The significance of this appointment
procedure is that it gives enormous power to the President or the
military leader over the control of the agency. In that
situation, it is difficult without additional mechanisms, to
expect a fair application of the federal character principle that
would adequately ensure the attainment of ethnic parity. In
short, this has been one of the problems of implementing the
"federal character policy" in the FCDA where such mechanisms for
enforcement are very weak.
The structural character (whereby either the president or
the military had the ultimate power over the agency's
appointments) had significant consequences during the civilian
regime. Because the ultimate power was largely vested upon one
person, the president, many of the key positions in the project's
implementation structure were filled either by the President's
party supporters or by persons of the same ethnic (Hausa/Fulani)
group.(l) For example, six of the seven chairmen appointed by
the president to head the Development Area Councils of the FCTA,
including the FCTA chairman, were of the Hausa/Fulani--the
President's--ethnic group. As Gandonu (1984, p. 11) noted about
the weakness of this appointment:
(1) See Ajato Gandonu. Abuja: Planning the Nation's Capital.
Ibid., op. cit., p. 23..
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the FCTA as an institution for developing the Abuja project
is further weakened by insensitively appointing to its key
personnel staff who do not reflect the national or neutral
image of the Federal Capital Territory.... No effort was
made to reflect a national character which would really be
appropriate for this project. This was a dangerous
oversight which enemies of the Abuja project could exploit.
(1)
Dr. Gandonu further wrote:
One hopes that the Government in general will see to it
that the original intention of neutralizing the FCT for all
Nigerians is not compromised. It is one sure means of
proving to otherwise sceptical Nigerians that Abuja is
truly for all Nigerians, and also remind ethnocentric
political malefactors that Abuja is not the preserve of any
ethnic group.(2)
While Gandonu's remark seems important to the credibility of
the project, he fails to realize that as long as the ultimate
power for appointments lies with the President or any group of
individuals who may belong to the same ethnic group or share
similar ideologies, and as long as there is a lack of adequate
mechanisms to check the appointment process, there is a high
probability that the personnel recruited would reflect interests
of those who hold the ultimate power.
Although there was an attempt by the Buhari Administration
to minimize inefficiencies in the FCDA by reducing the number of
departments and top staff positions, it is not certain that its
(1) Ibid., p. 23
(2) Ibid., p. 24.
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central goal was to distribute the remaining key positions in
such a way as to ensure ethnic balance. For example, 8 out of 10
key. positions in the FCDA (including the Minister, the Permanent
Secretary, and the Managing Directors) are held by persons from
the Northern States. This imbalance would seem to contradict one
of the central goals of the new capital project, that of national
integration.
Compounding the problem of inadequate mechanism for
enforcing the federal character policy is the fuzziness of the
concept. It is not clear at which level a particular department
of the FCDA can be considered dominated by one ethnic group or
the other. The existence of nineteen states in the federation
also seems to complicate the situation. Not all states in the
federation, for example, are capable of providing highly
qualified personnel at the time the state's quota may be open.
Thus, if the principle is to be adopted at its face value, a
position would have to remain vacant until the state is able to
produce such an individual. Alternatively, an incompetent
individual may be hired in order to fill the state's quota.
To some degree, there is evidence that some of the problems
highlighted above affected the recruitment of personnel in the
FCDA. There was a general belief among some of the FCDA's
officers, when interviewed by this writer, that certain positions
have been filled by incompetent personnel in order to meet the
federal character policy. This was done either through a rapid
promotion of such officers or by recruiting such officers through
their state's public service. Obviously, it is difficult to
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assess with certainty (unless with a very thorough analysis of
the personnel information which is highly classified) the
validity of the situation and how widespread it was. Suffice it
to say that the fact that this general feeling about the "wrong
officers for the right jobs" exists within the FCDA means that
the process of personnel appointments in conjunction with the
"federal character principle" would have to be reviewed. Some
officers are already expressing feelings of apathy and
helplessness from the belief that they are being denied their due
share of promotions and other remunerations, which some get
"without working for them." This kind of feeling of helplessness
and apathy obviously cannot sustain effective project
implementation, because it may lead to weak commitment and other
inefficiencies on the part of the agency staff. As one of the
officers put it, "you cannot expect me to lose both ways ... not
getting my due promotion, and at the same time, spending all my
energies."
The essential point to note here is the weakness of this
federal government intervention through its federal character
policy and appointments. Not only is its implementation
difficult, the policy, even when rightly implemented (that is,
when ethnic balance is achieved) may sacrifice efficiency, which
is a vital ingredient for an effective project implementation.
7.2.2 Impact of Governmental Control: The Case of Plot
Distribution
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Another impact of political and/or governmental intervention
in the affairs of the FCDA is witnessed in the distribution of
plots. The 1976 FCT Decree did not specifically identify how and
by whom the distribution of such plots should take place.
However, the authority to allocate or distribute lands could be
subsumed within the general provisions in the decree, which gave
the FCDA blanket powers to deal with all land-use matters in the
capital territory. The power to allocate plots to individuals or
groups willing to develop them therefore falls within the
province of the agency.
In 1978, this power or authority of the FCDA was weakened by
the introduction of a new Land Use Decree. This decree required
that all lands be kept under the trust of the federal military
government. However, the new federal capital territory had
already been acquired through eminent domain by the federal
government, which means that the new Land Use decree would have
insignificant impact on the position of the federal territory.
Nevertheless, the fact that the decree places all the land within
the national boundary of Nigeria under the management and control
of the federal government implied that the decree had provided a
tool to those in power (military or civilian) for intervening in
the administration of such lands.
In 1980, during the civilian administration, the Land Use
Decree was superseded by a Land Use Act. Like the preceding
decree, the 1980 Land Use Act entrusted the control and
management of all lands in the federation to the federal
government and gave the civilian executive president the powers
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to administer such lands.(1)
The 1980 Land Use Act thus provided the avenue for the
president to control all the lands in the country, including
those of the new federal capital territory. As a result, even
though the FCDA was formally responsible for administering all
the lands in the territory, in reality, the president could
override the agency on any decisions pertaining to land matters
in the territory.
Land allocation in the new capital city did not begin until
1981. By 1983, approximately 3,282 plots (including residential,
commercial, and industrial plots) assembled by the FCDA were
ready for distribution. The guideline or principle for
allocating the plots was again dictated by the general objective
principle of achieving ethnic integration.
Because there are more than 250 ethnic groups in the
country, the application of this "parity principle" was not
workable. A more workable approach was to allocate the plots
according to the states. As noted above, there are currently 19
states in the country. The states are partitioned generally
along ethnic lines, although most of the states include more than
one ethnic group.
The allocation of plots along state lines did not eliminate
necessarily, management and political problems. These problems
hinged on mainly the weaknesses of the procedures and
institutional mechanisms set up by the federal government for
allocating the plots.
(1) See the 1978 Land Use Decree, Section 2(2
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To accomplish the objective set down by the government for
allocating plots, a 19-member Land Use Allocation Committee
(LUAC) was appointed by the President. The establishment of this
committee according to the Minister for the FCT, "was
necessitated by the need to establish such a committee of wise
men under Section 2(2) of the Land Use Decree of 1978, to advise
the President in all matters relating to control and management
of all lands in the urban areas of the Federal Capital City,
Abuja, and Gwagwalada New Town." (1)
The members of the LUAC were appointed in such a way that
every state in the federation would be represented. The
committee met once a month at Abuja to allocate the assembled
plots. The prospective applicants for the plots are selected
from the list compiled by the FCDA according to state of origin.
Although the framework for the allocation of plots on paper
would seem to sustain the "federal character principle," in
reality it failed to address some of the management and political
issues in the scheme which hinged on the weaknesses of the
assumptions in the allocation principle. In providing the
framework for plot allocation, the government had implicitly
assumed that:
(i) plots would always be readily vailable for distribution at
the time the committee was convened;
(ii) corruptibility or lack of integrity of public officials
(including all the actors involved in the allocation of
plots) would not be a problem;
(1) New Nigerian. "Focus On Abuja--the New Federal Capital."
Monday January 11, 1982.
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(iii) efficient administration of the scheme would be guaranteed;
(iv) involvement of the LUAC would ensure an equitable
distribution of plots.
As noted above, by 1983 only a total of 3,282 plots had been
assembled by the FCDA. Consequently, in the three-year period
1981-1983, the average number of plots available each month was
91. This is the number of plots that the 19-member LUAC convened
to allocate. There were months they convened without plots to
distribute.
The significantly small number of plots available for
allocation meant that the capacity of the committee was not being
effectively utilized. This problem is significant in that a
considerable amount of resources were being expended to maintain
the committee. If the total number of plots prepared and
assembled were 91 per month, there would be little or no reason
why the FCDA could not have distributed the plots because the
agency prepared and assembled the plots anyway.
Related to the wasted resources tied to maintaining the
LUAC, was the problem of inadequate monitoring of the process.
Because the responsibility for allocating the plots shifted to
the LUAC, whose members were appointed by the President, it
became difficult for the FCDA to monitor effectively the program
because its powers over this matter were now overshadowed by
those of the Land Use Allocation Committee.
Furthermore, the integrity of the LUAC members was
questionable since their appointments were politically based. In
328
a period of intense and contentious party politics the President
was likely to appoint those who would ensure continued control
over the operations of the new capital project. For example,
the chairman of the committee, Alhaji Jibrin Mariga, the Emir of
Nazarawa, was one of the President's closest associates.(1) An
appointment of party loyalists would, in turn, dictate who gets
plots and how. An interview with some of the FCDA officers who
participated in assembling the plots confirmed that the ability
of most individuals to secure plots at Abuja was largely
dependent on their political party affiliation and ethnic
identity. Where these two criteria failed, the individual must
be willing to "bribe his way through" in order to obtain plots.
Obviously, other elements such as the high cost of procuring the
plots, and bureaucratic red tape, could have prevented other
people, especially the poor, from acquiring plots. As we shall
see in Chapter 8, these characteristics have adversely affected
accessibility for the poor to urban land and housing resources.
Although there are no statistical data to confirm the notion
of fraudulent practices, the 1984 decision by the Buhari
administration to confiscate all "illegally acquired" plots at
Abuja, tends to confirm the corrupt nature of the whole land
allocation exercise.(2)
(1) Ibid., p. 11
(2) The FCDA would not release any information about the personal
characteristics of plot recipients at Abuja. Such information
was treated as strictly classified. Because of this, it is
difficult to assess with certainty the degree of fraudulent
practices in the land allocation process.
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Other aspects in which governmental control has not
sustained effective project implementation include financing,
contract award, and land-use policies. The problems with respect
to project financing and contract award have already been
extensively discussed in Chapter 6.
The case of land-use control involves a periodic and often
unexpected intrusion by the government to alter adopted land-use
plans. A case in point relates to a 1982 order from the
President to convert a primary school site for the construction
of a mosque in the Garki District of the Phase One area. As a
result of this sudden and late change of land use, the school
children became subjected to crossing heavy traffic on the
expressway in order to walk to the next av-ailable primary school
located at Jabbi, which is nearly 12 kilometers from the Garki
district. The ability of the President to influence arbitrarily
the conversion of this site, obviously shows where the power
point within the FCDA's authority relations, as well as where the
President's priority lay.
In conclusion, it can be argued that none of the three
organizational models (two military and one civilian) seem to
have given sufficient autonomy to the FCDA to carry out its
functions. But in order to ensure a successful
implementation, recalling Palumbo and Harder's argument noted in
Chapter 1, sufficient discretion should be given the FCDA. The
lack of such discretion or autonomy as we maintained in the
preeceding analyses, has led to "failures" or "slippages" in
project implementation. These failures are reflected in various
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inefficiences in the management of the land distribution program
and non-achievement of ethnic balance in the agency. Although
the civilian model was expanded to accommodate intense
construction activities necessitated by the need to move the
capital by 1982, the structure never really meant more than an
involvement of additional execution units and personnel, rather
than a well-intentioned plan by the government to decentralize
power. Even the involvement of additional personnel slowed
project implementation because decisions had to pass through
several points which often caused delays. In addition, the high
cost of maintaining the expanded structure (as noted in Chapter
6) has not facilitated an efficient project implementation. On
the other hand, although the military models minimized the number
of decision points, many of the FCDA's policies could easily be
overturned by the military government.
7.3 FCDA: Other Organizational Problems
Other factors affecting the capacity of the FCDA to execute
the new capital project relate to adverse effects of rapid
structural changes in the agency, corruption, and an inadequate
labor force.
7.3.1 Effect of Organizational Metamorphosis
Since its establishment, the FCDA has undergone several
changes in both its structure and workforce. Although the
pattern of power relations seems to have remained fairly stable,
the individuals or officers (from the president to the directors)
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in control of such powers have changed very rapidly during the
last eight years of the agency's existence. As our discussion
will reveal, the rapid, and often unexpected, changes or turnover
have not provided an adequate ground for a sustained accumulation
of experience necessary for such a young agency. Associated with
the high turnover is a high probability of insecurity and low
morale among the agency staff.
In the past eight years, the FCDA has had five different
permanent secretaries. Thus, in the eight-year period 1976-84,
the average span of a permanent secretary was less than a
year-and-a-half.
Just as Permanent Secretaries have changed, so also has the
Board of Directors. In the eight-year period, membership on the
Board has changed too frequently. On some occasions, only a few
members have been replaced; on others, an entirely new Board of
Directors was chosen. The departmental units were no exception
to the rapid changes. For example, the Department of
Architecture has been reorganized at least four times; five
directors have headed the department. Other departments have
either been expanded, merged, or been scrapped. As the various
departments have come and gone, so have their various directors.
The rapid organizational changes have been precipitated by
three major factors: (i) the impact of the rapid political
changes in the country; (ii) the project's weakening financial
position; and (iii) the age of the agency.
The organizational models shown in Figures 7.1 to 7.3
reflect the impact of the rapid political changes. Since the new
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capital project was initiated in 1975, four different political
(civilian and military) regimes have emerged. The three models
are byproducts of three regimes.
Most of the structural changes occurred during the civilian
regime (1979 to 1983). The civilian government created the
Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory (MFCT) and the Federal
Capital Territory Administration. It was also during the
civilian administration that most changes involving the FCDA's
personnel occurred. In the nearly five-year period, the agency
witnessed four Permanent Secretaries including an executive
secretary. Almost all members of the Board of Directors from the
preceding regime were replaced by the civilian government. New
departments were also created (e.g. District Development, Legal
Services, Medical Services, etc.) and old departments were
scrapped.
The rapid structural changes were largely reflective of the
respective goals or priorities of the three political regimes.
The organizational model adopted by the Muhammed regime was
developed in anticipation that completion of the new capital
project would take nearly 15 years. Thus, the organizational
span was much narrower or more streamlined than the one adopted
by the civilian government. Probably because of the longer time
(15 years) budgeted for implementation, the Muhammed Model had
also avoided carefully many departmental units. A lesser number
of units would facilitate a precise and quick decision making
process, which is often characteristic of the military. On the
other hand, the civilian model was designed to accommodate the
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added demand from increased construction activities arising from
the shortened time frame, four years, stipulated by the civilian
government for relocating the capital.
There is also a general belief that the project's
organizational structure was expanded by the civilian government
in order to facilitate political patronage. Recall the
appointment by the President of party loyalists into the
administrative cadre of the FCTA and the Land Use Allocation
Committee.
The expansion of the new capital project's organizational
structure was yet influenced by other factors. The first of such
factors was the relatively strong federal revenue provided by the
oil resources. The oil revenue reached its peak between 1978 and
1981, and had generated revenue surpluses to the federal
government (Table 3.5). This, in turn, had made it relatively
easy to fund the new capital project.
However, in 1984, the size of the FCDA including that of the
MFCT was 'trimmed' by the Buhari administration as part of a
general austerity measure to improve the general economic
problems in the country. Some of the departmental units
inherited from the previous civilian administration were either
eliminated or merged. The changes, however, brought in a new set
of top-ranking officers, including a managing director, to the
agency. There were new directors in the Departments of
Administration, Finance, Estate and Quartering, Mechanical
Engineering, Civil Engineering, and Building Services. In
addition, the funds available to the FCDA from the federal
government was drastically reduced (Table 6.1).
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Finally, the fact that the FCDA is a relatively young agency
may have contributed to the structural changes. As pointed
out earlier, the FCDA was created in 1976. It is therefore
possible that it is only after many structural adjustments that
an optimal organizational structure can be built.
Whatever the causes of the changes, the rapid and often
unexpected transformations of the FCDA's structure have affected
the agency's capacity to execute the new capital project in two
major ways. First, because the agency is relatively young, the
rapid changes have not facilitated a long and sustained
accumulation of urban development experience needed by the agency
for effective project implementation. In other words, a high
turnover rate of officers has not allowed the agency to exploit
potential benefits associated with on-the-job experience
effectively. In this regard, the high turnover could have
worsened, rather than improved, the problem of skilled labor
shortage.
Second, the rapid turnover of officers has generally lead to
low employee morale and insecurity, especially because the
turnover is largely motivated by political forces, rather than by
the need to improve organizational effectiveness and efficiency.
This observation is based upon this writer's experience at the
site in 1984. Many FCDA officers complained that "things"
(referring to both the staff changes and new orders that ensue
from the changes) changed so quickly that it was difficult to
predict what was going to happen next.
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A corollary to the feeling of insecurity is the probability
of such insecurity leading to lack of commitment. This, in turn,
may lead to additional problems such as laxity and corruption.(1)
7.3.2 Problem of Shortage of Skilled Labor
In spite of the opinion of the chief personnel officer
(expressed during an interview) that the FCDA has sufficient
personnel, there is some evidence to suggest that there is a
shortage of skilled personnel. More than 70 percent of the 2,500
persons employed in the FCDA consist of the lower-grade (levels
01 to 6) officers. The remaining less than 30 percent are in
grade levels 7 and above categories. Very few of these officers
have had extensive experience in large-scale urban development.
The inexperience problem is likely to be exacerbated by the high
turnover of officers.
A further indication of insufficient skilled personnel is
reflected in part by the limited use of the FCDA's in-house staff
for many of the agency's projects and services. A good number of
projects (including site analysis and surveys, mapping, site
design, demographic studies, and project construction involving
roads, housing, etc.) are done mainly through the services of
outside consultants and contractors.
(1) There is a probability that someone whose position is
uncertain is likely to take advantage of every opportunity to
exploit any loopholes that may exist in the working environment,
including taking bribery especially, if he was inclined to do so.
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7.3.3 Problem of Public Corruption
Although most would agree that corruption has a very
debilitating effect, there is less agreement on the reasons why
it is so prevalent. Traditionally, corruption has been traced to
such social factors as the lack of a commitment to the nation
state, or the breakdown of traditional values (Bryant-and White,
1982). In a contrasting argument, James Scott contends that
corruption is mostly viewed as a means of political influence,
rather than as an expression of moral degradation.(l) Whereas
nations with more developed political institutions encourage the
exercise of such influence before laws are made, in third-world
countries, where political opportunities are limited, this
exertion is more apt to occur at the enforcement or
implementation stage. Scott says, for example, "where
organizational skills are scarce and where, as a result, interest
group associations are either weak or nonexistent, the corruption
of law enforcement may be a more economizing way to exert
influence over policy outcomes."(2) To the extent that bribery
requires less effort and fewer resources, it is a more rational
form of political influence.
To some degree, cases reflecting Scott's argument can be
observed in the construction of Abuja as well as in other
Nigerian cities. A case in point relates to the development of
temporary market shacks in most major cities in the country in
(1) James Scott, "An Essay on the Political Functions of
Corruption," Asian Studies, Vol. 5, 1967, p. 505.
(2) Ibid., p. 505.
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which informal activities (petty trading) take place in most of
the available public open spaces including the streets because of
lack of cheap and convenient commercial areas. Because the
conventional shopping areas and plazas often preferred by
planners (government and bureaucrats) are unresponsive to the
needs of these informal activities in terms of the high cost of
renting the spaces, and convenience, the petty traders often
resort to building make-shift shades and stalls, preferably along
city streets, as an alternative to the government-preferred and
often expensive-to-rent modern shopping facilities. Given that
these shacks constitute illegal structures, they are often torn
down by the government unless the traders affected can organize
to bring pressure on the municipal authority. Quite often, this
may not be possible because they lack the political clout to do
so. The next alternative, as in the case of Nigeria, is for
these traders to 'see the Ogas' directly responsible for the
demolition of the illegal structures.
Seeing the Oga in the context of influencing certain public
policy often ends up implying offering some favor (usually
bribery) to a public official in charge of executing a particular
policy or someone around him who holds a similar or higher
authority with respect to such policy in return for protection
from possible prosecution or as in the case of illegal shacks, to
prevent him from destroying the structures. Usually, the 'Oga'
should be seen periodically by members of a coalition of petty
traders (which is usually a weak coalition) in order to prevent
the 'Oga' (the officer-in-charge) from tearing down their
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makeshift structures. This mode of action (i.e., offering a
bribe to the 'Oga') at the policy's implementation stage rather
than when the policy is being formulated, is perhaps the least
costly way (using Scott's argument) by which the petty traders
can influence the policy of non-provision of adequate commercial
(market) spaces. In other words, because the petty traders
generally lacked the power to influence the city's land-use
policy specifying how spaces should be allocated, building
temporary shacks and offering bribery to sustain them, becomes
the most economical way through which the traders can bargain or
demand for their share of space.
The act of 'seeing the Ogas' has been an effective mode used
by groups of petty traders in maintaining a steady control of
illegal markets in many of the Nigerian cities. In Lagos, for
example, a group of petty traders for many years were able to
resist the Lagos City Council Ordinance disallowing street
trading along Tejuoso Road, Yaba, because they were able to
organize this kind of network (although weak) through which they
influenced public officials.(l) At Onitsha also, the Ojanja
Market which formerly witnessed constant raids from the municipal
authority (the Oga Afias) has remained relatively calm partly
because of the traders' ability to appease some members of the
municipal authority.
(1) Due in part to the resistance of the petty traders and the
high traffic congestion generated by the informal activities, the
municipal authority was compelled to build a permanent
market--the Tejuoso New market to accommodate the trading
activities.
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Although the phenomena just described are not yet prevalent
at Abuja, many loopholes that can give rise to this kind of
problem have begun to emerge. For example, so far in the Phase
One area of the new capital, no known single facility has been
provided for the more traditional market activities. Although
the Maser Plan contained a recommendation that each District
Center be provided with facilities for open-market activities,
the construction of the new capital has so far neglected this
recommendation. In keeping perhaps with the 'prestigious image'
expected of the new capital city, the planners have emphasized
the construction of a more modern and sophisticated shopping
plaza, rather than the provision of facilities for the
traditional, cheap-to-rent, and more familiar open market
activities. Consequently, illegal markets (structures) have
developed around strategic locations (at Wuse, Garki, the
Secretariat, and the A-2 junction) within the city (see Appendix
ii). Already, as we noted for other cities, the FCDA has embarked
upon a periodic 'bulldozing' of the illegal markets, which are
quickly rebuilt by their owners. Some of the traders have been
able to maintain these structures, especially those around the
Secretariat, because they know or have 'seen the public
officials.' Thus, depending on how widespread 'seeing the public
official' is, the illegal market may remain a permanent feature
of the new capital city.
Another source of corruption is related to the largely
inaccessible bureaucracy. The episode in which this writer
waited for ten days for a Director before he could receive
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authorization to make xerox copies of the 1981-83 budget
estimates, when, in fact, such authorization could have been
given by the Assistant Director who was available at the time,
brings attention to the bureaucratic red tape characteristic of
the agency. Every guideline is applied to the strictest rule of
the agency even when certain decisions require a flexible,
immediate, and common sense attention. The head person must
always give his approval or stamp his signature before an
approval for something could be granted.
Because of the delays that are associated with the red tape,
individuals often become frustrated and because it is more
economical for them to offer a bribe in order to get what they
want on time, rather than to wait indefinitely, bribery often
becomes a mode for getting things done.
An example where there is a high potential for the problem
described to occur relates to the approval of building plans,
permits, applications for plots, review of contracts, and payment
of the contractors. In many cases applications for these
activities take over a year to process, thus leaving open the
avenue for bribery. For example, this writer talked to a
contractor who was only able to collect part of his payment
which was two years overdue because he was able to 'see the
ogas.' As noted in Chapter 6, close to N1.4 billion are still
owed to the contractors as of June 1984 partly due to
bureaucratic red tape and due to shortage of funds.
The other possible source of corruption (related to the
impenetrable bureaucracy described above) is the highly
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centralized form of decision making and power structure described
in Sections 7.1 and 7.2. Because power is concentrated generally
on a few individuals at the top, and because there are no
existing or strong counter-balancing mechanisms to check
potential excesses of such individuals, it is relatively easier
for the individuals to manipulate existing policy instruments or
adopt new ones, generally in favor of particular interests both
within and outside the organizational structure. For example,
because the president had the ultimate control of the Abuja
project (as pointed out earlier), he could afford to appoint
members of his ethnic group to head the various units of the FCTA
irrespective of the constitutional requirement for ethnic
balancing-
The impacts of corruption described are generally felt in
three major aspects of the project's development. The first
aspect relates to substantial financial loss that resulted from
corruptive transactions. It was reported in 1981, for example,
that nearly N2 billion have been lost due to corruption in the
FCDA.(l) From this writer's estimate, however, this amount
almost exceeds the total amount of money released to the new
capital project between 1976 and 1981 (Table 6.2), which means
that the financial loss may have been exaggerated. Nevertheless,
the Buhari's government, in 1984, had instituted an inquiry into
the allegation of a widespread corruption in the agency. At the
time of this writing, the results of investigation has not been
(1) See theWest African Economic Digest, Vol. 2, No. 16, November
1981.
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made public. However, a large number of personnel suspected by
the government of being involved in corruption have either been
laid off or suspended, pending the end of that investigation.
The financial losses have contributed to the generally weak
financial position of the FCDA. This has, in turn, contributed
to the inability of the agency to meet its construction targets
(see Chapter 6).
Another impact of corruption relates to inefficiencies that
are generally associated with the problem. Inefficiencies can
result where incompetent persons, for example (because of their
connections), are appointed to key positions or incompetent
contractors are awarded contracts. We have, again, noted the
incidence of this problem and its impact with regard to some of
the contractors who were awarded contracts because of their
connections or through falsification of documents, but abandoned
their work half-way.
In addition to the inefficiency problem, corruption can
undermine the ability of the agency to enforce effectively
construction standards and guidelines. In other words, if some
of the illegal practices were condoned or supported by agency
officials, it is very unlikely that these same officials would be
in a strong position to bring sanctions or penalties to the same
individuals who they have helped to defraud the agency should
they fail to meet the stipulated construction quality guidelines.
The effect of this particular problem described, is reflected in
the poor quality construction characteristic of many of the
residential buildings in the Phase One area, as pointed out in
Chapter 4.
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Finally, corruptive practices are likely to jeopardize the
attainment of the overall project goal. If for example land is
distributed on the basis of connections, rather than on the basis
of achieving ethnic parity in the new capital city, then, the
probability of achieving the overall goal of national integration
would be very low.
7.4 Summary
In the chapter we carried out further, an in depth
examination of the FCDA's organizational structure in order to
identify additional problems that prevented effective project
implementation. The origin, objectives, and processes of the
agency were examined, as well as the effectiveness of its legal
powers with respect to ensuring effective implementation.
From the analysis, we were able to identify four major
factors that inhibited the agency's operations. The factors
included a general lack of management and administrative
autonomy, organizational instability, insufficient skilled
personnel, and corruption.
We pointed out that the FCDA could not control its
activities because of constant federal government intervention.
The intervention seemed to be worsened by political instability
which brought at least four political regimes in the eight-year
history of the agency. Our analysis of organizational models
adopted by the respective regime showed that consistently, each
had very strong control over the agency's operations and
activities.
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The emergence of the various political regimes also
contributed significantly to the rapid structural changes in the
FCDA's organizational structure. Such rapid changes were
reflected in a relatively high turnover of the agency's staff.
The high turnover as we pointed out, contributed in part to the
relatively inexperience of the agency and short supply of skilled
personnel. Because of the relatively short supply of skilled
labor, the agency had to rely heavily on the services of outside
consultants and contractors.
Finally, we noted in the chapter that the highly
inaccessible bureaucracy as well as the high ly centralized form
of decision-making and power structure adopted for project
implementation, generally led to misallocation of resources,
inequities and corruption.
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CHAPTER 8
FCDA: ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND PLAN EFFECTIVENESS
Chapters 6 and 7 have focused exclusively on the examination
of the Federal Capital Development authority (FCDA) in terms of
its funding mechanisms and general organizational structure and
processes. In Chapter 6 we noted the relatively weak financial
position of the agency, which resulted from a number of factors
including the fast pace of project construction, the FCDA;s
dependence on weak federal revenue sources, the agency's inability to
internally generate substantial revenue, and a general management
inefficiency. In Chapter 7, the FCDA's organizational structure
was reviewed, with particular attention to some factors that
impinged on the agency's ability to carry out its functions. The
factors were examined in light of a near-excessive governmental
control, rapid structural changes, corruption, and insufficient
skilled personnel.
In this chapter, we evaluate the FCDA's performance in urban
development. As noted in the general introduction, the FCDA's performance
is defined by the level of the agency's attainments in
facilities' constructions and allocation of urban resources.
The performance evaluation is done using the two criteria
(Target Achievement and Distributional Effectiveness) developed
earlier. The target achievement criterion is used to
compare the FCDA;s attainments with the agency's targets for
housing and other urban facilities and amenities for meeting the
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1986 movement deadline. The distributional effectiveness
criterion assesses the FCDA's attainments in urban development in
terms of their distributional implications on accessibility
among socio-economic groups.
The distributional effectiveness analysis is carried out
only for the urban land and housing resources. The restriction
of our analysis to these two resourses is necessitated by lack of
data, as well as by the indivisibility nature of most of the
other urban resources.
Our evaluation of the FCDA's performance is restricted to
the first phase of the new capital construction--Phase One.
Phase One was targeted for completion in March 1986.
We do not purport to provide a test of the arguments given
in preceding chapters of the FCDA's performance; however,
evidence of the result of the interactive factors discussed
earlier is, sort of, supported by the analysis in this chapter.
Our assessment of the FCDA's performance will reveal that the
agency has largely failed to meet the majority of its
construction targets. The failures are most significant in
housing and construction of institutional facilities and in some
aspects of community facilities. However, the agency has made
significant progress in the construction of water-supply systems,
sewer lines, roads, and health facilities, and police and fire
stations. We will further reveal that the FCDA;s beneficiary
distribution of its land and housing resources was significantly
regressive, and the forms of development involved significant
inefficiencies in the use of urban land.
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8.1 FCDA: Phase One Area Development
To facilitate the construction of the new capital, the
project was divided into six major phases. Phase One was
targeted for completion in March 1986, in order to facilitate
relocation of the national seat of government to the city in
October of that year. The construction of the second phase was
to follow immediately after Phase One, and was scheduled for
completion in 1990. Subsequent phases were to follow, with the
final phase completed by the year 2000. But, due to the
political situation, completion of Phase One was rescheduled by
the Shagari Administration for 1982 to enable relocation of the
national government to the city in the same year.
As indicated earlier, completion of Phase One was not
possible and movement to the new city did not occur, except for a
few subsidiaries of government functionaries relocated to the
city for the continuation of work at the site. The analysis in
this chapter is nevertheless geared towards the objective of
building the capital city or completing the first phase by the
original schedule of 1986 because the subsequent military
government that succeeded the civilian administration has
maintained the 1986 deadline.
The new capital city as conceived in the Master Plan is to
start with the smallest unit termed the neighborhood, which then
graduates to the district and the city center. Each neighborhood
is given a neighborhood center, which provides neighborhood
facilities and services, such as a primary school, corner shops,
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dispensary or clinic, postal agency, a community hall, etc. The
neighborhood is also allotted a population target of 4,000 to
5,000, a threshold large enough to sustain its center facilities.
This prescription also holds for each district. However, among
the district-center facilities are included a health center,
secondary school, market, shopping center, police and fire
stations, post offices, etc. The population target at the
district level is 40,000 to 60,000. The final unit in the
hierarchy is the city center, generally referred to here as the
Central Area, whose functions include: (i) the locations for the
State House, national assembly, and Supreme Court; (ii) the
ministerial zone where the building for all the federal
government ministries and parastatals and state government
liaison offices were to be located; (iii) the cultural zone where
all cultural edifices, such as national library, national museum,
national cathedral, national mosque, international conference
center, etc., are to be located. Included in the central area is
also the Central Business District (CBD), which was also assigned
a city hospital and a transportation terminal.
The boundaries of the Phase One area are shown in Fig. 8.1.
This area lies to the eastern part of the Federal Capital,
bounded by the Peripheral Expressways to the east and the Western
Expressways to the west. The population for this Phase One was
projected at 230,000 in the Master Plan but was scaled down to
150,000 during construction because of undevelopable terrain
encountered (see Chapter 5). It contains the Central Area, with
predominantly residential areas to the north and south.
-
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The Phase One area is 11 kilometers from north to south and
8 kilometers from east to west. It covers about 5,500 hectares
of both developable and undevelopable land, with the Central Area
covering nearly 30 percent (1,658 hectares) of the entire area.
The Central Area is the one dominant center of both this area and
the entire Federal Capital City. All affairs in the city and the
nation will focus on it. It will also be the center to which
representatives of other nations will come and therefore "will
symbolize Nigeria to the world."(1) This role gives the Central
Area a very important one, which had to be reflected in its
development. Also, it was important that construction targeted
for this area be completed by the 1986 deadline.
In terms of overall apportionment of the Phase One area, the
land budget distribution is shown in Table 8-1. The residential
sector is divided into four major districts: Garki and Wuse in
the south, and Asokoro and Maitama in the north. In addition to
supporting a hierarchy of commercial, community, and utility
services, each of the four districts was expected to support a
mixture of housing types and densities. Based on the original
230,000 population projected in the Master Plan, the proposals
for the residential sector were that the northern area (Asokoro
and Maitama districts) will accommodate 120,000 people out of
this population, and the southern area (Garki and Wuse districts)
80,000. The additional 30,000 people needed to make up the
Master Plan target would be accommodated in the Central Area.
(1) The Master Plan to Abuja, the new Federal Capital of Nigeria,
FCDA, February 1979, p. 79.
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Table 8.1
Land Budget for the Phase One Area
Land Allotted Plan
Type or Category (hectares) Population
Central Area (City Center) 1,658 30,000
Garki (1) District 365 26,000
(Formerly Area ADCP)
Wuse (1) District 630 34,000
(Formerly Area G and H)
Asokoro District 897 30,000
(Formerly Areas DEF)
Wuse (2) District 900 35,000
(Formerly Areas IJKL)
Maitama District 1,050 35,000
Totals 5 ,50 0a 190,000b
a: The area of 5,500 hectares includes both developable
and undevelopable lands.
b: The target of 190,000 inhabitants was arrived at during
a detailed urban design of the Central Area and the
five residential districts, but falls short of the
Master Plan projection of 230,000 persons. Even at
that, the 190,000 inhabitants could not be achieved
during the physical setting-out on the ground because
some residential plots in Garki and Asokoro Districts
were found to be undevelopable.
Source: Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago: "Implementing A Master
Plan, The Abuja Experience." Paper presented at a
workshop on The Planning of New Capital Cities in
Developing Countries, held at Abuja, Nigeria,
March 5-9, 1984, p. 6.
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An overall average density of 26 dwellings per hectare for
Phase One was recommended in the Master Plan.(l) Approximately
1,542 hectares of developable land (939 hectares in the north and
603 in the south) were made available for residential
purposes.(2) After about 17 percent of the available land is
deducted for supporting facilities and collector roads, 1,280
hectares remain for housing. Nearly 20 percent of this available
land was proposed for a low average density of 10 dwellings per
hectare, while the remaining 80 percent was to be developed at a
higher average density of 30 dwellings per hectare.(3) In total,
therefore, the residential sector would support at least 33,280
dwellings or at least 200,000 population at six persons per
dwelling. This would give an overall average of 26 dwellings per
hectare.(4)
The Phase One housing development has been planned to take
advantage of the two major land characteristics:(5) (i) land
that has no major constraints and is therefore available and
suitable for the normal ranges of housing densities; and (ii),
land that due to its "sensitive location," its relative
inaccessibility, or its steepness or woods is suitable for
low-density housing plots. The majority of the housing land (80
percent) falls into the former category. it was planned so as
(2) Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria: Phase 1 Area Final
Report, Land Use and Infrastructure Proposals, FCDA, September
1979, p. 37.
(1) Ibid., p. 37.
(2) Ibid., p. 36.
(3) Ibid., p. 36.
(4) Ibid., p. 38.
(5) Ibid., p. 38.
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to take maximum advantage of the opportunities afforded by the
natural features of this area. Dominant in this area are the
three major river valleys and their numerous tributaries. Most
of them have gently sloping sides and are ideal for housing.
These housing areas are capable of a range of housing densities
responding to the local land form and landscape. The remainder
of the housing land falls into the latter, low-density category.
There are five major areas; of these, two of them form a
semi-circle to the east of the Senate area utilizing the
attractive hilly, wooded area to the south and the peninsular
sites overlooking the golf course in the north. Some embassies
and official residences are expected to locate in these areas.
Two other low-density housing areas exist in the north in an
area of steep valleys, hills, and woods. These areas are less
accessible than most of the Phase One area.
The fifth area of low-density housing is that already
developed in the Accelerated District, containing some parts of
Garki and Wuse. This utilizes the opportunity provided by the
south-facing slopes overlooking the Parkway and the valley.
There is little or no question that the overall density
adopted for housing development in Phase One is low. In general,
this low density, as we shall argue in Section 8.3, has
contributed to inaccessibility problems to urban land resources
among low-income inhabitants of the city.
8.1.2 Program Targets and Objectives
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Measuring and analyzing the FCDA's performance in developing
Phase One will not provide sufficient grounds for evaluating that
performance, no matter how accurate the measures are, because
every evaluation consists essentially of comparing an actual
performance (or a measure of it) with some standard of 'what
ought to be.' Without a standard it is impossible to arrive at
conclusions about whether a performance has been adequate or
inadequate, efficient or inefficient, or even desirable or
undesirable. For example, the fact that close to 3,524 housing
units have been constructed in the FCC (Phase One) from 1979 to
1984 does not in itself allow for any conclusions about the
quality of the FCDA's performance concerning housing. There must
also be a standard for assessing the number of units needed, as
well as the distributional beneficiaries, before an adequate
evaluation can be made.
To enable an adequate evaluation of the FCDA's attainments
in urban development, this section outlines and discusses the
targets and objectives for the Phase One area development.
The development of the entire capital city has been guided
by four main objectives:
(i) coherence - The phasing of the capital should ensure that
at all stages of its growth the completed development and
infrastructure should create a coherent city, with clear
and logical form of development and movement corridors.
(ii) efficiency - The phasing of the capital should be such that
investment is used efficiently and cost effectively.
Therefore infrastructure should be used reasonably soon
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after its completion and its catchment should be developed
as quickly as possible compatible with other aims.
(iii) flexibility - The program should be flexible to allow for
unforeseen changes and different rates of growth.
(iv) balance - A city consists of many land uses and facilities
which support and complement each other. This balance
needed to be maintained during the development of Abuja.
The programs of housing, employment, facilities, and
infrastructure are therefore interrelated.(1)
On the basis of the preceding objectives, the targets that
would ensure for a realization of these objectives regarding the
Central Area, Residential Sector, and infrastructure were set for
the Phase One area. Table 8.2, column 3, shows construction
targets required to build a coherent, efficient, and balanced
city necessary to sustain an initial population of 150,000.(2)
The targets include the construction of approximately 232,000
square meters of office space, four primary health centers, a
250-bed hospital, one central market, and two shopping centers.
Others include 40 kilometers of regional roads, sewerage trunk
lines, a treatment plant, water supply schemes, electricity
supply, two post offices, and 25,000 units of housing, etc.
In general the construction targets are to be distributed as
follows:
(1) Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria: Phase 1 Final Report,
Implementation Strategy, FCDA, September 1979, p. 9.
(2) Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of
the Abuja Projects, August 1979, pp. 21-23.
Table 8.2
Schedule of Infrastructural Requirement in Abuja to Enable
Movement in 1986
(as of observed August 1984)
Amount of
Additional Infra-
Type of Amount in Amount Required for Amount Under structure Required
Infrastructure Place 1986 Movement Construction to Make Up for 1986
Offir Sc -- 90 R ffjoa 1V00 e-ffi&csa 2177 offi
Scho
Primary
Junior secondary
Senior secondary
Health Center
250 Bed Hospital
Commercial
Market
Shopping Centers
Roads
Regional
(Expressways)
District Roads
Sewage
Trunk lines
Treatment Plant
collector
,(232,500 sq.m.)
4 of 4 streams each
1 of 800 students
1 of 800 students
40 km
sub- 4 Districts: Garki,
districts Wuse, Maitama, Asokoro
Com-
pleted
Com-
pleted
2
Completed
1
Compl eted
(30,000 sq.m.)
ces I.
(202,500 sq.m.)
1
(Located outside
the Phase One area)
N/A
Garki 1
Wuse 1
Completed
Completed
N/A
N/A
Completed
1
2 2
40 km
interceptor
Table 8.2 Continued
Amount of
Additional Infra-
Type of Amount in Amount Required for Amount Under structure Required
Infrastructure Place 1986 Movement Construction to Make Up for 1986
Wae Su ly -.
Source
Treatment
facilities
Reservoirs
Secondary mains
Distribution
network
Electricity
133 KVA
network
2
Com-
pleted
Com-
Garki 1
Wuse 1
3,524
2 lines
Completed Completed
Completed
Garki 2
Wuse 2
Maitama 1&2
Asokoro l&2
25,000 units
Completed
Garki 1
Wuse 1
4,327 units
Garki 1
Wuse 1
14,149 units
Post and Telegraph
Post office
Cable Network
Police Station
Fire Station
2,000
lines
2
4,000 lines
more
2,500 offices
(232,500 sq.m.)
323 offices
(30,000 sq.m.)
2,177 offices
(202,500 sq.m.)
Housin *
Office Space
Table 8.2 Continued
Amount of
Additional Infra-
Type of Amount in Amount Required for Amount Under structure Required
Infrastructure Place 1986 Movement Construction to Make Up for 1986
*Central Area 2
National Assem- -- 1 (20,OOOm2
bly/Senate
Presidential -- 1 (2,000m2
Residence
Executive Office -- 1 (40,00Om2) 
-- 1
Building
National Monument -- N/A N/A
Legislative -- 1 (40,000m2) 1
Office Building
Justice Building -- 1 (32,000m) --
Municipal -- 1 (20,000m2 ) --
Administration
Complex
Embassies 
-- 20 (1,000m2 ) 
__ 20
Hotel, Retail -- 4 4 ..
Space
Sports Stadium 1 100,000 seats --
N/A: Not Available
- -: None
*: Derived from Master Plan for Abuia. the Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, Februar
1979, p. 265.
Source: Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the Abuja Project,
August 1984, pp. 21-24.
y
359
The Central Area. The fundamental target for Abuja was to have
the National Government Center, which might be called the hub of
the Central Area, well established in the new capital before
1986.(l) This would attract people who require housing and
back-up commercial and community facilities and services. This
development obviously requires infrastructure to be provided
before it can take place.
The growth of the city also required a 'balanced'
employment, housing, facilities, and infrastructure program. All
of these were to be led and the growth of the city determined, by
the establishment of the National Government Center and the other
components of the Central Area. By 1986, it was intended to have
completed the Senate Area, five ministries, and the Supreme Court
in the National Government Center, a significant number of the
major institutional uses, the central market, four retail and
four office schemes in the commercial area, and some of the
housing areas.(2) Allowance was also made for some additional
uses in the Central Area apart from those recommended in the
Master Plan. These include state liaison offices, television and
radio station, and a national visitors center. Also, some of the
Central Area uses were brought forward to 1986 for construction.
This was because it was decided that some job opportunities
should be established earlier to support and balance the target
rate of population growth.(3)
(1) Ibid., p. 4
(2) Ibid., p. 5.
(3) The Master Plan estimated the by 1981, at least 30,000 people
would be living at Abuja. These people consisted mainly of
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Housing. The target for the growth rate of Abuja is that there
should be 150,000 population by 1986. At a household size of six
persons per dwelling unit projected by the Master Plan, a total
of 25,000 dwellings was required to house this population.
However, the construction program would take some time to build
up to the level of construction activity necessary for the growth
rate of the capital. This is because the basic infrastructure
needs to be provided, a construction labor force established, and
local building materials made available. Thus, the development
of housing between 1980 and 1986 was concentrated in the later
years of this period. With this in mind, the FCDA developed a
housing-construction target that emphasized increased
construction at a later stage of the Phase One development.
Table 8.3 shows these construction targets for housing
development.
The annual targets and program are defined for financial
rather than calendar years. The annual targets included 400
dwelling units to be completed during FY 1980-81, 2,000 during
the 1981-82 period, 3,600 in 1982-83, 5,700 during the 1983-84
period, 6,600 during 1984-85, and 6,000 during the 1985-86
period, making a total of 25,000 units. If these annual targets
are met, the target of housing of the 150,000 population will be
achieved by the end of March 1986.
This population will be accommodated in the Residential
Sector and the Central Area. The target of an ultimate
construction workers and federal government personnel including
the FCDA staff.
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Table 8.3
Housing Construction Targets
(Dwelling Units)
(Phase One)
Residential Area Central Area
Annual Cumulative Annual Cumulative Total Cumulative
1980/81 400 400 400 400
1981/82 2,000 2,400 --- 2,000 2,400
1982/83 3,600 5,000 --- --- 3,600 6,000
1983/84 5,300 11,300 400 400 5,700 11,700
1984/85 6,200 17,500 400 800 6,600 18,300
1985/86 6,000 23,500 700 1,500 6,700 25,000
Source: "Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria, Phase 1
Final Report, Implementation Strategy." A report
submitted to F. C. Obinani, FCDA Project Coordinator
by Milton Keynes Development Corporation, September
1979, p. 6.
Date
362
population of 30,000 in the Central Area would require 5,000
dwellings; however, only 1,500 dwellings were-targeted for this
area by 1986.
Infrastructure and Community Facilities. The provision of
infrastructure and community facilities is vital for the
achievement of the overall programs. any delay in the
construction of the infrastructure will inevitably delay other
schemes. In order to reduce the risk of delays, certain types of
infrastructure were programmed for completion some months before
it would actually be used. Among the infrastructure and
community facilities targeted for completion before 1986 were the
water-supply systems, sewage/waste water systems, roads, power
lines, health facilities, schools, police and fire stations, etc.
(see Table 8.2).
8.1. 3 FCDA: Level of Attainments in Urban Development (Phase
One)
Table 8.2 shows a comparison of the FCDA;s attainments as of
1984, with the targets required to meet the 1986 deadline. The
data in this table are supported by the author's personal
observation at the site. The table shows that a majority of the
facilities and amenities are still under construction, while
construction of others is yet to begin. The facilities most
significantly affected include the construction of housing and
the Central Area. Construction of the institutional buildings
targeted for completion in 1986 for the Central Area has either
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not begun or is still underway. These include: the national
assembly, executive office building, the federal secretariat, the
justice building, and the municipal admini.strative complex.
Other facilities that have not yet been started include the
sewerage treatment plant and three of the four primary schools.
The development of housing has also proceeded slowly. Only 3,524
housing units out of a total of 25,000 units targeted for
completion have been completed.
Given the present level of attainment, it is unlikely that a
full realization of the infrastructure facilities requirements
projected for 1986 would be achieved. For example, if about 15
percent (3,524 units) of the total housing units (25,000 units)
targeted for 1986 took nearly five years (1979-1984) to complete,
it is highly probable that the remaining 85 percent of the
housing units would not be completed by 1986 unless there is: (1)
an increase in the level of funding over and above its present
level; (2) an increase in the amount and quality of labor
employed; (3) an increased availability of construction materials
and equipment; and (4) a minimization of the present level of
'politicization' of the entire project. But none of these four
goals seems feasible at the present. As we have noted in
preceding chapters, the level of the new capital's funding has
been drastically reduced (see Chapter 6). In addition, the
quality of executive capacity for project implementation has been
largely weakened by a number of problems, including bureaucratic
and political factors (see Chapter 7). Recently (August 1985),
another military coup has taken place, which is another
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indication of unpredictability of the political situation that
has critically affected the FCDA. Furthermore, construction
materials are scarce (see Chapter 5). This scarcity has been
accentuated by the present economic crisis, which has led to a
drastic curtailment of importation on which the majority of
construction materials depend.
In spite of the relatively low level of attainment, the
FCDA, however, has made remarkable strides in the construction of
some infrastructure and community facilities, especially the
following:
1. Central Area. A number of achievements have been recorded in
the Central Area. The presidential complex is nearing completion
and so are the hotel complexes, stadium, the central hospital,
shopping center, and some of the district roads.
When it became clear that permanent offices for the federal
government ministries being designed for construction in the city
center would not be ready to meet the demand of the six
ministries scheduled for movement to Abuja in 1982, the FCDA
embarked on the provision of eight blocks of four-story office
buildings to be used as temporary facilities for those
ministries. In addition, there are other office facilities under
construction in the two district centers in Garki and Wuse. In
all, some 68,180 square meters of office floor area will be made
available when all the present office blocks under construction
are completed.
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2. Housing, Infrastructure, and Community Facilities. Despite
the relatively poor achievement in housing development in the
Phase One area of the city, the FCDA has developed a number of
housing estates at various locations within the Federal Capital
Territory areas. Over 2,204 houses, ranging from two to six
bedrooms have been constructed in these areas.(l) Such projects
include the Nyanya Workers Settlement, Karu New Town, and the
Karshi Development Area (Table 8-4). In addition, a large number
of low-income housing units have been developed at Gwagwalada,
Abaji, Kuje, and Sheda Kwali (Table 8-5). However, as discussed
in Chapter 6, the distances from these housing complexes to the
city are so great as to offset the potential benefits of such
housing developments, especially since these houses were being
designed mainly for the low-income group.
The provision of infrastructural facilities, such as water,
electricity, roads, and telephone lines, etc., have thus far been
limited to Garki(1) and the Wuse(l) Districts and a few roads now
under construction in the Central Area. The first phase of the
Ring Road 1 has been completed. The construction of the outer
Northern Expressway has also gone a long way. Table 8-6 shows
the extent of road construction in the Phase One Area.
The FCDA has also made a remarkable amount of progress in
the development of water schemes, electricity supply, parks, and
gardens. The water schemes targeted for 1986 included a network
of three dams or reservoirs to be constructed on the River Usuma
(1) Ibid., p. 14
Table 8.4
Number of Houses by Type, Locations and
Capital Territory Being Provided by the
Stages of Construction in the Federal
Ministry of Federal Capital Territory
Location Type Total No. Completed Under Construction
Gwagwalada 6 BR 27 4 23
4 BR 79 40 39
3 BR 57 37 20
2 BR (SR) 150 111 139
2 BR (JR) 5.5 Ill
Karu New Town 2 BR (Row House) 598 400 198
3 BR (Bungalow)
4 BR (Single 2.5
Story) 7.415 3.2
Nyanya Workers 1 Room 6112 5040 1072
Camp 2 Room 1120 
_10 
_1
7-232 5.9-50 122
Karshi Devel. 6 BR 2 - 2
Area 4 BR 23 2 21
3 BR 40 6 34
2 BR (SR) 74 20 54
2 BR (JR) 1 3 
_28
.12.r -1 13.2
Bwari Dev. Area 2 BR (SR) 14 4 *10
BR (JR)
BR
BR
82
52
12
1.5
43
12
39
40
12
Table 8.4 Continued
Location Type Total No. Completed Under Construction
Yaba Dev. Area 1 BR 12
Rubochi Dev. Area
Kwali Dev. Area
Kuje Dev. Area
Abaji Dev. Area
2 BR
3 BR
2 BR
Jr.9r.
3 BR
4 BR
43
4
36
_7
2D
2 BR
3 BR
4 BR
6 BR
2 BR
3 BR
4 BR
6 BR
Jr. 9r.
2 BR
3 BR
4 BR
2 BR
83
58
33
-1
81
42
34
4
37
36
23
41
1.31
7
_-2
16
1
6
44
1
10
12
8
6
-
14
3
1
5.5
68
27
3
30
-
6.2
39
57
23
_1
12
69
34
28
4
,A
169
23
33
22
_A
a2
BR = Bedroom
Source: Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago, "Implementing a Master Plan: The Abuja Experience."
Paper presented at the Workshop on The Planning of New Capital Cities in Developing
Countrie., Under the Auspices of the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, held
at the Abuja, March 5-9, 1984.
Table 8.5
Federal Low Cost Housing Program in the Federal Capital Territory
Type and No. of Type and No. of Type and Units Type and No. of
Location Units Available Units Completed in Progress Units not Started
1 BR 3 BR l BR 3 BR 1 BR 3 BR 1 BR 3 BR
Gwagwalada
Abaji
Sheda
Kuje
Rubochi
Kwali
Karshi
Bwari
890
404
174
144
50
48
50
40
80
74
16
6
628
304
34
58
242
100
84
56
36
50
12
48
40
Total 1,800 200 1,068 92 650 78 82 22
BR = Bedroom
Source: Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago. "Implementing a Master Plan: The Abuja Experience."
Paper presented at the Workshop on The Planning of New Capital Cities in Developing
Countrie., Under the Auspices of the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan,
held at Abuja, March 5-9, 1984.
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Table 8.6
Extent of Road Development As of August 1984
Roads
Garki (I)
Wuse (I)
Percent
Completed Remarks
75% All contracts in very advanced stages of
completion. The work involves the
construction of 11 kilometers of dual
carriage ways with 7 meter wide carriage
ways. There are also 3 meter wide
verges and 3-5 meter wide footpaths
outside the local streets and access
roads and about 93,800 square meters of
parking areas.
95% Contracts for power supply yet to be
awarded. The works now in progress are
as follows:
a. Two-lane dual carriage ways, approxi-
mately 10 kilometers long;
b. About 60 kilometers of road networks;
c. 4 road bridges about 25 meters long
each;
d. 6 footbridges;
e. 2 subways;
f. Precast concrete curbs totalling
approximately 93 kilometers in length;
g. About 45 kilometers of piped trunk-
sewer drain and enclosed surface
water drainage system;
h. Pipe culverts of up to l'200 millimeter
diameter, totalling about 2 '500
meters in length;
i. Provision of Post and Telecommunication
cables, street lighting, etc.;j. Water-main pipe-work, approximately
100 kilometers in length, including
all valves and fittings, etc.
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Table 8.6 Continued
Percent
Roads Completed Remarks
Outer 85% Involves a 40 kilometer long stretch with
Northern 4-lane dual carriage way
Expressway
Ring Road -l 100% Involves a 20.4 kilometer long stretch
with 2-lane service carriage way.
Airport 90% Involves a 44 kilometer long stretch
Expressway with 2-lane main carriage way
Central Area 25% ----------------------
Roads and
Bridges
Source: Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago. "Implementing A Master
Plan: The Abuja Experience." Paper presented at
the Workshop on The Planning of New Capital Cities
in Developing Countries, Under the Auspices of the
United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, held at
Abuja, March 5-9, 1984.
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and a pipeline to be laid from the Shiroro Hydroelectric Dam.
The Lower Usman Dam and Jabbi Dam have been completed. It has a
capacity to cater to the 150,000 inhabitants of Phase One of the
city when Phase One has been fully developed.
A contract for the construction of interception sewer lines
for the whole of Phase One was awarded in 1982, and nearly 50
percent of the work has been undertaken.(1) A contract for the
supply and installation of the sewage treatment plant for Phase
One, as we noted in Chapter 5, has, however, not been awarded.
As a result, septic tanks and soakaways have been provided on a
temporary basis to completed houses in the Garki and Wuse
Districts, as well as at Karu New Town and Gwagwalada.
The Posts and Telegraphs Department has already commissioned
its first exchange in Abuja. Thus, both the city and Gwagwalada
enjoy telephone services. The first post office has also been
opened at a temporary location in the Neighborhood Center at
Garki. Radio and television started transmission services in
1981.
Electricity supply has been provided to some of the
completed developments. However, this has been done on a
temporary basis through the use of generators and overhead
cables, contrary to underground cables recommended in the the
Master Plan. Most of the housing developments in the Wuse
Districts are as yet without electricity. However, the Nigerian
Electric Power Authority (NEPA) has commissioned to transmit 132
(1) Ibid., p. 18
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KVA from Minna to Abuja as well as 132 KVA (substation) in Garki.
Parts of the Garki District where underground cabling had been
completed are already served with NEPA supplies.
A total of 2,582 residential and 121 commercial plots have
been assembled and distributed in the Phase One area (Table 8-7).
In conclusion it can be noted that the FCDA has made some
remarkable progress, as far as the provision of certain
infrastructural and community facilities were concerned.
However, at the level of Phase One's present developments, it is
unlikely that the FCDA would be able to meet all its construction
targets for 1986, given (as we have noted) the present and future
construction constraints the agency must face in terms of
funding, construction materials, organizational capacity, and
political uncertainties.
In the following section, the distributional implications of
the FCDA's attainments on urban land and housing allocations
among beneficiary groups are analyzed in order to
understand further the agency's effectiveness in urban
development. We assess the FCDA's attainments, using the second
criterion, distributional effectiveness criterion, presented
earlier in this chapter.
8.2 Urban Land: Processes of their Allocation and
Distributional Implications for Accessibility among Income Groups
With the introduction of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT)
Decree of 1976, as we pointed in Chapter 7, all lands in the new
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Table 8.7
Plot Allocations by Land-Use Categories and Locations
Location Industrial Commercial Residential
Central Area (Phase 1) -- 68 --
Wuse Dictrict (Phase 1) -- 31 875
Garki District (Phase 1) -- 8 383
Asokoro District (Phase 1) -- -- 416
Maitama District (Phase 1) -- 14 903
Karu New Town -- 4 --
Gwagwalada 124 -- --
IDU (Industrial Park) 85 -- --
Gaube (Industrial Park) -- -- --
Total 209 125 2,582
Source: Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago. "Implementing A Master
Plan: The Abuja Experience." Paper presented at
the Workshop on The Planning of New Capital Cities
in Developing Countries, Under the Auspices of the
United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, held at
Abuja, March 5-9, 1984.
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capital territory were converted to public land. One of the
goals of this public acquisition was to facilitate a better
distribution of such lands among all competing factions including
the socio-economic and ethnic groups in the territory. Thus,
governmental intervention in the management and control of lands,
in this respect, would be seen as an effort to remove
accessibility problems for both the institutions, socio-economic
groups, and all ethnic groups.
In Chapter 7 we noted that the institutional mechanism
established by the government to ensure equitable distribution of
plots among ethnic groups, was relatively ineffective. In this
section, the way in which urban land distribution and government
interventions in the process has determined urban land
alternatives for the new capital city's residents, in general,
and the urban poor in particular, is analyzed and discussed. The
character of the government's land use policy for FCDA plots is
examined along with the criteria and processes of allocation of
the agency's plots to beneficiaries. The implications of the
allocation criteria and processes (which define who benefits from
the FCDA lands) on the distributional accessibility of the
agency's land resources among income groups is also analyzed.
8.2.1 Criteria and Processes of Beneficiary Allocation
Generally, one or all of three factors would define who
(what type of people) benefits from the FCDA land: (1) the
government's land-use policy objectives; (2) the criteria for
allocating the plots and housing; (3) the FCDA's conditions for
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allocation and the terms of the covenant that the prospective
beneficiary is expected to fulfill.
The Government's Land-Use Policy Objective
As noted earlier, one of the principal arguments for a
new capital city was for the development of an urban environment
that would cater to Nigerians of all walks of life, and
socio-economic background. Implicit in the goal is that such a
city must provide for an equitable access to all its land
resources for all the groups in the city. A not surprising
experience, however, is that there is always a wide gap between
the official stated goal and the actual realization of those
goals, particularly with respect to the low-income group.
Even though the government's intention was to build a new
city that would be accessible in terms of its resources,
including land, to everyone, the character of its land use
policies tends to contradict this objective. One policy points
to the general government inclination towards building a new
capital city comparable with most of the Western cities. While a
city of comparable quality with the Western ones may be something
good to aspire for, its construction requires generally
sophisticated infrastructural amenities, which are often beyond
the financial capacity of the poor residents. We have noted the
influence of this policy attitude (attitude towards building a
high-class city) on the development of transport infrastructure
and sewerage treatment facilities in Chapter 5; and it will also
be apparent in this analysis on the development of urban land.
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According to the policy, one of the means to escape from
the crowded and squalid environment of the former
capital, Lagos, was to build sophisticated amenities and
adopt a 'high standard' of development. This general
attitude is perhaps best reflected in a warning echoed
during a workshop on the Planning of New Capital Cities,
by Dr. Ajato Gandonu, one of the earlier supporters of
the new capital project. He wrote:
Higher standards of housing construction and
space must be enforced beyond the poor
performance so far at the Accelerated
District, which appears to duplicate the
crowded conditions from which Lagos evacuees
expected to be freed. There is enough space
at the new site for a more pleasant environ-
ment and Abuja must set the standard for the
improved development of other Nigerian
cities.1
Given this general attitude for high development
standards, which is shared by many of the new capital
supporters including the government, it is doubtful that
the government intended to develop a city that would
cater seriously to the interest of the poor.
(1) Ajato Gandonu: "Abuja: Planning the Nation's Capital,"
a paper presented at the Workshop on Planning of New Capital
Cities in Developing Countries, held at Abuja Nigeria, March
5-9, 1984, p. 42.
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Some of the land-use policies adopted by the FCDA at
Abuja point in the direction of the above observation.
A low density (average of 26 dwellings per hectare) is
adopted for the Phase One area development. Critics
have argued that at this rate of low-density develop-
ment, it would be nearly impossible for the poor to
acquire plots, let alone develop them, without sub-
stantial subsidies from the government. This is because
at such low density the unit cost (which typically
accounts for between 20 and 45 percent of total resi-
dential costs) allocatable to individual households for
providing infrastructural services will be so high as to
make it unaffordable to most poor households. 1 The
costs of road networks and surface drainage, for
example, change substantially with different plot sizes
and planning configurations. As a result, the areas
where infrastructure costs can be reduced in residential
developments are: by reducing the standards of infra-
structure, primarily road networks and surface drainage,
or by increasing the number of households bearing those
costs, through more efficient planning (in this case by
intreasing the existing densities); or more likely,
through a combination of the above.
(1) See the Master Plan for Abuja, ibid., op. cit., p. 174.
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But because the standards for infrastructural develop-
ment housing, and for plot development are relatively
high, costs allocatable to households would be high and
potentially beyond the financial capacities of most of
the poor urban households.
Table 8-8 shows the average sizes (in area) of
plots and the maximum ground coverage and building
stories adopted for some of the plots allocated thus far
in the Phase One area. The plots range in size from an
average of 428 square meters to 604 square meters (M2).
The required maximum average ground coverage for the
plots is 35 percent. None of the buildings on these
plots is to exceed three stories high. 1
In designing the plots, there has not been a conscious
effort on the part of the FCDA or the government to
develop plots that are affordable to the poor. In other
words, the low-income group was assumed to be able to
compete effectively with the high income groups for
these plots. This attitude of the government is supported
by FCDA's allocation criteria and other conditions for
acquiring these plots, as we shall see later. If a uniform
(1) Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria: Development
Control Documents for the Plot Areas in the Accelerated
District, FCDA, March 1980, p. 18.
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Table 8.8
Average Plot Sizes at Selected Locations in the Phase One Area
Average Maximum
Average Maximum number
Area Location Area (size) ground of stories
in Phase One of plots (m2) coverage (%) permitted
A 1 502 35 2-3
A 2 428 35 2-3
A 3 ----
A 4 567 35 2-3
A 5 604 35 2
A 6 456 35 2
m2: square meters
*: subdivisions
Source: Computed from: "Abuja, New Federal Capital of
Nigeria: Development Control Documents for the
Plot Areas in Accelerated District, Phase One."
Report submitted to the Federal Capital Development
Authority (FCDA) by Milton Keynes Development
Corporation, March 1980.
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standard of plots should be developed for both the low- and
high-income groups at Abuja, then a look at standards adopted in
other developing countries for low-income families shows that the
plots designed for Abuja residents are of by far higher standards
than those in these countries (Table 8-9). For example, while
plot sizes at Abuja range from 428 m2 to 604 m2 , those in other
countries range from 60 m2 in India to 300 m2 in Egypt and Sudan.
(1) In Latin America, for instance in Brazil and Argentina, the
officially accepted plot size for low-income people is 200 m 2 ,
while in the "Villa Miseria" or favelas (slums), plot sizes per
dwelling are often less than 20 m 2. In Asia, the official
standard for the low-income groups tends to be even smaller and
to vary from city to city even within the same country. In
India, for example, the sizes are 95 m2 in Madras, 66 m2 in
Delhi, and go as low as 60 m2 in Hyderabad.(2) In the
Philippines the official standard is 90 m2 and in Malaysia, 123
m
2
.
In terms of accessibility to urban land resources, the FCDA
has not provided cheap and affordable plots for the poor,
especially when the standards of plots are matched with the
incomes of the poor residents.
The second factor that influenced the beneficiary
distribution of the FCDA's land resources was the criterion of
allocation for such resources. This factor is closely related to
(1) Magogunje, A.L., Hardoy, J.E., and Misra, R.P., Shelter
Provision in Developing Countries, John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., NY,
1978, pp. 10-15.
(2) Ibid., p. 10.
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Table 8.9
Officially Accepted Plot Sizes from Selected Countries
for Low-Income Groups
Country Average Plot Size (m2 )
Sudan 300
Egypt 300
Brazil 200
Argentina 200
India* 75
Philippines 90
Malaysia 123
*: Average for Madras, Delhi, and Hyderabad only.
Source: Computed from: A. L. Mabogunje, J. E. Hardoy, and
R. P. Misra. Shelter Provision in Developing
Countries. John Wiley and Son, Ltd., N.Y., 1978,
pp. 10-12.
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the first in that it lays out the principles on which the
allocation of plots at Abuja would be based, thereby attempting
to further the land use goals and objectives of the government.
The allocation principles were based on: (a) promotion of
national integration; (b) ensuring that the population of the new
capital city is federal in character; (c) capacity/ability to
build or develop; and (d) 'first come, first served.'(1)
The first two principles attempt to minimize ethnic monopoly
of the new capital's land resources, that was common in the
former capital city (Lagos) where one of the three major ethnic
groups mainly controlled ownership of most of the land resources.
Already, as noted in Chapter 7, the government has been
ineffective in trying to minimize ethnic monopoly of the land
resources because of the weak institutional structure established
to oversee the implementation of this goal.
The last two principles--capacity/ability to develop and
'first come, first served'--implicitly identify the category of
persons that should benefit from land allocation. The principles
have not, however, spelled out any guidelines for involving an
effective participation of the poor in the allocation of the
urban land resources. Basing allocation of land on the
ability/capacity to develop the plot, and first come, first
s e r v ed , means that the poor are left on their own to campete with the
high-income groups for land.
By the government not encouraging the poor to participate in
the urban land allocation through some kind of subsidy or
(1) See New Nigeria, "Focus on Abuja," January 11, 1982, p. 8.
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criterion that help them, it means that one of the central goals
of integration of all socio-economic groups is being neglected
because the poor cannot ordinarily compete effectively with the
high - income groups. The position of the poor in the whole
situation is further worsened by the high standards adopted for
the plots, as demonstrated earlier, as well as other conditions
(fee charges and bureaucratic processes), as we shall show later,
expected of plot beneficiaries to fulfill before plots can be
allocated to them.
The ability to develop and 'first-come, first-served' assume
a 'perfect market' situation whereby individuals with ability to
develop and who have applied first will get the plots. This
assumption is obviously weak in this case where the distribution
or allocation of plots depends very much on one's ethnic or
political party affiliation and one's connections.
Even if the urban 'land market' were 'perfect' such that
people competed fairly with each other for land, the poor would
still be constrained by two major handicaps:
(1) their relatively meager incomes: they cannot pay for the
acquisition of plots nor for other development charges and
fees;
(2) their inability to obtain financial loans from the financial
market.
Table 8-10 shows the income distribution structure of
expected inhabitants at the new capital city. As shown, nearly
10 percent of households in income category I are expected to
earn a median income of approximately N600 (US $840) annually.
Table 8.10
Number of Household and Income Distribution
W A G E E A R N E R S
Public Sectori Industrial Sector Service Sectorz
Number Number Number Number of Percent of
Median 3  of Em- of Em- Percent of Em Total Percent households households
Income Income Percent of ployees Percent ployees house- ployees Employees heading by income by income
Group N/year household (1000) household (1000) hold (1000) (1000) household of head of head
I 600 0 0 10 9.5 20 86.8 96.3 10 9.6 3.4
II 1,200 42 68.8 40 38.0 30 130.2 235.0 30 70.6 25.4
III 1,500 40 63.6 27 25.7 27 117.2 206.5 45 92.9 33.4
IV 2,600 10 15.9 11 10.5 11 47.7 74.1 55 40.9 14.7
V 6,100 7 11.1 9 8.6 9 39.1 58.8 80 47.1 16.9
VI 10,000 1 1.6 3 2.7 3 13.0 17.3 100 17.3 6.2
Total 100 159.0 100 95.0 100 434.0 688.0 278.4 100.0
1. Public Sector employment excludes the military
ment outside the New Federal Capital City.
employment which has previously been allocated to the canton-
2. Service Sector employment includes all formal employment and the estimated income earning informal sector
employment.
3. Income groups refer to the median income of head of household.
Source: The Master Plan for Abuia, the New Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, February 1979.
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Approximately 37 percent of households in category II are
expected to earn nearly N1,200 annually, and 31 percent (category
III) will earn N1500. The figures for categories IV, V, and VI
are, respectively, N2,600, N6,100, and N10,000, which will be
earned by only -11, 8, and 2 percent of households, respectively.
Nearly 77 percent of total households (which depend on just the
income of the head of the household) belonging to Groups I to Iv
could be classified as poor. These groups are expected to earn
less than N2,600 annually.
Juxtaposing the income ceilings of the respective income
groups I to IV on Table 8-11, which shows plot acquisition costs
and charges, we show in Table 9-12 the amount required to acquire
plots by persons (households) in each income group, which is an
indication of the degree of accessibility to urban land resources
among the various groups. We assume that members of the
low-income groups I-IV will be rational and acquire plots from
the high-density areas rather than from medium or low-density
areas, the central areas, and other areas because urban land
acquisition cost and charges in these areas are greater than in
the high-density areas.
Also, we assume that the high income groups (V and VI) would
tend to acquire plots from medium- to low-density areas given
their relative income and the probability that this group would
be much more apt to choose a low-density living condition than a
high-density environment. However, this assumption about the
high-income groups may break down because persons in Group V
income category, those earning approximately N6,100 annually,
Table 8.11
Plot Acquisition Cost, Development Charges and Fees
Initial
Application Layout Operational Ground
Type of Plot Fee (N) Fee (N) Deposit (N) Rent (N) Total*
Residential Plots
Low Density 250 1,000 1,000 400 2,650
Medium Density 250 750 1,000 300 2,300
High Density 250 500 1,000 200 1,950
Commercial Plots
Central Area 500 5,000 2,500 1,000 9,000
Other Area 500 2,500 2,500 700 6,200
Plots-Places of
Worship. Schools 500 250 1,000 50 1,800
*: Assumes that initial ground rent
requires this payment to be made
of occupancy.
will be charged the same year, because the
immediately when the beneficiary is issued
FCDA
a certificate
Source: "Development Control Documents for the Plot Areas in Accelerated District, Phase
One." Report submitted to the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) by
Milton Keynes Development Corporation, March 1980.
Table 8.12
Proportion of Annual Income Committed by Different Socio-Economic Groups to Urban Land Acquisition
PROPORTION OF INCOME COMMITTED TO LAND ACQUISITION AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS
HIGH-DENSITY AREAS MEDIUM DENSITY AREAS LOW DENSITY AREAS
Median Percent Percent Percent
Group Income Percent of Development of Income Development of Income Development of Income
Category N/year Households Cost (N) Committed Cost (N) Committed Cost (N) Committed
I 600 10% 1,950 325% 2,300 383% 2,650 442%
II 1,200 38% 1,950 163% 2,300 192% 2,650 221%
III 1,500 31% 1,950 130% 2,300 153% 2,650 177%
IV 2,600 11% 1,950 75% 2,300 84% 2,650 102%
V 6,100 8% 1,950 32% 2,300 38% 2,650 43%
IV 10,000 2% 1,950 20% 2,300 23% 2,650 27%
Source: Computed from Tables 8.10 and 8.11.
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will need to commit at least 38 percent and 43 percent of their
yearly income to acquire plots from the medium- and low-density
areas (Table 8-12). By the same token, the highest income group
(VI) will also need to commit at least 23 and 27 percent of their
annual income to acquire plots from the medium- and low-density
areas, respectively. Given as it were that human beings are
almost always economically rational, and given that there are no
restrictions (policy) stopping them from acquiring plots from any
part of the city, the high income groups may opt to acquire land
wherever it is more economical for them to do so. In that case,
these groups may choose to even buy plots from the high-density
areas, the most likely location for low-income groups to live.
If this should happen, then the poor are presented with an even
tighter or stiffer competition than before for the available land
in high-density areas.
But even with the low-income groups sticking with the
high-density area plots, and the high-income groups choosing from
low-density areas, the majority of low-income households (nearly
77 percent) will still be automatically priced out of the urban
land market at an acquisition cost of N1,950. As Table 8-12
indicates, those in the median-income range of N600 per annum
(Group I) would require nearly three years of their total income
to be able to pay even for the initial acquisition cost. Those
in Group II will require more than one and a half times their
total annual income to pay for the acquisition cost, while those
in Group III will require at least one year of earnings to pay
for plot acquisition and development costs. Those in Group IV
will need to commit at least 75 percent of their income also.
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The above analysis has no.t considered additional costs for
plot development, involving housing construction. When such cost
is added onto the plot acquisition cost, then the total cost of
acquiring and developing a plot in the new city could be
astronomical, and way beyond the capacity of the poor, who
constitute nearly 90 percent of the expected population in
the -city.
Certainly, the financial constraints being espoused above
could be overcome through other forms of credit financing. But,
quite often, this option is not readily available to the poor.
Housing development finance from commercial banks or other
private sector commercial credit institutions is practically
non-existent, and the trickle that exists in the public sector is
restricted to a very small segment of the civil service. Housing
finance is generally not available because the commercial credit
institutions and other creditors are reluctant to advance loans
for housing and other land-development activities because of the
insecurity of titles in land, nor do they accept land as security
or collateral on loans for the same reason.(l) Although all
lands in the New Capital Territory belong to the federal
government and are only leased (on a 99-year basis) to potential
developers, in which case security of titles may not be a
problem, there remains a high degree of uncertainty associated
with land development. The uncertainty arises from the fact that
(1) D.I. Okpala, "The Potentials and Perils of Public Land
Ownership and Management: A Case Study of the Lagos Executive
Development Board (Nigeria), 1928-1972," Ph.D. Thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1979, p. 60.
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the future (positive potentials) of the new capital city cannot
yet be ascertained by the commercial banks until perhaps the city
is fully developed or there are positive indications that it will
develop into a full-fledged urban center.
The third set of factors that determines the beneficiary
distribution configuration of the FCDA;s land is the agency's
conditions for allocation and the terms of the covenant that the
prospective beneficiary is expected to fulfill.
After land for residential development has been surveyed and
mapped, the building plots are demarcated, prepared, and
assembled for distribution by the Land Use and Allocation
Committee (LUAC) under the auspices of the Minister for the
Federal Capital TErritory. All applications for plots are made
through the Permanent Secretary of FCT on the prescribed form.
Ostensibly, any member of the public can apply and be
allocated a plot, but in practice the conditions and criteria of
allocation definitely exclude by implication certain economic
groups from obtaining land. The prospective applicant is
required to fill out an application form with the following
information:
(i) nationality and state of origin;
(ii) occupation and post held;
(iii) size of building plots being requested;
(iv) particular plot or location of plot in area.
Generally, in selecting applicants to be allocated plots of
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land, each applicant is invited for an interview,(l) to
determine:
(a) age and qualification (that s/he is over age 21 and has good
references);
(b) ability and willingness to build within a given period;
(c) financial circumstances including tax position (an applicant
must produce photocopies of the last three years of income
tax receipts);
(d) seriousness of his or her proposal.
The rationale for these requirements is to ensure that
development of the plots proceeds as rapidly as possible in order
to enable movement to the new city by 1986. While this rationale
may be justified under this political goal for "rapid movement"
as well as to ensure that mainly those capable of developing the
plots and that tax-paying Nigerians obtain them, the principle
violates one of the major goals of the new capital construction,
which calls for the participation of all Nigerians irrespective
of socio-economic group in the distribution of all land resources
at the new federal capital. Because the majority of the poor may
be unable to pay the plot acquisition cost, let alone develop it
given their financial position, it is obvious that most members
of this group will be excluded from owning plots in the city.
Furthermore, it is generally more difficult for low-income groups
to obtain acceptable references and tax clearances in Nigeria due
to to difficult bureaucratic hurdles required to obtain such
(1) Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria. Development Control
Documents for the Plot Areas. Ibid., op. cit., p. 23.
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receipts, and also partly because the majority of the poor
participate in informal activities that are generally not easy to
assess for tax purposes.
Having satisfied themselves on the above requirements, the
Ministry will then make an offer of a right of occupancy over
the relevant plot. Within one month of the date of this offer,
the applicant must formally accept or reject the offer. Details
of the procedure that must be followed in proceeding with plot
acquisition and development are given in Table 8-13.
If the applicant accepts the offer of a plot, arrangements
are made for preliminary plans to be drawn up and submitted to
the FCDA within three months of the offer of the right of
occupancy. The Agency will normally make a decision as to
whether they approve the plans within one month of receiving
them.
The applicant then has a further four months in which to
submit more detailed plans, and again the FCDA will normally make
a decision on these within one month. Once the final plans are
approved, the applicant must submit the appropriate layout fee
and the operational deposit to the FCDA, which will then issue a
Certificate of Occupancy. This will enable the applicant to
raise loans and start building.
Two years after receiving the initial offer of right of
occupancy, the applicant should have completed the building to a
standard acceptable to the FCDA. The FCDA staff will arrange for
the work to be inspected and for a completing certificate to be
sent to the applicant.
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Table 8.13
Procedural Steps for Acquisition and Development
of Plots at Abuja
Date
(months) FCT Ministry/FCDA Actions Beneficiary Actions
- 6 Apply for plot
0 Offer of Right of Occupancy
1 Formal Acceptance of
offer of Right of
Occupancy Submission
of Preliminary Plans
3
4 Approval of preliminary plans
8 Submission final plans
9 Approval of final plans
10 Pay layout fee and
Operational Deposit
11 Issue Certificate of Occu-
pancy in evidence of the
right of occupancy granted
12 Start construction
on site
24 Complete building
25 Inspection of Building
26 Grant Completion Certificate
Source: "Development Control Documents for the Plot Areas
in Accelerated District, Phase One." Report
submitted to the Federal Capital Development
Authority (FCDA) by Milton Keynes Development
Corporation, March 1980.
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The conditions for being allocated a plot by the Authority
can therefore be summarized as follows:
(i) The applicant must have the ability to pay the development
charges, and fees of up to N1,950 for the high density
areas, N2,300 for the medium density areas, and N2,650 for
the low density areas (see Table 8-10).
(ii) The applicant should preferably be of a high-income status.
This is because the high-income earner is the one more
likely to pay the development charges and invariably
develop the lot as quickly as the FCDA wanted. Where s/he
is not able to develop the plot using his/her income alone,
s/he is more likely eligible for a loan credit for housing.
The mortgage and other housing credit facilities in the
country are designed for the benefit of wage or salaried
earners (mainly of the high-income category) because most
of these are government-sponsored or guaranteed.(l) The
position or post held requested of applicants to furnish
when applying for plots will perhaps help the FCDA better
to sort out this category (high income) of individuals.
(iii) The applicant must be 21 years of age and have good
references. As stated above, those who are likely to have
good references are persons of middle to high income. And
in Nigeria, those with good references are the ones likely
to secure loans and credits.
(iv) The applicant must have paid taxes for at least the past
three years. This condition means that most of the civil
(1) D.I. Okpala, ibid., op. cit., p. 249.
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servants can be eligible since their taxes are
automatically deducted from their salaries. Individuals
such as those who are self-employed often owe taxes because
of inadequate record-keeping on the part of the government
and difficulty of assessing this group of persons.
Thus, an applicant who is of low income, who is not a wage
or salary earner nor wealthy self-employed, requires a guarantor
with acceptable collaterals, which in most cases are simply
either not available or are not acceptable to the FCDA. The very
low, limited amount of credit available to would-be low-income
land purchasers therefore contributed powerfully to limiting
their access to the urban land opportunities offered by the
Agency.
In addition to the requirements for obtaining the
Authority's lands, the FCDA stipulates the specifications
(covenants) to be complied with by the recipient, conditions some
of which further constrain or limit the beneficiary types and
define the form and type of development required by the
Authority. Some of these conditions include provisions that
require the beneficiary:
(1) to agree to pay the required charges and fees. Four types of
charges are made for the plots, an application fee, a layout-
fee or premium, an operational deposit, and a ground rent
(Table 8-10). All charges depend on the use to which the
plot is to be put. An application fee is charged before an
application form is processed and 80 percent of this would be
refunded after five years if the application is unsuccessful.
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A layout fee would be charged before beneficiaries take
physical possession of the plot allocated to them. An
operational deposit is required to cover damages by the
beneficiary or his agents to roads, services, fences,
landscaping, and trees. An annual ground rent is charged in
compliance with the Land Use Decree of 1978, Section 16. As
noted above, the sum total of these charges exceeded the
capacities of most low-income households.
(2) to agree to build within a fixed timescale. Approximately
two years was slotted by the FCDA for completion of both land
acquisition processes and plot development. In a situation
where bureaucratic red tape is minimal, construction
materials available, and adequate financing is easy to
obtain, two years would probably be sufficient to complete
the two activities. But as noted in Chapter 5, most
construction materials are imported. Even those that are
manufactured locally are hauled long distances from places of
manufacture. In Chapter 7 we also noted the inherent
inefficiencies of the bureaucracy with regard to the FCDA.
Because of the inefficiencies, to get the Rights of Occupancy
which the Authority specified would take as little as one
month could take as long as one year to obtain. Also, the
approval of final plans, which a beneficiary should expect at
the fourth month after his approval of the preliminary plans,
could take six to twelve months or longer. In this chapter
we have also noted the difficulty of obtaining housing
loans, especially for low-income earners. Thus, in these
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circumstances the two-year time scale could be said to be too
short to expect a full development of the plot.
(3) to agree to submit plans to the FCDA and obtain approval
before work starts. A beneficiary is required to submit
three copies of the following plans to the FCDA:
Preliminary Plans: (i) Preliminary plans to a scale of 1;100
showing proposed elevations, sections, and house plans; (ii)
preliminary plans to a scale of 1:500 showing proposed
layout, access, and service connections.
Final Plans: (i) Detailed plans to a scale of 1:100 showing
proposed elevations, sections, and house plans; (ii) detailed
plans to a scale of 1:500 showing proposed layout, access
details, and service connections; (iii) specification of
method of construction and materials; (iv) plan at 1:100
scale and specification of proposed landscape treatment at
the front of the plot. These plans are to be approved by the
FCDA before work can start on the site. The FCDA informs the
recipient of its decision within one month of the submission.
But as noted above, the approval of these plans often takes
as long as six months.
The plans will not be approved if they do not conform to
the following constraints:
Site Constraints
(a) Permitted uses. The permitted uses include: residential,
mosque/church, school/nursery, professional office including
medical/clinic, embassy/consulate, and other federal and
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state offices. No corner shops or canopies related to
informal activities such as crafts, dressmaking, shoe repair,
etc., were permitted. But these. happen to be most of the
activities carried out in the residential areas of the urban
poor.
(b) Building zone. All development must be in the building
zone, as shown in the schedule of plots.
(c) Ground cover ratio. The total ground floor area of all
buildings must not exceed the ground cover stipulated in the
schedule of plots. As noted above, these ranged from 30 to
40 percent, with the buildings rising to a maximum of two to
three stories in height.
Building Constraints
Plans will not be approved if they do not conform to the
following building constraints:
(a) Type of development. A single building with garage and
outbuildings. This can be any one of the permitted uses
listed in site constraints above. In the case of residential
use, it can be a self-contained dwelling or a group of flats.
Each flat must be no less than 50 m2 .
(b) Story height. All development is required to have a
maximum number of stories as given in the Schedule of Plots
(see Table 8-8).
(c) Parking. All development is required to incorporate
space for car parking on the following basis: at least two
spaces for a self-contained dwelling; at least one space per
flat unit; at least one space per 75 m2 for commercial uses.
399
This requirement automatically assumes that all residents,
including low income, own a car.
(d) Materials. All buildings are required to be finished in
white paint though areas of brick or local stone would be
permitted. The roofs are to be constructed of asbestos,
cement or metal sheeting. (Asbestos and metal sheeting are
imported materials.) All gates are to be of metal.
(e) Landscaping. Final plans are required to include a plan
and specification of the proposed landscaping treatment of
the plot and should include details of all trees to be
preserved and planted.
(f) Design. "All designs would be examined to ensure that
the required high standard of development in the Federal
Capital City is maintained."(1)
(g) Signs. Only one permanent sign per plot is permitted.
This should not exceed 1.5 m in height and 2 m2 in surface
area.
(4) To agree to conform to building regulations and by-laws as
laid down by the Minister for the Federal Capital Territory.
(5) To agree to construction conditions:
(a) The recipient should not carry out alterations to any
building without the approval of the FCDA.
(b) The recipient should not substitute any of the materials
specified in the final plans without the approval of the
FCDA.
(1) Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria: Development Control
Documents, ibid., op. cit., p. 19.
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(c) The recipient should conform to all the building
regulations including that: the developer ensure for
structural safety, adherence to fire regulations; to make
good any damage to the roads, services, fences, and
landscaping; to undertake to plant and maintain all trees and
landscaping as set out in the final plans.
(d) The recipient should not complete any sublease, mortgage,
assignment or other disposal of the property (until the grant
of the completion certificate) without the prior consent of
the FCDA.
From the foregoing conditions for allocation, it is clear
that a prospective beneficiary has to have a fairly strong
resource base to meet these conditions and qualify for
allocation. Most of the FCDA's plots were designed for people
with the ability to pay, which may be reasonable ordinarily. The
point in this case, however, is that given that all lands in the
Federal Territory belongs to the general public in which case
they are by definition subsidized, and this beneficiary class of
people is proportionally very small in relation to the rest of
the expected urban population, and if the criterion of access in
public ownership and management is that of the 'highest bidder
wins' or 'ability to pay,' then the poor or low-income person is
disproportionately bearing the burden of developing the new
capital city.
Thus, from the point of view of the resolution of the
objective problem--the amelioration of the urban land
accessibility problem and improvement of its quality--the various
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restrictive conditions imposed on those who got the plots with
respect to the type of development and standards, worked against
the achievement of such objective. The constraints placed on the
plots development and government policies would tend to constrain
the maximizing of land availability vis-a-vis housing production,
which could have an adverse impact on the quantity of housing
units at the new capital city. Further impacts of this limited
accessibility on the low-income sector will become evident as we
review the FCDA's processes of allocations of housing and their
distributional implications among socio-economic groups.
8.3 Housing: Processes of Allocation and Distributional
Implications among Socio-economic Groups
Just as the FCDA or the government was directly involved in
the distribution of urban lands (although without a conscious
effort to provide affordable land to the low income), so was it
actively involved in production and allocation of housing. The
FCDA's action in this regard was guided by the federal
government's overall goal of providing adequate housing for all
the city's inhabitants. This broad goal was, however, marred by
three often conflicting housing objectives requiring:
(a) that the FCDA be directly engaged in housing construction for
its workers as well as for all federal civil servants
including ministers, senators, and others.
(b) that none of the residents be committed to spending more than
20 percent of his or her income on housing consumption.
(This is part of the overall national housing goal, and not
just for Abuja alone.)
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(c) that residents be encouraged to rely on their resources to
provide their own housing.
An examination of these objective reveals that the way in
which these government objectives have determined housing
alternative for the city's residents, in general, and the poor,
in particular,.shows that the FCDA's beneficiary distribution of
its housing resources was, as in the case of land resources,
significantly regressive and the forms of housing development
involved significant inefficiencies as well.
The form of the FCDA or government's direct involvement in
housing development involves construction and renting of houses
to all the federal civil servants (including the parastatals and
those involved in city administration, and the Police) at rents
no more than 20 percent of their monthly income.
The government's estimated cost of providing an additional
15,000 units of such housing needed by 1986 was N353 million.(1)
From this estimate we have deduced that approximately N600
million would be required to build the 25,000 units of the
government housing programmed for the Phase One Area development.
At this cost the per capita expenditure on every civil servant
for housing development stands at nearly N29,000.(2) At rents of
no more than 20 percent of the civil servant's income, the total
revenue generated from most of the civil servants' rents would
(1) Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the
Abuja Project, FCDA, August 1984, p. 21.
(2) Approximately 21,000 civil servants consisting of federal
(11,300) federal parastatals (8,800), and city administration and
police (1,000), are expected to live in the city in 1986.
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not be enough to offset the cost of providing such housing even
after 15 years. This would represent a disproportionate share of
housing benefits by the civil servants, because the rest of the
city's residents (non-government employees) including the poor,
are left to provide housing on their own. However, given that
the families and dependents of these civil servants may
indirectly benefit from this housing development, the overall
benefit of this housing program may go beyond just the civil
servants.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that this governmental
housing excludes a large proportion of population who may be
either non-civil servants employed or unemployed in other sectors
of the city. The exclusion of this group means that they would
have to provide their own housing using their own means and
resources. While some of the well-paid workers among this
excluded group may be able to afford their own housing, a large
proportion of them would be excluded from the housing market,
especially because of their low level of income and the cost and
high standard of development adopted for housing development in
the city. We have noted in Chapter 5 that the FCDA had rejected
a housing proposal that would have incorporated sites and
services to provide cheap and serviced lands to the poor to
develop their own housing. We noted also that the standard of
plots being developed as well as the criteria and conditions for
plot acquisition fall beyond the financial capacity of most urban
residents.
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The magnitude of the plight of this excluded poor-income
group from the governmental housing is better appreciated by
reflecting on the characteristics of this group's position
relative to that of the civil servants. The city's population
and employmen-t characteristics (see Table 8-14) shows that at the
projected 1986 population of 150,000, the ratio of non-government
employees to federal civil servants (including parastatals and
city administration) would be 7:1. In the year 2000 when an
ultimate population of 1.6 million is expected, the ratio is even
higher at 10:1. Table 8-10 indicates that nearly 77 percent of
households (by income of the head of household) will earn less
than N1,500 annually. At this level of income, we showed that
none of these households would be able to acquire a plot in the
new city, let alone develop it (see Table 8-12). Of a total
employment of approximately 110,000 projected for 1986, 11,100 or
10 percent will be working in the informal sector. The number
working in the informal sector is expected to increase (by the
year 2000) to nearly 361,000 or 42 percent of the total employed.
With this category of people generally belonging to the income
group earning less than N1,500 annually, it is difficult to
imagine how they would be able to provide their own housing with
no governmental assistance.
The other implication of the FCDA's direct involvement in
housing construction relates to the inefficiencies often
associated with the government or its agency in implementing such
projects. Historically governments or their agencies are not
Table 8.14
Distribution of Total Labor Force by Sector and Type (1981-2000)
Employmen
Sector 1981 1986 1990 1995 2000
Public Sector
Federal Civil Service
Federal Corporation
City Administration
& Police
Military
State Government
Liaison
International
Diplomatic Corps
Subtotal
Industrial Sector
Services Sector
Total Formal Employment
Informal Employment
Total Labor Force
% of Total Population
Total Population
500
500
L.000
25,000
4,500
30,500
3,200
33,700
85%
39,050
11,300
8,800
1,000
3 ,000
1,800
700
44,100
28,100
98,800
11,100
109,900
70%
157,750
30,100
33,600
6,100
5,600
3,000
3,000
47,000
68,900
197,300
118,380
315,680
65%
485,660
60,300
65,000
21,900
12,500
7,600
4,000
45,600
55,700
14,600
9,100
5,800
4,000
134.800
6 2,700
150,280
347,780
235,600
583,380
58%
1,005,800
84,200
241,850
497 ,350
361,000
858,350
52%
1,642,100
Abuia. the Federal Capital of Nigeri, FSource: Master Plan for CDA, February 197 9, p. 6 0.
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known to be the most efficient provider of low-cost housing.(1)
This is because of high standards and sophisticated techniques
and materials often used to build these houses, which add to the
difficulty of providing cheap and affordable housing as well as
the fact that these houses often end up being invaded by the
middle- and upper-income people. Efficiency in housing
development can therefore be achieved by adopting proper
cost-saving strategies, which are generally related to the
components of housing costs, such as labor, materials, standards,
and techniques. The inefficiency of the FCDA housing development
hinged on its lack of incorporation or adoption of some of these
cost-saving strategies as shown.
1. Planning. Efficient layout can increase the number of
housing units sharing a given quantity of road and drainage
construction. Similarly, sharing utilities (water toilets,
kitchens) can reduce costs as shown in Table 8-15. (Today 70 to
80 percent(2) of Lagos residents share such facilities.) In this
chapter we have noted the low density (26 dwellings per hectare)
adopted for the overall development in Phase One and also pointed
out that at this level of density costs of infrastructure
allocatable to each plot would be high, thereby raising the
overall cost of housing development. Also, most so-called
low-income housing being developed in the outlying areas have not
(1) O.F. Grimes, Jr., Housing for Low Income Urban Families;
Economics and Policy in the Developing World, Johns Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore, 19/6, pp. 3-9.
(2) See Economic Commission for Africa, "Report on Demographic
Survey of Households, Housing and Living Conditions in Lagos,"
United Nations, New York, 1980.
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Table 8.15
Building Construction Costs (Naira/One square meter)
Construction Standard Cst
1. Standard Urban Construction N130
2. Reduced Internal Finish N107
3. Minimal with W.C. and shower N 90
4. Self-help/indigenous material N 60
Source: The Master Plan for Abuia. the Federal Capital of
Nigeria, FCDA, February 15, 1979, p. 175.
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incorporated this form of cost-saving measure , especially the
one related to sharing utilities, such as toilets, kitchens, and
water services.
2. Materials. Experience in West African countries shows that
cost reductions of as much as 30 percent can be achieved by using
domestic materials such as locally manufactured roofing
materials.(l) However, the feasibility of using locally produced
materials will depend on whether the local materials can be
produced at costs lower than imported materials.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the construction of the city has
relied essentially on imported building materials. Where local
building materials were used, they often had to be hauled from
long distances to the city.(2) Because the city is located on a
non-existing major highway network or river transport, the high
cost of transporting such materials could add to the overall cost
of housing development.
3. Subsystem Mix. Omitting superfluous portions of the building
or those parts that can be later upgraded (such as interior
doors, or reducing the level of finish on floors, walls, and
ceilings) or using locally manufactured fittings can also lead to
substantial savings in housing cost. Table 8-15 shows that
considerable savings could be achieved by adopting any one of the
(1) Quoted in the Master Plan for Abuja, the New Federal Capital
of Nigeria, ibid., op. cit., p. 175.
(2) Although some of the newly developed industrial complexes
within the FCT have started production of construction materials,
their outputs are still fairly low. Furthermore, some of the
plants rely on imported materials.
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three cost-reduction strategies. For example, nearly N23 per
square meter can be saved in construction cost by moving from a
standard urban construction (includes all the internal finish,
W.C., and shower) to housing that reduces its internal
finished.(l) As much as N40 per square meter can also be saved
by building a house that relies on minimal standards of plot size
with W.C. and shower. But the FCDA housing has relied mainly on
the standard urban construction technique, which implies that
even a somewhat modern smaller house of 60 square meters would
cost nearly N8,000 (60xN130 per square meter).
Certainly, there is a potential risk in building housing
with reduced internal finish. The unfinished portion of such a
house may remain so for a long time, especially if the poor
should be relied upon to upgrade at a later date. This may, in
turn, contribute to the deterioration of the housing unit and to
the environment (if there are many of such unfinished
structures). Such deterioration would run counter to the
government's policy or expectation of a "high standard urban
environment."
4. Infrastructure. Additional cost reductions may be achieved
by building infrastructure to lower initial standards. The
Master Plan shows that lower road paving and width standards and
reducing the quantity of finished drainage channels may reduce
on-site costs to these elements by up to 50 percent(2) (Table
8-16).
(1) The Master Plan for Abuja, ibid., op. cit., p. 176.
(2) Ibid., p. 175.
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Table 8.16
Inf.rastructure Costs in Naira/One Square Meter of Housing
Infrastructure Standards Cost
1. High N 45
2. Paved Roads--Surface Drainage 32
3. Unpaved Roads--Reduced Surf ace Drainage 22
4. Share Infrastructure 13
Source: The Master Plan for Abuia. the Federal Capital of
Nigeria, FCDA, February 15, 1979, p. 175.
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5. Self-help. Self-help housing incorporates a 'sites and
services' approach that involves public provision of subdivided
land, major infrastructure and often small core houses with
shared or individual water, kitchen, toilets, etc. Given
security of tenure, access to credit, and a good access and
infrastructure plan, owners (or long-term lessees) can be relied
upon to improve their dwelling.
Owner-built or self-help construction reduces costs by
removing contractor overheads and profits and by incorporating
only the skilled labor portion of construction costs.
The IPA had estimated that the incorporation of the
'self-help' technique into the new capital's total housing
program would have saved the FCDA more than 10 percent in total
governmental subsidy. But the FCDA had rejected the idea.
The overall political demand for having the new city
completed as quickly as possible has also necessitated, in part,
the rejection of the self-help strategy. The idea of involving
the low-income group, which did not have adequate financial
capacity to begin with, to meet the overall fast pace of
construction was likely to produce uncompleted structures which
would obliterate the high standard expected of the new capital
city.
Closely related to the question of inefficient housing
construction techniques, is the density of development adopted
for the Phase One area development. Generally, the lower the
density, the greater the amount of land needed for a given
quantity of housing. Conversely, the higher the density, the
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smaller the amount of land needed for a given quantity of
housing. Within reasonable limits, higher residential densities
would mean more efficient use of land. The criteria and
conditions for obtaining land from the FCDA emphasize development
on such lands of owner-occupied single family houses and flats.
The agency's direct involvement also emphasizes the construction
of mainly detached/semi-detached single family housing and flats
(Table 5.2). Ostensibly, the FCDA was pursuing a policy of
developing a relatively high quality housing in the new capital
city. As overcrowding was the most serious housing problem in
the former capital city, the agency might have thought that low
density forms of development were an effective way to improve
housing quality. In a situation of limited financial resources
and acute housing shortage, however, improvements in housing
standards are generally possible only when the production of new
housing has caught up with the housing deficit. Moreover, in
addition to physical shortages of housing, as such, the housing
problem is often essentially an income problem, and one of the
major goals of direct government or public involvement has
generally been to facilitate access to urban land and housing
resources for those with income problems.
The FCDA's conception of land development and its
appreciation of the problem of access were by implication best
demonstrated in the lands and houses it developed and
constructed itself. In most of these developments, as has been
pointed out, the middle and high income sectors were the major
groups by virtue of the costs of plot acquisition in relation to
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the general income levels and the characteristics of the housing
options adopted for the development of the new capital city.
Some details of the housing option are demonstrated by the
housing strategy adopted for the Accelerated District (later
Garki District) of the Phase One area. The strategy involved the
construction of 4,700 dwelling units and preparation of 1,000
plots to be allocated to individuals or private groups. The
plots are primarily intended for residential use (self-contained
dwellings, detached/semi-detached houses, and flats) but can also
be used for embassies or consulates, federal or state offices, or
professional offices including clinics, religious buildings, and
nursery schools.(l) The dwellings comply with the following
house size and type mixes:
House size: 1 bedroom unit 47.5%
2 bedroom unit 30 %
3 bedroom unit 15 %
4 bedroom unit 7.5%
Dwelling Type: Both houses and flats but not more than 50% of flats
(2)
The plots comply with the following plot mix:(3)
Minimum
Plot
Area
M
600
900
1350
Maximum
Ground Floor
Area
Proportion of
Total
Plot Area
200
300
450
(1) Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria. District Plan for the
North West District Final Plan, Report submitted to FCDA by
Milton Keynes Development Corporation, October 1980, pp. 12-14.
(2)
Ibid., p. 12.
(3)
Ibid., p. 13
Type A
Type B
Type C
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The price for a typical two bedroom house (approximately
N15,000 excluding land cost) was higher than the annual income of
nearly 97% of the expected city's population (a careful
observation of Table 8.10 shows that approximately 97% of the
city's total work force earned below N10,000 (US $14,000). Also
the cost of acquiring a plot of land in a typical high density
area (N1,950) of the city was higher than the annual income of
nearly 80 percent of the city's population (Tables 8.10, 8.11,
and 8.12).
Public involvement in urban land management is said to make
for efficiency on land use and management--efficiency in this
context implying the necessity of maximizing the use of the
quantity of land available without increasing environmental
dangers (Okpala, 1977, p. 294). Higher residential densities
could be maintained without necessarily endangering the
environment. Low densities are not necessarily synonymous with
good quality environment. Greater efficiency in land development
and housing units production could have been achieved by devoting
more land to higher density development than the FCDA did.
The degree of inefficiency involved in the agency's forms
and types of development can be inferred from a comparison of the
FCDA;s adopted housing types and residential densities, and the
standard densities (that are obtainable from other housing types
and characters) for conventionally acceptable aesthetic and
environmental qualities. As discussed above, 1280 hectares of
land (3,200 acres) were designated for residential housing. Of
this total, 20 percent (256 hectares; 640 acres) was committed to
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low density housing with an average density of 10 dwellings per
hectare (4 dwelling units per acre). The remaining 80 percent
(1024 hectares; 2560 acres) were designated for high density
development at an average of 30 dwelling units per hectare (12
units per acre). A comparison of these housing densities with
the conventionally accepted standards shows that the FCDA's
adopted housing density standards are higher than the
conventionally accepted standards. Figure 8.2 shows housing
types and their conventionally associated densities in dwelling
units per acre. It shows that the one-family detached house
types give about 5 dwelling units per acre (approximately 13
units per hectare); one-family semi-detached house types give
about 15 dwelling units per acre (38 units per hectare);
one-family attached house types give about 20 dwelling units per
acre (50 units per hectare), two-family detached house types give
about 10 dwelling units per acre; and two-family semi-detached,
20 dwelling units per acre (50 units per hectare).
In the case of multi-family housing, Figure 8.2 shows that
two-story (garden apartment) flats would give about 30 dwelling
units per acre (75 units per hectare) and three-story, about 45
dwellings per acre (113 per hectare).
On the basis of these standards, it is possible to calculate
an index of land waste or inefficiency in the FCDA's forms of
residential developments, as follows.
Figure 8.2
Housing Types and their Associated Densities
Dwelling Units per Acre
Housing Type 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135
Oft and Two-Family
'1 Farmliy Detached
I -Famni'y Semidetached
I Famlly Attached
Z-Family Detached
2- Family Semidetached
2. Stry (Garden Ap4 s.)
6 Stery
9 Sa
Z3 Stry
25St1ry arnd Over
NOTE- All densities indicated are approximnate
and should be used as a guide only.
Source: DeChiara, J. and Koppelman, 1.: Manual of Housing Planning and Design Criteria (Prentice-Hall,
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, Now Jersey, (p. 79).
mm - dmqmmmdw ' - - __ -- - I - . - . __
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Wx 
- Dx X 100%
Wx
where Wx is the number of dwelling units per hectare obtainable
under the most efficient (economical) housing type, and Dx is the
number of dwelling units per hectare obtainable under the
particular FCDA housing types and form of development.
Using this formula and using various actual predominant
development densities (10, 30) and using various 'possible'
densities based on Figure 8.2, Table 8.17 shows the relative
amount of inefficiency (waste) involved in some of the FCDA forms
or densities of development.
The table shows that these 'indices of waste or
inefficiency' varied between 23 and 80 percent on the average.
This implies that 23-80 percent more housing units per hectare
could be provided from given FCDA housing scheme in the Phase One
area.
Since an occupancy rate of six persons per dwelling unit was
adopted for the entire city, population loss due to inefficient
use of space in the Phase One area can be calculated as follows:
Given possible (average) density (Table 8.17) = 53.4 d.u/hectare*
Assuming FCDA (average) density = 26 d.u/hectare
Waste in space consumption:
Given possible density - Assuming FCDA density= 27.4 d.u/hectare
Possible population loss per hectare = 27.4x6 = 164.4 persons/hectare
* d.u = dwelling unit
418
Table 8.17
FCDA Actual Densities or Forms of Development Compared with
"Possible" Densities, as Index of Efficiency
Assuming Index
Possible* FCDA Den- of Waste
Densities sities in in FCDA
no. of Phase One Form of
housing housing of Devel-
units per units per opment
Form of Development hectare hectare (percent)
Assuming 1 Family Detached 13 10 23.0
Assuming 1 Family Semi-detached 38 10 73.7
Assuming 1 Family Attached 50 10 80.0
Assuming 2 Family Detached 35 10 71.4
Assuming 2 Family Semi-Detached 50 30 40.0
Assuming 2 Story Apt. (Flats) 75 30 60.0
Assuming 3 Story Apt. (Flats) 113 30 73.5
*Acceptable limit of density that
environmental quality.
is possible without sacrificing
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Assuming FCDA total area for residential development in Phase One
to be 1280 hectares, possible total population loss in Phase one:
164.4 x 1280 = 210,432 persons.
Thus, if the population of 210,432 persons is added to the
150,000 projected for the Phase One area, the total population
that could have been accommodated in Phase One, without
jeopardizing environmental quality would have been 360,432. At
this population, the Phase One could have conveniently
accommodated the original 230,000 estimated in the Master Plan
that was scaled down to 150,000 due to terrain difficulties (see
discussion of terrain problems in Chapter 4).
8.4 Summary
Our assessment of the FCDA's effectiveness in urban
development shows that the agency has largely failed to meet its
construction targets. Construction of many of the urban
facilities has yet to be started, or if started are at the
preliminary stages of development. The agency has, however, made
significant progress in the construction of some aspects of the
urban facilities.
The conditions and criteria of the FCDA land allocations
were restrictive of accessibility to the general population. The
agency's land development policy emphasis was unduly oriented in
favor of the upper-middle and upper-income groups, who could
afford to pay the agency's prices and meet the high development
requirements. Considering the general income levels and
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distribution structure, the FCDA's land development practices
were not favorable to the overwhelming majority of the expected
urban population who were low income earners and who had limited,
if any, access to credit facilities.
Where the FCDA constructed housing, the emphases too, were
on low density single-family type houses averaging 10 dwelling
units per hectare (4 per acre) and flats averaging 30 dwelling
units per hectare (12 per acre). Obviously these low density
developments involved large uneconomical use of land in the order
of 23-80 percent wastage rate. The population potentially lost
to Phase One from this wastage of land is nearly 200,000.
The FCDA's land management practices therefore were hardly
addressed to the priority problem areas--that of producing as
many plots and housing units as possible (in the face of limited
financial resources) that would make them accessible to a
majority of the people. (Nearly 8,000 applications were received
for less than 2,000 plots available for distribution in 1981.) (1)
Rather, the agency's management practices were geared mainly to
the creation of housing opportunities for the middle and high
income families in luxury subdivisions. The FCDA, however, seems
to be mirroring the government's mood (policy) for high quality
urban environment which it thought was synonymous with the low
density development.
(1) New Nigeria, "Spotlight on Abuja," January 11, 1982, p. 8.
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CHAPTER 9
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Having examined the problems associated with the
construction of Abuja, and all the Federal Capital Develop-
ment Authority's (FCDA's) involvement in this project, we
will now recapitulate the main themes of this thesis and the
lessons drawn from the results of the foregoing analyses.
We also provide a review of the theories of implementation
discussed in Chapter 1 and the relation those theories have
to the project. We also suggest directions for a more
effective approach to the implementation of the new capital
project. We begin by summarizing the impacts of the FCDA on
the construction of the new capital project.
9.1 Impacts of the FCDA on Project Implementation
In spite of the problems (caused mainly by the institu-
tional climate within which it had to operate and its
shortage of operating funds) and its weaknesses (caused
mainly by its shortage of management skills, and organiza-
tional instability), the FCDA made some noticeable and
commendable progress on the implementation of the new
capital project. Various residential schemes have been
developed by the agency and its role in the development of
some basic urban infrastructure had been remarkable.
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Generally, more than 50 percent of the agency's budget has
been devoted to the provision of basic urban infrastructure,
services, and related facilities. The FCDA has completed
approximatedly 3,524 units of housing in Garki, Asokoro,
Wuse, and Maitama districts of the Phase One area (Table
6.5). An additional 7,000 units, including low income
housing, have been built in other areas of the Federal
Territory (Table 6.6). Close to 4,000 units and 3,000 units
of housing respectively,are also under construction in the
Phase One area and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The
agency has prepared and distributed nearly 2,600 residen-
tial, 209 industrial, and 125 commercial plots of land to
private developers, house-holders, and industrialists (Table
8.7).
In addition to these, there are other aspects of the
project's achievements (tangible and intangible, some of
which are outside the domain of our analysis) that the FCDA
could also lay claim to in its eight years of existence.
Major studies and surveys have been accomplished at the
site. The master plan has been prepared and put into
operation. Workable structural organization has been
evolved. Other commendable achievements include: Air
traffic into the FCT has been inaugurated by putting the
FCDA air strip into operation as early as 1977. An inter-
national airport was opened in the territory by 1982. This
large airport is already revolutionizing the pattern of
transportation in Nigeria by providing useful options to
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travellers in the long-isolated middlebelt areas and easing
communication between the North and South, particularly in
the harmattan season when the Kaduna and Kano airports
become difficult to use.
Abuja hosted the very successful celebration of
Nigeria's twenty-second independence anniversary on October
1, 1982. It was the first grand opportunity for many
Nigerians and foreigners to see Abuja and "taste her
promise." The FCDA has acquired vast experience in contract
affairs from this project. The Abuja project represented
the largest single construction project anywhere in the
world today. As such, it has attracted many contractors and
consultants from all over the world.
Although the FCDA has made some important contribu-
tions, the agency has nevertheless been unable to meet most
of its construction targets that would be needed for the
movement of the national seat of government in March, 1986.
Of nearly 18,000 housing units required in the Phase One
area by 1985, for example, only 19 percent or 3,500 units
have been completed (see Tables 6.5 and 8.3). Most of the
houses completed in parts of the Phase One and the FCT areas
are still without electricity and water service. The
construction of the Central Area, that was to serve as a
spin-off for the growth and development of the entire city
has progressed rather slowly. Many of the Central Area
facilities have not been built, and others whose contracts
have been awarded, are at the preliminary stages of con-
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struction, thereby making it difficult to achieve the 1986
deadline.
In addition, the FCDA's contributions in urban develop-
ment were not without substantial costs in resources,
efficiency, and equity. The unintended negative effects of
its activities, sometimes, to a great extent, adversely
affected the very goals the new capital project was expected
to achieve. In this regard, it can be said that although
its activities were to a significant extent inhibited by
institutional factors and problems of inadequate funding--
which were essentially external to it, its internal problems
of management competence and administrative efficiency were
substantially responsible for some of its conceptual and
operational problems and failures.
Certain concepts of the FCDA's land development
practices, for example, were particularly counter-productive
to the expected general development goals of the new capital
city. Among these, two were particularly outstanding:
(i) the "first come first served and ability to
develop" concept adopted for the allocation of
land--which implied that the general public
(irrespective of anyone's financial strength,
including the poor) was to compete for plots of
land in the city; and as a corollary,
(ii) the generally low-density development emphasis--
emphasis placed on low-lying, detached and
semidetached, and executive-flat-type houses.
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By the "first come first served and ability to develop"
concept, the FCDA's plots of land were largely accessible to
those who could afford to pay the relatively high develop-
ment plot charges and fees and meet the stringent conditions
reserved for land development. This group constituted of
largely the upper-middle and high-income segment of the
society. Because the distribution of plots also depended
largely on plot recipient's connections, the poor's accessi-
bility to land resources became even further constrained in
that they were the least likely to have such connections.
By pursuing this policy of first-come, first-served,
and ability to develop, the FCDA excluded a high proportion
of the city's expected population from leasing plots in the
capital city (nearly 80 percent of the expected households
would earn less than N2,600 per annum; see Table 8.10).
This implies that the development of residential housing
(including owner-occupied and rentable flats) will fall on
the remaining relatively small (wealthy) segment of the
population. This will, in turn, result inexclusive possession
of land by these relatively few people.As maximum profit will
be the guiding operating principle, land and housing will be
available to those who can pay the price. This will mean
overcrowding in the relatively fewer houses at the lower end
of the quality scale, thus resulting in a city residentially
segregated along economic lines. This system, too, will
tend to ignore the broder desirable social goal--national
integration (which the new capital project seeks to accom-
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plish), which is necessary for the peace and stability of
the country.
The corollary concept of "low-density development" has
the effect of making such housing development more costly
than would be the case with alternative (higher density)
forms of development, because low-density development has
the tendency to be relatively lavish with land; therefore,
it involves spending more for land. The fact that land for
low-density residential development is more expensive than
land for high-density development is fully recognized and
practiced by the FCDA itself in its land-disposal practices.
It, for example, charged a total of N2,650 (including
applications and layout fees, operational deposit, and
initial ground rent) per plot for the low-density areas,
N2,300 for the medium-density areas, and 1,950 for the
high-density areas (Table 8.11). Furthermore, the propor-
tions of land and infrastructure costs in the total housing
development costs is often higher in low-density develop-
ments because the cost of raw land and infrastructure is
generally dependent on the lot size. In apartment type
developments, for example, more units are produced on a
given piece of land, and more families are able to live on
the same piece of land that otherwise would have been
occupied by only one family in one housing unit. This would
distribute the cost of land and infrastructure over many
more housing units, thus reducing the per unit cost of land
and infrastructure and at the same time accommodating more
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families.
Also, given the inordinately high-quality standards of
these land developments and their high cost, they were
accessible only to a very small proportion of the- popula-
tion. This small proportion is generally not the strata of
the population where the quantitative demand is most acute.
It could be said that the FCDA's mode of land alloca-
tion and housing production has aided the development of
squatter housing that has begun to emerge around the new
capital city (see Chapter 4) . This has resulted from the
agency having in its possession and control large tracts of
land, but producing very limited numbers of housing units
and housing plots from them. This meant withdrawing housing
land from its most efficient potential use and forestalling
whatever might have been produced (by these individuals who
resorted to building temporary shelters for themselves) if
such lands were not pre-empted by the FCDA. The result has
been that many people are beginning to construct temporary
shelters, thus increasing the potential for development and
environmental deterioration of the city--evils which could
have been minimized by allocating sufficient land for low-
income housing.
9.2 Summary: FCDA's Effectiveness in Urban Development
Given the significance of the FCDA's role in the new
capital construction, we summarize the general effectiveness
(performance) of this agency so far in terms of the new
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capital's urban development goal. It has been noted earlier
that one of the main (national) goals of the new capital
construction was to create an urban environment where a
national integration of Nigerians of all walks of life,
ethnic groups, and socio-economic backgrounds could take
place. Because this goal is broad, we convert it into an
analytically feasible framework involving a set of cate-
gories of urban development objectives (attainment objec-
tives) with which we measure the FCDA's effectiveness.
Attainment objectives, we refer to as those sub-goals
related to the substantive contents of development (such as
how many houses are built or kilometers of roads construc-
ted) needed to achieve the overall goal.
Given that a task as complex as building a city
involves multiple objectives that are always in partial if
not full conflict at least at the margins, it is frequently
necessary to make decisions affecting two or more conflict-
ing objectives. In order to analyze how these decisions
contribute most toward the primary goal, we assign priori-
ties, by creating a hierarchy of objectives to facilitate
this. A priority rating of objectives is prepared by
classifying all items according to three categories: "A"
for critical objectives, "B" for important but not critical
objectives, and "C" for the rest. We use these priority
ratings as subjective judgments of the relation of each
objective to the primary urban development goal.
In addition, we divide the attainment goals into three
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main types. Each component of a city usually serves only
certain segments of the population, or serves different
segments in diverse ways. Moreover, various groups have
dissimilar objectives regarding any one component of the
city (such as housing). Thus, the objectives of urban
development can best be stated in terms of the aspirations
and needs of specific groups of people rather than in terms
of the requirements of the population as a whole. While the
city can be divided into many groups, we believe that a two-
way breakdown is adequate for setting general attainment
objectives. These two groups are (i) the low-income
(earning less than or equal to N2,600 per year), and (ii)
the middle/high income group (earning over N2,600 annually).
(The two categories are derived from the income distribution
pattern in Table 8.10.)
Because the objectives formulated are stated in broad
terms rather than quantitatively, it is possible to make
only a general evaluation of the "adequacy" of urban
development attainments related to them. In making this
admittedly subjective evaluation, we use the following
classifications: "A" for excellent or good progress toward
achieving objectives, "B" for fair progress, and "C" for
poor progress.
Comparison of the priority ratings with the performance
ratings for the attainment objectives is summarized in Table
9.1. The table sets forth (1) the urban development
objectives we formulated, (2) the priority ratings assigned
Table 9.1
Priority and Performance Ratings
of Urban Development Objectives by Income Groups
Low Income Groups (Income .542,600)
Urban Development Priority Performance
Category Attainment Objective Rating Rating Comments/Remarks
1. Land Provide land at a cheap A C Plots of land provided
and affordable cost to on a first-come first-
this group served and ability to
develop basis
2. Utiltiies Provide at least minimum A B Low cost housing at
standards of water, sew- Nyanya and other areas
age, and electric service in the FCT still lack
to the greatest number of pipe borne water and
households sewerage services, but
majority of low-income
areas are hooked into
these services
3. Transportation Develop systems (transport) A C Although many district
and that provide adequate ser- roads are completed,
Communication vices at low cost to there is yet no public
users transport, such as
public buses, in the
city
(table cont'd)
Table 9.1 (cont'd)
Low Income Groups (cont'd)
Urban Development Priority Performance
Category Attainment Objective Rating Rating Comments/Remarks
4. Educational Provide facilities for B C There are elementary,
Facilities elementary education, secondary and post-
secondary and post- secondary educational
secondary facilities located in
the FCT but not inside
the city
5. Health Provide adequate A C Only one health clinic
public hospitals, clinics located at a temporary
site in Gark is opera-
tional. This clinic
caters to nearly 30,000
inhabitants of the city
as well as an additional
50,000 living in outly-
ing areas such as Svleja,
Gwagw.lada, Nyanya, etc.
6. Housing Provide properly-located A C Most of the low-income
housing sites withmini- housing is located at
mum standards that would estates far from the city.
facilitate accessibility The standards of low-in-
to housing come housing are also
generally very high.
7. Social, Cultur- Provide facilities for C C
al, and Recre- activities that will
ational Facili- satisfy the leisure time
ties needs of these people
(table cont'd)
Table 9.1 (cont'd)
Low Income Groups (cont'd)
Urban Development Priority Performance
Category Attainment Objective Rating Rating Comments/Remarks
8. Commercial Provide land for low - A C Greater emphasis is given
Facilities cost stores, services , to the development of
and open market areas 'modern' shopping centers
convenient and afford- than to the development
able to this group of more familiar tradi-
tional open market
centers
Middle/Upper Income Groups (Income N2,600)
1. Land Provide adequate and A B
properly located
housing for this
group
2. Utilities Provide good A B Except for Wuse District
quality water, sewage, in the FCC which is cur-
and electric service rently not served with
to households electricity, the rest of
the middle/high income
housing areas are served
with relatively good
quality utilities
3. Transportation Maximize convenience and B B
and minimize time at reason-
Communication able cost. Provide high
System qualtiy telephone service
to all households
(table cont'd)
Table 9.1 (cont'd)
Middle/Upper Income Groups (cont'd)
Urban Development Priority Performance
Category Attainment Objectives Rating Rating Comments/Remarks
4. Educational Establish good-quality A C The middle-upper income
Facilities facilities at elementary, group is affected in the
secondary, and college same way as the low-in-
levels come group by lack of
educational facilities
5. Health Provide both public and A C Members of this group
private hospitals, clinics, are served as well by
and other health facilities the single clinic at
of the high quality devised the Garki District
by this group
6. Housing Provide medium- and high- A A The housing schemes
quality housing in desir- developed thus far for
able locations this group are well
located (see discussion,
Chapter 8)
7. Social, Cultural, Provide facilities to house B C
and Recreational all the social functions,
Facilities theater, and other enter-
tainment and recreational
activities deemed desirable
by this group
8. Commerical Provide medium- and high-
Facilities quality shopping areas
convenient to middle- and
upper-income housing
areas
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to them, and (3) our subjective ratings of actual perform-
ance for each.
From Table 9.2 it is very significant that we rated the
FCDA's performance poor (C) in 11 of the 16 attainment
objectives. Of the 11 objectives rated critical
to urban development, we rated FCDA's performance excellent
in only 1, involving the provision of medium- and high-
quality housing to the middle/upper-income group. However,
we also rated the agency fair in 3 of these 11 critical
objectives. Thus, in total, the FCDA's performance is rated
fair or excellent in 4 of the 11 critical attainment
objectives involving: the provision of adequate and properly
located housing areas, for the middle/upper-income group;
provision of good quality water, sewage, and electric
services to households for the middle/upper-income group;
provisions of medium- and high-quality housing in desirable
locations for the middle/upper-income group; and provisions
of minimum standards of utilities for the low-income group.
It is also significant that there is a differential gap
in level of attainments between the low-income and middle/
upper-income groups. Of the 6 attainment objectives rated
critical for the low income group, we rated the FCDA's
performance fair in only 1, while its performance is rated
fair or excellent for the middle/upper-income group in 3 of
the 6 objectives rated critical to urban development.
Aspects where the low-income group was seriously affected
include, the provision of cheap and affordable land,
435
Table 9.2
Distribution of Performance Scores
among the Socio-Economic Groups
Performance Rating Critical (A) Important (B) Other (C) TOTAL
Low-Income Group
Good (A) 0 0 0 0
Fair (B) 1 0 0 1
Poor (C) 5 1 1 7
TOTAL 6 1 1 8
Middle- and Upper-Income Group
Good (A) 1 1 0 2
Fair (B) 2 1 0 3
Poor (C) 2 1 0 3
TOTAL 5 3 0 8
Overall Scores Among the Two Groups
Good (A) 1 1 0 2
Fair (B) 3 1 0 4
Poor (C) 7 2 1 11
TOTAL 11 4 1 16
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provision of adequate and cheap transportation services,
adequate health services, commercial facilities, and the
provision of cheap and affordable housing.
The foregoing summary, while providing a framework for
understanding the FCDA's general performance, has omitted
other critical elements that can also be useful for assess-
ing adequately this agency's overall performance. The
elements include the impact of the agency's activities or
operations on other segments of the society (e.g., the
ethnic groups) which are expected to benefit from the
construction of the new capital project. Nevertheless, the
scheme presented in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 can be expanded to
include such elements. This has, however, not been done in
the preceding analysis because of lack of adequate data and
resources to do so.
The advantage of the scheme, however, in addition to
its potential for expanded analysis, is that it can be
useful for identifying where resources are being over-
expended or under-expended. In other words, the scheme can
make it easier for the FCDA to identify (although subjec-
tively) areas that are being neglected or bver-attended to
in the overall urban development activity. That way, it is
possible to adjust the allocation of resources accordingly.
For example, the fact that FCDA's performance is rated poor
in most of the critical objectives (elements) related to the
low-income group, may call for a rechanneling of resources
to this segment of the population. Conversely, the fact that
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the FCDA's performance is rated excellent in the provision
of medium/high quality shopping areas for the middle/upper-
income group in spite of the low priority of this particular
objective for achieving the overall goals, may imply that
greater than necessary resources are being expended for the
achievement of this particular urban development (attain-
ment) objective.
9.3 Implementation Theory Revisited: Some Concluding
Thoughts
In carrying out this study, we accept in principle the
construction of a new capital city in Nigeria. We contend,
however, that the success in realizing the goals of con-
struction is by no means a given. Much would generally
depend on the "quality" of the political (institutional)
environment, the financial resources and mechanisms avail-
able, and the quality of the administration and arrangement
charged with the implementation of the new capital project.
We also recognize that the appropriate processes and
mechanisms employed in a particular aspect or aspects of the
project varies with the goals and objectives in view. In
any case, the realization of the goals or potentials of the
new capital project should not be taken for granted.
Having examined the theories of project implementation
(Chapter 1), and having profiled the FCDA as an instrument
for implementing the new capital project, and having also
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analyzed its operations and activities and noted its
achievements and failures, the question becomes: What is
the relationship between the theories so reviewed, and the
FCDA's effectiveness in project implementation? What
inferences, if any, can be drawn from these theories of
implementation? In order to address these questions ade-
quately, we will first recapitulate some of the main themes
of the implementation theorists, as well as the major
sources of the FCDA's problems and weaknesses.
In analyzing the various perspectives on project
implementation, we classified the theorists into two major
groups--the discrete theorists, and the structural theor-
ists. The discrete theorists as we noted, argue that the
success of any policy will generally depend on the agency's
internal management efficiency.- In other words, with
clearly defined goals, standard operating procedures,
clearly defined roles and authority relationships, and other
internal resources, an agency will generally implement
policies as written, or policy goals will be realized as
intended. The issues of interest group pressure, political
instability, etc. which may be beyond the agency's control,
are assumed by the discrete theorists to be inconsequential
to the agency's effectiveness.
The structural theorists, on the other hand, argue that
organizational effectiveness or "successes" are mostly
determined by factors external to the agency. Such factors
which include social, economic, political, and environmental
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factors, the structural theorists argue, are what determine
organizational outcomes. Thus, the success of any policy
implementation will depend, according to this group of
analysts, on the ability of the implementing agency to learn
and incorporate strength from these factors into the process
of project implementation. By focusing most of their
emphasis on the agency's external environment, the struc-
tural theorists assume implicitly that management efficiency
(the focus of the discrete theorists) is inconsequential to
organizational outcomes.
We argued in Chapter 1 that while the two theoretical
perspectives have useful insights for examining the imple-
mentation of the new capital project, it is more likely that
the most acceptable position cannot lie wholly or exclu-
sively with only one of the two perspectives. In either
case, as pointed out, some institutional factors with
serious potential social consequences are not fully taken
into consideration by either set of theorists. While the
discrete theorists can, for example, show that based on some
assumptions (stable social, economic, political, and
cultural environment), an agency can execute projects as
designed, the immediate or remote environmental situation of
an agency is not always stable. Similarly, there are
weaknesses of the structuralists' view. The issue of
management skill, ability, and personal commitment, finan-
cial resources, etc., that this group of theorists view as
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unimportant for projects' successes, have led to many
projects' failures, as we pointed out in Chapter 1.
Using the results from our analysis of the FCDA's
activities in the preceding chapters, we can draw some
inferences from the two theoretical perspectives on project
implementation. In order to do so, we first summarize some
of the problems that affected the agency's operations.
From the analyses of the FCDA's activities, we identify
at least 8 variables/factors that impinge upon the FCDA's
effectiveness. These variables are:
1. Political control/intervention;
2. Ethnic conflict;
3. Political (national) instability;
4. Organizational instability;
5. Inadequate financial resources;
6. Management inefficiency;
7. Corruption;
8. Fast pace of construction.
By political control/intervention is meant the ability
of outside interests including the military and civilian
leaders, any arm of the government, politicians, or ethnic
group, to influence the activities, policies, and operations
of the FCDA thereby affecting, adversely, the outcome of
project implementation. Although each of the eight problem-
areas listed above has contributed to inhibiting the
performance of the FCDA, it would seem that the problem of
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political intervention and control was pivotal in determin-
ing the degree of success. This is in the sense that if the
FCDA had sufficient autonomy, that is, if it often did not
have to operate under the weight of this political control,
problems arising from most of the seven problem areas could
have been handled with more resourcefulness, and better
initiative could have minimized the degree of adverse
impacts or effects of these on the operations and success of
the FCDA.
In order to draw adequately the relationship between
the theoretical perspectives and the variables listed above,
we subjectively classify these variables according to
whether they are generally attributed to factors outside the
FCDA's formal organizational structure or whether the
variables are induced by factors from within the agency's
internal (structural) environment. Those variables that are
essentially attributed to factors outside the agency's
formal corporate boundary, we classify as externally-
induced, and those that generally resulted from within, we
classify as internally-induced variables. Because all the
variables may not neatly fit into the two classifications,
we develop a third classification--externally/internally-
induced category. This category represents those variables
that may be attributed to factors that are both within and
outside the agency's boundary, that cannot easily be
identified with either one of the other two classifications.
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In carrying out our classifications, we assume that the
FCDA has very little or no control over the factors outside
its organizational boundary, even when such factors may
adversely affect its operations. However, we assume that
the FCDA does or should have control over -all the interven-
ing factors within its organizational boundary. We,
therefore, assume that the presence of externally-induced
variables will imply that the views of the structural
theorists are upheld. This group of theorists, as can be
recalled, argue that organizational outcomes (in this case,
the FCDA's failures or problems) depend largely on the
presence or absence of external variables. Similarly, the
presence of internally-induced variables will indicate that
the discrete view is sustained. The discrete theorists, as
we also noted, maintain that organizational outcomes depend
mainly on an agency's internal management effectiveness.
Using our classifications and assumptions above, we
present a distribution of the variables in Table 9.3.
Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the table represent the problem
variables, the externally-induced, internally-induced, and
externally/internally-induced variables respectively. The
table shows that out of the 8 variables, 5 are externally-
induced, and 3 externally/internally-induced. None of the
variables is internally-induced. The externally-induced
variables include: political (national) instability;
organizational instability; and fast pace of construction.
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Table 9.3 Distribution of Problem Variables by Sources
Externally/
Externally- Internally- Internally-
Problem, Variable Induced Induced Induced
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political Control/Inter- X
vention
Ethnic Conflict X
Political (National)
Instability X
Organizational Instability X
Management Inefficiency X
Inadequate Financial
Resources X
Corruption X
Fast Pace of Construction X
X: Indicates "yes," the variable is either externally-
induced, internally-induced, or externally/internally-
induced.
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Those in the externally/internally-induced column are:
management inefficiency; inadequate financial resources; and
corruption.
It is significant to note from Table 9.3 that the-
majority of the variables (5) are externally-induced. This
will generally imply that most of the FCDA's problems are
attributable to external factors. The solutions for the
agency's problems will, therefore, focus mainly on the
external factors. This tends to support the structuralists'
position. Similarly, the presence of externally/internally-
induced variables tends to support our earlier hypothesis
that an acceptable position in terms of the theoretical
perspectives cannot lie entirely or exclusively with only
one of the two theoretical views.
The fact that there are no internally-induced variables
in the table does not necessarily imply that the discrete
theorists' argument has no relevance to our study. After
all, we showed in Chapter 6 that some of the FCDA's finan-
cial difficulties were attributed to internal management
difficulties. Also, in Chapter 8, we noted that the
relatively high level of waste in urban land and housing
development was largely due to internal management ineffi-
ciency.
The absence of (exclusively) internally-induced
variables in the table may be due to the way the variables
are classified. We have included a third classification--
externally/internally induced column which tends to pick up
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some of the variables that could have appeared under the
internally-induced variable column. Management ineffi-
ciency, for example, while essentially an internally-induced
problem, appears in Column 4 because the problem is also
contributed by external factors.
It is, nevertheless, significant that we classified
management inefficiency as an externally/internally-induced
variable. This would imply that management inefficiency,
thought of as an exclusively internal organizational problem
by the discrete theorists, may not necessarily be so. In
other words, the problem can also result from pressures or
influences exerted from outside the boundaries of the
agency. We noted such pressure in Chapter 6 and the
inefficiencies that resulted from involving incompetent
contractors by politicians for project construction.
Similarly, allocation of urban land and housing resources as
we noted in Chapter 8, was frought with inefficiencies
(wastes) that largely resulted from governmental (exter-
nally-induced) policies.
In concluding this section, three main points should be
noted from our analysis. The first is that the outcome of
project implementation is a function of both externally-
induced and internally-induced factors. Second, it is
generally difficult to define appropriately the boundary
between the two variables. In other words, the extent of
the impact or influence of the two factors cannot be defined
with great certainty. Thirdly, the problem of management
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inefficiency, often thought of as exclusively internal
organizational problems of public agencies, can also result
from factors outside the control of the agency as demon-
strated by the case of the FCDA.
9.4 Improving the FCDA's Effectiveness: Some Suggestions
Having analyzed the FCDA's operations and noted its
strengths and weaknesses, the relevant question then
becomes: How could the FCDA (or any similar agency in such
a society's context) have been made to function better and
more effectively. In what directions could the agency go
operationally and structurally to improve its effective-
ness.1
The FCDA's problems, as we noted in the preceding
section, resulted from eight major factors: (i) political
control/intervention; (ii) ethnic conflict; (iii) political
(national) instability; (iv) organizational instability; (v)
inadequate financial resources; (vi) management ineffi-
ciency; (vii) corruption; and (viii) fast pace of construc-
tion. A careful examination of the eight problem areas
shows that some of them are interconnected. The problems
resulting from ethnic conflicts, political instability,
organization instability, and to some degree, fast pace of
(1) By "improving effectiveness," is meant meeting FCDA's
construction targets for housing and other urban facilities,
and improving access to these resources for all income
segments of the population and ethnic groups.
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construction, for example, may not necessarily have affected
the FCDA without the ability of the federal government and
other outside interests to control or intervene in the
operations of the agency. This is in the sense that if the
problem of political control/intervention could be minimized
or eliminated, problems arising from these areas noted above
could be eliminated.
Similarly, the problem of corruption, although noted as
resulting also from outside political intervention, was (as
we noted in Chapter 7) essentially a management problem.
Thus, in the sense that management inefficiencies could be
eliminated, problems resulting from corruption could also be
greatly reduced.
Because the problems are generally interrelated, we
rearrange them into four major areas as follows:
(i) political control/intervention and the problems it
created for the agency in terms of its ability to
control its general destiny;
(ii) inadequate funding;
(iii) problems arising from management skills and
competence or administrative efficiency as well as
the integrity of the personnel involved or charged
with project execution;
(iv) fast pace of construction.
Suggestions for improving the effectiveness of the
agency would then have to solve the above-listed problems--
minimizing or eliminating them, as well as redefining the
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scope of functions, objectives, and goals of the agency.
Various alternatives are possible.
A. Problem of Political Control/Intervention
There were two main sources of political control and
intervention problems. One source relates to the control
exerted on the FCDA by the federal government through the
military and civilian leaders and their policies. Evidence
of this control was reflected in the ability of these
leaders to arbitrarily step in and change the agency's
operating rules or impose a new set of operating principles
on the agency. The creation of the FCTA to oversee the
construction and management of territorial infrastructure,
formerly the responsibility of the FCDA, and the shifting of
completion deadlines are a few examples of this sudden
change of operational policies (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7).
Another evidence of governmental control and intervention
was reflected in the ability of the same government leaders
to "sweep out" the entire membership of the FCDA's Board of
Directors or the department heads, thereby creating organi-
zational instability and insecurity among the agency's
staff. Because the FCDA is tied to this political control
mechanism, it must often operate under some of the rigid
policies, even if detrimental, set for it by the government.
An example of such policy was the requirement that the FCDA
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should not enter into any loan negotiations even in times of
financial crisis (see Chapter 7).
The other source of political control and influence
relates to the type exerted on the agency for reasons of
ethnic discord. Because this problem (ethnic group influ-
ence) permeates the entire political system and the society
as a whole, it is generally difficult to measure adequately
its impacts on the agency. One way to view the problem is
that, given that the political power was concentrated at the
top of the FCDA's organizational hierarchy (as we have noted
in Chapter 7), and was controlled or dominated by one ethnic
group, it was almost inevitable (given the ethnic rivalries
and tensions that exist in the country) that the interest of
that particular ethnic group would be protected in the
distribution of resources in the agency. The case of the
President appointing members of his own ethnic group to head
the FCTA's departments and the Land Use Allocations Commit-
tee is an example of this situation. Similarly, during the
time of Buhari's Administration, most of the department
heads, including the minister of the Federal Capital
Territory as well as the Managing Director of the FCDA, were
of northern states origin.
However, since the influence of ethnic group pressure
is generally transmitted through the people in power, it is
felt that minimizing governmental intervention and control,
which was our first source of political problem, would
reduce the impact of this ethnic group influence. The
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question then is, how can this governmental control be
minimized? Because the solution to the problem lies almost
entirely outside the domain of the FCDA, and because
political problems are generally human problems requiring
gradual solutions, and also because this problem permeates
the entire society, it is difficult to formulate a feasible
solution or solutions. Nevertheless, four possibilities are
considered.
1. Our first option for reducing the impact of
political intervention/control would be for the
FCDA to continue along lines of its present
relationship with the fedreal government, but to
improve the FCDA's management and administrative
mechanisms and its goal priorities to accommodate
this federal government's role in the overall
project implementation. Adopting this strategy
may not, however, eliminate the problem, since the
problem of the FCDA's management inefficiencies
and incompetence is also closely linked to the
impact of governmental intervention. It is, for
example, the military and civilian leaders who
appointed members of the FCDA's Board of Directors
and the minister of the Federal Capital Territory,
and also generally directed the appointment of
other top-ranking personnel of the agency,
including the permanent secretary and department
heads. Thus, if the appointment of these person-
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nel was based on political objectives rather than
on management competence (which was sometimes the
case),it would be generally difficult to expect an effi-
cient administration of the agency, which means
that the adverse impact of political control could
remain unabated. An example of an (adverse)
outcome of the political control, as noted in
Chapter 6, relates to the case of contract review
in which the President appointed his committee to
be in charge of certain categories of projects and
select contractors. We noted that some of the
contractors were generally selected for mainly
political reasons rather than on their competence.
In addition, the FCDA had little or no power to
question their selection. This means that even if
the FCDA's management inefficiencies were to be
"straightened out," the agency could still not
have been able to control the incompetence (nor
the resulting inefficiencies) of such contractors.
In any case, it is felt that if the politicians
(government leaders) are told about the negative
impacts of some of their behaviors or actions
(using one of the prescriptions of the communica-
tion theorists in Chapter 1) , they may be willing
to release some of their grip on the FCDA's
activities because it is to their advantage that
project execution succeeds.
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2. The second possible alternative to deal with the
political control/intervention problem is to
"autonomize" the FCDA. This would completely
eliminate potential interferences from the federal
government. The FCDA would then operate almost as
a private agency depending on itself for all the
resources--financial, personnel, etc., that it
needed for project execution. The advantage of
this position is that it would eliminate govern-
mental interferences, and could make the agency
more stable. This strategy may not however be a
feasible alternative for various reasons. The
first relates to political inertia. Politicians
may not be willing to completely relinquish the
control of the agency because of personal interest
in the project. Secondly, the withdrawal of
federal control would mean a loss of governmental
funding, and the FCDA is not in a financial
position to cover the loss. Thirdly, there are
certain societal goals other than efficient
management and administration which the FCDA is
pursuing. The goals, which include an equitable
distribution of resources among competing societal
groups, may not be adequately pursued without
governmental control or presence. The fourth is
that in order for the FCDA to operate as a private
agency, there are certain constitutional changes
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that may be necessary in order to effect the
change of the FCDA's status from that of a public
agency to a private one. Because other para-
statals (of the FCDA's type) are experiencing
similar problems (governmental control problems),
it is unlikely that such constitutional change
would take place just for the FCDA.
3. The third alternative for addressing the political
control/intervention problem is probably to
involve greater private-sector participation and
expect that this would cushion the impact of
governmental control. Presently, the FCDA is
nearly 100 percent-funded by the federal govern-
ment. This situation makes it almost inevitable
that the federal government should exercise full
control over the agency in order to ensure that
its resources are expended judiciously. By
involving the private sector, it is felt that it
would attract some capital to the agency. Because
the private sector is generally often profit-
oriented, it is likely that its presence would
bring about some measure of management efficiency,
which is usually required to sustain sufficient
profit returns to the private sector. Also, for
sufficient returns to be guaranteed to the private
sector, it would have to be involved in some
aspects of the decision-making affecting the
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general development of the capital. This way, it
is likely that its presence would minimize some of
the impacts of the political control problem, that
also impinged on management efficiency.
This third alternative (private sector
participation) seems most feasible of the three
alternatives proposed so far, for three reasons.
The first reason is that unlike the first and
second alternatives, here, the government retains
some degree of control of the agency (although not
entirely), because the private sector would have
now to be involved in the decision-making. The-
second advantage is that, it is likely to bring
about some degree of management efficiency, as
noted above. Third, private sector participation
is likely to bring in development (investment)
capital to the agency, which would, in turn,
relieve the government of some of the financial
burden of building the new capital city. (Al-
ready, we have noted that government allocation to
the project has been declining be'ause of the
general economic (financial) problems in the
country. Thus, it is almost inevitable that the
FCDA would have to look at additional sources for
funding anyway.)
4. The final alternative for addressing the political
control problem is to expect that the politicians
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and military leaders would realize that their
"near excessive" control of the FCDA has indeed
adversely affected the FCDA's ability to execute
the new capital project. By recommending this
strategy, as pointed out earlier, it is assumed
that it would be to the interest of the poli-
ticians that the project succeeds. Given that the
failure of the project may likely decrease the
politicians' reputation as well as reduce the
chances of carrying out similar projects in the
future, it would be to their advantage to do
whatever may be necessary, including giving
adequate autonomy to the FCDA. Given also, as
noted in Chapter 4, that opponents of the new
capital have often capitalized on some of its
implementation mistakes, it becomes even more
pressing for the politicians to support some form
of authority.
In fact, this last strategy would form the
basis for adopting any one of the other three
alternatives. This is because, before the
government would opt to minimize its dominance of
the FCDA, it must first come to the realization
that the project must succeed in order to retain
its credibility.
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B. The Problem of Inadequate Funding
Our analysis revealed, in Chapter 6, that federal
government revenues were declining, and with them the level
of the new capital's funding. As such, the FCDA in addition
to retaining the relatively small annual allocation from the
federal government, would have to look at additional options
to deal with its relatively weak financial situation. Four
main options/strategies are presented, which could be
implemented by combining some or all of them.
The first of such options is for the FCDA to seek
external (including foreign) loans, which the agency has
already begun to negotiate through the federal government.
The difficulty with foreign loans is that the federal
government whose foreign reserves have been depleted over
the years would have to guarantee such loans. Also, the
policy emphasis of the federal government has been shifting
to agriculture, food production, and industrial production.
Thus, the federal government may not support such loans at
the present time. However, it is felt that the federal
government should see it as in its interest to support any
FCDA action (including application for loan) that would be
necessary to complete the new capital construction.
Stoppage of construction would imply that some of the
potential benefits of the project would be lost because
nearly W2 billion have been sunk already into the develop-
ment of infrastructure that would be lying idle.
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The second option for improving FCDA's financial
position is to float general obligation bonds. Such bonds
should be guaranteed by the federal government. The time
for their maturity, -interest payments, and other features
should be spelled out by the FCDA. The income from such
bonds should be used for the development of infrastructure--
roads, water, sewerage,and other urban facilities. Interest
payments on the bonds should be made using charges, rents,
and fees generated from land, housing, commercial, indus-
trial development, and the infrastructural facilities. The
advantage of a public bond is that, unlike foreign loans,
they rely on an internal (within the country) form of
financing. This is not to suggest that foreign loans cannot
be sought in conjunction with floating public bonds.
A third option is to encourage more participation of
private developers, as recommended earlier. We believe that
increased participation of private developers would relieve
the FCDA of some of the obligation of having to build most
of the facilities by itself. Presently, the FCDA is
responsible for building and managing all the housing units
for the federal civil servants, providing most of the urban
infrastructural facilities--roads, water, sewerage, health,
educational facilities, and commercial facilities. Given
its limited financial resources, there is little or no
strong reason why the FCDA cannot release the construction
and development of some of the facilities (including housing
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and commercial facilities, especially shopping centers), to
households and private developers.
The FCDA should transfer the development of some
aspects of low-income housing development to individual
households including the civil servants. This could be done
through the use of sites and services housing strategy. In
this case, the FCDA designates the housing areas, prepares
the plots (at standards much lower than the present sizes of
the plots), provides the necessary infrastructure and leases
them out to individual households. This way, the agency
would be saving the money that would have been committed to
building the housing structure. The advantage also in
implementing this strategy (providing sites and services) is
that the problem of access to housing would be minimized
because this process is likely to make housing development
cheap and affordable especially for the low-income people.
In the case of commercial facilities, private develop-
ers can be invited.to develop the shopping centers. Income
generated from such development can be channeled back to the
development of other facilities. Another advantage of this
transfer of activities to private developers, is that it
would ease the problem of the FCDA having to develop and
manage, and administer, the projects all at the same time,
because the agency would now concentrate mainly on manage-
ment rather than on both construction and management. This
would relatively reduce the chances of management ineffi-
ciencies.
459
However, because the private developer is likely to
rent his shopping/market spaces to the highest bidder in
order to maximize profit, it is likely that the relatively
poor-income groups may be displaced from the shopping
spaces. The inaccessibility problem can be minimized,
however, by requiring the developer to allocate a certain
minimum number of units of space for the low-income sector
or by the agency setting rent ceilings for the spaces.
There are still other problems the FCDA must face.
Abuja is a new urban development whose future potentials
cannot be fully nor adequately assessed by investors at the
present stage of its development. Movement to the city has
been rescheduled to occur in phases instead of in a one-shot
movement scheduled originally for 1986. Most of the
infrastructural facilities (roads, water, sewerage, elec-
tricity) have not been extended to the areas designated for
private development. Given this situation, developers may
be reluctant to invest in the city without the facilities
being in place, and adequate commitment and assurance from
the government, as to when the national seat of government
would be finally moved to the city. What this means, is
that in addition to providing infrastructural facilities,
the government must openly declare its total commitment to
the project. Again, the question becomes, how can the
facilities be built without adequate financial resources?
This question can be addressed by making use of the first
and second strategies involving debt financing--loan and
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general bonds application--and the annual allocations from
the government.
The fourth option that would help improve the FCDA's
financial situation is to reduce some of the relatively high
development standards adopted for the development of various
infrastructures, including housing and plots. In Chapter 8,
we demonstrated that the agency's standards for plots and
housing development, for example, are relatively high, and
we noted that many more people than were originally planned
for in the city could actually be adequately accommodated
without jeopardizing environmental quality. Thus reducing
the plot sizes, for example, would not only ensure that
greater access to land and housing resources would be
provided, but would also make it relatively cheaper to
provide infrastructural services, because per capita
expenditure on infrastructure would then be smaller given
the larger number of people that would now be accommodated.
In turn, this greater number of people would imply higher
revenue incomes from user charges and development fees for
the FCDA.
Lowering the standards may be resisted by the poli-
ticians in that it probably would impinge on the "grandeur"
image originally expected of the new city. However, it is
believed that given the choice between two evils in terms of
whether to maintain the relatively high standard and not
complete the new capital project, or reduce the standard in
order to complete it, the choice would be obvious--reducing
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the standards in order to complete the project. There are
numerous cost-saving measures and techniques in housing
construction that have been itemized and discussed in
Chapter 8. Those techniques, including efficient planning,
use of local building materials, etc., should be carefully
considered by the agency, especially for the development of
the so-called low-income housing.
C. Problem of Management Efficiency
Generally, the question of management competence and
efficient administration, as well as problems of political
control, are essentially human as opposed to technical ones,
and therefore have no easy or straightforward equation for
solution. Improvement in this area will inevitably be
gradual and incremental. Perhaps a set of mechanisms and
instruments to bring about periodic public accountability of
the agency and its key executives is necessary with the
expectation that the awareness of such public accounting
might help keep them and the operation of the FCDA within
lines of better efficiency and integrity.
In addition to the mechanisms for improving the FCDA's
financial and land management situation discussed above, it
is important also for the agency to improve its record
keeping and accounting mechanisms. Generally, the agency's
records were kept in scattered forms and in some situations
may not exist at all. Better record keeping and accounting
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would help the agency identify immediately where and how
wastages of resources have occurred or are going to occur.
Related to proper record keeping is the need for the
agency appropriately to define and recognize authority roles
of the various units in the agency. In Chapter 6 we pointed
out that it was often difficult to ascertain which depart-
ment was responsible for assigning housing units to appli-
cants, for example. Any department was in a position to
overturn decisions made by another unit legally-designated
to take the decisions. It is important that conflicts of
this nature be minimized in order to facilitate faster
project execution and potential wastes of resources that can
result from such conflicts.
Furthermore, it is important to note that some of the
bureaucratic red tapes or delays, which are often character-
istic of many public agencies, often stifled the speed
required for rapid project execution and should be avoided.
Because the agency is expected to operate under the hood of
the civil services rules which often bring about such
delays, the agency can seek special permission from the
government for exemption from some of these rules. If the
objective of government's policy is to complete the con-
struction of the new capital project within a stipulated
length of time, we can make a case for granting special
permission that would enable the agency to carry out its
operations speedily. For example, the FCDA instead of
having to go through the Federal Commission for Establish-
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ments before recruiting its personnel, can seek special
permission that can exempt the agency from this requirement.
D. The Problem of Fast Pace of Construction
A relatively large part of the FCDA's financial and
organizational problems have been noted to hinge on this
aspect of implementation problem (see discussions in
Chapters 5, 6, and 7). Emanating from the political control
problem, the problem of fast pace of construction falls
outside the domain of the FCDA's control. The fast pace of
construction, as we have noted, is related to the relatively
short span of time demanded by the military and civilian
leaders for the completion of the new capital project. This
short time (eight years, later reduced to four years) as we
noted, has not taken adequately into consideration FCDA's
relatively weak financial, management and administrative
capacity.
Two options for dealing with the fast pace of construc-
tion can be considered. The first is to maintain the
relatively short time span but increase the resources of the
agency to enable it to meet its deadline. This option seems
to be difficult to attain, judging from our analysis of the
FCDA's financial and organizational resources. The agency's
current financial situation is poor, and with it the federal
revenue sources which have supported the agency all along.
Hence, the agency's allocations have been drastically
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reduced.. Its management capacity, as we also noted, is
inefficient and since improvement of such efficiency
involves a gradual process, it is not therefore feasible to
expect an increase in the agency's resources in the near
future. This means that the option of maintaining a
relatively short time span cannot be sustained. This leaves
us with a second option that will involve the extension of
the construction period. But more than just extending the
time period, the FCDA must prioritize its objectives in
terms of the general urban development goal that the new
capital project was intended to achieve. Such prioritiza-
tion of urban development objectives which can also be
classified as attainment objectives should be carried out
for various categories of urban development schemes involv-
ing land and housing, utilities, transport and communica-
tions, commercial facilities, educational and health
facilities, social, cultural, and recreational facilities
development. An example of how the prioritization scheme
should be pursued is similar to the one presented in Section
9.2.
Finally, it is important for the politicians, govern-
ments, bureaucrats, and planners who set the time table to
note that cities do not operate like machines that their
parts can be fitted, and keys turned on and they begin to
function. Cities evolve. Such evolution is a gradual
process. As such, even the city's construction must be
gradual in order to accommodate many emerging and unforeseen
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circumstances which often accompany this evolutionary
process. Buhari's Administration seems to recognize this
characteristic when it decided to reschedule the movement to
Abuja in phases rather than in a one-shot movement origi-
nally planned for 1986. However, simply phasing the
movement is not sufficient. To realize the potentials of
such phased movement vis-a-vis the goals of the new capital
project, its construction must properly accommodate the
constraints imposed by limited financial, organizational,
and political resources.
It is important to note that in our evaluation of the
movement of Nigeria's capital city, we were unable to deal
effectively with a number of issues. These issues can form a
research agenda for future studies. There is a need, for example,
to link the various tenets of implementation theories with
reality. Some of the theoretical views examined in the thesis
were relevant in a limited way to our analyses of the new
capital construction; however, others were inadequate for
evaluating the implementation activity. What is needed,
therefore, is a more effective approach for linking the
various theoretical perspectives with actual practice,
especially in developing countries.
Another critical area for further investigation relates
to the economic and social implications of the new capital
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project. The construction of Abuja was started in the mid-
1970s when the Nigerian government had revenue surpluses due to
oil income. At that time, no one predicted the present down
turn of oil prices; instead, analysts (including proponents of
the new capital) believed that oil revenues would remain steady,
or even increase, over the years. The relevant question now is,
given the current oil market situation, and the subsequent
decline in government revenues, what effects will all these
developments have on the new capital construction?
We noted in Chapter 6 the decline in projected federal
government allocations to the project caused by the falling
oil revenues. But those projections were based on the expecta-
tion of oil prices remaining steady at $30 a barrel. Given that
this price has drastically declined to approximately $15 a barrel
(March 1986),a number of questions arise.What effect will this
have on the national budget as well as the new capital project?
What will be the opportunity cost in both the short run and
the long run of continued government funding of Abuja? What
will be the distributional implications of continued funding
(in light of the economic changes) among the various sectors
and regions of the economy? What will be the impact on the
various ethnic groups in light of the general ethnic tensions
reviewed in the earlier chapters? In other words, what impact
will continued funding have on ethno-regional conflicts?
Given that Abuja is located in the northern states, and given
the serious economic and financial situation, it is likely
that a continued emphasis on the project may bring about
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increased tensions, and may actually exacerbate, rather than
improve, the regional conflicts expected to be resolved by
the new capital construction. These are but a few of the
important social, cultural, economic, and political issues
that could form the basis for continued research.
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